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Senility and Its Future
Our aims in bringing together the scholars assembled in this volume were
threefold. First, we wanted to link a variety of research strategies and disciplin-
ary vantage points in the human and social sciences in order to better under-
stand the remaking—biological and clinical, economic and political, public and
phenomenological—of the senile dementias today. Beyond the specificity of
Alzheimer’s disease or vascular dementia, many of us have been involved in
research on what I have long termed senility. By senility, I mean the perception of
deleterious behavioral change in someone understood to be old, with attention to both
the biology and the institutional milieu in which such change is marked, measured,
researched, and treated (Cohen ). For us, as social scientists and humanists of
medicine, to organize our conversations around senility in this sense of the
word, as opposed to organizing them around dementia, is simply not to pre-
sume in advance how perception, biology, and milieu are related. This reluc-
tance to presume, as opposed to any shibboleth of naive social construction, is
what makes us careful about terms and what makes our conversation anthropo-
logical. But far-ranging and systematic conversations among scholars of senility
are few.
Second, we presume that the future of senility, and clinically of the demen-
tias, is an open one. Much is changing: state- and corporate-funded pharmaceu-
tical, genomic, and epidemiological initiatives; instruments and regimes of
health-care funding and insurance; structures and strategies of treatment and
of care and their associated forms of reason; modes of therapeutic and non-
therapeutic practice challenging the limits to such reason; differences and in-
equalities across axes of difference we attempt to capture by terms such as class,
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gender, race, and nation; and the larger frames of the structure of economies and
institutions, generations and ethics, and bodies and persons. The perspective of
the editors is not to presume that we understand what senility has been and
must be—in the home, laboratory, clinic, chronic-care facility, regulatory office,
or boardroom—and thus to offer an expert critique. It is rather to put our inter-
pretive and critical tools to work to understand what senility might be becom-
ing. In the case of the assembled chapters, our focus is on the dominant modern
clinical form by which senility has been articulated—dementia—and what is
happening to it.
Finally, we presume that thinking about dementia is not only a salutary but
also a necessary practice to address broader questions: of language, selfhood,
and sovereignty; of the structure of care both in general and in the clinic; and of
the practices and forms of reason and of life. That is, we hope to begin to reani-
mate the relation of senility to creative understanding in the human sciences
more broadly, to move beyond the solicitous and welfare-driven categories of
contemporary gerontology.
We do not wish to claim that these chapters, or this introduction, singly or
collectively accomplish all these objectives: such a claim would not do justice to
the specific and contingent projects of the authors. But we do hope and expect
that bringing these projects together will begin to suggest the contours of a field
in the three ways we have outlined. Nor do we claim that we have been able to
invite all or even most of the growing number of scholars thinking creatively
about senility and dementia to participate in this volume. Our expectation is
simply to frame a broader and more inclusive conversation.
Both editors have in earlier or ongoing work focused on what the dementia
clinic looks like beyond Western Europe and North America and share as well a
sense of critical distinctions in the making and management of dementia
within the so-called West. We have asked for contributions from authors who
have been trained or are working or doing research in and across a variety of
national sites (Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, and the
United States). The tools and theoretical commitments of these authors differ
from one another and from those of the editors, and we have encouraged these
contradictions in service of a robust conversation.
The chapters in Thinking about Dementia are organized around a discrete set
of problems, specific sites of the creative application of technical reason: () the
emergence of new or reorganized forms of clinical practice in dementia given
shifts in the dynamic of forces constituting clinical reality; () the role of
genomics in Alzheimer’s research and clinical practice, its reconstitution as a
media object, and the popular reception and use of such media-driven under-
standings; () the organization of voice, self, or personhood in individuals with
dementia across therapeutic and experimental milieus as well as the set of
forces and forms that constitute both clinical and scholarly attention to “the
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person” with dementia; and () the relation between dependency and discipline in
the constitution of senility as what Steven Collier and Andrew Lakoff ()
have termed a regime of life. Before we turn to a preliminary engagement with
each of these sets of problems, we offer some general reflections.
Senility as a Site for Thought
What do we mean by, as stated earlier, reanimating the relation of senility to cre-
ative understanding in the human sciences? Simply that the study of senility can and
must set out to do more than improve the care and treatment of demented
persons: it must use senility to understand the critical stakes in persistent and
emergent forms of reason, memory, care, aging, medicine, and life itself. And
inversely, we are suggesting that scholars with general commitments to these
broad themes would do well to consider senility carefully. We are not dismissing
the necessity or value of applied research: most of the authors of the essays
collected here make direct or indirect claims upon the everyday structure and
management of dementia as an area of pragmatic concern. But at their best they
do so by troubling any division between “applied” work and social theory. At
stake for the editors is the future of medical anthropology and its allied fields:
we are as troubled by a persistent anti-intellectualism masquerading as public
or applied research as we are by scholarship that presumes that academic excel-
lence is inversely related to practical relevance.
We want to suggest that senility has had—at various moments and in
reference to various kinds of human problems (Rabinow )—this broader rel-
evance for critical thought and application, though by the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries it for the most part has been reduced to a medical problem.
Such an assertion is banal to the extent that it exemplifies a kind of
speaker’s benefit: gerontological discourse has arguably long justified itself by
claiming some sort of cataclysmic lack or fallen state it will redress (Cohen ,
). That senility has been “reduced” to a medical problem—in other words,
rendered coherent only as dementia or in particular as Alzheimer’s disease—is
not necessarily a bad thing. Several of the authors in this volume attend with
extraordinary care to the future of dementia in itself. Others speak to what we
might call the “personhood turn”—to the movement, within and among clini-
cal, lay, and academic spaces, to rediscover the person “lost” within the logic of
dementia diagnosis and care. And a few engage the conditions under which
attention to dementia and to what may be lost in its wake can be conjoined.
Rather, then, than offering a generalized lapsarian account of the impover-
ishment of senility as an existential figure, we will attempt a partial and undeni-
ably potted genealogy of earlier forms and forums of reason organized in critical
relation to senility. These fragments are offered as provisional materials for un-
derstanding the present.
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Senility as a Matter of Voice
Of the three great figures of mental anguish that might be said to haunt Euro-
pean thought before the nineteenth century—melancholy, lunacy, and dotage
or senility—the first two become central to the reflexive accounting of moder-
nity, whether refigured as alienation and anomie or violence, disorder, and pos-
session. Senility, despite an earlier centrality to figurations of emergent reason
in its articulation as dotage or folly (think, for example, of the significance of
Shakespeare’s Lear at the boundaries of sovereignty and nature), comes to be
less central to thinking modernity, with the exception perhaps of the imperial
representation of colonized subjectivity as age-discordant to civilized norms,
simultaneously too juvenile and too senile: the African or oriental despot as
both infantile and doddering (Haggard , ; Nandy ). Senility as the
state of ancient civilizations gone to seed, within such fields of colonial repre-
sentation, becomes a figure disjunctive from the self-understanding of Euro-
pean modernity.
It might have been otherwise. King Lear is not an incidental reference: the
suffering old person and the quality of his or her speech is a frequent figure
within the contest for reason in the Renaissance. When physicians begin to
make claims of authority over this speech, they do so in relation to a prolifera-
tion of women’s voices that are out of place (MacFarlane ). The problem of
the old voice is feminized as the witch’s curse. For the ideologies of the mem-
bers of the Inquisition and other prosecutors of witches, the dangerous claims
of older women’s speech suggest devilry. The physicians Reginald Scot and
Johannes Weyer—in their contest with the Inquisition for authority—hear the
voices of accused witches not as devilry but as a natural process of dotage. The
witches are but “doting old women.” Previously a general figure of memento
mori in earlier medical literature, dotage in Weyer () and in Scot () be-
comes something more than a sign of the ephemeral condition of worldly life.
For the physician, dotage is the epitome of unreason as a natural state, the
epitome of Nature itself. Few of these persons would have been demented: the
dotage of interest to the physician was both more capacious (older indigent
persons in general) and narrower (primarily women) than much later articula-
tions of senility.
Scot and Weyer’s interest was primarily juridical: they were engaged in ap-
peals to the prince in contestation with the church over the question of punish-
ment for accused witches. Dotage materializes the stakes in Reformation
struggle. There has been no Great Confinement (Foucault ): doting women,
or men, do not form populations presenting problems of governance. When
medicine in Europe will again make claims over senile bodies, much later, in
the mid-nineteenth century, it will be to articulate the relation between con-
finement and norms. Although everything has changed, we again confront a
proliferation of senile voices, and these are again feminized. The hospital marks
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the age and quality of its population: it registers the shift from young women’s
hysteria to old women’s senile dementia. In the Salpêtrière hospital in Paris,
what is at stake is less Nature in itself than its normalization under physiology
as an emergent science of life. Jean-Martin Charcot is interested in aging as a
process that stands at the border of the normal and the pathological and that
delineates the limits to each. In his Leçons cliniques sur les maladies des vieillards,
Charcot examines the life of the old women of the Salpêtrière as material for the
establishment of norms. The old body is critical to the stabilization of life itself
as the object of the new biomedicine. But the old voice, central to Scot and
Weyer’s earlier practice of listening against church accusation, fails to awake
the imagination here. Charcot’s () theater of clinical pathology comes to
focus on a different age, that of the young woman, the voice of the hysteric. Later
fin de siècle and modernist accounts of pathological modernity remain deeply
invested in hysterical rather than senile form. Over the course of the twentieth
century, both hysteria and senility become marked as disorders of memory. But
senility fails, with a few exceptions, to anchor an inquiry in the relation of lan-
guage, memory, and the self. For Charcot and his successors, senility stands as a
problem of life but not of the subject: it no longer speaks.
Senility and Geriatric Lament
Charcot’s early-twentieth-century heir, I. L. Nascher, the coiner of the term geri-
atrics, as a distinct form of knowledge and practice, recognizes old age in general
and mental debility in old age in particular as marginal sites within a reformu-
lated clinic. The relevance of the aging body to the systematization of normal
life has declined since the time of Charcot’s clinic. Nascher revives the nine-
teenth-century focus on old age as a problem of the limit, but unlike Charcot, he
frames old age’s status as limiting case as an ethical problem for medicine.
Nascher tells of his turn to the medicine of the aged: he was a medical student in
New York, in an institution for the indigent, wondering why his preceptor
seemed to be ignoring the repeated demands for attention of an old woman.
When his preceptor notes her problem is nothing but old age, Nascher has his
epiphany. Because we do not know how to distinguish the normal and the
pathological in old age, we cannot listen. We do not know how to hear. The old
voice returns as something that cannot be heard. This marginality demands an
ethical response; thus, geriatrics, an inquiry into the norms of aging (Nascher
; Thewlis ). The new field is organized as a lament against silence, and it
responds by analyzing the senescent voice into its discrete normal and patho-
logical components. Senility, to be heard within the clinic, is split into the exis-
tential condition of “normal aging” and the purified (Latour ) pathology of
dementia.
The project is progressive: the normal elder, split off from his or her
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pathology, can be redeemed as the liberal subject. In practice, the location of
the really old simply moves along the life course: for the “old old” or “the frail,”
normality and pathology remain inextricably entangled. Yet the hopes of geriat-
rics fail to materialize for the ever older bodies constituting its subject popula-
tion: the field becomes recognizable within biomedical culture as utopian and
unrealistic. Yet this very utopianism undergirds the centrality of geriatrics and
its sister discipline gerontology to the twentieth-century dreamworlds (Buck-
Morss ) of planned development and state socialism.
With the Cold War emergence of modernization theory and planned devel-
opment as instruments of state (and the parallel Soviet emergence of a socialist
science of international welfare) aging returns as a normed index of modernity
in nonclinical forums. Thus the social sciences (in the Western, nonsocialist
variant) collaborate on the production of a binary and its resolution: “tradi-
tional” societies value the aged; “modern” societies currently and unfortunately
do not, but future moderns will value them all the more through the beneficent
welfare technology of gerontology (Katz ; Ballenger, this volume). Echoing
the nineteenth-century colonial tableau of the senile elsewhere, gerontology as
a signature apparatus of postcolonial internationalism extends the presump-
tive ethical project of Nascherian geriatrics as a set of norms for nation-building.
The gerontologist Erdman Palmore could thus draw a hopeful “J-shaped curve”:
it may look bleaker and bleaker for the elderly—the initial failure of utopia—but
fund us professionals and things will get better (Palmore and Manton ).
Sociology, anthropology, and social history become of particular relevance
to setting the new norms. The social turmoil of the s brings a reaction in
these fields against the adequacy of modernization binaries. More nuanced ac-
counts of aging appear in the name of complexity and liberal relativism. But the
emergence of a disciplinary apparatus around old age remains unchecked by
such nominally critical gestures. On the contrary, the continuation of a debate
over whether old age was better here versus there or now versus then extends
the normative claims of even the most critical gerontologies (Cohen ).
Scholarly imagination is limited because of the massive expansion of the
“aging enterprise” as a normative and disciplinary apparatus, as chronicled by
Carroll Estes (), W. Andrew Achenbaum (), and in particular Stephen
Katz (). With expansion come capital, a proliferation of new audit appara-
tuses to assess research value, and the increasing delimiting of legitimate
gerontological practice by the more empiricist discourses of psychology, applied
sociology, and social work. Debates in the human sciences that might have in-
formed a rigorous engagement with age and voice—for example, s and
s conversations over the narrative structure of experience—are translated
into banal practices. In the case of narrative, social gerontology degenerates
into computer-mediated word counts that look more operational and scientific,
a putative “narrative analysis” that comes to stand in for serious scholarship.
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Despite iterative calls for a critical gerontology, the subdiscipline relegates itself
to the (relatively well-funded) margins of mainstream anthropology and sociol-
ogy, in contrast to other fields predicated on the study of social difference: race,
gender, and sexuality. This self-marginalization and effective cultivation of me-
diocrity allow the foundational lament of Nascherian geriatrics—no one listens to
old people—to be maintained as disciplinary ressentiment.
The Age of Alzheimer’s
Until the s, senility is not central either to a normalized gerontology or to
the social sciences and humanities of medicine. Despite persuasive claims for
the genealogy of the modern self as a melding of memory and will, senile de-
mentia as a matter of memory loss understandably remains a more peripheral
concern to the medical humanities than emergent nineteenth- and twentieth-
century disorders of consciousness such as multiple or split personality and
traumatic memory loss (Hacking ; Young ). At stake is a recurring ten-
dency to exhaust the significance of senility in the social fact of old age, a pat-
tern tracked by Jesse Ballenger in this volume. Where change occurs, given a
postwar assemblage of norms and forms (Rabinow , ) that powerfully
links modernity to a crisis of the growing population of dependent elderly, it is
in the emergence of an aging public whose members are organized around their
independence from the demands of the labor force and the support of children.
This independence, though mediated by practices of identification tied to mar-
ket and electoral incitements, is naturalized as the category of the (progres-
sively older) “young old,” who make up a population framed by its ability to
avoid the stigma of physical and economic frailty. By the s the market, more
than the welfare apparatus, becomes critical to available forms and narratives
of successful aging (Featherstone and Hepworth ): over time, what emerges
is an assemblage of market and welfare forms.
“Alzheimer’s disease” as both a clinical site and a popular citation appears
at precisely this moment of naturalized independence and dependency, extend-
ing the effects of the constitution of old age as an instrument of welfare to an
emergent “aging public” consuming Alzheimer’s narratives as a form of depen-
dency anxiety: the problem appears not as an adjudication of values, but as the
increasing prevalence of an insidious disease. Ballenger, in this volume,
troubles any reading of this shift as an effective conquest of stigma in his re-
thinking of the recent history of Alzheimer’s disease. One of the dynamics of the
age of Alzheimer’s is its apparent total biologization of senility: internal disease
processes become not only the necessary but also the sufficient ground of all
reasoned conversation on the recognition of behavioral change in late life.
An example of such reasoned conversation in reference to senility’s
biologization is the writer John Bayley’s () series of memoirs about his late
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wife, the well-known novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch. Bayley deploys the
irony of a beautiful mind felled by the unstoppable natural processes of demen-
tia as both a touching art of remembrance and a perverse act of revenge against
his sometimes wayward and inattentive and always far more successful spouse.
We accede to Bayley’s abject version of the end of Iris, as the invocation of
“Alzheimer’s” offers few other narrative possibilities.
But there are multiple possibilities for rethinking senility’s reason, as the
contributions in this volume indicate. Abjection may not be the only mode of
thinking about dementia, and irony can be deployed in less punishing ways
(Cohen ). The rise of “behavioral” and “personhood” turns in clinical prac-
tice and social science research, the emergence of new forms of literary produc-
tion and theatrical experiment, the complexity with which the genetics of
dementia is interpreted by experts and laypersons alike. These possibilities are
rooted not only in what the dominant discourse fails to see but also in on-the-
ground changes and the emergence of new social and biological forms. As many
of the chapters in this volume differently reveal, changes in the making of de-
mented persons in and out of the clinic both respond, often eloquently, to ear-
lier and ongoing limits of practice, and in so doing generate new sets of
problems for future research.
Shifts in Clinical Practice
The chapters by Janice Graham; by Ladson Hinton, Yvette Flores, Carol Franz,
Isabel Hernandez, and Linda S. Mitteness; by Sharon Kaufman; by André Smith;
and by Jesse Ballenger address critical determinants in the transformation of
clinical practice. Kaufman’s chapter comes out of a multiyear study of the man-
agement of death on an intensive care unit in the western United States, and
building on a set of powerfully delineated case studies, she defines as her object
the status of what she terms dementia-near-death. This focus on hospital death
allows Kaufman to locate dementia within what the sociologist Nikolas Rose has
termed the politics of life itself. Kaufman notes that “dementia works [in the making
of hospital death] in three ways: as a rationale for facilitating death, as a con-
tested feature of what matters about the patient’s identity, and as a moral-clinical
designation of value when a frail life is perceived to hang in the balance.”
That dementia has become a central if contested feature of situated prac-
tices whereby differential forms of life are valued and their cessation made com-
prehensible is one of the critical insights of this volume. Dementia becomes a
limit case within a broader biopolitics through which technicians and experts,
on the one hand, and citizens, consumers, and caregivers, on the other, struggle
to constitute an ethics of life itself. “Dementia has entered the domain of the
ethical because the ‘fact’ of the person can be questioned and because, often,
death is a matter of a decision. One must choose,” writes Kaufman.
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Rose (), like Giorgio Agamben, Michael Fischer, Paul Rabinow, and sev-
eral other contemporary thinkers, reworks the legacy of Georges Canguilhem
and Michel Foucault to engage the politics of life and death today. Of this group,
Agamben () has been the most cited of late, perhaps because his evocation
of the death camps of Nazi Germany and of more recent practices of defining
brain death to ensure more organs for transplantation at first glance appear
most evocative of the contemporary stakes in life itself. Yet dementia, which is
complexly central, as Kaufman shows, to the constitution of hospital death as a
problem, may be a more compelling, or at the least more generative, exemplar
given the strong ambivalence that comes to haunt the value of severely de-
mented life.
This ambivalence, and the structures, norms, and forms that both constitute
and are constituted by it, are central to Kaufman’s analysis. Less a bald “cultural
value” in some vague anthropological sense, it is an effect of a proliferation of
techniques and the normative demands they make. “Inescapable today,” writes
Kaufman, “is the fact that demented life (as all forms of life itself) is the object of
debate about value; it must be accorded a value. . . . We can choose, and it is our
responsibility to choose, because biomedical technique has extended choice to
every aspect of existence, . . . including the timing of death. In the case of
dementia-near-death, death in the hospital is facilitated or postponed accord-
ing to a negotiated calculus about the value of a particular kind of vulnerable
life in relation to assumptions about the nearness of that life to death.”
Kaufman shows how nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century debates over
normal versus pathological aging (Charcot, Nascher) are “supplemented” by
“ethical, institutional, and economic imperatives about the classification of
life-sustaining treatments as appropriate or not.” Borrowing Rabinow’s ()
use of the term, one could speak of this mix of historical norms and forms that
confront experts and caregivers today as an “assemblage”; Kaufman incorpo-
rates not only genealogical materials and technical forms but also the social
structural dynamics of families and other more or less institutionalized rela-
tions of care.
Ladson Hinton, Yvette Flores, Carol Franz, Isabel Hernandez, and Linda
Mitteness write on the treatment of dementia in the “borderlands” of primary
care, working in a similar region and managed-care environment within the
United States as did Kaufman. But while Kaufman looked at dementia-near-
death in the hospital, Hinton and colleagues examine a rather distinct milieu of
dementia-in-life, where persons with cognitive and behavioral changes and
those who care for them negotiate with primary care practitioners who are of-
ten poorly trained in the diagnosis and treatment of dementia and unlikely to
seek psychiatric referral, given immense bureaucratic roadblocks.
As Annette Leibing will later note, concerns over the overly cognitive stress
of the polythetic definition of the dementias gave rise during the later s to
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a (muted) behavioral turn and its accompanying stress on “personhood.”
Hinton and colleagues share with many of the authors in this book a commit-
ment to the therapeutic and diagnostic value of this turn. Yet they demonstrate
convincingly that what is at stake in the failure of behavior-based diagnosis and
the reliance of primary care practitioners on cognitive testing and neurological
referrals is not simply an ideological commitment by physicians or families to
an exclusively cognitive understanding. On the contrary, both caregivers and
clinicians struggle to reach a “good enough” intimacy. Despite this frequent will
to mutual engagement, the promise of intimate care repeatedly fails. Hinton
and colleagues offer several reasons for this failure, further contextualizing
these by structuring their analysis as a comparative study of care groups they
identify as either Anglo or Latino.
The dominant reason for failure is structural: the changing organization of
clinical time and labor, limited training in geriatrics or dementia care, and a
fairly Kafkaesque pattern of psychiatric referral built into long-term medical
ambivalence about psychiatry and intensified by consolidating privatized strat-
egies of cost containment. Hinton and colleagues draw on earlier work by
Kaufman on the management of stroke to summarize this part of their argu-
ment: “[Sharon Kaufman] notes that ‘the structure of social services and health
care delivery, as well as their limits, creates the facts, the only knowledge that
patients and families have as a basis for decision making and coping with long-
term disability.’”
Such available reason, constrained by issues of temporal and fiscal ratio-
nalization, avoids ambiguity. Despite the promise of the behavioral turn,
Hinton and colleagues point out that it increases ambiguous information for
clinicians who are poorly able to manage it. As in Nascher, what is at stake is the
failure of the medical binary of the normal and pathological, a failure that
within a managerial regime with particularly low tolerance for what is under-
stood as ambiguity demands the persistent separation in everyday practice of
the cognitive and the psychiatric. Returning to Kaufman’s assemblage, it may be
that ambiguity can only be tolerated under the sign of thanatology. In any event,
the juxtaposition of these pieces leaves as an open question the relation of
biopolitics and behavior in the current moment.
The focus on “behavior” and, in a later chapter in this book, on “coher-
ence,” suggests a shift of scholarly emphasis away from memory. Yet André
Smith’s chapter compellingly demonstrates how complex any dispensation of
the cognitive and the behavioral must be. He examines the subjective experi-
ence of persons with memory problems who in most cases fail to receive a diag-
nosis of what they understand as early Alzheimer’s disease or a related brain
disorder. Smith, in three of his case studies, suggests that “seeking an evalua-
tion for dementia can be seen as an act of resistance against the stigma of psy-
chiatric labeling.” Resistance here is being used carefully, in sympathy with a
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large somatization literature that Hinton and colleagues also cite in noting dif-
ferences that emerged between their Latino- and Anglo-identified populations.
For Smith, “diagnostic categories do not simply describe underlying psycho-
pathologies but also serve to label the moral status of problematic behaviors” in
everyday life. In contrast to the sites delineated by Kaufman and by Hinton and
colleagues, for these women, dementia’s Kraepelinian form as a purely cogni-
tive and “nonbehavioral” syndrome reduces the ambiguity and stigma of a psy-
chiatric diagnosis. Dementia places the burden of illness in the arena of life
itself, beyond responsibility and the threat of a politics—in Agamben’s Aristote-
lian language, beyond bios. For these sufferers, it is this space of life itself, and
the hint of a genetic explanation that secures it, that offers a refuge. Memory
loss, genes, and bare life line up against the threat of depression as an over-
whelming life-in-the-world.
If dementia—whether as the proxy or promise of bare life—comes to stand
against the pain or ambiguity of indeterminate relations and values and there-
fore self-limits its interpretation in the terms of personhood or behavior, the
biopolitics of epidemiological reason are a critical site where the stakes in
dementia-life are articulated. Janice Graham, in her review of a much larger
project, offers through what has been called the “ethnography of the document”
a careful engagement with the “culture” of norms and forms whereby epidemi-
ologists can effect a translation apparatus between the distinct languages and
practices of different specializations, clinical milieus, and localities and pro-
duce dementia in the unambiguous form Kraepelin had attempted to wrest out
of Alzheimer’s original data. Graham’s effort is not simply to “deconstruct” the
databases she studies, demonstrating the erasures and ellipses beneath the pu-
tative commensurability of different data sets, but rather to develop a form of
reading them that can both reassert the lost specificities of illness and location
and yet capitalize on the power of large data sets. The goal in part is collabora-
tive, part of a moment in which the heterogeneity of the dementias is recog-
nized and, under the sign of pharmacogenomics, new criteria of distinctiveness
sought. In an unexpected way, her project exemplifies the “anthropology of in-
commensurability” that Elizabeth Povinelli () frames as a critical response
to late liberalism, and we are confronted with the question of what an illiberal
epistemic culture of medicine would look like. In the effort to imagine such a
beast, Graham turns to Dumontian anthropology and hints at a different rela-
tionship of value to life.
Jesse Ballenger reviews an earlier clinical shift, the rise of Alzheimer’s dis-
ease as a diagnostic category, and the clinical and social transformations predi-
cated on this change. Parts of this story have been classically and powerfully
engaged by Patrick Fox (), Jaber Gubrium (), Martha Holstein (),
and others, but what Ballenger does is to locate the assemblage of contemporary
geriatric reason within two closely bound moves: the idealism of a postwar
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“gerontologic persuasion” (his reading of the work of Leo Simmons is particu-
larly elegant) and its use of psychoanalysis, and what he calls a biomedical
“deconstruction,” meaning in this case an unpacking and distancing, of irre-
versible “brain disease” on the one hand and reversible disorders, social condi-
tions, and aging tout court on the other. Whereas Smith shows the importance for
his interlocutors of an Alzheimer’s diagnosis as less stigmatizing than the threat
of an affective disorder, Ballenger troubles the ability of a radically biologized
dementia to achieve the “gerontologic” dream of a destigmatized old age.
Genes
What biologization entails, of course, is itself up for grabs. Margaret Lock,
Stephanie Lloyd, and Janalyn Prest evaluate a contemporary shift in expert un-
derstanding of the genetics of dementia, the correlation of genetic markers with
late-onset Alzheimer’s disease, which through the s was still understood as
the sporadic, “nongenetic” type of the condition, noting that “genetics is impli-
cated in an as yet poorly understood, complex fashion in late-onset AD, as it is
in numerous other common diseases. When making estimates about the sus-
ceptibility of individuals to a particular disease on the basis of their genotype
and, which is inevitably compounded by the varying “penetrance” of virtually
all disease-producing genes, resulting in a wide range of phenotypic effects in
individuals, uncertainty is compounded enormously, and the prediction of who
exactly is at increased risk is fraught with difficulty.”
Given this uncertainty, Lock, Lloyd, and Prest are interested in the parallel
penetrance of what we might term genetic publicity. They are troubled by social
scientific critiques of scientific and media “geneticization” that presume rather
than investigate how variously positioned individuals come to understand the
relation of genetics to life. In contrast, they find that “geneticism” characterizes
some but by no means all professional and media publicity and that despite this
publicity, families and advocacy groups “minimize the contribution of
genetics.”
Life in the face of dementia, for both experts and laypersons, is life amid a
multiplicity of exigencies. Advances in expert knowledge of genetic susceptibility
can constitute one such exigency, but the relevance of such advances, particu-
larly given their failure to date to translate into effective therapy, is contingent
at best.
Subjectivity
Dementia in the early twentieth century is being reconstituted, therefore,
through a multiplicity of such exigencies, the various turns described above:
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the making of dementia-near-death with the proliferation of life-extension
technologies, the behavioral turn, the genetic turn, and what Annette Leibing
in her chapter calls the turn to personhood.
The discussion on personhood addresses broader assembled social forms
that, after anthropologists Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff, we might call
regimes of living. For Collier and Lakoff, such a concept addresses a variety of
situations that raise questions such as “What is human life becoming?”
By “regime of living” we refer to a tentative and situated configuration of
normative, technical, and political elements that are brought into align-
ment in situations that present ethical problems—that is, situations in
which the question of how to live is at stake. Here the word regime sug-
gests a “manner, method, or system of rule or government,” including
principles of reasoning, valuation, and practice that have a provisional
consistency or coherence. To say that such regimes relate to questions of
living means: first, that they concern reasoning about and acting with re-
spect to an understanding of the good; and second, that they are involved
in processes of ethical formation, that is, in the constitution of subjects,
both individual and collective. (, )
What is at stake in this turn to personhood emerges powerfully in the chap-
ters by Athena McLean, Anne Davis Basting, Pia Kontos, Roma Chatterji, and
John Traphagan. McLean troubles “clinical applications of reminiscence and
developmental understandings of the life course” that read the lack of an appar-
ent “capacity to produce a coherent and authentic life story” as the sign of a loss
or failure of selfhood. Working in the northeastern United States in an old-age-
care facility with a primarily Jewish resident population, she evaluates patient
narratives for a coherence that is presumed missing. Reframing a dominant lit-
erature that finds that “considerable loss of coherence occurs, particularly in
the ability to create logical time sequence . . . and sticking to the point,” McLean
subjects these narratives to formal linguistic criteria for coherence, demon-
strating that the story of Mrs. Fine offers “a reasonable narrative structure” and
“a socially shared coherence system.” However, as challenges to such formal cri-
teria, gaps and lack of verisimilitude appear. Addressing the latter, McLean
makes a strong argument for an analytic shift from “coherence within the text
to coherence within the person.” She addresses relational and environmental
sources of incoherence, suggesting that the fragmentation of the narrative
reflects not only cognitive processes of dementia but also the institutionally
mediated fragmentation of a life-world on the ward. Fine’s story is no longer
reduced to its status as a departure from the facts and compelling evidence of
dementia: given the interweaving of internal (the illness) and external (the in-
stitution) sources of incoherence, her story becomes a form of living.
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In closing, McLean argues for the necessity not of deconstructive accounts
that decenter all meaning but in so doing evade the specific work of text-
making such as that accomplished by Mrs. Fine, but of a phenomenology atten-
tive to the production of subjects through language and “coherence work.” Such
coherence is not an essentialized quality of a universal subject but a product of
specific regimes of labor involving persons within intersubjective milieus.
Anne Davis Basting uses storytelling and theater as experimental tech-
niques in the fashioning of new milieus for coherence work. The TimeSlips
project created forms of listening and shared retelling in a series of distinct sites
in two American cities. Coherence and personhood are neither essentialized
absences of Alzheimer’s victims nor presences of heroic survivors-with-
Alzheimer’s. They are possibilities within spaces of story-making. Nor does
Basting essentialize the redemptive power of narrative: TimeSlips is an account
of specific techniques, distinct engagements with distinct populations. It is ex-
perimental in the serious sense. Like McLean, Basting distinguishes storytelling
from reminiscence, questioning the presumption of an earlier and naturalized
gerontology that life course review is a necessary and sufficient practice of late
life.
TimeSlips is not only an experimental form of therapy, both for the person
with dementia and for the caregiver; it is also a form of publicity. At stake is the
constitution of a public that may identify the loss of memory, continuity, and
apparent coherence, and of a familiar voice, with the loss of a possible present,
with the end of the person, and with death-in-life. Anthropologist John
Borneman () has suggested the reformulation of the anthropological inter-
est in kinship as the study of forms of caring and being cared for. What the
pragmatic orientation of TimeSlips and its apparent success demonstrates is
that forms of care are not merely cultural patterns or individual or collective
strategies: they are critically public and mediated phenomena. Practices of
subjectification involve a theory and practice of mediation.
Pia Kontos approaches the question of presumptively lost coherence from a
radically different angle, not by critical practices of listening and of eliciting
voice, but by troubling the necessary relation of voice and of language to the
constitution of the subject, a turn away from the presence of language to the
ground of Mauss and Merleau-Ponty, and then from Merleau-Ponty to Bourdieu.
Here deconstructive practice is not opposed to a phenomenological under-
standing: Merleau-Ponty is used to frame a subject in and of the body, bracket-
ing the question of language and the metaphysics of presence. Like McLean,
working in an institution with elderly Jews, in this case in Canada, Kontos fo-
cuses on the bodily movements rather than the language of residents. Despite
the effects of dementing illness, the residents she describes “exhibited selfhood
in the face of severe cognitive impairment. It is a notion of selfhood that speaks of a
complex interrelationship between the primordial and the social characteris-
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tics of the body.” Practices of daily life—dressing, praying, dancing, weaving—
give coherence and communicability to action. Kontos’s account of an ex-
change of nonsense syllables between two home residents is powerful in the
intercorporeal selfhood it reveals:
 Even when speech is incoherent and void of linguistic meaning, in face-
to-face interaction there is a smooth and appropriate alternating pattern
of vocalizing, as well as gesticulating, back and forth. With the utterance
of only “Bah,” “Shah,” “BRRRRRR!” and “Bupalupah,” Abe and Anna were
able to communicate without any recourse to intellectual interpretation.
There was a fittingness and a meaningful relationship between the rise
and fall of their pitch, their pauses, and their postural shifts. . . . What
this example illustrates is Merleau-Ponty’s argument that communica-
tion dwells in corporeality or, more specifically, in the body’s capability to
gesture.
Like Thomas Csordas () and other anthropologists who have used
Merleau-Ponty to trouble disciplinary logocentrism, Kontos engages Bourdieu’s
revision of this “capability of gesture” as a socially located habitus. Her analysis
of the class-specific gesture and meaning-making of persons often read as but
death-in-life troubles any ethnography of senility rooted only in the phenom-
enology of the voice.
Roma Chatterji’s chapter is critical in locating these debates over voice,
gesture, and the subject not as abstracted ethnographic or experimental argu-
ment alone but as forms of engagement with complex and specific genealogies.
Regina Pacis, the verpleeghuis, or nursing home, in the Netherlands where
Chatterji conducted fieldwork, was structured according to explicit phenom-
enologically based criteria that emerged in relation to the history and economy
of the Dutch welfare state and specifically to the wartime and postwar institu-
tional goal of the physical rehabilitation and economic “revalidation” of
wounded bodies. Although the meanings of revalidation are reworked (as “reac-
tivation”) given that the verpleeghuis residents are not being positioned to re-
enter the labor market, the old-age home shares with its predecessors a fairly
elaborate set of commitments to “phenomenological” techniques of milieu
therapy focused on the mindful body in space and time. Thus, despite the divi-
sion of the institution into somatic and psychogeriatric wards, notes Chatterji,
institutional practice and culture are not organized around explicitly cognitive
criteria: “Dementia as a term, has very little operative significance in the organi-
zation of verpleeghuis work. Instead it is subsumed within more functional cat-
egories that are able to discriminate quantitatively between different kinds of
corporeal capability,” notably the ADL, or Activities of Daily Living, scale.
The use of the ADL is of course not limited to such a genealogical frame,
and what is critical in Chatterji’s discussion of Regina Pacis is the limit—if one
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pays attention to these genealogies of practice—of the adequacy of a putatively
Foucauldian critique of such scales as regulative sites of pastoral power. Within
the regime of the institution and of its first director, Cornelius Leering, the ADL
is mobilized less as a regulative and hierarchized norm of ability and invalidity
and more as an index of the coherence of the “public” and the “intimate,” in
keeping with Dutch cultural norms of privacy and sociality. For McLean and
Basting, coherence is intersubjectively achieved; as for Kontos, coherence is less
a matter of language than of the potential for bodily movement in space and
time. Leering and the chronotopic structure of the verpleeghuis are deeply influ-
enced by Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists, and Chatterji draws on
Rabinow’s () discussion of French modernity in delineating the assemblage
whereby a modernist parceling out of space by function is mapped “onto the
phenomenological body of the invalid resident.”
The two wards thus each articulate a different space of intersubjective en-
gagement, a difference Chatterji crystallizes in the story of Mw. Klasen, whose
movement troubles the norms of the somatic ward and is successfully trans-
ferred. Chatterji tacks between a Foucauldian critique of institutional “dividing
practices” and an attentiveness to the technical goals of the institution in pro-
ducing subjects despite the fragmentation of illness, personal history, and in-
stitutional life. “Dividing practices also produce subjectivities. Patients become
who they are in the process of interactive reflexivity with others in the ward.”
The two halves of the institution offer distinct productions of normalized sub-
jectivity as alternative regimes of life.
While the phenomenological regimes of the verpleeghuis may be located
within a broader experimental history of European welfare form, Annette
Leibing’s chapter examines the temporal specificity of the personhood turn. By
the mid-s in the large cities of southern Brazil, the new disease category of
Alzheimer’s was suddenly “everywhere,” in its wake reconstituting old age as a
new kind of life: “something ‘less alive,’ a new kind of being.” Institutions were
founded or renamed as Alzheimer’s centers, drawing on the charisma of the
category, and within these—despite the formal devaluing of noncognitive, be-
havioral and “subjective” criteria of evaluation and care—staff experimentation
slowly gave rise to norms and forms that seemed to minimize client and
caregiver discomfort. What emerged by the end of the decade, according to
Leibing, was a shifted focus on “personhood” and an apparent division between
“hard” and “soft” forms of dementia expertise: “The center soon had its
‘personhood war’”—it was divided into two kinds of knowledge, with the aca-
demic psychologist working in part “in the doctor’s way” (with scales and struc-
tured interview) and the “different” (empathetic) doctors forming bridges
between the two fractions. This division was given force by claims elsewhere,
particularly in Europe, for the internationalism of personhood as a “move-
ment.”
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Leibing’s discussion goes far beyond the Brazilian case. She locates the rise
of the nonperson in the postwar institutional transformation of the global
North and the rationalization of psychiatry. She fleshes out the argument for
personhood, developing the idea of a biosocial death (related to Kaufman’s idea
of dementia-near-death) that makes dementia life a kind of devalued bare life
and locating pastoral efforts to “rescue” the biosocially dead as a broader fea-
ture of turn-of-the-century welfare. Although Leibing shares the commitments
of the personhood camp, she recognizes the slippery slope between critical res-
cue and pastoral regulation and locates the growth of personhood in part in
terms of the exigencies of pharmaceutical reason. Whereas the genetic turn has
been less productive of pharmaceutical care, the personhood turn promises a
proliferation of sites and projects for intervention. Personhood—hitherto the
elusive philosopher’s stone in discussions of the sociology of dementia—is re-
vealed as yet another life-resisting, death-defying machine.
Like Chatterji, John Traphagan wrestles with the usefulness of a Foucauld-
ian analytic of power, here in reference to state-sponsored efforts in a town’s
senior center in rural Japan to inculcate new forms of disciplined practice in old
age. The center, the Furiai Puraza, offers classes designed to encourage the
“moral ideal” of ikigai, which Traphagan translates as practices of self-actualiza-
tion and which are central to being and remaining a good ro–jin, an old person.
He analyzes the classes and center administration within a broader “strategic
field” constituting the good ro–jin: “At the center of this strategic field of power is
senility, which in certain forms represents a basis for differentiation, distin-
guishing the good ro–jin from the bad.”
Senility marks the failure of a disciplined interdependence. Traphagan dis-
cusses both biomedical framings of senility and boke, the latter, unlike the
former categories, represented as a state over which one has some control.
Drawing on Dorinne Kondo’s work, he discusses the “pedagogy of self-enactment”
that constitutes an ideal self across the life course and that is rooted in interde-
pendency. Boke threatens the continued discipline of self-work as one becomes
dependent without the apparent possibility of reciprocation.
Traphagan details many other sites where an active and interactive health
discipline is encouraged, together constituting the linked practices of
machizukuri, or town-making, and hitozukuri, or person-making. These dis-
ciplinary practices are both exquisitely regulative and highly valued by the
various subjects they constitute. State officials and planners mobilize them to
address the concerns of a growing population of frail and dependent elderly in
an aging rural hinterland. Older persons perform “full effort” at their ikigai
to avoid boke and to live an ideal, ethical life; but they also use the performance
of effort as “a tactic . . . to manipulate potential positive and negative
sanctions.”
Traphagan’s chapter emphasizes the “isomorphism” of governmental
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practices, techniques of self-making, and reflexive understandings of local and
national value. Like Chatterji, he engages normalizing practices not only
through the optic of power but also as part of a regime of living. What the chap-
ter powerfully demonstrates is how central senility is to regimes of living, which
are reorganizing the space of living in rural areas like “Yonegawa,” places we
might term zones of senescence: as in the Renaissance England of Reginald Scot,
senility becomes a critical site through which persons and relations constituted
by shifts in forms of scale and space, labor and population, and care and ex-
change are rendered both governable and good.
REFERENCES
Achenbaum, W. Andrew. . Crossing Frontiers: Gerontology Emerges as a Science. Cam-
bridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Agamben, Giorgio. . Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bayley, John. . Iris: A Memoir of Iris Murdoch. London: Duckworth.
Borneman, John. . “Caring and Being Cared For: Displacing Marriage, Kinship, Gender,
and Sexuality.” International Social Science Journal :–.
Buck-Morss, Susan. . Dreamworld and Utopia: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Charcot, Jean Martin. . Leçons cliniques sur les maladies des vieillards et les maladies
chroniques. Paris: A. Delahaye.
Cohen, Lawrence. . “Old Age: Cultural and Critical Perspectives.” Annual Review of An-
thropology :–.
———. . No Aging in India: Alzheimer’s, the Bad Family, and Other Modern Things. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
———. . “Is Treating Dementia Ironic?” In Illness and Irony: On the Ambiguity of Suffering
in Culture, ed. Michael Lambek and Paul Antze. New York: Berghahn.
Collier, Stephen, and Andrew Lakoff. . “On Regimes of Living.” In Global Assemblages:
Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems, ed. Aihwa Ong and Stephen
Collier. Oxford: Blackwell.
Csordas, Thomas. . “Somatic Modes of Attention.” Cultural Anthropology  (): –.
Estes, Carroll. . The Aging Enterprise. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Featherstone, Mike, and Mike Hepworth. . “Images of Positive Aging: A Case Study of
Retirement Choice Magazine.” In Images of Aging: Cultural Representations of Later Life, ed.
Mike Featherstone and Mike Hepworth. London: Routledge.
Foucault, Michel. . Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason.
Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Vintage. (Orig. pub. .)
Fox, Patrick. . “From Senility to Alzheimer’s Disease: The Rise of the Alzheimer’s Dis-
ease Movement.” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly :–.
Gubrium, Jaber. . Oldtimers and Alzheimer’s: The Descriptive Organization of Senility.
Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
Hacking, Ian. . Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Haggard, H. Rider. . She, a History of Adventure. London: Longmans, Green.
———. . Ayesha: The Return of She. London: Ward Lock & Co.
INTRODUCTION 19
Holstein, Martha. . “Alzheimer’s Disease and Senile Dementia, –: An Interpre-
tive History of Disease Negotiation.” Journal of Aging Studies  (): –.
Katz, Stephen. . Disciplining Old Age: The Formation of Gerontological Knowledge.
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
Latour, Bruno. . Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
MacFarlane, Alan. . Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England: A Regional and Comparative
Study. New York: Harper and Row.
Nandy, Ashis. . The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Nascher, I. L. . Geriatrics: The Diseases of Old Age and Their Treatment. Philadelphia: P.
Blakiston’s.
Palmore, Erdman B., and Kenneth Manton. . “Modernization and Status of the Aged:
International Correlations.” Journal of Gerontology :–.
Povinelli, Elizabeth. . “Radical Worlds: The Anthropology of Incommensurability and
Inconceivability.” Annual Review of Anthropology :–.
Rabinow, Paul. . French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
———. . French DNA: Trouble in Purgatory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. . Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Rose, Nikolas. . “The Politics of Life Itself.” Theory, Culture, and Society  (): –.
Scot, Reginald. . The Discoverie of Witchcraft. Arundel, U.K.: Centaur. (Orig. pub. .)
Thewlis, Malford Wilcox. . The Care of the Aged (Geriatrics). St. Louis: C. V. Mosby.
Weyer, Johannes. . Witches, Devils, and Doctors in the Renaissance [De praestigiis
daemonum]. Ed. George Mora. Trans. John Shea. Binghampton, N.Y.: Medieval and Re-
naissance Texts and Studies. (Orig. pub. .)
Young, Allan. . The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.













This chapter is about the cultural work that dementia does, the sociomedical
uses to which it is put in the American hospital at the end of life. I suggest that
dementia works there in three ways: as a rationale for facilitating death, as a
contested feature of what matters about the patient’s identity, and as a moral-
clinical designation of value when a frail life is perceived to hang in the balance.
In performing this multiplex work, dementia makes manifest one aspect of the
ethics and politics of life itself in the negotiations it elicits about “quality of
life,” “loss of personhood” and “diminishing life”; in debates about what consti-
tutes “normal” and “natural” decline toward death; and in cultural ambivalence
about whether the end of “meaningful life” is reason enough for death.1 Demen-
tia has entered the domain of choice; to confront dementia is to be faced with
options for maximizing function, minimizing suffering, and organizing care.
Decision making is inevitable.
Moreover, dementia, as a mutable category of knowledge and cultural
form, obscures the distinction between life and death. In its various stages—
early, moderate, advanced, severe, and end-stage—dementia is a condition both
of death-in-life and of life-in-death. This ambiguity becomes more profound as
the disease progresses, and it lies at the heart of the anguish about what to do.
This ambiguity is what makes dementia so compelling for families; so unnerv-
ing in the context of the cultural importance of memory, control, and reason;
and so unsettling to the existing order of things.
As with other medical sites in which productive technologies are scruti-
nized by ethnographers, dementia-near-death brings together biomedical and
socioeconomic features of contemporary American health-care delivery in
novel ways to permit and create a further remapping of the notions of life,
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person, and value.2 Specifically, the normalization of clinical techniques to con-
trol the timing of death, the ubiquitous structural imperative of patient and
family decision making, quandaries about the relation of the person to the body
when disease masks or destroys normal consciousness, disputes about the goals
of medicine when the end of life is imminent, and the fact that clinical inter-
ventions are possible up to the moment of death all converge at this site. That
convergence has multiple effects. For example, a new kind of patient population
is produced. The ethics of medical and familial responsibility are further
complicated.
Canguilhem’s prediction that “the science of life no longer resembles a por-
trait of life” (, ) is a useful starting point for thinking about dementia as
a form of cultural production and, more broadly, for adding to an anthropology
of “life itself.” In their histories of the modern life sciences, Canguilhem and
Michel Foucault point out that the concept of life, as a specific object of knowl-
edge, to be known through the modern biological sciences, did not exist until
the end of the nineteenth century. Foucault writes, “Historians want to write
histories of biology in the nineteenth century; but they do not realize that biol-
ogy did not exist then, and that the pattern of knowledge that has been familiar
to us for a hundred and fifty years is not valid for a previous period. And that if
biology was unknown, there was a very simple reason for it: that life itself did
not exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed through a grid of
knowledge constituted by natural history” (, ; italics added).
The idea that life as a process, mechanism, and structure could be studied
(and perhaps ultimately understood) owes its emergence to the rise of theories
of evolution and owes its expansion to concepts formed through the sciences,
first physiology, and more recently molecular biology and genetics (Canguilhem
; Franklin ). Importantly, by the mid- to late twentieth century, knowl-
edge of the living body and the forms and structures that constitute life, espe-
cially DNA or the genetic code, “became intrinsically linked to interventions
that transformed those living bodies” (Rose ). Life, health, illness catego-
ries, and death were objects to be acted on via the instrumentalization tech-
niques that the biological sciences and clinical medicine offered (Franklin
; Rabinow , ).
Here I explore how cultural meanings about aging, senescence, dementing
illness, and the “natural” life span are inscribed in biological materiality and
the biomedical techniques that enable us to know what life is. The biological
and biomedical, in turn, shape understandings of how the person with demen-
tia is bodily (that is, fundamentally) constituted and provide moral and socio-
economic frames for the range of interventions. Uttered today as a gloss for any
neurological condition that slowly or rapidly destroys cognition, memory, re-
flexivity, and expressive capacity, dementia is a modern form of life itself, in the
sense that biomedical and related apparatuses are brought to bear on a diag-
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nosed condition, transforming “living beings” into victims, patients, and re-
search subjects with a degenerative brain disease and rationalizing a host of
management strategies.
The Changing Relationship of Old Age and Dementia
That both the nature of aging itself and the relationship of old age to dementia
have been debated for well more than a century is significant for the contempo-
rary fact that (in the United States at least) dying requires certain kinds of deci-
sions and interventions in order to be considered “good,” “natural,” or
“humane.” Whether normal aging is a disease, whether senility in old age is
normal, and whether aging per se leads inevitably to death are all questions that
persisted long before recent forms of medicocultural negotiation emerged. Al-
though the terms of the debate have shifted since the nineteenth century with
the growing sophistication of biological knowledge and with changes in the
politics of medical science and the structure of health-care delivery, the debate
itself is ongoing (Holstein ).
Once a synonym for old age, by the late nineteenth century, the term senil-
ity referred specifically to the weakness and decrepitude that characterize old
age, and it gradually gained pathological connotations (Achenbaum ; Cole
; Haber ). The gradual shift in the perception of senility gave rise to a
medicocultural site for debates about the classification of symptoms, behaviors,
and old age itself and, especially, whether old age was a normal physiological
process or a pathological condition. When, in , Alois Alzheimer described
the clinical condition that bears his name, dementia associated with old age
was still considered a normal, expected part of age-related decline. The normal
aged body, regardless of how healthy or diseased, was characterized by that par-
ticular pathological sign (Herskovits ; Katz , ). “If old age was a period
of progressive decline, then the signs and symptoms of dementia were ex-
pected, if not inevitable, a “normal” correlate of old age. Thus, in what may
seem contradictory to modern readers, turn of the [twentieth] century investi-
gators often described ‘normal’ aging somewhat quixotically as pathological . . .
in this way, dementia could be simultaneously ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’”
(Holstein , ).
Physicians practicing at the beginning of the twentieth century found it
almost impossible to separate ordinary, normal changes of late life from organic
brain disease. In , I. L. Nascher, the New York physician who coined the
term geriatrics, aimed to separate the concepts of old age and disease and cut
through the debate of the period with the assumption that old age is a normal
condition (yet one requiring distinctive medical attention). He sought, follow-
ing Charcot, to separate “normal senile degeneration” from pathological “soft-
ening” of the brain. Yet the separate explanations of normal and pathological
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offered in his foundational text of , Geriatrics, are muddied, and he found
the task of clinically distinguishing normal degeneration from pathological
signs to be impossible (Cohen , ). Nascher’s work, though authoritative
in the United States, did not provide definitive clarification about relationships
between advanced age, dementia, and decline at the end of life. Debates about
pathology and normalcy in old age, especially vis-à-vis mental disease, contin-
ued. One theory of aging as a chronic disease was taught in American medical
schools at least until the late s (Cole , ). In the period between
World Wars I and II, two opposing views of old age competed for acceptance in
American medicine: “One school considered ‘senility’ a pathological disorder;
the other described it as a normal physiological state. In , it remained ‘a
major problem for science to determine which is correct’” (Gray [] cited in
Achenbaum , ).
The move from “senility” to “senile dementia” to “Alzheimer’s disease,” well
documented as the medicalization of senility by social scientists (Fox ; Hol-
stein ), indicates the gradual decoupling of normal aging from distinct
brain pathology. Yet debate remains lively today in clinical medicine and
gerontological science about whether Alzheimer’s disease is a distinctly patho-
logical state or a quantitative extreme of normal aging (Herskovits ). The
plaques and tangles that characterize the disease can be seen as well in healthy
elderly brains on autopsy and sometimes are not present in the brains of those
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s. In addition, some of the behavioral symptoms of
Alzheimer’s (especially those of forgetfulness) can be found in normal, healthy
older persons (Drachman ; Goodwin ; Gubrium ). Attempts to dis-
tinguish normal aging from discrete medical conditions of the brain plague
contemporary researchers and clinicians. Ambiguity about which conditions
are normal or pathological is reflected in recent titles from the geriatric and
gerontological literatures, such as “Dementia of the Aged: Disease or Atypical
Accelerated Aging?” “Geriatric Ideology: The Myth of the Myth of Senility,” and
“Aging versus Disease: Which Changes Seen with Age Are the Result of Biological
Aging?”
The idea of age-related disease muddies the waters further and is of interest
here because aging and disease, separately or together, can cause death. Arte-
riosclerosis and the decalcification of bone, for example, are expressions of nor-
mal, ordinary human aging “until they progress to a point at which they lead to
diseases such as heart attacks, strokes, osteoporosis and renal disorders. How
one identifies the point of transition is not clear” (Blumenthal , ). Arte-
riosclerosis can be thought of as disease or as normal aging, depending on the
definition of aging (Forbes and Hirdes ). Some scientists and clinicians pro-
pose that aging and disease be viewed as a continuum rather than as discrete
categories, using the example that there may be a continuum of brain lesions
from normal aging to Alzheimer’s disease just as there is a continuum of arte-
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riosclerotic changes from normal to disease entity (Forbes and Hirdes ; Von
Dras and Blumenthal ). For instance: “[F]rom the biopathological perspec-
tive, virtually all of the lesions associated with dementia . . . are commonly seen
in the non-demented aged as age-dependent lesions. And in both non-
demented and demented subjects various combinations of these are also
commonly encountered. . . . The aging-disease relationship with respect to de-
mentia has also been regarded as a threshold phenomenon in which dementia
occurs when aging changes exceed a particular limit” (Von Dras and Blumenthal
, ).3
Dementia, Death, and Value: The Ethics of Life Itself
While those debates continue, they have been joined in recent years by a new
set of concerns about the relationship of dementia to death, to quandaries over
life prolongation, and to the widespread desire and bureaucratic need to con-
trol the timing of death. These concerns are born of the fact that, first, feeding
tubes, antibiotics, and surgery of all kinds can and do extend demented lives for
prolonged periods; and, second, memory, consciousness, and the modern task
of self-making are considered essential to being fully alive (Cranford and Smith
; Foucault , ; Giddens ; Taylor ). Dementia has entered the
domain of the ethical because the “fact” of the person can be questioned and
because, often, death is a matter of a decision. One must choose. The discourse
of apocalyptic demography—namely, Alzheimer’s is “the disease of the cen-
tury”—coupled with the widespread fear of losing one’s mind, feeds concerns
about whether, and when, one should choose death—for oneself or for another.
The late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century attention to the classification
of symptoms as normal or pathological has been supplemented today by ethical,
institutional, and economic imperatives about the classification of life-sustain-
ing treatments as appropriate or not. Considerations of the “rightness” of pro-
longing life or of dying take center stage, as do evaluations of the “right” time to
die and the temporal nearness to death of the demented person. These consid-
erations are further troubled by questions about when “dying begins,” the
moral and clinical relevance of subjectivity to life prolongation, whether the
person with dementia is still “alive,” and which medical interventions contrib-
ute to or relieve “suffering.” Dementia-near-death problematizes the subject in
an unprecedented way.
Inescapable today is the fact that demented life (as all forms of life itself) is
the object of debate about value; it must be accorded a value. The “new ethics of
biomedical subjectivity” (Novas and Rose , ; Rabinow , ) can
be characterized by disputes over value, which are made apparent, first, in the
ubiquitous discourses of “quality of life,” “the right to know,” the “right to
choose,” and “risk assessment” that penetrate so deeply in the affluent sectors
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of Western societies and, second, in the life strategies opened up through
biomedical techniques (such as assisted reproduction, genetic screening,
mood-altering drugs, and plastic surgery). One’s biological destiny, and that of
one’s progeny, is no longer fixed and immutable. Prevention, enhancement,
and intervention are possible, even into advanced age. We can choose, and it is
our responsibility to choose, because biomedical technique has extended
choice to every aspect of existence (Rose , ), including the timing of
death. In the case of dementia-near-death, death in the hospital is facilitated or
postponed according to a negotiated calculus about the value of a particular
kind of vulnerable life in relation to assumptions about the nearness of that life
to death.
The Clinical Articulation of Forms of Life
The disease category advanced dementia is a window onto changing knowledge
about the organization of life itself, and those changes are revealed in the ways
clinical medicine grapples with what to do (because it must do something) in
the face of death. Two examples highlight the unstable understandings of this
form of life:
1. In response to the exponential growth of the use of feeding tubes in per-
sons with advanced dementia, therapeutics took a stand in – and
changed course. The Journal of the American Medical Association and the New
England Journal of Medicine published statements reflecting new medical
thinking about the treatment of that condition. Contrary to standard U.S.
clinical practice of the preceding two or three decades—which had consid-
ered tube feeding by percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) as appro-
priate therapy to prevent aspiration pneumonia, prolong survival, reduce
risk of pressure sores or infection, improve function, and provide “com-
fort”—academic clinicians and geriatric researchers decided that tube
feeding did none of those things (Finucane, Christmas, and Travis ;
Gillick ). Evidence had accumulated from a series of clinical studies
that food and water given by feeding tube to persons with advanced de-
mentia caused rather than ameliorated suffering and did not contribute to
the extension of life, regardless of whether that life was considered “mean-
ingful” by any standard. Thus tube feeding was no longer appropriate and
necessary medical care for persons with advanced disease.
The authors of both articles were careful to note the limit of their
claim—only in advanced dementia was tube feeding no longer medically in-
dicated. Yet in their reflections on the clinical evidence, the writers of
both these state-of-the-art articles made sense of advanced dementia in a
new way—as a form of life that has lost all potentiality except the move
toward death. Its reconfigured characterization, being near death, justified
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and rationalized the withholding of nutrition and hydration at the same
time as it reorganized value about this kind of life. This general pronounce-
ment, however, did not immediately eradicate or ease dilemmas associated
with the goals, on the ground, of caring for any individual patient or one’s
own family member.
2. In a study to examine treatments and survival of patients with “end-stage
dementia” following acute illness, researchers documented the interven-
tions received by  hospitalized patients. The rationale for conducting
the study was as follows: “An estimated . million people in the United
States are in the final stages of a dementing illness (e.g., Alzheimer disease,
vascular dementia) and are unable to recognize family, dependent in ac-
tivities of daily living, unable to communicate, and experience repeated
infections and other complications. Despite the prevalence of advanced
dementia, little is known about the prognosis of patients with this condi-
tion who develop a superimposed acute illness (e.g., pneumonia)”
(Morrison and Siu ).
The researchers found that advanced dementia is not viewed as a termi-
nal diagnosis by physicians or families, that patients with end-stage de-
mentia receive “as many burdensome procedures as cognitively intact
patients,” and that there is an absence of awareness about the poor short-
term prognosis for these patients. They suggest that efforts be turned to the
provision of palliative or comfort, rather than life-extending, measures.
Both these examples reveal how clinical medicine is working out an under-
standing of and an approach to this form of life. Moreover, both engage, at the
same time as they attempt to end, one aspect of the societal debates about what
forms of life are worth sustaining, why, and for how long.
In a different sort of articulation expressed beyond the clinic, advanced de-
mentia is juxtaposed with early dementia. Both designations, early and advanced
dementia, are noteworthy for the distinctive ways in which they reorganize soci-
etal understanding of this disease by incorporating death into their schema.
Early dementia further specifies this form of life that pushes decline, disease,
and death earlier into the life course. On the one hand, the specter of genetic
testing opens the possibility of “living with” dementia for years prior to the ap-
pearance of any symptoms. On the other hand, contemporary understandings—
that the disease progresses via the loss of abilities acquired during infancy and
early child development—brings death into life slowly. It is generally acknowl-
edged that the death of the person and the self will occur in stages that can be
differentiated over a protracted period of time. Life will diminish via a pattern of
developmental regression (Reisberg ; Shenk ) at the same time that
death will advance within the person and the person’s body.
Dementing illness is widely characterized as a process that slows down
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death. The novelist Jonathan Franzen (), reflecting on the death of his fa-
ther from Alzheimer’s, notes that the disease is like a prism that refracts death
into a spectrum of its parts: death of autonomy, death of memory, death of self-
consciousness, death of personality, death of the body. These features of the
disease can be considered separately, even when they are observed to occur
together, so that the phased death of the demented person is exquisitely de-
scribed as the disease worsens. With the diagnosis of early dementia, the pro-
cess of dying takes place over decades and is reflected in such well-worn phrases
as death in life, death before death, and never ending death.
When the condition becomes advanced and is accompanied by other life-
threatening illnesses, consideration of techniques for allowing death vie with
those of prolonging life, as the preceding examples from the medical literature
show. The medical pronouncements, that tube feeding is no longer humane or
efficacious for extending life and that comfort measures should be employed for
end-stage disease, are often irrelevant for family members struggling to sustain
a valued life. Those pronouncements are sidelined by staff concerned with hon-
oring family demands. Moreover, in the hospital, that new knowledge cannot
compete with the initial press to prevent death. Most often death is not named
as possible or inevitable until shortly before it occurs. Thus, when death is
finally pronounced as an impending truth by medical staff, the “choice” to with-
draw or withhold therapies makes dying appear, to families, to be “speeded up.”
Negotiations about Life when Death Is Near
I now turn to ways in which dementia is invoked and ignored in the hospital at
the end of life and the ways in which knowledge about the demented person,
disease, life itself, and the worth of a particular life come together for negotia-
tion. The hospital practices in which dementia is implicated provide one ex-
ample of how clinical medicine governs the end of life and how death is elided
with ways of knowing life. The following two stories of patients’ pathways to
death are common, and they reveal the tensions surrounding the protection,
extension, manipulation, and demise of that kind of life. Highlighted in these
stories are the “choices” confronted by family members, who often feel they are
being asked to choose between “life” and “death,” as though those notions were
equally weighted. Confusion between inexorable decline, possibly hastened by
dementia, and disease that may be arrested by medical interventions con-
founds that choice, and families often refuse to choose anything at all. Staff, by
contrast, feel the pressure of the hospital system to move things along to death
when they know it is inevitable. Within the rules and norms of the hospital
world, families and medical staff each engage the patient’s life with different
sensibilities about the relevance of dementia, along with other signs of end-
stage disease, for calculating an appropriate time for death.
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Acute Disease, Heroic Intervention, Organized Death:
Dorothy Mason
HOSPITALIZATION, DAY 1 : At ICU (intensive care unit) rounds, I follow the team
to the bed of Dorothy Mason, and the doctor tells me that she arrived last night
from a nursing home with “bad pneumonia, bad lung disease, and Alzheimer’s
disease. I don’t know how she got here,” he says, “but her son was with her. He
wants everything done.” The nurse assigned to her tells me, “If this were my
mother, I’d let her go. I don’t know why the son is doing this—guilt? need? If she
doesn’t get better, the doctors will begin to talk to the son about taking her off
the mechanical ventilator and letting go, but not until she doesn’t start to get
better.” Another nurse says, “She came from the nursing home extremely mal-
nourished, weighs seventy-five pounds, and looks like she arrived from
Auschwitz.” All I can see is the head of a very frail old woman who is connected
to a breathing machine and to several intravenous lines for fluids and medica-
tions. Mrs. Mason is seventy-nine years old. Someone at the nursing home
called the paramedics when Mrs. Mason was observed to be in respiratory dis-
tress; she was brought by ambulance, with high-flow oxygen, to the hospital
emergency room and intubated there.
DAY 2: The lens through which all hospital patients are viewed is colored by the
imperative to move them efficiently along one of several treatment pathways—
to life-saving treatments, to cure or stabilization, or to death. Several nurses
sketch a sociomedical portrait of Mrs. Mason for me. “She’s a ‘no code,’ but still
on the vent and getting nutrition and care. We just won’t do CPR [cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation],” I am told. Another nurse says, “She was made a no code at
: P.M. last night. Up to then the son wanted everything done. The doctor
talked to the son earlier, then at nine o’clock last night he went to him again,
explained the situation again, and asked him, ‘Would you really want us to
pound on her chest and crack her ribs?’ That’s when the son reluctantly agreed
it was OK to make his mother a no code.” Later, the nurse on the evening shift
says, “The son made the decision to continue full-out antibiotics for twenty-four
hours. If there is no improvement by tomorrow, he’ll consider withdrawing
care. He has moved a lot, from thinking she was a viable hospital patient to
acknowledging that she might die. He’s come far.”
DAY 3:  There is no improvement. Mrs. Mason is not responsive, though her eyes
open sometimes and she seems to look around the room, but nurses tell me that
she cannot purposefully move her eyes; there is no intent behind the look, no
person behind the stare. That clinical judgment—that the patient is not fully,
really alive—often contradicts the opinion of family members, who tend to see
purposefulness in small movements and to think that the conscious person
they knew before the crisis is still there, hidden within a sick body.
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Mrs. Mason’s son wants to continue antibiotics for an additional twenty-
four hours to “see what happens” and then consider withdrawing life-sustaining
treatments. The patient’s nurse for today confides to me: “She should never
have been put on a ventilator in the emergency room. She should have had a
nasal cannula, and then she would have eventually died, peacefully. . . . She has
had Alzheimer’s disease for a long time and has been incontinent for a long
time. She came in with bilobar pneumonia [pneumonia in both lobes of the
lungs]. In the nursing home they weren’t treating it, which was wise on their
part, but she wasn’t supposed to die, because she wasn’t made a no code.” The
nurse goes on to say that it is difficult for Mrs. Mason’s son to see anything other
than a strong mother who has bounced back before: “She had been sort of mov-
ing along, incontinent, demented, getting more frail, with lousy nutrition, but
not that sick. This is the first time he’s seen her really sick, maybe going to die.
So he can’t accept it at first.”
DAY 4: At the bedside I speak with Mrs. Mason’s son for the first time. He is
sitting close to his mother’s bed and looking at her tenderly, talking to her and
holding her hand. She is unresponsive. He tells me, “She had a living will done
about eight years ago, and in it she was clear that she didn’t want her dying
prolonged. Now it’s tough in the hospital because she couldn’t have predicted
this sort of a situation and I don’t know if this is prolonging her life.” He had
been with her in the nursing home when the nurses there called . He had
come to the hospital with her. The doctors in the emergency room needed to
know immediately if they should intubate her because without mechanical ven-
tilation she would have died. With tears in his eyes he reports that he said, “Yes,
go ahead,” because he wanted her to live, was hopeful she would stabilize, and
could not accept being singled out to be responsible for her death at that mo-
ment. Although he made that decision quickly, he tells me he agonized over it.
“It isn’t her time yet,” he says and tells me she had been hospitalized a year
earlier and had “come back” from other crises. “She is tough.” But he would not
want her to live indefinitely on a ventilator and neither would she. He only
wants her to have the opportunity to get better, to get off the ventilator.
“You’re not seeing the really tough decision points,” he tells me. “They hap-
pened earlier. My toughest decision was moving her from home to assisted liv-
ing eighteen months ago.” She had covered up her Alzheimer’s disease well.
“She was social and she had a good sense of humor.” He knew things were
changing, but he did not know how bad things were until about a year ago when
he moved her to the nursing home and she was diagnosed with advanced
Alzheimer’s. Regarding the hospital requirement for a “code status” decision, he
volunteers that he made his mother a no code. He says to me, “Some families
might think making a no-code decision is participating in killing the patient,
but I don’t think so.” (He does not mention what I was told two days before by
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the medical and nursing staff, that he had had to be talked into making that
decision.)
DAY 8: The nurse calls me to the bedside, dramatically pulls the sheet off Mrs.
Mason, and says, “Look at this.” She has been trying to turn Mrs. Mason and is
having a great deal of difficulty. Mrs. Mason’s limbs are so contracted, her legs
so tightly wrapped around one another, that the nurse cannot disentangle
them. Mrs. Mason is not responding to the nurse’s maneuvers or to our conver-
sation. I am looking at emaciated legs with the skin hanging directly on bones
that look brittle, as if they would shatter if they were touched. I have never been
this close to such frailty.
DAY 10: Mrs. Mason’s son continues to want “aggressive” care, that is, contin-
ued mechanical ventilation, nasogastric tube feeding (use of a thin tube in-
serted through the nose that delivers nutritional liquid to the stomach), and
antibiotics for the recalcitrant pneumonia. The medical staff is trying a differ-
ent antibiotic. I go to Mrs. Mason’s bedside with a technician who is going to
draw her blood. He speaks to her in a loud but caring voice, close to her face,
telling her what he is going to do, and she turns her head to stare at him. I
reintroduce myself, and she turns to me and stares. But she does not respond in
any other way or even blink.
At the bedside I speak again with Mrs. Mason’s son and also with her
daughter, who has just arrived from another state. Mrs. Mason is looking at her
children, that is, her eyes seem to focus on them, but I cannot be sure. It is
impossible for me to tell if she is hearing and then comprehending our conver-
sation, because she is so unresponsive. The nurse comes in to draw her blood.
Mrs. Mason’s son and daughter both repeat to me that they do not want their
mother to be on life support. I am not sure if they realize that their mother is,
indeed, on life support.
DAY 12: The intensive-care doctor mentions to me that Mrs. Mason’s kidneys
and other organs are beginning to fail. Her family doctor discusses her failing
condition with her children for some time and urges them “to withdraw ventila-
tor support and let her die.” They listen and agree. She dies shortly after the
ventilator is withdrawn, with her children, the family doctor, and the intensive-
care specialist at her bedside.
Slowing Diminishing Life, Debate about Life: Nhu Vinh
BACKGROUND: Mrs. Nhu Vinh’s medical condition was not unusual; nor was
the response to it of her daughter, Mrs. Tran. Mrs. Vinh, age eighty-four, had
been diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease six years before her current hospital-
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ization, though in retrospect, Mrs. Tran tells me, her mother had had symptoms
long before the diagnosis. Shortly after her diagnosis, she needed round-the-
clock care at home, which Mrs. Tran arranged with attendants. But, Mrs. Tran
says, her mother still had “quality of life.” She could go out to family functions
and enjoy herself. The past two years, however, had become much more difficult
as the disease had progressed. Mrs. Tran relates the story of her mother’s de-
cline while we sit together in her mother’s hospital room. She has just washed
Mrs. Vinh’s long gray hair and is spreading it out across the pillow as her mother
lies sleeping. It is a warm day and Mrs. Tran has turned on a fan to help dry her
mother’s hair. Mrs. Vinh is breathing through a nasal cannula. Her hands, vis-
ible above the sheets, are extremely contracted.
In the months before her hospitalization, Mrs. Vinh could not walk. It took
three or four hours to feed her each meal. The attendants, whose work Mrs. Tran
supervised closely, would spoon pureed food into her mother’s mouth and they
were extremely careful to watch that she swallowed each mouthful. Mrs. Vinh
had become incontinent and demented. But she could still interact with her
daughter. Six weeks before I met the patient and her daughter in the hospital,
the home attendants, doctors, nurses, and speech therapist who were caring for
Mrs. Vinh all agreed without debate that Mrs. Vinh was not getting enough nu-
trition and needed a feeding tube inserted into her stomach.
Mrs. Vinh had the routine, low-risk, low-tech procedure to insert what is
known as a g-tube. But since that time, Mrs. Tran tells me, her mother has had
nothing but problems, especially recurring reflux and fevers. Mrs. Tran says
with pride that in the two years prior to the insertion of the tube, her mother
was not hospitalized and nothing had ever gone wrong.
ADMISSION TO DAY 6: After six weeks of problems following the placement of
the feeding tube, Mrs. Tran admitted her mother to the hospital. Mrs. Vinh had
pneumonia from aspirating her own secretions, and in addition the g-tube had
accidentally moved (“migrated,” in medical language). Upon admission to the
hospital, physicians treated the pneumonia and suggested replacing the g-tube
with a tube inserted into the jejunum (j-tube), the small bowel, in order to
avoid the regurgitation and possible aspiration of food into the lungs.
The procedure would require general anesthesia, and Mrs. Tran debated,
along with her large extended family, whether the surgery was the right thing to
do. They finally decided to go ahead with it. “This was a very, very hard decision,
because we knew she was a high-risk surgical patient,” she tells me. Mrs. Tran is
adept at quickly translating her way of knowing into language that American
health-care providers can easily understand, and she explains that for her fam-
ily, as Buddhists, and as Asians, the decision was not based on quality-of-life
considerations—“My mother hasn’t had any quality of life for two years.” The
family simply wanted to prolong Mrs. Vinh’s life. However, they did not want to
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do anything that would create pain and suffering. They had decided previously
that Mrs. Vinh would not be put on ventilator support if she could no longer
breathe on her own, and she would not be subjected to CPR if her heart stopped
beating. Other than that, her life should be maintained. Mrs. Tran explains
these decisions and adds other things she wants me to know about her. Her
father had been a well-regarded Buddhist practitioner. She had come to the
United States from Vietnam thirty-five years ago. Her very young grandchildren,
she says proudly, speak Vietnamese. She has a disabled cousin whose care she
supervised for many years. She herself works in a health profession and has
taken a leave to care for her mother. She is spending most of her time, day and
night, at her mother’s bedside.
DAY 7:  The surgery, which took place the day after Mrs. Vinh was admitted to the
hospital, was not complicated, but Mrs. Vinh has not been doing well since
then. She has not regained her previous physical condition and mental state, as
the medical team and family had hoped. The doctors treating her have written
in her medical chart, “end-stage care,” “dementia and chronic vegetative state,”
and “continues to deteriorate.” The physicians tell Mrs. Tran that her mother’s
condition is deteriorating, that she will not survive. She was still aspirating,
despite the j-tube, so she could not be fed through it, and Mrs. Vinh is now
receiving antibiotics, food, and morphine through an intravenous line, a situa-
tion that cannot go on indefinitely.
Expressing both her convictions and her ambivalence, Mrs. Tran tells me,
“My mother is a fighter. She wants to live. I know this about her very deeply. All
of this talk about quality of life is not relevant. She wants to live, even in this
condition; that is why she struggles to breathe so much; that is why they gave
her the morphine, to make her breathing easier. But I don’t know. Maybe they
just should give her more morphine till she stops breathing. . . . I want her to
live, but I want her to be comfortable.” Mrs. Tran’s brother is on his way to the
hospital from his home in another city. Mrs. Tran says that her mother is wait-
ing to die—waiting for her son to come and see her.
Now, six days after the surgery, the medical team wants to stop giving Mrs.
Vinh infection-fighting medications and move her along to her death. They as-
sume she is not conscious and know she is at the end stage of her disease. They
see no reason to prolong her dying and perhaps cause her to suffer. They want to
create a comfortable death. The hospital social worker tells Mrs. Tran that the
staff wants to meet with the family as soon as her brother arrives. Mrs. Tran,
quite familiar with predictable (and desired) hospital pathways, asks rhetori-
cally, “Why do they want to have a meeting? We’ve already made her DNR [(do
not resuscitate) order] and no intubation. I am ready to take her home if she can
be discharged. I can handle it. I am set up for it with new caregivers. My mother
didn’t have oxygen at home before, but we’d get it this time, and I’d learn how to
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do it. This is not a problem. We’ve discussed everything already. There is no
need for a meeting. Why do they want a meeting? It’s because they want to tell
me that if they take off the oxygen mask she’ll die more quickly. That leaving on
the mask is prolonging her life. It’s just like the ventilator. If you remove the
mask, she’ll live maybe a few hours, or a few days or a few weeks, but she’ll die
sooner. That’s why they want to have the meeting.” Mrs. Tran is quite aware that
the medical team views her as the obstruction to a quicker death.
The Vinh family conference was scheduled to take place as soon as the son
arrived. The conference follows the standard format for medical staff communi-
cation with families: medicine speaks what it understands to be the truth about
the patient and outlines the proper course of events, and the family is expected
to understand, to agree, and “to get with the program.” The doctor, an immi-
grant from China, speaks first and begins by reviewing the patient’s medical
condition. He is thoughtful and describes her condition as best he can.
MD: We removed the g-tube but now your mother is having problems with the j-
tube. We’re treating her with antibiotics. She was in the ICU for a day or
two, intubated. She still has pneumonia. That is not going away. She still
has off-and-on fevers. Her breathing is more labored, more fast and shal-
low, because she doesn’t have enough oxygen in her lungs. Basically, I’m
sorry to say, she’s not doing well, and I want to give you a true picture. This
situation is difficult for everyone and for the medical profession as well. I’m
afraid she’s going to die very soon. She almost died already a couple of
times. We have no way to treat her condition. I’m afraid she’s going to keep
aspirating because of her secretions, even if they suctioned her around the
clock. Regarding her nutrition, we are hoping the j-tube will work. But
meanwhile we’re giving her IV [intravenous] feedings—it is life support. We
can do this short term but not long term. To me this is not in her best
interest. She’s not communicative. She is demented. We can keep her alive
a little while, though even with the best management, she can die anytime.
There’s really no good treatment for her difficulties. My recommendation is
that we should keep her comfortable, keep her mouth from getting dry. I
recommend that we cut down on the oxygen. She’s getting fourteen liters at
the moment—that’s a lot. And stop the antibiotics and let her go to sleep.
Let nature take its course. I’m very sorry. She’s lived a full life. She’s very
near the end of her life at this time. There’s no more quality of life. Most
people in her condition would have died by now.
MRS. VINH’S SON: Quality of life?
MD: She’s not aware of her environment. She doesn’t demonstrate anything. She
cannot respond in any meaningful way.
MRS. TRAN: Sometimes, in rare moments, when she opens her eyes, when she
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hears me talking she turns her eyes toward me. So we can’t say that she’s
totally unconscious. I believe she recognizes my voice.
SON: If you don’t stop any treatments how long will she live?
MD: I don’t know. Days, hours, months. Her GI [gastrointestinal] tract is not
working. She can’t absorb nutrients. Antibiotics are not keeping the fever
under control.
SON: Is she’s suffering? She’s not conscious, as you say.
MD: She’s not getting pain medications or sedatives.
MRS. TRAN: We are giving her morphine.
SOCIAL WORKER: Are you worried about her comfort level?
SON: I’m basically wanting to know if she is alive. Is she conscious? Is she’s suf-
fering?
MD: Well, her body is alive; you’re keeping it alive. Her consciousness is mini-
mal. There are gradations of this, of consciousness.
MRS. TRAN: But she’s been like this for years.
MD: As far as suffering, I don’t think she’s in pain, but I can’t know for sure. Even
if we do everything, I don’t know how long she’ll live. Most families won’t
keep someone alive on tube feeding.
SON: What is your recommendation?
MD: Let nature take its course.
SON: What does that mean?
MD: Stop the feeding and antibiotics. Give her a little oxygen for comfort only.
Give a little morphine for pain. But let nature take its course. Even with the
current treatments, I don’t think she’ll live more than a few days.
SON: We have some family members missing. We want to meet as a family.
MD: She’s in limbo land, between life and death. Regardless of our interven-
tions, she’ll die.
SON:  It’s very important that she has all the comfort.
(The doctor leaves the room.)
CASE MANAGER: Absolutely, that’s what we want to do.
MRS. TRAN: So we can’t talk about discharge?
SOCIAL WORKER: The doctor’s job was to give you the medical picture and his
recommendations.
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MRS. TRAN: Does she have to be hospitalized?
SOCIAL WORKER: That’s a hard call. The fever is an issue. Could we set this up at
home? You’d have to be trained.
MRS. TRAN: We’re talking about a short time until she dies, regardless of what we
do; that’s what he said. Right?
SOCIAL WORKER: Yes. If you withdraw some of these things we can predict more
closely, maybe. But if you keep all the interventions we cannot predict.
Whatever you decide we’ll accommodate.
MRS. TRAN: Are you in a hurry? Is there pressure? (Looks to her brother and asks
him:) Can you make a decision now? If we withdraw everything she’ll die—
correct? She still has living brothers and sisters. Maybe they’ll feel that isn’t
right. That’s a big decision.
SOCIAL WORKER: How much time do you need?
SON: Two or three days at most.
MRS. TRAN: One sister is in France. A brother is in New York. You have to realize
this is a difficult decision. This is a life-and-death decision. He’s saying if we
leave everything she’ll die slower. If we remove everything she’ll die faster.
It’s still a decision of life and death. I really feel pressure from you.
SOCIAL WORKER: I sense that. But in a few days we need to know.
MRS. TRAN: We want her home.
The conference ends and everyone stands up to leave. Mrs. Tran tells me
she is going to leave the hospital for a while. She is not sure what the staff is
going to do, but she is going to let her mind rest and not think about this—at
least until she comes back in the evening. The social worker says that someone
always takes the heat about putting pressure on families, and this time it was
her turn, but she did not mind. The nurse case manager goes to see Mrs. Vinh,
and it is obvious to her that she has taken a turn for the worse. She thinks the
patient will die quite soon.
Two hours later Mrs. Tran leaves me a telephone message. She is crying as
she says, “My mother just passed away at : P.M., and she had the elegance to
pass away without her children making any decision.”
Affirming Life, Allowing Death
Proactively “shortening” a life is a complicated matter. Where is the line to be
drawn between giving permission to stop life-sustaining treatments and aiding
the death of another? Families often conflate “not treating” with “causing”
death; and that conflation is a source of the anguish that so many associate with
hospital death. Most families I encountered strongly resisted authorizing death,
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regardless of the specific condition of their relative. They remained hopeful that
medical technology and expertise would save life and were reluctant to learn
that often it fails to do so. Even though families are told that technological sup-
port is only maintaining the bodily functions, not the life, of the patient, unless
and until they are convinced that it is certain that death will result from a medi-
cal condition, the pressure to withdraw supportive therapies can appear to be
the same as or akin to outright murder. Much family resistance to staff requests
for “decisions” is the result of the connection that families make between kill-
ing and withdrawing treatments.
Dorothy Mason, malnourished and with severe pneumonia and advanced
dementia, suffered respiratory distress and was rushed to the hospital, where
she died after twelve days on a mechanical ventilator in the ICU. Her children
thought she could recover from the pneumonia despite her extreme frailty and
they advocated for aggressive treatments that the staff considered inappropri-
ate. Her son could not, would not, quickly authorize his mother’s death in the
emergency department, for that, from his point of view, was what he was being
asked to do. Why should he authorize death when emergency medicine saves
lives? He hoped for her recovery, ignored her advanced Alzheimer’s, did not
acknowledge pneumonia as her final illness, and certainly did not “prepare” for
her death according to popularized psychosocial scripts. He pressed for contin-
ued treatment and struggled deeply with the fact that she would not, could not,
be saved if she had a cardiac arrest. Doctors and nurses eventually persuaded
him to authorize the DNR order that would prevent his emaciated, demented,
and very ill mother from having to undergo a resuscitation attempt. But first he
had to ponder for days the relationship of authorizing the DNR order to murder.
Only when Mrs. Mason’s family physician named death as real, told the family
that their mother was clearly dying and would die no matter what, did her son
assent to the withdrawal of life-support technologies.
Nhu Vinh, with advanced Parkinson’s disease and dementia, was in the last
stage of her illness and at the very end of her life when her daughter brought her
to the hospital. Knowing her mother was near death, she nonetheless struggled
to keep her alive with a feeding tube. To Mrs. Vinh’s doctor, the patient was not
alive in any meaningful sense (she lacked any expressive capability); and that
“truth” was indicated by all her bodily signs, including her apparent lack of con-
sciousness. For the doctor, Mrs. Vinh’s general condition—very near death—
trumped the vagaries of consciousness. For the patient’s daughter, Mrs. Vinh
was very much alive—she even died elegantly. The patient’s son wanted to know
the operational definitions of quality of life, and let nature take its course vis-à-vis
his mother’s condition, since the doctor introduced those concepts. He needed
to learn whether her condition could be classified as life. Any attribution of suf-
fering would flow from that designation, as would any decision on his part
about terminating life. The doctor made the ambiguous point that though the
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life of the patient is questionable, the family is keeping the patient (or at least
her body) alive, and that is an unnatural (and perhaps pain-causing) thing to do.
The patient’s son remarked to the assembled group that if the staff was going to
place on the family the responsibility for actively terminating his mother’s life,
then the relatives needed to meet as a family to gather support for such a pro-
found act. The pressure on Mrs. Tran to allow, as quickly as possible, the re-
moval of Mrs. Vinh’s life-supporting measures was among the most extreme
that I encountered. But the staff felt that they had to respect Mrs. Tran’s reluc-
tance, and if Mrs. Vinh had continued to hover at the threshold of death instead
of dying shortly after the conference with the family, the health-care team
would have helped set up life-sustaining care for her at home.
Physicians sometimes unwittingly offer contradictory directives to families;
and a kind of doublespeak, evident in the Vinh family conference, revolves
around the mystery of life, the difficulty of easily defining life’s end point, and
the fuzzy characterization of the relationship between the two notions. It
emerges in the language that physicians use to explain physiological decline,
the absence of beneficial treatments, and the role dementia plays in the near-
ness to death. It takes the following shape: “Your mother is not actually (or com-
pletely) dead, or dead yet, but neither is she alive.” Or, “She’s not really alive, but
we can keep her alive a bit longer.” Or, “He has no meaningful life, but we can
continue to take care of him.” Practically, life and death merge in this language.
Life is present, but to the physician, the condition of that life indicates the inevi-
table transition to death. Families see unresponsive or machine- and tube-
dependent patients and have no idea what to make of the gray zone in which
their relative hovers. So they prefer not to acknowledge it. They are asked to
make decisions, but they have too many doubts about the life of the person whom
they can see with their own eyes. They cannot follow staff directives without
substantial anxiety about what they are being asked to do.
Conclusion
Both these stories reflect routine responses to old age and disease in the United
States and they exemplify common patterns of care and negotiation. In an ear-
lier era neither Dorothy Mason nor Nhu Vinh would have been hospitalized,
though specific disease labels might have been attached to their conditions. But
today families must imagine either impending death caused by some combina-
tion of age and disease or treatable medical conditions regardless of age and
disease. And then they must choose. Staff and family must respond to the life
that is being maintained at the threshold of death by enacting what they per-
ceive to be the most respectful and least painful passage to death or the best
methods for continued maintenance of life. Their negotiated decisions about
appropriate intervention and their desire to save life but also to facilitate the
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least worst death together discursively operationalize life and reverence for it.
Conceptions of expected physiological processes as the body nears death
(for example, that it is normal to stop eating); knowledge of what constitutes
the normal progression of dementia toward death; and how evidence for the life
of a person is to be judged, and by whom, are all at stake in those negotiations.
I have illustrated at another medical site of cultural production that “choice”
replaces “nature” when contested life is prolonged by biotechnologies because
something can and must be done (Kaufman ). But it is a specific kind of
moral choice: the potential or suffering or quality or life of this kind of person
must be weighed against the finality (and comfort) of death. That choice both
results from and affects changing medical categorizations, institutional impera-
tives to “speed up” or “slow down” death, and deliberation about value. In the
ethics and politics of life itself, dementia is one more emergent example of a
mutable form.
NOTES
. This interpretation is inspired by the work of Nikolas Rose.
. Among such other medical sites entailing scrutinized technologies are reproductive
technologies, organ transplantation, molecular biology, and genetics.
. See also Gubrium : “It is not yet possible to clearly differentiate dementing illness
from normal aging, and that the attempt to do so is a social construction to create
order from the disorderly aspects of living with dementia” ().
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The Borderlands of Primary Care
Physician and Family Perspectives on
“Troublesome” Behaviors of People with Dementia
LADSON HINTON, YVETTE FLORES, CAROL FRANZ,
ISABEL HERNANDEZ, AND LINDA S.  MITTENESS
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Midway through our interview, Mrs. Jones, whose husband was diagnosed
with Alzheimer’s disease two years earlier, began talking about a change in her
husband that distressed her—his forgetfulness. My immediate association was
to short-term memory loss, a core part of the professional criteria of dementia.
She then told us a story about his inability to set the alarm in their house in
response to her admonitions to do so. Again, her description appeared to con-
form to the clinical criteria for dementia, which include functional decline and
difficulties with higher-order cognitive tasks that require planning and se-
quencing (executive functioning). At this point, her story seemed off the central
focus of our research: how families understand, manage, and seek help for the
behavioral changes of a person who has been diagnosed with dementia. What
followed next, however, surprised me. Mrs. Jones described how her husband
became frustrated when he was unable to set the alarm, and then proceeded to
“vent at her,” which she described as his getting very angry and pounding on
the walls of the house. These outbursts occurred often and represented a
change from how he had been before he was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease. We later learned that despite being very involved in her husband’s medi-
cal care, she had yet to mention these violent outbursts to his primary care
physician. While the reasons for not telling his physician never became entirely
clear, her own nonmedical, psychosocial explanation of his distress, a sympa-
thetic physician who reinforced her interpretation of his behavioral changes, and
the realities of a very constrained health-care system all played important roles.
This vignette highlights some of the core issues that will be explored in this
chapter, which focuses on the behavioral changes of people with dementia as
observed and responded to by families and primary care providers. We use the
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term behavioral changes to refer to the diverse set of noncognitive symptoms (for
example, depression, irritability, psychosis, wandering, agitation, aggression)
that fall outside the formal diagnostic criteria for dementia (which emphasize
cognitive symptoms and functional decline), yet are common clinical manifes-
tations and are cited by family caregivers as among the most challenging as-
pects of living with a person who has been diagnosed with dementia (Chappell
and Penning ; Chenoweth and Spencer ). For those interested in the
anthropology of senility, primary care settings are important sites for study be-
cause that is where most people who suffer from dementia are diagnosed and
treated (Small et al. ). Yet despite the enormous public-health significance
of Alzheimer’s disease, “underdiagnosis” and “undertreatment” of dementia is
ubiquitous in primary care (Boise et al. ; Callahan, Hendriel, and Tierney
). This lack of medicalization is striking because it occurs against the back-
drop of clinical guidelines highlighting the need for early diagnosis and of con-
siderable optimism among scientists and clinical researchers about the ability
of pharmacological and nonpharmacological interventions to delay the pro-
gression of cognitive decline and ameliorate behavioral symptoms (Dorais-
wamy ). This disjunction between “expert” knowledge and routine clinical
practice raises intriguing questions about how behavioral changes in persons
with dementia are valued and responded to in primary care settings, where
older adults, their families, and physicians come together. Anthropological per-
spectives may help us to understand how social and cultural processes influ-
ence the occurrence and timing of medicalization of cognitive decline,
functional impairment, and behavioral change in older adults who meet crite-
ria for dementia.
This chapter is based on early analysis of interviews conducted with fami-
lies and primary care physicians who provide care to a person who has received
a formal diagnosis of some type of degenerative dementia (such as Alzheimer’s
disease). To frame our analysis, we use the concept of borderlands. Our use of
this concept developed from the observation that clinical encounters in pri-
mary care have the potential for intimacy and supportive intervention as well as
conflict, misunderstanding, and unnecessary or even dehumanizing medical-
ization. The concept of borderlands, which was developed in postcolonial femi-
nist discourse, holds together the dual aspects of these settings that are so
important to the experience and actions of families and primary care providers.
Gloria Anzaldúa describes borderlands as “physically present wherever two or
more cultures edge each other, where people of different races occupy the same
territory, where under, lower, middle, and upper classes touch, where the space
between two individuals shrinks with intimacy” (, ). Her writing, which
derives from her own experience growing up as a Latina woman on the Texas-
Mexico border, highlights the psychological meaning of living between two cul-
tures. Among other things, this postcolonial situation requires of those who live
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in it a tolerance of the ambiguity that results from contact with multiple, some-
times contradictory cultural frames.
The concept of borderlands is relevant to our examination of behavior
change among people with dementia and primary care settings in at least three
ways. First, behavioral aspects of dementia have occupied a borderland in the
history of the professional description and diagnostic criteria of dementia. Af-
ter years of languishing in the shadows of cognitive symptomatology, there is
now a flourishing scientific discourse and debate about dementia behavioral
symptoms, their etiology, and their management. Second, in routine primary
care settings, “troublesome” behaviors often elude formal medical intervention
because of their ambiguous nature. Families and primary care clinicians
struggle to clarify, understand, and negotiate care for these changes, highlight-
ing what Sharon Kaufman () has referred to as the boundaries of profes-
sional authority. Third, primary care settings can be viewed as contested spaces.
They are contested because of the sometimes competing agendas of patients,
families, primary care providers, insurance companies, and health systems.
Within these borderlands of primary care, families and primary care providers
are not passive, but actively resist what they view as oppressive bureaucratic
structures or inadequate care.
In this chapter, we will describe two cases that differ substantially in the
degree of intimacy and trust that is achieved between family and primary care
physician. Despite their differences, each case shows the relevance of border-
lands to the experience of families and primary care physicians, with particular
attention to how these clinical and interpersonal processes of care are influ-
enced by larger structural forces (health-care bureaucracies, political economy
of health care, physician education), which operate somewhat in opposition to
“expert” discourse on the diagnosis and management of Alzheimer’s disease
and related dementias. Our attention to the structural and cultural contexts of
care is influenced by the work of Cohen (), who emphasizes the need to
examine multiple perspectives, including those of biology, culture, and political
economy, in relationship to local contexts and politics of communities and
families in order to account for medicalization of senility. The importance of
structural constraints in the management of chronic illness in contemporary
American health-care settings has been highlighted by others (Good ;
Kaufman ; Kleinman ; Mitteness and Barker ). These structural
constraints, combined with the lack of formal training for primary care provid-
ers in the care of persons with dementia and the latter’s skepticism of “expert”
knowledge, converge to make the medicalization of noncognitive, behavioral
changes less likely. The outcomes are varied, and they are complicated by cul-
tural, gender, and age differences in the clinical encounter. Before discussing
the case material, we review historical and contemporary perspectives on
dementia behavioral symptoms to highlight their borderland status.
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Nosological Borderlands from Past to Present
In this section we focus on the marginalization of behavioral symptoms in diag-
nostic criteria for dementia, despite ample data showing that they are common
clinical features, and then turn to a description of the reemergence of behav-
ioral symptoms as an area of active scientific interest in dementia research. We
will not review the critique of the construction of Alzheimer’s disease and other
forms of dementia as distinct disease entities (Gubrium ; Lyman ).
Clinical diagnostic criteria for dementia emphasize cognitive symptoms and
deemphasize noncognitive, behavioral symptoms. For example, according to
the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV), the most widely used diagnostic manual in American psychiatry, de-
mentia is a clinical syndrome characterized by cognitive impairment that repre-
sents deterioration from a previous state and is associated with functional
decline (American Psychiatric Association ). Cognitive impairments are
further defined as short-term-memory loss and at least one additional domain
of cognitive impairment, such as apraxia, agnosia, aphasia, or loss of executive
functioning. There are multiple diagnoses (based on presumed etiologies) that
fall under the general rubric of dementia, including a cluster of what are com-
monly referred to as the degenerative dementias: Alzheimer’s disease, vascular
dementia, and frontotemporal dementia. The first two dementia subtypes are
much more elaborated in DSM-IV, and behavioral symptoms are not part of the
core description of either. Clinicians are, however, encouraged to subtype,
specifying predominant behavioral symptoms (that is, with delusions, with de-
pression, or with behavioral disturbance), although this is not essential for di-
agnosis or billing purposes. While frontotemporal dementia does not have
explicit diagnostic criteria in DSM-IV, its clinical description does include an
emphasis on changes in personality and behavior (Miller and Gustavson ).
It is worth noting that one of the core diagnostic criteria for dementia with Lewy
bodies, which is not included in DSM-IV but will likely emerge as a diagnostic
category in DSM-V, is the presence of visual hallucinations.
The omission of behavioral symptoms from the description of Alzheimer’s
disease can be traced to the early part of the twentieth century. In a historical
review of the social and scientific construction of the Alzheimer’s disease cat-
egory, Cohen (), citing Berrios (), demonstrates how behavioral symp-
toms moved to the periphery of the diagnostic criteria for this particular
subtype of dementia. Alois Alzheimer’s initial description of a patient with
Alzheimer’s disease in  gave equal weight to both cognitive (memory loss)
and behavioral (hallucinations, delusions, depression) symptomatology. Sev-
eral years later, Emil Kraeplin used this clinical description as the basis for the
creation of a disease category bearing Alzheimer’s name, distinguishing it from
senile dementia, which was first described several decades earlier by
Binswanger. As reviewed by Fox (), the distinction between senile dementia
THE BORDERLANDS OF PRIMARY CARE 47
and Alzheimer’s disease was much debated at the time and over the ensuing
years. Fox makes the point that technological developments, particularly the
development of the electron microscope, which allowed more detailed study of
brain neuropathology, were critical in the elimination of the word presenile from
the definition of Alzheimer’s and paved the way for its description in DSM-III
and beyond. However, as highlighted by Cohen () and Berrios (), the
DSM retained Kraeplin’s emphasis on cognitive symptoms in his description of
Alzheimer’s disease and deemphasized the noncognitive symptomatology that
was so carefully documented and emphasized by Alzheimer himself. While
DSM-III did include “personality change” as one of the core criteria for demen-
tia, this was subsequently dropped in DSM-IV.
Although behavioral changes are not part of the criteria for Alzheimer’s
disease and vascular dementia, clinical and social gerontological literature over
the past twenty years has continued to highlight their importance. In one of the
earliest clinical epidemiological studies, Reisberg and colleagues () found
that  percent of Alzheimer’s patients had significant behavioral symptoma-
tology, with delusions, agitation, day-night disturbance, motor restlessness, and
violence among the most common symptoms. Community-based epidemiologi-
cal studies have also found that mental and behavioral disturbances are much
more common in people with dementia compared with their nondemented or
mildly cognitively impaired counterparts (Hinton et al., forthcoming, Lyketsos
et al. ). Early on, studies of families revealed that what was often most dis-
turbing to them was not the extent of cognitive impairment or disability, but
the disruptive behavioral symptoms, such as hallucinations, delusions, and agi-
tation (Schulz et al ). Subsequent studies found that these symptoms are
associated with elevated caregiver depression and felt burden, increased rates
of hospitalization, early institutionalization, excess disability, and higher
health-care costs (Beeri et al. ; Donaldson, Tarrier, and Burns ; Finkel
et al. ; Norton, Malloy, and Salloway ; O’Donnell et al. ; Schulz et al.
).
Current scientific discourse on behavioral symptomatology contains two
alternative sets of theories about etiology. From the perspective of neuropsy-
chiatry and neurology, there is a strong tendency to view these symptoms as
brain based, that is, a result of pathological changes in the brain, particularly in
neurotransmitter systems such as acetylcholine, dopamine, serotonin, and
norepinephrine. In an example of this approach, Jeffrey Cummings has recently
published an article speculating that acetylcholine deficiency, which has long
been considered a factor in the development of cognitive deficits, is also impli-
cated in the development of neuropsychiatric symptoms (Cummings and Back
). This medical approach to behavioral symptoms leads to an emphasis on
pharmacological substances as a treatment. In contrast, perspectives on the eti-
ology of behavioral disturbances from a social work and nursing perspective
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give greater emphasis to environmental and psychological factors. Cohen-
Mansfield (), in a recent summary of research, highlights three alternative
formulations: () behavioral problems as signs of underlying unmet needs or,
essentially as idioms of distress; () stress/vulnerability causing behavioral
problems as a result of a process in which dementia lowers the threshold at
which environmental stimuli influence behavior (for example, overstimu-
lation); and () learning/behavioral models. This formulation of behavioral
problems underpins a set of nonpharmacological approaches to treatment.
To the critical eye, much remains ambiguous about behavioral symptoms.
While symptoms such as hallucinations are abnormal, where one draws the line
between normal and pathological levels of other neuropsychiatric symptoms,
such as depression or aggression, remains unclear. Reflecting this, existing in-
struments that measure behavioral symptomatology (Cummings ; Reisberg
et al. ) are continuous and do not clearly demarcate “normal” from “abnor-
mal,” leaving uncertainty about where this boundary lies. When symptoms are
present, clinicians must rely heavily on the statements of family caregivers,
whose reports are filtered through the lens of their own emotional states, bi-
ases, and agendas, making older adults with dementia more vulnerable to the
medicalization of behavior in response to caregiver distress. Finally, pharmaco-
logical and nonpharmacological interventions for behavioral problems, while
clearly helpful in some clinical situations, have modest effects overall (Bour-
geois, Schulz, and Burgios ; Trinh et al. ). Nonpharmacological inter-
ventions remain underused, perhaps reflecting a bias in research toward a
neuropsychiatric (brain-based) view of symptomatology.
The Larger Project
The case studies that follow are drawn from a larger, ongoing study whose over-
all goal is to better understand patterns of help-seeking and barriers related to
behavior changes in people who have received a formal diagnosis of some type
of degenerative dementia. Interest in the role of sociocultural factors, specifi-
cally gender and ethnicity, led to a comparative focus on Latinos and Anglos.
Thus, our study focuses primarily on the social responses to behavior changes
after the point of diagnosis through in-depth qualitative interviews with both
families (spouses or adult children) and primary care providers (PCP). Families
were selected from two sources: a memory-loss clinic at a major university hos-
pital and an ongoing epidemiological study of older Latinos. Interviews are con-
ducted first with family members and then, with the family’s permission, PCPs.
Family interviews focus on the caregiver’s experience of caregiving; the chal-
lenges they face in day-to-day care, including any behavioral difficulties; their
patterns of help-seeking (both formal and informal); and their experience of
care in primary care settings. The interviews with PCPs focus on their experi-
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ences in the diagnosis and management of dementia and on their care of the
specific person with dementia through whom they were identified.
The Contexts of Primary Care
As documented by Fitzhugh Mullan () in Big Doctoring in America, the field
of primary care has undergone dramatic changes in recent years, largely as a
result of managed care. Many physicians have given up solo practices to become
members of larger groups in an increasingly competitive health-care market-
place. Our data were gathered in a major metropolitan area in Northern Califor-
nia, where a higher percentage of elderly opt for managed-care plans, which
restrict choice but often offer enhanced coverage for medications. Most of the
clinicians we have interviewed thus far are internists or family practice physi-
cians who work in outpatient clinic settings with typical patient loads averaging
twenty-five hundred patients. The percentage of elderly patients on individual
physician panels varied widely, from a low of  percent to more than  per-
cent. Few physicians received specialty training in geriatrics, with most learning
“on the job.”
There is great variation across health systems and primary care clinics in
the support systems provided for clinicians in their management of patients
with dementia and their families. Since few of the PCPs have particular exper-
tise in dementia or psychiatry, the availability and accessibility of referrals to
specialists, particularly neurologists and psychiatrists or other mental health
professionals, is a major concern. Although neurologists are generally perceived
to be available, providers consistently complain about linkages with mental
health, and psychiatry in particular. In one system, there is significant integra-
tion of physical and mental health care, with a behavioral mental health spe-
cialist available on site to assist clinicians. At the other sites, mental health
remains more of a “theoretical” than a real resource and is marginalized in
these stories except as the object of considerable complaint.
As a result of this, patterns of specialty referral for dementia are heavily
tilted toward neurology, with the burden of recognition and treatment for psy-
chiatric problems falling on the PCP. There are also emerging differences be-
tween PCPs in urban and rural areas, where access to resources such as
specialists; translators; and social and medical programs for the elderly with
dementia and their families, such as day care, visiting nurses, and support
groups, is much sparser. The lack of access to specialists, combined with prob-
lems in finding additional time to deal with both the physical and psychological
health of these elderly patients, difficulties in billing for behavioral problems,
and limited and expensive pharmaceutical arsenals for treating dementia pa-
tients, plus the reams of paperwork and forms required to allow the family to
access support, places a heavy burden on the PCP.
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The overall approach to managing behavioral problems that we are finding
is what one PCP refers to as “reactive care” in which the family is relied upon to
seek out help for these “problems.” The primary care office can be viewed as the
borderland to which patients, caregivers, and physicians bring their respective
cultures—personal, social, and structural—to bear on providing care for the eld-
erly with dementia. Within clinical encounters, families and primary care clini-
cians often share intimacy and caring at the same time that they struggle to
clarify, understand, and negotiate care for the ambiguous nature of behavioral
changes, highlighting the borders of professional authority and personal
responsibility.
The Jones Family and Dr. Henry
Surveys find that Americans are quite critical of physicians generally, but they
tend to hold their own personal physician in much higher regard. Satisfaction
and a degree of closeness would seem to characterize the relationship of a num-
ber of family caregivers and PCPs we interviewed, including the Joneses and Dr.
Henry. Mr. and Mrs. Jones, both retired professionals, are healthy looking, ener-
getic adults in their mid-seventies and have lived in their current home, which
is located in the suburb of a major metropolitan area, for nearly as long as they
have been married, fifty years. Although they are still active as a couple in many
volunteer organizations, in travel, and in social events, Mr. Jones has become
more dependent on his wife for initiating and maintaining these activities.
More recently, Mrs. Jones took over the finances of the family. With no local
family members to help care for Mr. Jones, Mrs. Jones pays caregivers to help out
so that she can maintain some semblance of the autonomous active lifestyle to
which she was accustomed.
When Mrs. Jones first noticed her husband’s memory loss two years ago,
she was distressed by the cavalier attitude of her husband’s PCP in making the
diagnosis and felt that the physician was not thorough enough in his assess-
ment. A self-described “go-getter” who is heavily involved in her husband’s
care, she sought a second opinion through a memory-loss clinic and had her
husband switch doctors to Dr. Henry, in that order. She is quite complimentary
when speaking about Dr. Henry, her husband’s current PCP, who accurately di-
agnosed her husband’s heart condition one year ago, enabling him to get a
pacemaker that may well have saved his life. At the same time, she expects rela-
tively little from him with regard to dementia care, in part because she views the
neurologist as being “first” (in order of involvement with her husband’s demen-
tia care) and as more of an expert.
MRS. JONES: Dr. Henry seems to want to get on top of all the little minor things
before we hit a big problem. He’s got too many patients. I can never keep
THE BORDERLANDS OF PRIMARY CARE 51
him there long enough. But he’s the one that if he doesn’t know, he’ll find
out before we come back the next time. He doesn’t know about medica-
tions. See this Aricept and Exelon and all that. He didn’t know much about
that—nothing in fact—but he does now.
INTERVIEWER: Dr. Henry didn’t know anything about those at all?
MRS. JONES: No. I mean he’s a GP [general practitioner].
On the surface, Mr. Jones suffers from what would be characterized clini-
cally as “mild” dementia; he appears quite normal—is extroverted and jovial—
and is able to interact in a socially appropriate ways with others. In addition to
the dementia, he suffers from heart disease, diabetes, and hearing loss. Despite
his apparent cheerfulness, Mr. Jones can become quite irritable and—in the
past six months—more physically aggressive. These episodes tend to be trig-
gered by Mrs. Jones’s attempts to get him to do things around the house, such as
setting the house alarm, or taking his own medications.
MRS. JONES: Like his pills, he said, “I don’t know where you keep them.” “Take
your pills now.” I have a card there that tells him exactly what to do in the
morning. Turn it over, exactly what to do at night. “Where are they, where
are my pills?” “Same place they were yesterday: in the basket on the table.”
He would get so mad at me when he can’t remember how to do his blood
count.
INTERVIEWER: And he gets frustrated?
MRS. JONES: Terribly, I really don’t think that I should help him step by step be-
cause the more I help him, the more he expects me to help him. . . . Right
now the big thing that we got going, we have an alarm system in the house
and I make him set it every night. It’s four digits, which is our secret code,
and then two other things that he has to push. I make him undo it in the
morning when he gets up. If he doesn’t, then he sets off the thing and it’s
awfully loud. I told the neurologist that’s what I was doing, and he says
“Fine, that’s great,” so I feel that the more I make him think, the better off
he’s going to be. Maybe I’m wrong.
INTERVIEWER: How do you deal with that when he, you know, gets frustrated or
angry? How do you . . . ?
MRS. JONES: I don’t hit the wall like he does sometimes. Going down the hallway
there, pow! I don’t do that. I just say, “Now think, think.”
INTERVIEWER: How often does that happen?
MRS. JONES: (Crying) Every day now . . . ’cause he takes pills twice a day.
Although initially Mrs. Jones seemed to downplay the extent and intensity of
her husband’s irritability, it is apparent here that these episodes are both
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frequent and quite upsetting to her. As she put it, “He vents at me.” She under-
stands his frustration and anger as a psychological response to his problems
with memory and functioning and his growing dependence on his wife. Reflect-
ing on his difficulties, she says, “Well, I know what causes it. It’s that he doesn’t
want to give up his man-in-charge and he has had to.”
Mr. Jones is under the care of both a neurologist and his PCP, yet Mrs. Jones
says that she has not discussed the seriousness of these episodes of agitation
with either of them. His neurologist sees him infrequently and the visits are
brief. Asked why she does not talk to Dr. Henry about it, she drew the distinc-
tion between “physical” and “mental” health issues and emphasized that he is
the expert in the former, rather than the latter.
INTERVIEWER: And would there be any reluctance to mention the moods, or the
irritability, or the swearing to Dr. Henry?
MRS. JONES: Oh no, I could do it, but I don’t know what good it would do. I don’t
think he would appreciate me saying anything because his interest in [Mr.
Jones] is in the physical part of him, not in the mental part of him.
Although Mrs. Jones clearly has high regard for Dr. Henry, she does not feel
that he is “knowledgeable about the disease,” and her husband has enough
physical health problems. This attitude was somewhat surprising, as our initial
sense of Mrs. Jones was that of a very agentic (that is, assertive and aggressive)
caregiver. It is as if she does not want to jeopardize the satisfactory medical care
she receives for her husband by being too demanding of the PCP regarding de-
mentia or emotional care.
In important respects, Dr. Henry, a young family-practice physician, agrees
with Mrs. Jones’s assessment. Dr. Henry does note that the primary behavioral
problems are “essentially surrounding fatigue types of issues and lack of want-
ing to do very many things, sort of being semiwithdrawn . . . the wife also noted
a few instances of a short temper, agitation types of things.” However, he has
not seen the Joneses in more than six months—the period during which Mrs.
Jones said the venting became worse. He admits he does not really know how
severe the “agitation” is, in part because Mr. Jones and his wife seem to perceive
these incidents differently:
DR. HENRY: You know, when I was talking to them about this . . . and having him
sit there and go, “Ah, I don’t see that,” and having her say, “Yes, I saw it,” and
this and that. I take the road that life-experience-wise they’re a lot more
experienced than I am. But I always tell all my patients it doesn’t matter the
age difference between us, I’m going to be open with you. . . . He [Mr. Jones]
totally downplays it. He doesn’t really see it as a problem and I don’t know if
it actually is a problem or if it’s just normal spouse conversation. Yeah, I
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didn’t think that it was something that was concerning enough for me to
intervene.
As a participant in this borderland, Dr. Henry has alternatives that are lim-
ited not only by structural constraints but also by the limits of what he observes
or is told. In this relatively brief two-year relationship, the differences in age,
experience, training, and agendas as well as the structural constraints of the
medical system both benefit and interfere with adequate treatment of Mr.
Jones.
Dr. Henry describes his role as a PCP as that of being an “anchor” for his
patients and a conduit for the opinions and recommendations of specialists,
which he can interpret for families:
DR. HENRY: I think that my primary role is an anchor, OK? And that is having
good communication with the family members or caregiver for that par-
ticular patient and then making sure that they’re associated with a neu-
rologist. Also having close follow-up—which I haven’t had with him
yet—close follow-up with him, keeping an eye out for any changes, also as a
person that the family can feel comfortable coming and saying, you know, I
went and saw this doctor, they prescribed me this type of medication, I
have this question regarding this medication. I have a little bit more time
on my hands and little bit more follow-up capacity to be able to let me pull
up a couple of articles on this particular treatment regimen and I can re-
view that with you sort of like an educator as well.
However, in his practice, this integrated model does not work well when
mental health specialists are needed, though it is unclear that this is an option
he has ever considered for the Joneses. Access to specialty mental health is par-
ticularly difficult because for many patients, including Mr. Jones, benefits have
been “carved out” to a group of mental health providers separate from the pro-
viders of the rest of his health care. He described at length how cumbersome
and difficult it is to refer patients for mental health treatment as a result of the
presence of mental health carve-outs. As a result of the long delays in getting
patients referred, he often finds that he is left to manage the mental health
problems at least for a while: the phenomenon he describes, mental health
carve-outs, have become much more common over the past ten years with the
spread of managed care. They were introduced in response to mental health
parity legislation largely because major health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) were concerned that they would not be able to contain the mental
health costs. Mental health benefit is carved out to another bureaucratic entity,
which is subcapitated to care for the mental health care at a certain level of
benefit, for the specified populations. In the context of mental health carve-out,
Dr. Henry often finds that when patients do receive mental health treatment,
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the communication from the providers of mental health care back to the PCPs is
inadequate; care becomes fractured. The relative lack of access to mental health
specialty care has changed Dr. Henry’s strategies for managing mental health
issues so that he relies much more heavily on neurologists and himself, even for
problems that he considers to be psychiatric.
Discussion of the Jones Family and Dr. Henry
What is most striking in this case is the failure to “medicalize” Mr. Jones’s be-
havioral symptoms. Dementia is a chronic illness, and there is often consider-
able “uncertainty” about the cause of “changes.” Are they essentially
expressions of interpersonal distress in response to his wife’s efforts to keep
him mentally active, a psychological reaction to his growing dependence on his
wife, or signs of underlying brain disease? Mrs. Jones settles on an explanation
that attributes Mr. Jones’s irritability and aggression to marital discord trig-
gered by the difficulties in adjusting to his increased dependence on his wife
and to her prodding that he does more. From Mr. Jones’s perspective, these
outbursts are understandable responses to a tragic loss of ability to function as
he once had; his increasing reliance on his wife; and role reversal, which threat-
ens his sense of self and manhood. Even with us, Mrs. Jones seemed to downplay
the significance of his “venting” episodes and has yet to speak with physicians
about the worsening venting and wall banging. Interestingly enough, even
though Mrs. Jones says that she has not spoken with Dr. Henry in detail, Dr.
Henry apparently has observed some of these spousal dynamics in his office
visits. While hedging his bets somewhat, he basically views their difficulties as
“normal spouse conversation” and thus outside his domain. For Mrs. Jones,
what is clearly at stake in the issue of whether her husband’s irritability is
caused by psychosocial stress or his Alzheimer’s are issues of loss, personhood,
and identity that go very much to the core of their marriage. The alternative of
medicalization of the irritability, though potentially providing relief from the
strain of coping with these problems, is to let the disease enter further into
their personal lives. In addition, she does not view Dr. Henry as a resource for
these types of problems—only for physical health issues. Dr. Henry, by contrast,
appears to be doing his best to mediate the problem away, considering each
person’s opinion in an egalitarian fashion and attempting to do his best to ne-
gotiate a solution, much as if he were providing marital counseling. While Dr.
Henry values Mr. Jones’s perspective, there is a tacit assumption that Mr.
Jones’s “voice” needs to be balanced with that of his wife, reflecting his dimin-
ished autonomy personally and his ability to make medical decisions for him-
self. While Mrs. Jones has sought expert help both for Mr. Jones’s physical
health problems and for his dementia diagnosis, that same energy has yet to be
used in regard to the behavioral problems.
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The multitude of constraints revealed in our interview with Dr. Henry sug-
gests a somewhat different yet complementary reading. For patients who have
been diagnosed with dementia, the reality is that PCPs and systems of care are
often poorly equipped to provide the type of care that is described by experts. In
the case of Mr. Jones, Dr. Henry sees him once every four to six months, mainly
for management of Mr. Jones’s physical health problems. Mrs. Jones and Dr.
Henry mutually allow care of his dementia to be performed by a neurologist,
who allots fifteen to twenty minutes for office visits every six months or so.
Although mental health specialty care is a theoretical possibility, it is not even
under consideration yet by either the family or the physician. In any case, it is
for all practical purposes out of reach, because of maddening layers of bureau-
cracy, which severely limit access and disrupt continuity. Mrs. Jones and Dr.
Henry agree that the latter has little expertise in managing the “mental health”
aspects of care; they also persist in viewing Mr. Jones’s emotional problems as
constituting a marital style as opposed to a concomitant of dementia. These
constraints may tacitly operate to direct efforts at help seeking away from the
formal health care system and toward other sources, such as Mrs. Jones’s net-
work of female friends. Thus, in this case, the medical office becomes a border-
land where personal, marital, medical, and psychiatric issues collide, yet remain
unresolved, if not unrecognized. Finally, we are left to wonder if Dr. Henry’s
resistance to medicalize is shaped by his own reluctance to engage “mental
health issues” in his practice, to keep a lid on this Pandora’s box.
The Garcia Family and Dr. Paul
The systemic constraints and challenges that physicians face in the delivery of
services to patients who have been diagnosed with dementia is furthered nu-
anced by linguistic and cultural differences between physician, family, and pa-
tient. The intimacy needed to forge a treatment alliance of family members,
patient, and physician is difficult to achieve when the physician misunder-
stands or lacks the cultural knowledge to contextualize the patient’s idioms of
distress.
Mr. Garcia and his wife live in a small modest house located in an alley
between two streets. Both were born in Michoacan, Mexico, and moved to the
United States more than fifty years ago. They have been married for fifty years
and are both in their seventies. Mr. Garcia is a retired farmworker and is mono-
lingual Spanish speaking. They have four children; two live in the Sacramento
area. While Mr. Garcia lives with his wife and cares for her day to day, their
oldest son, José, manages his mother’s health care, in a pattern that is quite
common among immigrant Mexican families. At this point in time she is basi-
cally nonverbal, yet is still able to perform some basic care. A social worker
comes to the home once every few months to evaluate her condition, and the
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family has hired a caregiver to help out for a few hours a day, to provide addi-
tional support for Mr. Garcia.
For the past four years Mrs. Garcia has experienced multiple health prob-
lems. In addition to suffering from her ongoing diabetes, high blood pressure,
heart condition, recent stroke, and memory loss, in  she was hospitalized
for six months because of sepsis—at one point falling in to a coma. The resulting
weight loss, decrease in appetite, and continued extreme pain, as well as her
increased distress, depression, and anxiety, spurred José to become aggressively
involved in his mother’s health care. He changed health systems in late ,
leaving the mother’s long-term physician for a new PCP and also searching for
better solutions to his mother’s depression, anxiety, and hallucinations.
The central theme of the interview with the Garcias, told primarily from
José’s perspective, is the struggle to obtain an accurate diagnosis and treatment
for his mother’s behavioral symptoms. Their story is an interesting one, be-
cause it begins with her development of feelings of depression, anxiety, and
memory problems while she was also suffering from a number of other health
problems. Later, the mother started having visions of her deceased mother and
father. When the son brought these symptoms to the attention of her PCP, the
latter diagnosed her with depression and prescribed an antidepressant. José
was not satisfied with the diagnosis, because his mother’s visions signaled to
him that her troubles could not be explained just as depression or nerves: “The
most alarming sign was when she said she saw her father or mother. I was sure
this was not part of her depression.”
José discussed these symptoms with her PCPs and complained over and
over again that her symptoms could not possibly be attributed to irritable bowel
syndrome or depression alone, yet the PCP continued to maintain that all these
things were part of the depression and part of the aging process itself.
MRS. GARCIA’S SON: She was in the care of a doctor, but the doctor would always
say that it was due in part to her age, and in part to a problem—ah, she was
very depressed and had a lot of problems with anxiety. And the doctor at-
tributed those mental problems to that. I would tell the doctor that it
wasn’t OK, that her behavior was not OK, her behavior was not in accor-
dance with a depressed person, with a person with anxiety.
After about a year, Mrs. Garcia’s new PCP left the clinic and she came under
the care of her current PCP, Dr. Paul, who also spoke some Spanish. When José
approached the new doctor, however, he felt that he received a similar response
to his concerns about this mother’s behavioral symptoms.
MRS. GARCIA’S SON:  Well, this doctor left and we got another one. Then when we
got the other doctor we spoke to him about the same problem. And this
doctor was almost—I don’t know why they have the same mentality—he
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said something similar to what the other doctor had said, but . . . I would
always tell him that it wasn’t logical, their explanations.
He also requested that his mother be seen by a psychiatrist, but felt that his
doctor stonewalled and was very defensive because his authority had been chal-
lenged. About the same time that Mrs. Garcia switched health systems, José set
out to research the Internet for answers. He had learned about Alzheimer’s dis-
ease on the television show / and felt that his mother exhibited many
symptoms of that condition; he then went online to research information, fi-
nally finding the Web site of a memory-loss clinic. He arranged for his mother to
be evaluated there, and she was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. This pro-
vided him with an explanation that made sense. Armed with a diagnosis of
Alzheimer’s and recommendations from the memory-loss clinic, which in-
cluded treatment of the hallucinations, José was finally able to get his PCP to
prescribe an antipsychotic medication for his mother’s hallucinations. While
her depression, anxiety, and hallucinations have stabilized, José feels quite bit-
ter about his experiences in the health-care system and continues to search for
an alternative site of health care for his mother.
Although the Garcias’ journey to finding care for Mrs. Garcia has been
riddled with difficulties, her son, wanting answers, fought his way through a
nonsupportive system to find them. He has been relentless in finding a doctor
or clinic that would give him “logical answers” to his concerns. He challenged
doctors’ diagnoses to the point of arguing with them. He explained that living in
this country means fighting for answers, for the things that you need. His father,
by contrast, has a more accepting, passive approach to medical care. This in-
cludes a much more deferential stance toward doctors, through the belief that
they must know what they are doing. It is clear that neither approach has
yielded optimal care for Mrs. Garcia’s complicated comorbid medical and be-
havioral problems.
This case shows us how the approach to health care of an educated bilin-
gual adult child differs from that of a monolingual immigrant farmworker. This
is not to say that all migrant monolingual farmworkers would take this passive
approach, yet we have had similar cases in which adult children are the ones
taking the lead in their parents’ health care. They are more aggressive about
getting answers to their questions. They do not have the cultural value that a
doctor must know what he or she is talking about and is not questioned. Fur-
thermore, knowledge of English, the ability to converse directly with physicians,
and the capacity to seek answers by using technology facilitated José’s search for
a solution to his mother’s illness. Mr. Garcia, however, was hesitant to challenge
the medical status quo. In fact, he was guarded about the interview itself, ex-
pressed hesitancy in challenging the doctor, and was uncomfortable with his
son’s assertiveness. In Mrs. Garcia’s case, without her son’s intervention, she
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would still be undiagnosed, suffering from hallucinations, depression, and anxi-
ety and not receiving the appropriate treatment. Since her diagnosis, she has
been given medication for Alzheimer’s disease and for the hallucinations,
which ceased shortly after she began taking the medicine.
This case reflects some common patterns of caregiving among Latinos.
While the spouse was involved in the day-to-day care of his wife, it was the adult
child who negotiated the health-care system. In other families we have inter-
viewed who have several adult children, most if not all are involved in support-
ing the ill parent by taking him or her to the doctor, searching for information
and treatment, and supporting the spouse by taking on these tasks. Moreover,
we have noted significant differences in how immigrant compared with U.S.-
born children negotiate the barriers to health care. Mexican-immigrant adult
children appear to feel less comfortable challenging, confronting, or even ques-
tioning physicians. It must be noted that most of the caregivers we have inter-
viewed primarily migrated from rural Mexico, have less education, and may have
had less access to health care while in Mexico. Therefore, as a result of these
demographic characteristics, they may appear to have less agency. The pattern
of deferring to authority may be exacerbated postmigration, as they are not able
to negotiate the health-care system without adequate English-language skills.
Dr. Paul is a young family-practice physician who presented himself as a
caring, but naive and overwhelmed, physician, unprepared for the challenges of
dementia care. Even before we were through the consent process, he began talk-
ing about the terrible impact of mental health carve-outs on clinical care. This
was a major theme throughout the interview, as he described the enormous
difficulties involved in referring patients for mental health evaluation—some-
thing that often places him in the position of having to manage patients. He
says that his patients’ mental health services are constantly being carved out to
new sets of providers. This has several effects. For patients who are on cognitive
enhancers, for example, a new insurance company may require a lengthy prior-
authorization process before the patient is allowed to get the medication. This
results in a period of time when they do not take the medication, because their
prescription from the old insurance has run out but they are not yet approved
by the new insurance company. Some of these patients go “downhill” when they
are taken off the medication. This is such a problem that Dr. Paul is inclined to
prescribe cognitive enhancers less readily. He says that his patients’ insurance
is changing “all the time.” Another problem is that in the current system, he has
to wait for a long time before he can arrange for his patients to see specialists,
particularly mental health specialists. While he often finds himself forced to see
them, he then faces the hurdle of billing for the services, as the insurance com-
pany will often not allow him to charge under psychiatric diagnostic codes.
He described Mrs. Garcia’s case in some detail, particularly the family dy-
namics. Clearly, this was a challenging and frustrating case, one that caused the
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clinic to take the extreme position of limiting office visits, because of the high
frequency of these visits, which included the family’s often showing up unan-
nounced. Dr. Paul felt that their pattern of help-seeking was driven by Mrs.
Garcia’s son, who, he believed, had unrealistic expectations about the extent to
which his mother would recover. Interestingly, the issue of dementia was rarely
discussed in the background of that conversation, with more emphasis being
placed on family dynamics. There was relatively little discussion from him of the
dementia diagnosis. However, he also tells us that the focus of the family was
less on dementia symptoms and more on her physical ailments—in particular
her abdominal pain. He readily admits that he does not have either the time or
the training to manage many medical issues in his practice, including dementia
and mental health issues:
DR. PAUL: I’m not the best, I’m not the best qualified. And I don’t have enough
time, and that’s tough, it really, you know, it is very hard to know, I cannot
believe how much other medicine that I do, that I really don’t want to do,
and it’s not that I don’t want to do this, but there are some aspects I really
don’t want to do, and I’m like, oh, wow, want to see a specialist, next ap-
pointment, six months, well I guess we’re working together for a while here
until we get this taken care of or worked through.
As the interview moves to a description of the patient, it is interesting that
dementia is so much in the background of this case. This may have some impor-
tant consequences for care. For example, Dr. Paul describes his exasperation at
the inconsistencies in his patient’s presentation—when she is in the room alone
and when she is in the room with her son. However, he suggests that this may be
a result of her loss of verbal abilities as well as cultural differences between
himself and the family. The difficulties of communication with the family, since
the patient is not a reliable source of information, may make it much more
difficult to identify and treat behavioral symptoms, particularly when the family
is labeled as a “problem” family:
DR. PAUL: This is the tough part, because I think he went overboard and then it
was very hard to then figure out where the compromise was, because you’d
really rather have somebody say, “Something’s different,” as opposed to the
same thing over, and over, and over again. Something’s different then,
then, oh, now I got to pay attention. Maybe now there’s something wrong
that we can try to address, and that was hard.
INTERVIEWER: In this family did you feel that the family dynamics contributed to
good or better care for her, that the son was as involved as he was, or did
you think that the family dynamics, did the son and the father agree basi-
cally? Did they have the same agenda?
DR. PAUL: I don’t think they had the same agenda. The son’s agenda was to get
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her back [to] how she was. She’s not the same, get her back, and the
husband’s agenda was not that. He just wanted her to feel comfortable. He
didn’t want her to be in pain for sure, but I think he understood when there
was nothing wrong, he was like, OK, there’s nothing really wrong. OK, he
was much more accepting, right from the get-go.
At the same time as Dr. Paul had some insight and appreciation for the
plight of the Garcia’s, he seemed particularly limited—both in his professional
training and in the health-system bureaucracy in providing care for them.
Discussion of the Garcias and Dr. Paul
This case exemplifies the inherent difficulties of delivering medical services to
the elderly with dementia while needing to negotiate managed care, carve-outs,
and the challenges of a cross-cultural medical encounter. Dr. Paul experienced
the family and the case as a difficult one. Despite his feeling that he was cultur-
ally aware, and that his Spanish benefited the interactions that he had with the
family, Dr. Paul appeared unaware that somatization of behavioral and psychiat-
ric symptoms is common among Latinos and may well have explained Mrs.
Garcia’s presentation. He also appeared not to be aware of the highly interde-
pendent nature of many Mexican-immigrant families or the role of adult chil-
dren as linguistic and cultural interpreters or brokers for the parents and,
instead, problematized José’s effort to help. What we were unable to ascertain
was whether the conflicts arose from the extreme differences in agendas—José’s
to bring his mother back to her original health, alleviate her pain, and treat her
depression and hallucinations; Dr. Paul’s to care for this frail elderly patient
with multiple health problems at the same time as he conformed to the bureau-
cratic demands of his clinic and colleagues.
Dr. Paul’s self-admitted lack of training and experience in assessing and
treating people with dementia and his limited cultural awareness appeared to
create a frustrating and unsatisfactory relationship for both him and the
Garcias. Once the family was labeled problematic, and their contact with the
clinic was significantly constrained, the medical encounter became a contested
borderland for both, one where the doctor and clinic staff were viewed as exces-
sively controlling, if not denying, care to Mrs. Garcia. The family felt no connec-
tion to the doctor and the doctor appeared to feel burdened by the family’s
demands, precluding the development of the intimacy, respect, and coopera-
tion that Latinos value in their interactions with doctors.
Conclusion
The extent to which these borderlands of primary care are constrained by eco-
nomic and bureaucratic structures needs to be highlighted. Lack of adequate
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training in geriatrics and mental health for PCPs, large patient panels and rela-
tively short office visits, very limited access to specialists for anything other
than consultation, and lack of continuity in formal services are just some of the
structural barriers that limit the options available to families and physicians in
managing the sometimes “troublesome” behaviors of people with dementia.
When resources are very limited, the expectations of both patients/families and
PCPs may be realistically lowered with respect to the nature and type of care for
behavioral symptoms. The situation described here for behavioral change in
dementia is similar to what Sharon Kaufman described in her study of people
rehabilitating from stroke. She notes that “the structure of social services and
health care delivery, as well as their limits, creates the facts, the only knowledge
that patients and families have as a basis for decision making and coping with
long-term disability” (, ). These constraints make nearly impossible, for
many families, the careful biopsychosocial assessment that would lead to careful
consideration of behavioral symptoms of environmental, interpersonal, and bio-
logical causes of behavioral change; prioritization of early nonpharmacological
interventions, and the use of medications only as a last resort. Instead, the con-
straints of primary care in many cases dictate that there will be, at best, careful
use of pharmaceutical agents to ameliorate symptoms that are presented by
families, often at the point of “crisis.” Ultimately, this reflects the larger prob-
lem of a health-care system that has long excelled at handling acute illness, but
that fails, often miserably, in the management of illness that is chronic.
These forces powerfully shape the experiences of PCPs and families, who,
however, are far from passive. In these cases we can see the extent to which
behavioral changes remain a borderland in the diagnosis and treatment of de-
mentia by going unrecognized, misunderstood, or undiscussed in the primary
care office. Within these borderlands, the influence of ethnic/cultural and gen-
der differences and the power inherent in the role of the physician, caregiver,
and health system can be acknowledged, recognized, and renegotiated to create
sites for collaborative partnership in healing and support, as in the case of the
Joneses, or a failure to treat adequately, as in the case of the Garcias. In some
instances families and physicians can be seen actively resisting systemic pres-
sures, trying their best, sometimes heroically forging humane and decent care
for older adults who have been diagnosed with dementia and their families.
Otherwise, these borderlands, as is especially apparent in the case of the
Garcias, can be characterized by deep interstices within which the human con-
nection that fosters healing can be lost. We suggest that these borderlands need
not be sites of respite from marginalization (Alarcon ; Anzaldúa ), but
also as active terrain where physicians, patients, and patients’ families can form
partnerships that contest the influence of bureaucracy and unnecessary
medicalization. We argue for a closer analysis of systems issues and of the im-
pact of these on providers, families, and patients.
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The Experiences of Forgetful Individuals
Diagnosed with No Dementia
ANDRÉ P.  SMITH
UUUUUUUUUUU
There is evidence to suggest that individuals who complain of memory prob-
lems but have no objective deficits constitute between  and  percent of the
patient population that is seen in memory clinics (Almeida et al. ; Berrios,
Marková, and Girala ). There are conflicting views about the clinical sig-
nificance of such complaints. Berrios, Markovà, and Girala () remark that
because these patients do not fit into any accepted definition of memory disor-
der, attitudes toward “persistent memory complainers with negative neurologi-
cal, neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric assessments tend to be harsher,
particularly in memory clinics whose objective is to collect patients for demen-
tia drug trials” (). Yet most recently, there has been a growing clinical inter-
est in this population because of the possibility that very mild symptoms of
cognitive impairment could, in some cases, progress to overt dementia at a later
stage (Petersen et al. ).
Although much research is now being directed at developing more sensi-
tive psychometric instruments to detect these potentially milder symptoms of
dementia, little is known about the subjective experiences of individuals whose
complaints of cognitive impairment do not fall within quantifiable parameters.
To address this gap in knowledge, this study provides an in-depth account of the
histories of four women ranging in age from forty-four to fifty-seven years who
underwent full clinical evaluation for complaints of mild and sporadic memory
lapses but did not meet criteria for a dementia disorder. While these women
reported impairment that fell outside the realm of psychometric verification,
they nevertheless experienced profound subjective distress that was not neces-
sarily identified during clinical evaluation. This account situates these women’s
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memory problems in relation to the struggles and challenges that characterized
their lives and how these issues were dealt with during clinical assessment.
Literature Review
There is a complex and overlapping nomenclature to describe persons with cog-
nitive impairment that diagnostically extends beyond the normal range relative
to same-age peers but fails to meet criteria for dementia with regards to the
severity of deficits. Kral () initially proposed the term benign senescent forget-
fulness in reference to a slowly progressing age-related mild memory decline,
which he distinguished from malignant senescent forgetfulness, a more rapidly
progressing decline consistent with dementia. Several terms have since been
introduced, including mild dysfunction (Johansson and Zarit ), age-associated
memory impairment (Crook et al. ), late-life forgetfulness (Blackford and La
Rue ), predementia (Reifler ), mild cognitive impairment (Zaudig ),
very mild dementia (Stroehle et al. ), and cognitive impairment, not dementia
(Graham et al. ). The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV [American Psychiatric Association (APA) ]) fea-
tures research criteria for mild neurocognitive disorder (MND). MND refers to
objective impairment verified by cognitive assessment and associated with an
identifiable neurological, medical, or substance abuse condition and that inter-
feres with social, occupational areas of functioning. DSM-IV also features a diag-
nostic category for age-related cognitive impairment attributable to the aging
process but that is within normal range given the person’s age. This condition
can apply to individuals who, for example, experience difficulties remembering
names or appointments or solving complex problems despite the absence of a
mental disorder or neurological condition.
The preceding categories likely capture a heterogeneous group of condi-
tions with varying severity, etiology, and course given that the continuum be-
tween what is normal and what is pathological for dementia is not well
understood. Research on mild cognitive impairment has been spurred by longi-
tudinal evidence suggesting that such impairment can progress to overt demen-
tia in – percent of cases (Petersen et al. ). There is also a more urgent
need to identify dementia-related mild impairment accurately with the recent
advent of drug therapies that can slow the progression of cognitive decline, par-
ticularly when prescribed early on in the disease.
Several nondementia factors have also been associated with mild cognitive
impairment, including fatigue, depressive symptoms, sensory impairments,
and other physical disabilities, as well as social, cultural, and educational issues
(Tuokko, Frerichs, and Kristjansson ). Among those factors, the relation-
ship between depression and cognitive functioning has been best documented
(Kahn et al. ; La Rue, Swan, and Carmelli ). In particular, depressive
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symptoms have been associated with self-reported problems with basic cogni-
tive processes, including memory and concentration (Bola et al., ; McGlone
et al. ; O’Connor et al., ; Basset and Folstein ; Watts and Sharrock
). In a meta-analysis of studies on depression and memory impairment,
Burt and Zembar () found a significant association between depressed
mood and memory impairment.
Finally, there are several concepts that seek to account for the presence of
subjective memory complaints in the absence of any diagnostic findings on
neuropsychological, neurological, and neuropsychiatric testing. For example,
Berrios, Markovà, and Girala () propose the concept of mnestic hypochon-
dria (MnH), which is adapted from the DSM-IV (APA ) diagnosis of hypo-
chondriasis. MnH occurs when patients misinterpret normal fluctuations in
memory function and develop unwarranted preoccupations about a disease
causing cognitive impairment. Berrios, Markovà, and Girala identified fears of
growing older, a self-reported history of an undiagnosed heart attack, and the
death of a parent as precipitants for this condition. Similarly, Hanninen and
colleagues () reported subjective memory complaints to be positively asso-
ciated with tendencies toward somatic complaining, increased feelings of anxi-
ety about physical well-being, and more negative feelings of one’s own
competence.
Another concept accounting for subjective concerns about memory func-
tioning is that of anticipatory dementia, which was proposed by Cutler and
Hodgson () to explain fears of developing Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in indi-
viduals experiencing normal age-associated memory changes. In their initial
study, the authors had hypothesized a greater propensity among adult children
with a living AD parent to interpret normal fluctuations in memory perfor-
mance attributable to normal aging as indicative of the onset of AD, particularly
if they believed the disease to be inheritable. They recruited fifty men and
women between the ages of forty and sixty years, twenty-five of whom were
adult children of a living parent with AD, and twenty-five who were a matched
group with no family history of dementia. Using composite measures of
memory appraisals, the authors reported significant bivariate and multivariate
relationships between self-assessments of memory functioning and concerns
about developing AD. Contrary to expectations, these findings held true both
for adult children with an AD parent and for adult children in families where AD
was not present. Concerns about developing AD were greater for females, for
the unmarried, for younger persons, and for those who believed that AD is in-
heritable. Cutler and Hodgson speculated that the increased visibility of AD and
the success of private foundations and public agencies in educating the public
about the disease and its symptoms were possible factors contributing to antici-
patory dementia. Subsequently, Hodgson, Cutler, and Livingston () con-
ducted a qualitative analysis of the responses of adult children with AD parents,
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contrasting them to those of adult children with non-AD parents. The authors
hypothesized that adult children of AD parents developed a greater self-aware-
ness of even minor fluctuations in their own cognitive functioning as a result of
having being intimately attuned to their parents’ cognitive loss as caregivers.
Despite several concepts to account for mild cognitive impairment,
whether it be objectively verified or otherwise, there remains little information
about how individuals actually experience such impairment, particularly in re-
lation to the ways they make decisions about seeking clinical help. While exist-
ing studies offer possible explanations for why such individuals interpret their
symptoms as those of dementia, little is known about their life circumstances
and what specifically triggers concerns about cognitive impairment. In this
study I address this gap in knowledge by discussing the lived experience of
memory problems in four women ranging in age from forty-four to sixty-five
years. The intent is to situate these women’s interpretations of impairment in
the context of their everyday lives and how their concerns were dealt with dur-
ing clinical evaluation.
Background Information and Methods
The pseudonyms of Claudia, Vivian, Sonia, and Marilyn are used in the discus-
sion of these women’s experiences. Claudia is a forty-four-year-old single
mother of one teenage daughter and works as an elementary school teacher.
Vivian is a forty-seven-year-old married woman with two children from a previ-
ous marriage who is employed as a cashier in a large department store. Sonia is
a fifty-year-old mother of two teenage children who is on sick leave from her job
as a hospital nurse. Marilyn is a sixty-five-year-old married woman with two
children who volunteers her time as a coordinator in an evangelical mission.
Claudia and Marilyn described their symptoms as being the early signs of
Alzheimer’s disease (AD), whereas Vivian and Sonia believed they were suffering
from an “organic brain disorder,” which they described as being similar to AD.
These women were selected from a larger qualitative investigation con-
ducted by the author on the diagnostic experiences of fourteen patients and
twenty-four family members at a Canadian memory clinic, henceforth referred
to as the Clinic (Smith and Beattie ). The author is a sociologist who is not
affiliated with the Clinic. Of that group of patients, three had probable AD; five,
possible AD; and six were diagnosed as having no dementia. This no-dementia
group included the four women mentioned here as well as two other patients
who are not discussed because neither complained of memory problems and
both were evaluated as part of a study on genetic risk and AD. All four women
took part in an extensive multidisciplinary evaluation at the Clinic according to
established protocol and underwent radiological and laboratory investigations
as indicated. They were assessed by a geriatric medicine specialist, a neurologist,
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a psychiatrist, and a geneticist. Paramedical assessments were also conducted
by a psychologist, a social worker, and a speech-language pathologist.
I collected data according to consent by observing the women’s respective
clinical evaluations and family conferences at which they were informed about
their diagnoses and by conducting two semistructured home interviews with
each woman and her spouse. In one case, a daughter was also interviewed. The
first set of interviews took place following the clinical evaluation and the sec-
ond set after disclosure of the diagnosis at the family conference. The elapsed
time between the evaluation and disclosure was eleven weeks on average. All
interviews were transcribed verbatim, reviewed, and coded for salient com-
ments from participants. By means of inductive reasoning, the topics were
gradually grouped into more refined themes.
Situating Memory Problems in Everyday Life
In this section I report on the participants’ experiences of memory problems
within the context of events in their personal lives and at work. Claudia com-
plained of memory lapses that started about one year prior to her assessment at
the Clinic. At that time, she was living through a series of stressful events at
work and in her personal life. She divorced her first husband because she could
no longer cope with his erratic behavior and multiple hospitalizations for bipo-
lar illness. She gained sole custody of her daughter, remarried, and relocated to
a new city to accommodate her second husband’s employment situation. This
meant that she had to relinquish her position as school librarian, which she had
held for ten years and very much enjoyed. She also left colleagues who had been
part of her support network during her dealings with her first husband. She
found work again as an elementary school teacher, but did not adapt well to her
new job because of her lack of experience in the classroom. Shortly afterward,
she separated from her second husband because of his alcoholism and abusive
behavior. Around that time, her daughter, whom she described as the “teenager
from hell,” attempted suicide and was placed under the care of a psychiatrist.
Claudia said she felt overwhelmed and fearful that she would fail as both
schoolteacher and parent. She consulted her family physician, who prescribed
an antidepressant.
During that time, Claudia had several memory lapses that triggered fears
about having the early symptoms of AD, a disease that had taken her mother
earlier. For instance, she recalled how one day at school, she forgot about send-
ing one of her pupils to the principal’s office and was reminded of his where-
abouts by the other pupils when she started to look for him in a panicked state.
On several occasions, she also forgot the names of colleagues at school func-
tions and once misplaced important class preparation material. In another inci-
dent, Claudia canceled her credit cards, which she believed lost, only to
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remember later that she had put them away in a safe deposit box to prevent
overspending. As the following comment indicates, Claudia also experienced
word-recall problems: “I said to my daughter one time, “Oh, get the milk out of
the, uh, uh,” and I’m looking at her, “the cold thing, the cold white box, the, uh,
fridge.” And I’m going, “Oh, God.” At the time of the interview, Claudia was
concerned that she would be dismissed from her job as schoolteacher on the
grounds that her memory lapses endangered the safety of her pupils in the
classroom.
In Vivian’s case, she began experiencing memory lapses about eighteen
months prior to her assessment at the Clinic. At the time, she had divorced and
obtained shared custody of her two teenage sons. She later remarried and found
employment as a display manager in a large department store. She went on
stress leave because she could no longer cope with the constant critiques of
other employees about her store displays. Her family physician diagnosed her
with depression and put her on an antidepressant. While on stress leave, she
became increasingly forgetful to the point of doing things she described as “so
stupid” she did not even want to disclose them to her husband. Her memory
problems eventually subsided and she returned to work as a cashier with the
same employer but at a different store. However, her memory problems soon
returned, interfering with her ability to operate her cash register. She would
frequently forget specific key sequences needed to operate the register and had
to look them up in an instruction manual, which was embarrassing when there
were long lines of customers. Vivian said those memory lapses made her feel
“stupid” and “incompetent.” She was convinced she would soon lose her job.
Vivian did not believe that her diagnosis of depression explained why she
had recurring memory problems. Instead, she came to believe that she suffered
from an undiagnosed “organic brain disease” similar to AD. During the inter-
view, her husband dismissed his wife’s concern and attributed her inability to
operate the cash register to a lack of understanding of the “logic” behind its key
sequences. Vivian retorted that there was no logic to those sequences and that
she just had to memorize them, something she was unable to do because of her
brain disorder.
The other two participants, Sonia and Marilyn, reported similar memory
problems. Sonia was working as a nurse at a local general hospital when she
began forgetting to do particular care procedures for her patients. She eventu-
ally went on extended sick leave and received treatment for depression from a
psychiatrist. She stayed at home, managing a hobby farm she co-owned with her
husband. She continued to experience memory problems and requested a refer-
ral to the Clinic because of concerns about having an AD-like brain disease. As
for Marilyn, she sought a referral to the Clinic because of concerns about having
the early symptoms of AD. She reported forgetting the names of friends and
colleagues, which she felt interfered with her ability to adequately carry out her
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responsibilities as event coordinator for an evangelical mission. She was not
receiving treatment for depression at the time of the study but reported having
been on antidepressants for several years following the death of her son.
Referral and Clinical Evaluation
Claudia, Vivian, and Marilyn were referred to the Clinic by their respective fam-
ily physicians; Sonia was referred by her psychiatrist. All felt that their doctors
had not taken their memory complaints seriously. For example, Claudia con-
sulted four physicians before finding one willing to refer her to the Clinic. Sonia
said her psychiatrist initially told her that an assessment at the Clinic would be
futile but eventually agreed to a referral if only to reassure her about her
memory function. Vivian obtained a referral from her family physician after re-
peatedly arguing with him that her depression did not cause her forgetfulness.
She said he eventually agreed to refer her, stating that her memory problems
were beyond his “expertise.” Marilyn was referred more readily by her family
physician, although he did mention that her concerns were exaggerated.
These women also reported that their husbands, family members, and
friends had dismissed their concerns about memory function. For example,
Vivian did not tell her husband about her referral to the Clinic because she
feared he would think it was “silly.” Her husband found out about the referral
when the Clinic’s coordinator contacted him at work to set up an appointment
time for his wife. Vivian had assumed the Clinic would contact her directly, not
realizing that the Clinic coordinator instead preferred to make arrangements
with relatives, rather than patients, who were often too impaired to organize
their own appointments. Although initially dumbfounded by his wife’s deci-
sion, he eventually supported her in the hope that the assessment would allevi-
ate her fears about having a brain disorder. Likewise, Claudia did not want to
tell her immediate family about the referral because she feared they would dis-
miss her concerns as unwarranted. However, she disclosed it to several of her
friends, none of whom felt she had serious memory problems. Claudia equated
their behavior to her own denial of her mother’s early symptoms of AD. Finally,
for Sonia and Marilyn, their respective husbands were more supportive of their
decisions to be assessed at the Clinic, but neither believed that his wife suffered
from dementia.
Each patient underwent a multidisciplinary assessment that included ra-
diological and laboratory investigations. All were evaluated by NINCDS-ADRDA1
criteria for AD and by DSM-III-R criteria for dementia (APA ). Not only did all
patients perform well within the normal range on all tests; their ability to con-
sistently report instances of memory lapses on separate occasions naturalisti-
cally reaffirmed the intact nature of their memory function. In one instance,
Claudia cited as evidence of her failing memory the need to purchase an alarm
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watch to remind her about meetings, yet readily admitted being able to remem-
ber which meetings she needed to attend whenever the alarm went off.
At first glance, it would be easy to dismiss these cases as those of “worried
well” individuals. Yet the Clinic coordinator commented that it was not uncom-
mon for family physicians to refer younger patients to the Clinic because of
their psychological problems:
The word is out that we are not just for Alzheimer’s disease, that we do
the related disorders. And there are people out in the community that
know that’s what we’re looking at. A lot of the referring physicians, if the
patients are young, rather than trying to deal with the psychosocial issues
and family matters and things like that, they’ll send them out and see
what we can do. Some are still working. They’ve got subjective com-
plaints. They can walk in and say, “Look it, I don’t think I’m functioning at
my previous level.” So they’re just maybe a little freaked that they forgot
so-and-so’s birthday on Friday. But a lot of those are turning out that they
don’t meet criteria. I’m not saying that they don’t have problems, but
they don’t meet the formal DSM-IV criteria for dementia. Just being un-
able to think of a word is considered to be a symptom associated with so
many normal conditions. You can’t tell what somebody’s got. It goes with
depression, it goes with anxiety, it goes with attention disorders, it goes
with distraction, it goes with memory problems, it goes with language
problems, it just goes with everything. It is nondiagnostic.
Findings from an internal Clinic report confirm the coordinator’s observa-
tions. Patients not meeting criteria for dementia account for  percent of all
referrals, and out of that number, only  percent are later diagnosed with a
dementia disorder upon reassessment. These findings, along with studies by
Almeida et al. () and Berrios, Markovà, and Girala (), suggest that sig-
nificant clinical resources are being devoted in memory clinics to the evalua-
tion of individuals with subjective complaints of cognitive impairment that
cannot be verified by objective testing.
Negotiating the Moral Status of Trouble
In accounting for why these women interpreted their memory problems as
symptomatic of dementia, I offer in this section an explanation that is based on
the notion that diagnostic categories do not simply describe underlying psycho-
pathologies but also serve to label the moral status of problematic behaviors.
More specifically, the argument is that these women considered the alternative
diagnosis of dementia as a way to resist the stigma they perceived to be attached
to the diagnosis of depression. Goffman () defined stigma as an “attribute
that is deeply discrediting” and that reduces the bearer “from a whole and usual
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person to a tainted, discounted one” (). The discrediting nature of depression
has been well documented in the literature on mental illness. Depression is one
of several serious mental illnesses that continue to elicit generally unfavorable
attitudes from members of the public (Bhugra ). Having one’s name associ-
ated with depression can be detrimental to one’s career and future. For ex-
ample, Glozier () found that personnel directors in a sample of two hundred
U.K. companies were much less likely to hire an applicant described in a vi-
gnette as having depression over someone with diabetes. A famous example of
discrimination is the case of former U.S. senator Thomas Francis Eagleton, who
was dropped as running mate by presidential candidate George McGovern
shortly after the  Democratic Party convention when it was revealed that
Eagleton had been hospitalized for depression.
Particularly relevant here is the distinction between felt and enacted
stigma (Scrambler and Hopkins ; Jacoby ). Whereas enacted stigma re-
fers to concrete instances of rejection or discrimination toward the person with
a stigmatized condition, felt stigma reflects that person’s expectations of how
others will react to the condition. There is evidence to suggest that being diag-
nosed with depression can produce intense experiences of felt stigma. For ex-
ample, Angermeyer and colleagues () found that patients diagnosed with
schizophrenia and major depression had equal expectations about negative re-
action at work and in the domain of interpersonal interaction, although pa-
tients with schizophrenia reported far more frequent actual incidents of stigma.
The intensity of the felt stigma appears to be related in part to concerns that
depressed individuals have about how others will interpret the legitimacy of
their condition (Schreiber and Hartrick ). Others in the depressed person’s
social environment may seek to determine whether the depression is legitimate
on the basis of whether life circumstances justify the severity of its symptoms. If
those circumstances are judged as lacking the necessary severity, then the de-
pressed person may be perceived as deficient, weak, or incompetent in han-
dling the ordinary pressures of work and life.
As Gray () remarks, the concept of felt stigma has two advantages.
First, this concept acknowledges the precariousness of maintaining a normal
identity once a stigmatized label is applied; and it underlines the importance of
accounting for the ways a person manages the social presentation of his or her
stigmatized condition in light of anticipated rejection. A common management
strategy is to conceal the diagnosis and minimize one’s involvement in social
situations where disclosure could occur. However, the experiences of these
women suggest another strategy whereby an alternate and less stigmatized label
is considered to explain problematic behaviors in a less discreditable manner.
To better understand this process, it is crucial not to dichotomize between de-
mentia and depression on the basis of their respective psychopathological fea-
tures. Undoubtedly, being diagnosed with dementia is a much less desirable
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option given the condition’s irreversible and ultimately fatal pathology. By con-
trast, depression is an eminently treatable and thus comparatively hopeful ill-
ness. However, these women were less concerned about the prognostic
implications of being diagnosed with dementia and instead focused on the per-
ceived positive societal reaction associated with this label. In that sense, the
anticipation of being diagnosed with dementia can be understood as a heuristic
device that conveys a lack of control (and thus responsibility) over discreditable
behaviors and thus reduces the possibility of one’s being interpreted by others
as being morally disreputable. This is possible because the label of dementia
shifts the cause of personal problems away from the morally charged realm of
psychiatry onto the more neutral ground of neurobiology. A dementia diagnosis
points the finger at a pathology that is outside one’s control, thus diffusing
moral responsibility for discredited behaviors in everyday life.
Biologization as a stigma-management strategy has been documented in
women with major depression who explained their condition almost exclusively
in neurobiological terms (Schreiber and Hartrick ). This responsibility-
absolving feature of a biological explanation has also been documented by
Weinberg () in patients receiving treatment for substance abuse and men-
tal illness. Those patients often described their psychiatric conditions as non-
human agents that controlled their daily lives. They learned to justify
rule-breaking behaviors as “lapses” during which they had been momentarily
overtaken by their disorders despite efforts to resist. Herman () has also
documented similar strategies among some deinstitutionalized psychiatric pa-
tients who developed “beyond-my-control” interpretations of their condition as
a way to diffuse the stigma associated with severe mental illnesses. Lock ()
has also documented the use of culture-specific labels to destigmatized psychi-
atric distress in a group of first-generation Greek women immigrants in
Montreal, Canada. These women had unusually high rates of depression, anxi-
ety, and psychosomatic distress that were locally labeled as nevra (nerves), an
umbrella condition described in terms of feelings of bursting out, breaking out,
and boiling over. Lock found that women suffering from nevra also had life his-
tories characterized by social isolation, marital discord, and poverty and often
worked in the city’s notorious garment industry, where they confronted racism
and sexism on a daily basis. Lock argues that while the symptoms of nevra sug-
gest a psychosomatic reaction or an anxiety disorder under DSM nosology, the
condition should actually be viewed as a culturally specific outlet for the social
isolation and work exploitation experienced by these women. In that sense,
nevra allows for a more socially acceptable way of labeling the distress these
women experienced in everyday life.
Thus, one can argue that the women described here attempted to secure a
more socially accepted label for the distress they experienced while struggling
with alienating work situations and traumatic life events. This was particularly
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evident for Claudia, Sonia and Vivian, who clearly expressed in their interviews
that they regarded the diagnosis of depression as inadequate for explaining the
problems they were experiencing. For example, Vivian was convinced that her
inability to operate her cash register resulted from a condition she described as
an “organic brain disorder along the lines of a stroke, a lack of circulation to the
brain causing some atrophy and subsequent memory loss.” Sonia attributed the
errors she made while working as a nurse to a mild form of a brain pathology
similar to AD but less severe. In the following comment, Claudia explains how
her diagnosis of depression stirred fears of ending up like her first husband,
who had bipolar illness.
You have to understand that my daughter’s dad is a manic-depressive. He
was in the mental ward thirteen times in the last two years we were mar-
ried. In , my husband screamed out, “I’m the Antichrist,” and threw
himself in front of a bus. And I have been in the hospital’s waiting room
when the police had been called because he had started to take his
clothes off. I’ve seen people in the mental ward. I don’t want to end up
like that. So, when you say things to me like I might be mentally ill, well,
that’s pretty strong words, you know, because I have seen mentally ill
people. I took Prozac, Zanax, and everything. They did absolutely nothing,
and I only went on them on the doctor’s recommendation. They were just
trying to see if they could ease the tension, the anxiety, or whatever.
Reading the report, it sounds like, you know, “We tried this mentally ill
lady on Prozac, and we tried this mentally ill lady on Zanax . . . ”
Like Sonia and Vivian, Claudia viewed her having a mild form of dementia
as a more likely explanation for her memory problems. She also more readily
disclosed this prospect to others, whereas she never mentioned her depression.
This behavior suggests that, like the other women, she anticipated the demen-
tia label to elicit a more favorable response. There is some evidence that sup-
ports the validity of this expectation. For example, Werner and Davidson ()
conducted face-to-face interviews with  Jewish Israeli adults to ascertain
their emotional responses to a vignette depicting a person with the symptoms
of AD. This person elicited more positive than negative feelings, including com-
passion, concern, and sympathy. Using a similar methodology with female un-
dergraduate students, Wadley and Haley () found that a vignette depicting a
person exhibiting inappropriate behavior in a social situation produced more
sympathy, less blame, and a greater willingness to help when a label of AD was
provided as compared to no label or a label of major depression, because unlike
depression, AD is seen as a brain pathology outside of the person’s control.
These findings highlight how people are less likely to attribute moral blame to
problematic behaviors when a biological label is applied.
The significance of the dementia diagnosis in diffusing stigma and moral
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blame for these women is further underlined by how they reacted when told
they did not have dementia. For instance, Vivian reacted angrily and felt the
Clinic had not taken her condition seriously. In the days following disclosure,
Vivian began to entertain an alternate explanation for her memory lapses,
thinking that perhaps they were caused by a head injury she had sustained
while playing baseball as a child. She cited a “lazy eye” as evidence for the pres-
ence of undiagnosed brain damage. Sonia was also disappointed but more ac-
cepting of the lack of clinical findings, in part because of the manner in which
disclosure was managed. While Vivian was notified of her assessment results
over the phone, Sonia was seen by the Clinic’s neuropsychologist, who sug-
gested that the absence of findings could have been an artifact of the instru-
ments’ lack of sensitivity in detecting mild cognitive symptoms such as those
caused by higher levels of stress. This approach validated Sonia’s experience of
impairment while providing her with a nonpsychiatric explanation for her
symptoms.
The neuropsychologist used a similar approach with Claudia, who initially
resisted the suggestion that stress could cause her to be forgetful. She eventually
agreed to consider the explanation once it was emphasized that anyone having
to cope with stressful events like the ones she experienced in the past year
would have had similar memory deficits. She worked on reducing her stress
level to improve her memory performance. Reflecting on her involvement with
the Clinic, Claudia said, “I have one of those personalities that likes reassur-
ance. I guess what I’m looking for is a pat on the back. The Clinic was saying, you
know, ‘You’re OK.’ But I had a couple of bouts of forgetting, which has put me
back on the alert. Maybe these will never go away. Maybe those are normal ag-
ing memory losses that every single forty-five-year-old has. But I guess I react a
little more emotionally than normal.”
While the neuropsychologist’s interventions did not address the alienating
circumstances that contributed to these women’s distress, they nevertheless
normalized their experiences as legitimate reactions to difficult life events. One
wonders if these women would have decided to seek a referral to the Clinic had
a similar approach been used by their respective family physicians.
One caveat is that diagnostic labels tend to obscure the relationship be-
tween memory problems and alienating work or life circumstances. For ex-
ample, in Vivian’s case, while she had difficulties in operating her cash register,
she had also started her job during the busy holiday season without adequate
training. In Sonia’s case, she started making mistakes at work at a time when
her workload increased as a result of health-care cutbacks and a shortage of
nursing staff. As for Claudia, she took on a new position as schoolteacher, de-
spite having minimal experience in the classroom. Those work circumstances
undoubtedly compounded the stressful life events these women endured, in-
cluding divorce, abuse, and single parenthood.
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Perception of Genetic Risk
The perception of being at risk for having inherited AD is another factor that
accounted for why some of the participants interpreted their memory problems
as indicative of dementia. In particular, Marilyn expressed the fear that her
memory lapses were symptoms similar to those that had afflicted her mother,
who had been diagnosed several years earlier with “organic brain syndrome,” an
older diagnostic designation for dementia. Similarly, Claudia was concerned
about having inherited AD from her mother. In the following comment, Claudia
compares her impairment to her mother’s early symptoms: “When my memory
started to fail in the last two or three years, I did panic a lot. I have the history of
AD from my mother. Some of the signs are so indicative of what Mom used to
do. That’s why they freaked me out. It wasn’t just the memory losses; it was the
way some of the memory losses were similar to my mother’s.”
Claudia positioned herself as the latest victim in a long matriarchal line of
AD sufferers. She surmised that her grandmother, although never diagnosed
with dementia, had committed suicide because she was experiencing the early
symptoms of AD and did not want to face the prospect of losing her mind.
Claudia believed she was a carrier for “the AD gene” and wanted to be tested to
confirm her suspicion:
At my age and with what’s going on, I would want to be tested. I’d rather
know now because let’s say I got it, then I would downsize. I would make
provisions for Sandra and then I’d live life to the fullest. Not that I don’t
live life to the fullest now, but at least my goals would be a bit more time
oriented, which is important, you know, if I am aiming to retire at age
sixty-five. I’ll be forty-five in October. If I have the gene, then I might aim
to retire in ten years. What I would have to do is to downsize so that I put
money in a pension so I’ll be taken care of or somehow transfer all my
stuff to Sandra and then be poor and a ward of the court. You know, let’s
face it, that’s the name of the game, you know, if I got that ill.
Claudia said she would also have her daughter tested but under the false
pretense of getting a “routine blood test” so as not to worry her needlessly.
While this comment shows a lack of knowledge about informed-consent proce-
dures, it nevertheless reflects a genuine concern about genetic risk. Claudia’s
daughter was bluntly dismissive of her mother’s concerns, saying she behaved
like someone with AD to get sympathy from others.
An assessment performed by the Clinic’s geneticist revealed that neither
Claudia nor Marilyn had positive family histories for the inherited forms of AD.
Yet, their concern about being at risk may have been amplified by increasingly
salient reports of AD being a genetic disorder, although genetic mutations ac-
count for only – percent of all cases of the disease (Post, Whitehouse, and Zinn
).
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Conclusion
In this study I have explored how social context mediated the experiences and
help-seeking behavior of individuals complaining of mild and sporadic memory
problems. In their paper on anticipatory dementia, Cutler and Hodgson ()
suggest a need to further examine the relationship between depression and
unwarranted concerns about having dementia. The cases discussed here sug-
gest that this relationship is complex and multifactorial. One factor predispos-
ing some individuals to interpret mild fluctuations in memory performance as
symptomatic of dementia is the perception of being at risk for having inherited
AD from a parent. It also has been suggested that the stigma attached to a diag-
nosis of depression could predispose some individuals to seek an alternate ex-
planation as a way to diffuse the moral blame sometimes associated with that
psychiatric label. A diagnosis of dementia represents a morally neutral alterna-
tive that situates memory lapses within the realm of neurobiology, thus exoner-
ating afflicted individuals from responsibility for whatever troublesome
behaviors may have been caused by the “impairment.” Thus, seeking an evalua-
tion for dementia can be seen as an act of resistance against psychiatric label-
ing. To borrow from Lock (), dementia “comes free of moralistic rhetoric”
(). However, while the diagnosis of dementia allows individuals to negotiate
the moral status of their circumstances and diffuse the stigma attached to psy-
chiatric labels, it may also serve to obscure the contribution of alienating social
conditions to personal distress.
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Epidemiological and Clinical Data
as Cultural Text
JANICE E.  GRAHAM
UUUUUUUUUUU
What meanings are hidden in the plaques and tangles of an atrophying brain,
in the artifacts of diagnostic clinical history, in the bioinformatic matrices of an
epidemiological database? Or in the lived experiences of a still-active mind try-
ing to express a voice, to perform an action, but unable to find the means to do
so? How do seemingly disparate bits and pieces of pathology, clinical history,
social relationships, and specialist training come together? How do these frac-
tured components form interpretable constellations that help us better under-
stand the science; the sufferers; the relationships between dementia, data, and
the diagnostic process?
In this chapter, I explore the concepts used by clinicians in the practice of
differentially diagnosing dementia. Based upon standard clinical texts, and
from the many “cases” seen in the past and discussed among colleagues, a medi-
cal diagnosis is an interpretation that a clinician constructs by piecing together
symptoms provided from the narrative of a suffering person during a clinical
interview and signs from that person’s physical examination and tests. The fre-
quency of occurrence of these symptoms and signs form characteristic patterns
that match those of other, similar cases or stand out as somewhat different. The
patterns direct the physician along one or another diagnostic path. Researchers
collect these diagnostic symptoms and signs with other information and in-
scribe them in clinical, epidemiological, and health-service databases. These
facts inform and direct health-care practice, policy, and planning. Over time,
the data also serve to transform the standardized diagnostic criteria.
What is often unrecognized is that the culturally conditioned practices of
the people and institutions that construct the data are also, often unknowingly,
incorporated into the body of these databases. The instruments that dictate
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facts, the assemblages of local and expert knowledge used to guide choice, and
the decisions that are arrived at and appear in these electronic repositories as
separate yet interrelated elements allow a researcher to explore similarities and
redundancies, as well as incoherences and incommensurabilities. This chapter
shows the extent to which physicians see through the lenses of their clinical
specialties in the execution of standardized criteria, how dementia is actualized
in diagnostic practice and then written into data, and how these data may dis-
close more than the raw information instantiated within.
The methodology described here includes a comparative analysis of the
established medical criteria with data from nearly three thousand extensive
clinical assessments of elderly people that were collected as part of a national-
population representative epidemiological survey of dementia. The bilingual
Canadian Study of Health and Aging ([CSHA] , ; Graham et al. a;
Tuokko ) involved interviewing , Canadians age sixty-five and over,
from British Columbia to Newfoundland. Most lived in the community;  per-
cent resided in institutional care facilities. All participants received the Modi-
fied Mini Mental State (MS) screening test for cognitive impairment (Teng and
Chui ). From the community, all those who tested positive for cognitive
impairment and a sample of those testing negative were followed up with a
more extensive neuropsychological assessment, clinical examination, and
medical history (n = ,). All residents of care facilities received the clinical
examination (,). Relatives of all study participants provided personal and
family history using section H of the Cambridge Mental Disorders Examination
(CAMDEX) (Roth et al. ).
I worked as the clinical database manager for the CSHA between  and
. My initial job was to determine the reliability and validity of the clinical
data from the eighteen study centers. Later, during doctoral and postdoctoral
studies in anthropology, neuroepidemiology, and geriatric medicine, I explored
the differential diagnoses of cognitive impairment and dementia in light of
standardized criteria. Although the majority of dementia diagnoses were
subtyped as Alzheimer’s disease, I began to examine other possible paths to-
ward subtype differentiation within the dementia syndrome.1
IN THIS CHAPTER I detail a comparative approach to understanding dementia
from three separate but connected sources of information:
1. The established clinical diagnostic criteria for dementia as derived from
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (APA ,
), the tenth revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)
(World Health Organization [WHO] , ) for vascular and other
dementias, and the NINCDS-ADRDA2 criteria for probable and possible
Alzheimer’s disease (McKhann et al. ). Later developments introduced
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new criteria, for example, for dementia of the Lewy body type (McKeith et
al. ), that had not originally been targeted during the CSHA survey. I
call this information the written standardized text.
2. An epidemiological database electronically compiled from raw data, cata-
loging symptoms and signs collected as part of a national epidemiological
study by clinicians from several specialties (database text).
3. The often unknown information embedded in the database text that can
show, as in the examples presented here, important relationships between
signs and symptoms, and also how specialists, who represent local expert
cultures within medicine, differentially operationalize standardized crite-
ria for dementia (belief-practice text).
Databases as Cultural Text
I wish to make the claim that a database can be understood as a text in the way
that Hanks () defines text as a “sociocultural product and process . . . [that]
can be taken (heuristically) to designate any configuration of signs that is co-
herently interpretable by some community of users.” The text is located in the
“social matrix within which the discourse is produced and understood” (–
). My position is that the database holds unique information, but impor-
tantly, as a text of the culture that produces it, it remains “subordinate to
culture” (Bibeau and Corin ). It contains facts or ideas that are not easily
disaggregated from the values and beliefs of those constructing the data.
There is considerable potential for databases to be more productively en-
gaged as organic structures for interpreting beyond what Latour and Woolgar
() call “brute facts.” By reconfiguring the sets of elements within a database,
we can explore classifications, similarities, differences, and relations that the
observers who initially collected the information and created the database may
not have recognized. While new tools in informatics allow for easier navigation
of archived data that await innovative findings through secondary analyses, it
becomes ever more important to remain cautious of these secondary analyses,
or data prospecting, since, as Dumont has told us, referring to very different
materials, “all documents [do not] have the same value” (, ). In second-
ary analyses of existing databases, especially those that are maintained over
long periods with several timepoints of data entry, the ethnographer can track
and uncover how the meanings that are assigned to objects shift over time,
what Appadurai () has called “the social life of things.” In a chapter that
pays particular respect to the works of Mauss, Dumont emphasizes the
ethnographer’s task “to dig beneath the best native information” to the “under-
lying facts, which are almost unconscious because they exist only in collective
tradition. But these are the real facts, the things [cf. Durkheim!] that we shall try
to reach through the documents” (, ). Anthropological methods are
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adaptable to interpreting electronic fieldwork sites (databases), where “almost
unconscious” facts can be found in what I call here the physician’s “belief-
practice text.”
Social and historical drivers, the political nature of data, are locked in and
can also be constructed from these seemingly static repositories. The variables
initially observed, collected, and correlated can be countered by an almost infi-
nite array of factors that are not included. While epidemiologists struggle to
assure users of the controlled nature of the databases they design, that is a very
limited and essentialist representation of what is, in actuality, a stochastic
world in ever changing activity. While prediction is the central pillar of science
(Casti ), and is approached using deduction in physics and astronomy, for
example, the capability to explain lessens progressively as we move into biol-
ogy, economics, and other social sciences and into the humanities. However,
some level of prediction is possible, even if only in a statistical sense as a prob-
ability statement with degrees of confidence. And while some interpretations
may be better than others (Eco ), it is important that the criteria used to
make such determinations transparent for scrutiny.
If a strength of the morally and practically “obliged” ethnographer (Lambek
, , in theory; Maranda , , in practice) is in orchestrating multiple
voices and meanings, why not extend our study sites and fieldwork to databases,
where much activity is being deposited? Yet we must endeavor to create a space
in these electronic mines for sociohistorical context, without which there
would be no limit to the ambiguity of the symbols (the signs and symptoms)
that compose meanings, which tell so much more about the cultures, situa-
tions, and individuals relating within. “Context implies that all meaning is a
matter of degree, probability, multiplicity, and, from the individual’s point of
view, indeterminacy” (Friedrich , ). The exercise here is to consider the
textuality of databases and diagnoses. It allows poetics, the diversity of voices,
styles, practices, and politics, to play in harmony with science, which articulates
methods to determine degrees of probability of these various interpretations.
An anthropologist’s critical attention to how power resides in and trans-
forms arrangements between individuals and groups can show how dominant
ideological and social patterns are intimately related to hegemonic ideologies
and practices. Empirical, systematic research methods allow us to attend to the
sources, agencies, and relationships that are used to construct facts in science.
We can deconstruct the truth claims of science by showing the radical his-
torical specificity, and so contestability, of the very layer of the onion of scien-
tific constructions. Anthropologists underline how scientific activity is not
always about uncovering “nature.” It is a fierce fight to construct reality. Ethnog-
raphers slay positivistic facts and accepted ideals that create an aura of facticity
(fact seeking, fact finding) in a sea of interpretations. Making biopolitics
clearer, and acknowledging the ethical-political choices involved in what are
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reported as neutral positions of fact in these proliferating databases (Agamben
; Keenan ), remains a work in the anthropology of science and biotech-
nology (Bibeau, Graham, Fleising, forthcoming).
The database is not the antithesis of hermeneutics. The ambiguities
present in the actual lives of people and the institutional bodies that surround
them are recorded and incorporated into databases; they are fuzzy and
muddled, despite their predefined categories. Coded facts do assault the herme-
neutical position, but they also compel attempts to interpret and understand.
People can enter databases after the fact and create (compute) new variables
from the old, build new models, algorithms, and criteria that were not con-
ceived at the time the data were written. We can dissect the old, and write new
stories. Multiple interpretations can be read. Databases are imperfect objects
created by experts targeting the other. Nevertheless, they offer a landscape of
ethnographic riches.
Dementia: Making Sense of the Diagnostic Categories
At the  Lancet conference to address “the challenge of the dementias,”
Raymond Tallis, an eminent British geriatrician, strongly suggested that it was
time to “reboot the disk” in the nosology of dementia, to let us start anew with
different models of criteria.3 While I agree, this clinical directive does, however,
require some caution, for it is the structure rather than the content of our noso-
logical “disks” that requires rethinking. It is the very content, in all its disarray,
that might allow us to reinvent more dynamic “categories” that may prove to
have buried within them useful connections, with the capacity to address the
personal interrelationships and management of, and perhaps therapeutic ap-
proaches to, those suffering from senility and their caregivers and families. Ex-
isting data are rich resources that reveal the direction the models might take. In
this chapter I make the case for an anthropologically inductive interpretive ap-
proach, which nevertheless makes use of sophisticated mathematical modeling
to build upon the strength of interpretations. This approach contrasts with the
deductive techniques more commonly used in epidemiology and in medicine.
The growth of interest in cognitive impairment has generated new ap-
proaches to dementia with an increased appreciation of the central importance
of heterogeneity in its subdiagnosis (Graham et al. , ). The syndromic
diagnosis (that is, the definition of dementia) was revised both in DSM-IV (APA
), and in ICD– (WHO ). Dementia, using these criteria, is clinically
identified as a progressive degenerative disorder characterized by “a decline
from a previously higher level of functioning” and by multiple cognitive deficits
that “must be sufficiently severe to cause impairment in occupational or social
functioning” (APA , ). An appreciation of previously unrecognized causes
of cognitive impairment, such as frontotemporal dementia (Lund and
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Manchester ) and dementia of the Lewy body type (McKeith et al. ), has
coincided with substantial changes in the way in which more established causes
of dementia are being redefined. Significant emerging developments in under-
standing vascular causes of cognitive impairment have been driven by the abil-
ity to target identifiable risk factors, which have so far eluded researchers of
Alzheimer’s disease (Roman et al. ; Chui et al. ; Rockwood et al. ,
; Hachinski , ; Mitnitski et al. ; Nyehhuis and Gorelick ;
Graham et al. ; Jellinger and Mitter-Ferstl ; Erkinjuntti et al. ). As a
result of improved understandings of the existence of these definable sub-
groups, Alzheimer’s disease—which had the full support of a remarkable lobby-
ing platform by the National Institute of Neurological and Communications
Disorders and Stroke (NINCDS) committee within the United States National
Institutes of Health (NIH) (McKhann et al. ; Fox ; Adelman )—has
encountered a challenge to its former preeminent diagnostic status (Erkinjuntti
et al. ; Blennow, Wallin, and Gottfries ; Emery and Oxman ; Bowler
and Hachinski ). The development of treatments and the role of the phar-
maceutical industry in restructuring this understanding provided a market op-
portunity during the s. But that is another story (Graham , ).4
Despite a few voices that could be heard promoting “the ubiquity of brain/
mind interactions” and warning that “problems in living necessarily influence
brain state and structure” (Eisenberg , ), the predominant mindscape of
the medical community has been focused on a pathological/anatomical expla-
nation for degenerating cognition and behavior. Although causes of the various
subtypes of dementia cannot be determined in the absence of readily available
biological markers, an assessment of the personal and medical history of the
clinical symptoms and signs is required in order to diagnostically differentiate
the subtypes. The overlap of configurations of symptoms and signs, com-
pounded by multiple comorbidities (Graham et al. b, ; Mitnitski et al.
; Jellinger and Mitter-Ferstl ), represent key challenges to the etiologi-
cal diagnosis of dementia.
In clinical practice the presence of one sign may not necessarily sound an
alarm. Rather, the emergence of certain combinations of symptoms and signs char-
acterizes a disorder. Clinicians meet this challenge by recognizing patterns of
symptoms and signs. Our group showed, however, that diagnoses are not always
distinguishable when based simply upon the presence or absence of these signs
and symptoms; rather, it is conditional relationships among the symptoms and
signs that form probabilities for a particular diagnosis and for more than one
diagnosis within an individual. By establishing that diagnostic probabilities can
be ascertained from identifying the co-occurrences of symptoms and signs, this
approach illustrated what is foundational to clinical reasoning: symptoms and
signs do not occur independently, but are conditional on each other.
While with the CSHA, I had established that the clinicians’ diagnoses met
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the standardized criteria for dementia. This was done by developing a series of
algorithms that initially mimicked the standardized text for dementia as set out
in the DSM and ICD texts (Graham et al. a).5 I later examined how signs and
symptoms, which were recorded in the data, interrelated with one another
(Graham et al. b, c). Importantly, these analyses revealed redundancies
in diagnostic activity—more than one constellation of signs and symptoms can
constitute a single diagnosis. The evidence that a single diagnosis can actually
be derived from very different patterns of signs and symptoms brings us closer
to the meanings of the anomalies and inconsistencies and atypical presenta-
tions that are characterized in the elderly.
Additionally, the semiological catalogs, the bundles of meaningful symp-
toms and signs that define a diagnosis of dementia, can be quite specific for a
given clinician or specialty, while varying among clinical specialties. While
“harmonization” of standards remains the mission of many international pri-
vate and public agencies (presumably to reduce redundancies and the costly
repetition of drug trials in each regulating country), this standardization will be
at the cost of multiple variant diagnostic interpretations, each plausible and
potentially revealing of unknown but important relationships that are worthy of
further study. By calling for more, rather than reduced, opportunities for vari-
ability in clinical representations, I challenge a clinical epidemiological tradi-
tion of standardization and of analyzing or “reading” a database as if it were a
telephone book. Instead, not wanting to limit potential diagnostic interpreta-
tions, I suggest that Umberto Eco’s () “encyclopedia” approach can be
adapted to reading database texts. This is an unusual inductive approach to
reading epidemiological databases, but it paves the way for novel possibilities
for understanding dementia, as well as other heterogeneous disorders.
Dementia subsumes an already formed mind, adding to but also taking
away from it. How these bits and pieces form relationships and mark the type of
dementia is the subject herein. The effects of how different clinicians hearken,
or call attention (Haraway , ), to the existence of particular signs or
symptoms in creating the diagnosis is of importance, and so, too, is the evi-
dence for co-occurrence and relationships among the elements used to classify
the subtypes for dementia (for example, Alzheimer’s diseases, dementia of the
Lewy body type, vascular cognitive impairments, and frontotemporal
dementias). As Dumont suggested in looking at social castes, order results from
a consideration of value and, necessarily, context. Considering value and
Leibniz’s struggle to embrace difference in the whole (, ), I looked to the
data for the configurations formed by idea-values or value-ideas of clinicians
about dementia (the belief-practice text). Illustrating an empirical fit with
Leibniz’s concept of the “whole,” the interrelating signs and symptoms form
(hierarchical) structures that underline the type and severity of the dementia.
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The statistical strength (probabilistic value and context) among them varies,
marking a particular subtype or severity.
By looking for associations between the constellations of symptoms and
signs in the differential diagnoses and severities found in our sample popula-
tion (in the database text), my colleagues and I found that certain symptoms
and signs were conditional upon one another in forming a particular diagnosis.
With more than four hundred variables in the CSHA clinical data, we did not
intend to analyze all possible relationships. Instead, fifty-six variables were se-
lected on the basis of their suspected clinical relevance. Nineteen of these
symptoms and signs showed statistically significant probabilities (frequencies)
and variance across fifteen diagnostic categories, including no cognitive im-
pairment, cognitive impairment but no dementia; mild, moderate, and severe
forms of Alzheimer’s disease and vascular dementia; four subtypes of possible
Alzheimer’s disease; Parkinson’s dementia; unspecified other dementias; and
unclassified.6
A synergy index was calculated from the number of significant connections
(synergies) divided by the square root of the diagnostic sample size. The pattern
of associations (the “coordination” of the items) varied according to the specific
diagnosis. For example, as a given sign is present, the probability that another
sign is present systematically increases (“synergism”) or decreases (“antago-
nism”). Importantly, these relationships between the signs and symptoms fall
apart, decreasing significantly as dementia progresses (Graham et al. b).
Dementia progression and specific etiologies have characteristic patterns of
decline and destruction from the strong synergy that exists between symptoms
and signs for those with no cognitive impairment. Those with no cognitive im-
pairment had many coordinations (that is, strong synergy). This synergy de-
creased in those with severe dementia, and there were intermediate pictures for
mild and moderate forms. There was significant reduction (more than ten
times) in the values of our synergy index in the severe Alzheimer’s disease
group compared with results for the no-cognitive-impairment group. Synergy
reached a maximum value in the no-cognitive-impairment group (.), declin-
ing to . in those with severe Alzheimer’s, . in those with severe vascular
dementia, and . in those with Parkinson’s dementia. There is a strong rela-
tionship between activities of daily living (basic personal tasks of everyday life)
and instrumental activities of daily living (those found in independent living,
for example, the ability to do one’s own shopping). This synergy score dropped
from . for those with no cognitive impairment to . for those with cogni-
tive impairment not dementia (CIND), and from . to . to . among those
with mild, moderate, and severe Alzheimer’s disease. Particular diagnoses give
rise to discernible patterns of synergy and antagonism; the coordination of
items in Alzheimer’s disease is distinct from the coordination of items in
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vascular dementia, for example. The different configurations of signs and symp-
toms, buried in the CSHA database, reflect etiology and stage for frailty and cog-
nitive aging (Mitnitski et al. ; Graham et al. ).
WHEN DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORIES can be disaggregated into the elements used to
construct them, and the relations between these items are revealed, then cul-
ture and nature can be seen to comfortably coexist in relationships neither
wholly natural nor cultural; nosology has what Latour () might refer to as a
“symmetrical” anthropological landscape, one that weaves both culture and bi-
ology. Each trope of clinical decision making is precipitated on some configura-
tion of signs and symptoms that reveal themselves as distinct constellations. I
suggest that any constellation of events has probabilistic dimensions, with dif-
ferent degrees of overlapping clusters of interconnected elements. The nosolo-
gies currently in use rely on hard categories; they cut up a degenerative process
into segments that mask, rather than mirror, a plurality of different
socioneurodegenerative processes (Lyman ; Davies ). Built-in redun-
dancies mean that many different routes can be followed. As Tallis reminds us,
these are people encountering a process in which “life becomes an impen-
etrable solitude of a series of disconnected moments” (personal communica-
tion), witnessed by involuntary egoism with the failure to engage in the
organized interest of others. The demented person is conscious, yet his or her
purposive actions give an enigmatic cast to a context no longer shared with
others. Without memory, the sufferer does not experience shared continuity
through time (Tallis ). And the current medical approach to determining
hard diagnostic categories indeed also reflects this discontinuity. Having seen
where the database text reveals relationships that are not articulated in the
standardized criteria, let us turn now to what is buried in the belief-practices of
medical mindscapes and clinical cultures that are diagnosing dementia.
Medical Mindscapes
I have suggested here that one can read the CSHA database as narrated stories
by some seventy-six physicians representing five clinical specialties. These hid-
den and unintended stories provide us with an extraordinary view of the cul-
tural activity of the diagnostic practices of clinicians. Shepherd, in examining
the role played by British nosologists in psychiatric classification, noted that
after considerable international work on the schizophrenias by the WHO’s ICD,
“it quickly became apparent that the major source of variation among experi-
enced clinicians was the difference between their nosological schemata, all of
which were subject to influence by the various schools of psychiatry” (, ).
But “culture is a perspective on reality, rather than a collection of categories
marking differences among individuals” (Corin , ). The fervent activity
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directed at international standardization in case ascertainment and assessment
of severity is an attempt to gain what Shepherd refers to as a “common lan-
guage, a psychiatric Esperanto, [that] constitutes no more than a necessary pre-
requisite for a rationally-based nosology” ().
The exercise of standardizing empirical evidence is intriguing, but it may
well result in the reduction or loss of important details that provide us with the
key to unlocking a terrain that presently remains illusive. While the idea of
comorbid dementias, of an Alzheimerized Parkinson’s or vascular dementia,
existed (Emery and Oxman ), only more recently has evidence begun to
corroborate the theory (Graham et al. b, Mitnitski et al. ; Jellinger and
Mitter-Ferstl ). Importantly, those standardizations use the probabilities or
synergy coordinations between signs and symptoms that represented these
emerging classifications (Graham et al. b; Mitnitski et al. ; Graham et
al. ).
In areas of medical diagnostics that are undergoing shifts in classification,
such as that encountered among the evolving dementia etiologies, important
information (which might be called empirical evidence but certainly is not nec-
essarily limited to that epistemological terrain) is frequently overlooked, re-
duced to an incomprehensible construct, or lost entirely. Attention to this lost,
or (adopting a genomic analogy) junk data (the butterfly effect in systems, where
sensitivity to initial conditions result in a hurricane oceans away [Gleik ]),
might have led to innovative breakthroughs in understanding the particular
syndrome and its many different manifestations in individual sufferers. For in-
stance, those suffering dementia of the Lewy body type could be easily identifi-
able as “different from Alzheimer’s disease” using the probabilistic method.
They could be prevented from being prematurely hurried along a degenerative
path when misdiagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and subsequently prescribed
the neuroleptic medications harmful to those suffering Lewy body dementia
that are commonly used in Alzheimer’s sufferers.
Almeido-Filho and colleagues argue convincingly for inclusion of a cultural
reading of nosology:
[V]ariations in disease categories and criteria through history and across
cultures and societies make clear the lack of “objectivity” of diagnostic
categories. Phenomena associated with mental health, disease and care
must be conceived as historical, context-sensitive, fragmented, conflic-
tive, dependent, and uncertain processes, therefore more efficiently
modelled as open systems. In a particular social and cultural setting, the
professional conception of such specific model-objects shall be the result
of the application of a methodological practice equally context-sensitive,
interactive and pluralistic (n.d., ).
The symptoms and signs used by each clinician are based on the physician’s
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training, reading, and clinical experience. This is information existing in the
mindscape of all clinicians and is based on the material they have read and all
the patients they have examined. It includes a whole range of attitudes that can
be included in what epidemiologists call biases (Sackett ), which “sneak in”
to the pursuit of objectivity (Huston ; Klein et al. ). As noted by Corin,
“The diagnosis only exists and has value in relation to the specific semiological
system of the clinician” (Almeido-Filho et al. n.d., ).
Empirical data do not always form the basis of nosology in psychiatry, and
“consequently, the definition of discrete disorders remains an artifact of some-
times arbitrary criteria that leave the classification of milder and intermediate
forms of distress ambiguous” (Kirmayer , ). As is done in much of the
anthropological study of medicine, Kirmayer focuses particularly on the mean-
ing of the symptoms to the patient, on how “culture influences symptoms from
their inception.” As a result of this focus, there is a valuable body of information
on the profound cultural meanings of symptoms. Cultural variations in the
manifestations of these symptoms are being addressed by the “new cross-
cultural psychiatry” and influence much of medical anthropology and psychia-
try (Good and Good ; Kleinman , ; Kirmayer ; Littlewood ),
making room for alternative approaches to the exploration of eternally evolving
concepts of clinical practice (for example, Eisenberg , ). The universal-
ity of disease categories continues to be questioned as epistemological consid-
erations generate, in extreme instances, “a view of psychiatry as a cultural
product of Western societies in the same way as are the diatonic scale and Coca-
Cola. These products can be exported all over the world and may be appreciated
by the local populace, but are no more valid than indigenous music or veg-
etables” (Leff , ).
Even Kraepelin, a century ago, took a “far from dogmatic” position on the
relationship between symptoms and disease etiology. He “accepted the exist-
ence of both psychological and biological factors and recognized that their na-
ture and role were in many cases hypothetical or unknown” (Pichot , ). It
was Kraepelin’s essentialist ideal, which is described here by Pichot: “If we had
at our disposal all the scientific facts, we could define the categories either by
symptomatic, pathogenic, or etiological criteria, but the three resulting nosolo-
gies would be identical, a perfect correspondence between the three levels be-
ing postulated. Accordingly, if we do not yet have a sufficient knowledge of the
mechanisms and the causes, the study of the symptoms, of their conditions of
apparition, their nature, and their evolution will result in a ‘natural’ nosology”
(–).
My work, presented in this chapter, focuses on the collection of symptoms
and signs that are reported by physicians in the act of diagnosing dementia.
While the examination of a patient is interpreted by clinicians as empirical evi-
dence for their diagnostic opinion, it is also shaped by the conceptual tropes of
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their discipline. For the purpose of exploring how they place different weights,
different interpretations of importance, on particular items or particular
intertextual configurations of their observations of symptoms, signs, and be-
haviors in a person, I accepted their observations as facts in the world. I could
thereby explore the potential to uncover the direction in which cultures of clini-
cal specialties influence diagnostic practice. Whether this will provide a
“greater understanding of the whole” by embracing difference will remain elu-
sive until there is a shift from the existing categorical thinking to a dimensional
approach that examines probabilities within the symptoms and signs.
Some earlier epidemiological surveys have used operational criteria for de-
mentia that neglect the essential “social functioning” dimension in the defini-
tion of dementia (for example, Pfeffer, Afifi, and Chance ; Evans et al. ).
Responding to these studies, colleagues and I found that neuropsychologists
and physicians had different but complementary approaches to diagnosing de-
mentia. Diagnostic agreements were greater when the patient had higher edu-
cation, while depression and lower MS scores in dementia sufferers decreased
diagnostic consistency between the neuropsychologists and physicians
(McKnight, Graham, and Rockwood ). Neuropsychologists relied on perfor-
mance ratings on the neuropsychological tests and less on functional activities
(Larrea et al. ). There are differing approaches by clinical specialties to
criterion selectivity. A continental divide that had existed between more so-
cially engaged old-age psychiatry in the United Kingdom and a more
psychoneurological approach in the United States had closed by the turn of the
previous century as the hard facts of neurological signs have gained diagnostic
supremacy over that of the social affect and general well-being of the person.
The neurological brain attracted the medical attention of clinical specialists,
while the psychosocial contextualized mind of people with dementia now goes
largely ignored (Eastwood , ; Eisenberg ).
Local Cultures of Medical Specialization
Physicians use the inventory of tests that they learn in medical school as prisms
through which they look at their patients. Even though they ostensibly examine
patients using the same standardized criteria, they rely most strongly on the
signs that they have skills in detecting and in the instruments that most effi-
ciently and effectively assist them in achieving a diagnosis. While the voices of
clinical medicine may appear united, I suggest that different paths that are
taken toward achieving this goal are oriented around the ecology of the particu-
lar specialty or school. Even when it is manacled to the operational criteria and
standardized protocol, we can see in evidence that the clinical world of demen-
tia too is organized around different cultural percepts and worldviews.
Seventy-six physicians representing five areas of medical specialty—family
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medicine (n = ), general internal medicine (n = ), geriatric medicine (n =
), neurology (n = ), and psychiatry (n = )—performed the clinical assess-
ments in the CSHA. There was very good diagnostic consistency among the phy-
sicians from across the country and extremely high concordance ( percent) of
their diagnoses with DSM-III-R criteria for dementia and NINCDS-ADRDA (
percent) (Graham et al. a). A kappa measure for interrater reliability mea-
sured ., for a near-perfect agreement. As the diagnosis was made more spe-
cific, however, from a comparison of dementia/not dementia, to dementia/
CIND/no impairment, to dementia subtyping, the consistency declined. Addi-
tionally, there were some differences in the patient populations seen by some
clinical specialties. For example,  percent of the CSHA participants who were
examined by psychiatrists were living in institutional care facilities, whereas
the majority ( percent) of people seen by family physicians lived in the com-
munity. In a U.S. study, Rybicki, Johnson, and Gorell () found that primary
care physicians were more likely to refer Parkinson’s cases to a neurologist if the
patient was younger, was male, had a private insurance plan, used health care
more often than the norm, and used hospital-based clinics for their primary
care. This selective referral bias remains an important deterrent to hospital-
based case-control studies. The randomized representative sample of elderly
Canadians selected for the CSHA was meant to counter this form of systematic
bias. Despite this study design, however, CSHA psychiatrists saw proportion-
ately more institutionalized elderly than did the other physicians (although
residence could be controlled in subsequent analyses). In general, their patients
TABLE 4.1
Characteristics of All People Receiving Clinical Assessment
(n = 2,914) by Clinical Specialty
Family General Geria- Neuro- Psychia-
practitioner  internist trician logist trist All
3MS score 66.3 66.2 62.3a, b, d 65.7 57.1a, b, c, d 64.0
Age 81.6 82.2 82.5a, e 81.8 80.9 82.0
Education 8.2b, c, d 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.2b, c 8.6
Percentage living
in institution 40.1 36.1 45.3a, b 43.9 52.8a, b, c 43.1
Figures represent significant differences, when adjusted for multiple
comparisons, with afamily practitioners; bgeneral internists; cgeriatricians;
dneurologists; epsychiatrists
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had a lower MS score and lower education level than the people examined by
the other study physicians (Table .).
Considerable variation in specialist differential-diagnostic opinion became
apparent. Neurologists diagnosed proportionately almost twice as many people
with probable Alzheimer’s disease than did psychiatrists, who, in turn, diag-
nosed two and a half times the proportion of vascular dementias compared with
the neurologists, and about . times more frequently made “other specific de-
mentia” diagnoses (which include Parkinson’s dementia, alcohol-related condi-
tions, postinjury to the head, tumors, normal pressure hydrocephalus, frontal
lobe disorder, Pick’s disease). General internists and psychiatrists made propor-
tionately fewer probable Alzheimer’s disease diagnoses than the others, with
internists identifying more people with possible Alzheimer’s disease (which in-
cludes four distinct subcategories of atypical presentation, vascular compo-
nents, Parkinsonism, and comorbidity) and psychiatrists finding vascular
dementia at roughly three times the rate that neurologists made the same diag-
nosis in the community population and twice the rate in the institutionalized
elderly.
General internists and neurologists diagnosed vascular dementia the least
among the clinical specialties. The general internists were also least likely to
place a person into an unclassifiable dementia category. Psychiatrists, by con-
trast, placed  percent of community-living elderly into this category, in com-
parison to an average rate of  percent for all physicians.
If we look to particular characteristics of the diagnostic patterns by the
various clinical specialties for all people represented in the CSHA, including
those with no cognitive impairment and those with cognitive impairment but
not meeting dementia criteria (that is, CIND), we see some interesting differ-
ences. Even when controlling for residence, psychiatrists found significantly
fewer people to be cognitively normal. Corroborating the findings of Wind and
colleagues (), but different from what was found among German general
practitioners who tended to overestimate impairment (Cooper, Bickel,
Schäufele ), CSHA family practitioners and internists were less likely to
make a dementia syndrome diagnosis than were the other specialists.
The people diagnosed as cognitively normal seemed to have relatively simi-
lar characteristics across examining specialists, although those seen by geriatri-
cians and neurologists had higher cognitive scores, and there was a slightly
greater proportion of institutionalized elderly seen by family practitioners than
by geriatricians (Table .). Among the people diagnosed with CIND (Graham et
al. ), there were few differences associated with clinical specialty, although
those examined by psychiatrists were younger than the people seen by geriatri-
cians, and those seen by internists had higher education on average and a
smaller proportion were institutionalized (Table .). However, when we look at
the people diagnosed with dementia (Table .), those seen by the neurologists
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had a higher MS score than those examined by other specialists. The people
seen by CSHA psychiatrists tended to be slightly younger; those examined by the
geriatricians had, on average, a lower MS score for cognitive functioning along
with a higher level of education.
Finally, Table . provides the probabilities of twenty-one symptoms and
TABLE 4.2
Characteristics of People Diagnosed as Cognitively Normal
(n = 921) by Clinical Specialty
Family General Geria- Neuro- Psychi-
practitioner internist trician logist atrist All
3MS score 82.8 82.8 86.2a, b 87.2a, b 85.6 84.6
Age 79.8 80.7 80.0 80.3 80.6 80.1
Education 8.6 9.7 9.7 10.2 8.9 9.2
Percentage living
in institution 21.8c 17.0 13.1 22.0 15.4 17.9
Figures represent significant differences, when adjusted for multiple
comparisons, with afamily practitioners; bgeneral internists; cgeriatricians;
dneurologists; epsychiatrists
TABLE 4.3
Characteristics of People Diagnosed as Cognitively Impaired but Not
Dementia (CIND) (n = 861) by Clinical Specialty
 Family General Geria- Neuro- Psychi-
practitioner internist trician logist atrist All
3MS score 70.5 69.6 72.1 71.0 71.5 71.1
Age 81.3 81.3 81.8 80.5 79.4c 81.3
Education 7.9 9.1a, d 8.2 7.7 8.1 8.1
Percentage living
in institution 42.0 30.4c 44.7 39.1 45.5 41.8
Figures represent significant differences, when adjusted for multiple
comparisons, with afamily practitioners; bgeneral internists; cgeriatricians;
dneurologists; epsychiatrists
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signs assessed for everyone diagnosed with dementia by the specialty of those
diagnosing. An additional four demographic items—the MS score, age, years of
education, and percentage of this study population living in an institution—are
also provided. Probabilities that were significantly different from those of the
other clinical specialist groupings are identified. Even controlling for multiple
comparison, only three items show no variation between the clinical special-
ties. These are impaired abstract thinking and impaired judgment, both of
which remain consistently high in all people suffering from dementia, and para-
noid behavior.
Conclusions
Addressing the cultural dimensions of the experience of Alzheimer’s disease
and of other dementias for the sufferer and caregivers was not the goal of this
chapter (see, instead, e.g. Henderson ; Gubrium ; Cohen ;
Herskovits ; as well as other chapters in this volume). Estes and Binney
() have described in detail many of the arguments against the
biomedicalization of aging that have privileged the clinical over political and
ontological constructs. It is precisely these clinical constructs that I have tar-
geted in my novel approach to dementia, for these constructs are the tropes by
means of which physicians make diagnoses. I have shown, however, that these
clinical constructs are not separate from cultural practices and beliefs by focus-
ing on what clinicians use to assemble a diagnosis of dementia and its subtypes.
TABLE 4.4
Characteristics of People Diagnosed with Dementia
(n = 1,132) by Clinical Specialty
Family General Geria- Neuro- Psychi-
practitioner internist trician logist atrist All
3MS score 41.4 44.3 36.9a, b, d 46.3e 36.9 40.0
Age 83.9 84.5 84.7 83.8 82.0a, b, c, d 84.1
Education 8.0 8.4 9.0a, e 8.6 8.0 8.5
Percentage living
in institution 58.7c, e 61.0 68.9 61.4 70.3 64.5
Figures represent significant differences, when adjusted for multiple
comparisons, with afamily practitioners; bgeneral internists; cgeriatricians;
dneurologists; epsychiatrists
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TABLE 4.5
Probability of Symptoms for All Diagnoses of Dementia by Clinical
Specialty (Number of Diagnoses)
Family Geria- Neuro- Psychi-
Practitioner Internist trician logist atrist TOTAL
SYMPTOM (n = 322) (n = 100) (n = 454) (n = 145) (n = 111) (n = 1132)
Facial bradykinesia .132 .055 .141b .211a, b .243a, b, c .149
Limb bradykinesia .190 .074a, d, e .145 .285a, c .206 .176
Limb tone .341 .187a, c, d, e .467a, d .344 .374 .383
Agnosia .444b, d, e .179 .471b, d, e .321 .250 .406
Memory impairment .917 1.00a, c, d .921 .864c, e .949 .923
Impaired focal signs .329 .200a, c, e .373 .252c, e .436 .336
History of stroke .245 .282 .308 .172c, e .317 .272
Arterial hypertension .351 .229c .383 .294 .296 .340
Impaired abstract
thinking .893 .862 .929 .882 .913 .905
Impaired judgment .808 .785 .835 .784 .807 .814
Diminished activities
of daily living .554 .586 .662a, d .472 .682a, d .602
Emotional incontinence .086 .109 .210a, b, d .049 .208a, b, d .146
Somatic complaints .072 .224a, c, d .068 .128 .196a, c .104
Depression (MD exam) .096e .139 .072d, e .167 .233 .113
Depression (CAMDEX) .419 .541a, c, d .378 .317 .548a, c, d .413
Episodes of agitation .190 .207 .330a, b, d .119 .371a, b, d .260
Personality changes .753 .788 .755 .634a, b, c, e .835 .750
Difficulties with
everyday activities .793 .788 .860a, d .731 .809 .813
Paranoid .231 .278 .231 .201 .278 .236
Cerebrovascular
problems .436 .404 .429 .273a, b, d, e .608a, b, c .427
Mobility difficulties .663 .719 .708 .515a, b, c, e .722 .674
3MS score 41.4 44.3 36.9a, b, d 46.3 36.9d 40.0
Age (years) 83.9 84.5 84.7 83.8 82.0a, b, c, d 84.1
Education (years) 8.0 8.4 9.0a, e 8.6 8.0 8.5
Percentage living
in institution 58.7c, e 61.0 68.9 61.4 70.3 64.5
Figures represent significant differences, when adjusted for multiple
comparisons, with afamily practitioners; bgeneral internists; cgeriatricians;
dneurologists; epsychiatrists
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In this chapter I present various diagnostic approaches to dementia and its
subtyping by physicians, carried out in clinical practice, collected, and then
inscribed in a database text. Historically, anthropology has kept distant from
broken bones and “organic” disease in examining health, illness, and sickness.
In taking on a syndrome that can be explored as disease, illness, and sickness
(Young ), I advance here a methodology that employs an anthropology of
diagnostic process, examining the physician’s own data for hidden relation-
ships that usually go without saying. In the process, I reveal potentially useful
“bundles of criteria” specific to the refined skills and training of subcultures
within clinical medicine.
Exploring the manner in which senile dementia is classified by expert re-
search clinicians places emphasis on how they “distinguish-choose-posit-
assemble-count-speak” (Castoriadis ) through the data they report. The
choices they make often reveal the underlying premises with which they engage
in diagnostic practice. The assemblage of signs, symptoms, and behaviors col-
lected, cataloged, and interpreted by clinicians in diagnosing dementia, and the
clinical diagnostic decision-making process in general are represented in a
database text. I have elucidated this text using what Eco refers to as an encyclo-
paedia perspective. The database, I suggest, represents a “systematic assem-
blage of the key configurations which connect elements in a given culture,”
which, like an encyclopaedia, “can be seen as providing the major codes and key
categories that prevail in a culture, including the preferential schemas that de-
termine the architecture of that culture, and the semantic web that links cul-
tural elements together” (Bibeau and Corin , ).
I have shown that we can empirically draw the intertextual relational prop-
erties of the individual items that make up the constituent units of diagnostic
practice. Symptoms and signs gain meaning via their interactions, through
their synergies and antagonisms. Furthermore, they can be used as building
blocks in the construction of the social imaginary of medical mindscapes. They
hold within their relationships to one another hierarchical orderings that rep-
resent particular distinctive expressions of etiology and neurodegeneration. My
methodology develops a preliminary and exploratory heuristic instrument (an
algorithm with synergies) that produces a differential diagnosis for dementia
based upon clinical decision-making probabilities and groupings of clinical fac-
tors. The methodology has been used to develop more refined definitions
through access to bodies of information that are concealed in databases. New
and evolving categories of dementia can be probabilistically estimated on the
basis of already existing data. It can thereby be used to demonstrate the concep-
tual shifts and overlaps at the level of diagnostic discursive practice (Foucault
, ) and the construction of illness as an object of diagnostic activity (Good
, ).
Particular tropes direct clinical specialists in their choice of configurations
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of symptoms and signs. Psychiatrists look more carefully at the affective quali-
ties of their patients, on depression, somatic complaints, agitation, emotions.
The context of social functioning is of some importance for psychiatrists. Neu-
rologists examine the neurological signs, activities, and functioning, while af-
fective and personality characteristics seem less important for them.
Geriatricians focus on functional and global concerns; their patients’ compe-
tence in activities of daily living, that is, their ability to perform everyday tasks,
is clearly significant, but so too (and no doubt related to the individual’s capac-
ity to function) are configurations of neurological components. These addi-
tional elements in the geriatrician’s toolkit likely reflect geriatric medicine in
Canada, where it is a subspecialty in which the practitioner focuses on geriatrics
after having already specialized in internal medicine. General internists appear
to represent a more diverse group, placing less focus on the “aging” individual
and more on the mechanistic systemic signs and symptoms; family practitio-
ners consider the management and care of the patient and the patient’s family
and seem to be less concerned with a specific etiological diagnosis and more
interested in the ongoing ability of the aging individual to continue to function
in his or her everyday life.
Rather than follow international harmonization attempts to funnel the per-
spectives of these different practical approaches into one reduced set of criteria
that can be universally applied to all, in this chapter I make a case that, instead,
we might be better served by embracing differences in diagnostic practice. Al-
though a standardized toolkit has practical utility in addressing common con-
cerns and public-health policy, much might be gained by allowing many
different approaches. The loss of information when a standardized approach is
forged should be avoided, for it leads to items that go unrecorded, which cannot
then be reflected upon, and which are removed from the landscape of possibili-
ties. These lost bits and pieces might have had the potential to later answer the
questions that further our inquiry and knowledge.
I have described how clinicians and the medical-scientific community in-
terpret dementia through belief-practices that are not often consciously known.
I believe that the approach I have taken as a means to understand this repre-
sents a similar decision-making model that the physicians themselves use. I
have, however, found no other such attempts to examine the probabilistic rela-
tionships of the meaningful units of diagnostic activity. Clinicians’ own texts,
comparing their standardized diagnostic criteria to their practices as recorded
in their databases, were used to unravel the constellation of elements (signs,
symptoms) of diagnostic meaning. This approach includes a multiplicity of
voices of clinicians diagnosing dementia, their interpretations of the particular
tests, and technologies used distinctively by them to identify symptoms and
signs that represent meaningful aspects of some disease process.
Through a recognition of databases, dementia, and diagnostic processes as
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technoscientific objects, the tension between structure and agency, that is, the
relationships between the databases, as well as the databases themselves, have
been examined. I relied on the epidemiological database created by these same
scientists and clinicians for disclosure and understanding. This serves both to
facilitate their important quest to diagnose more accurately and efficiently,
while providing us with the information on the discourse they engage in to go
about this task. The relationships between the signs and symptoms, what I
called synergism and antagonism, were described and used ontologically to con-
struct other diagnostic narratives. Multiple comorbidities and severities were
thereby illustrated.
My approach addresses the issues of standardization, reliability, and valid-
ity that are inherent in epidemiological, clinical, and anthropological interpre-
tations; and in the process of advancing the clinical-medical-scientific inquiry
into the syndrome of dementia and its differential diagnosis, I elucidate ele-
ments and aspects of clinical culture in diagnostic practice. Evidence of several
paths to diagnosis were provided, incorporating many different configurations
of symptoms and signs in diverse semiological catalogs. If this argument is
sound, then perhaps we should consider a reexamination of the importance of
emphasizing the standardization of diagnoses and explore instead the wealth of
information contained in the plurality of clinical approaches that are currently
hidden under the guise of standardization.
NOTES
. The CSHA clinical exam had been designed in consultation with several international
studies, including a World Health Organization (WHO) study on dementia (Amaducci
and Baldereschi ), and with the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s
Disease (CERAD) project in the United States (Heyman ), whose work continues
and has been widely influential in international studies (e.g., Prince et al. ). Dur-
ing the s, I consulted extensively with an international group of expert dementia
diagnosticians, which included a team of Canadian neurologists, geriatricians, psy-
chiatrists, neuropsychologists, and epidemiologists from across Canada (Graham et
al. a). I also met with investigators in the Eurodem (European Community Con-
certed Action Epidemiology and Prevention of Dementia) and the U.K. Medical Re-
search Council (MRC) Multicentre Study of Cognitive Function and Ageing (Cooper
and Bickel ; Copeland et al. ).
. National Institute of Neuological and Communicative Diseases and Stroke/
Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Association.
. Ironically, the banquet menu at this meeting of the invited leading international de-
mentia experts, held during the height of the variant Creutzfeld-Jacob (mad cow) epi-
demic in the United Kingdom, included a robust serving of haggis.
. Identification of a population experiencing some form of mild cognitive impairment
that did not meet the dementia criteria (CIND) in my Lancet article in  expanded
the Canadian prevalence rates from  percent of the population over sixty-five years
old with some form of dementia to  percent of this same population having some
form of cognitive impairment. Despite my emphasis that CIND was a heuristic
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category, identified for research purposes only, its market potential for the fast-
emerging therapeutic products was not lost on the pharmaceutical industry, or on
medical researchers who were funded for clinical trials. I had developed qualitative
and ethnographic methods for an approach to assess dementia progression and treat-
ment responses from the perspectives of the sufferers and their caregivers (Joffres,
Graham, and Rockwood ; Rockwood et al. ). Attention to individual problem
areas provides a detailed inventory of events that allow for a more meaningful inter-
pretation than that provided by the usual psychometric characteristics, as well as
important references for counseling patients with what was being clinically referred
to in research circles at the time and increasingly marketed as the “new entity of
pharmacologically treated dementia.” Patient expectations are marketed by pharma-
ceutical companies (Graham ). My most recent work has turned to an exploration
of the moral basis of profit and drug regulation (Graham , ). A primary drive
behind diagnostics is therapeutics, which has multiple stakeholders, including cor-
porate interests. The life history of a pharmaceutical involves a relationship between
finance, research, and marketing.
. For example, a diagnosis of dementia demands that a series of criteria be met, includ-
ing memory loss, a decline from a previous higher level of functioning, and cognitive
loss that affects social functioning. All these items had to be met in the clinical diag-
noses to establish consistency with the diagnostic criteria.
. The following symptoms and signs used are for the synergy index (from Graham et al.
b). Clinical history: arterial hypertension, episodes of agitation, stroke, memory,
mood (for example, anxiety, sadness); CAMDEX (informant interview): clouding/de-
lirium; and neurological examination: facial bradykinesia, limb bradykinesia, limb tone,
neck tone, muscle bulk, strength, posture, limb coordination, gait pattern, resting
tremor, action tremor, voice, focal signs.
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of Senility and the Persistent
Stigmatization of Old Age
in the United States
JESSE F.  BALLENGER
Last scene of all, that ends this strange eventful history, is second childish-
ness and mere oblivion, sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.
—Shakespeare, As You Like It
UUUUUUUUUUU
This oft-quoted characterization of the seventh and final stage of a person’s life
has usually been taken as a commonplace of old age: this period has always been
stigmatized. In particular, the mental losses associated with age, “second child-
ishness and mere oblivion,” have been among the most deeply stigmatized con-
ditions. In its frightening totality—effacing the memories and abilities that are
widely seen as the very essence of personhood—senile dementia seems to taint
the entire experience of aging. In its relentless inevitability, deeply associated
with aging and the mere passage of time, it makes a mockery of the achieve-
ment of longevity.
But if senility has always been stigmatized, it has not always been stigma-
tized in the same way. In this chapter, I will discuss some of the complexities of
the stigmatization of senility in the United States since World War II. In doing so,
I intend to challenge the view that the causes of stigma are ignorance and mys-
tification and that the remedy, therefore, is scientific progress and education.
Stigma is the product not simply of ignorance but of deeply felt anxieties about
the coherence and stability of the self. To be sure, scientific progress and educa-
tion remain important for a variety of reasons, but they will not address the
sorts of anxieties that produce stigma.
After World War II a diverse array of professionals in the emerging field of
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gerontology sought to remove the stigma surrounding senility and old age
through scientific understanding and education. By the late s, they sought
to destigmatize aging by recasting senility as Alzheimer’s disease, a problem in
the brain, not of the mental or moral fortitude of the person suffering from it.
Since then, researchers can claim much in terms of scientific progress and pub-
lic education concerning Alzheimer’s. Yet I will argue that Alzheimer’s remains
at least as stigmatizing as “senility” was before it, and that this stigma continues
to overshadow the entire experience of aging.
Representing Senility in the Modern United States
Since the late nineteenth century, representations of senility have been part of
a broader narrative on the fate of old age in modern society—about whether the
aging body and mind could possibly keep up with the frenetic pace of change in
an industrial and postindustrial age. The image of the senile, especially of the
senile man, has been one of the most prevalent stereotypes for managing anxi-
ety about the coherence, stability, and moral agency of the self under the con-
flicting demands of liberal capitalism.
There is perhaps no better example of the stereotype of the senile than that
found in the writing of George Miller Beard, the New York neurologist who, in
the s and s, popularized the diagnosis of neurasthenia, an ailment that
many historians have seen as emblematic of late-nineteenth-century American
anxiety about the pace of modern industrial society. Historians of aging have
seen him as one of the principle architects of the scientific legitimization of the
denigration of old age (Achenbaum , –; Graebner , ; Cole ,
–).
In Beard’s Legal Responsibility in Old Age, first published in , we can see
the modern stereotype of the senile in its most characteristic and vitriolic
forms. Beard asserted that the brain and the mental and moral faculties that
depended on it were subject to deterioration and in fact normally would decline
more rapidly than the rest of the body. “Men die as trees die,” he argued, “slowly,
and frequently at the top first. As the moral and reasoning faculties are the high-
est, most complex and most delicate development of human nature, they are
the first to show signs of cerebral disease; when they begin to decay in advanced
life we are generally safe in predicting that, if neglected, other faculties will
sooner or later be impaired. When conscience is gone the constitution may
soon follow (Beard , ).
For Beard, senile mental deterioration could only be regarded as a calamity,
signifying the start of the gradual, vegetative process of death—the slow, top-
down withering away of a life. The dissolution of the intellectual and moral fac-
ulties was not a simple process, however. “Very few men decline in all the moral
faculties,” Beard observed. “One becomes peevish, another avaricious, another
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misanthropic, another mean and tyrannical, another exacting and querulous,
another sensual, another cold and cruelly conservative, another vain and ambi-
tious, and others simply lose their moral enthusiasm, or their moral courage, or
their capacity of resisting temptation and enduring disappointment” (). Beard
thus represented the senile in a number of characteristic guises—as miser, ty-
rant, fool, and dirty old man.
Whatever the particular form, Beard represented the senile as hopelessly
out of step with the times. Failing to fulfill the complex intellectual and moral
tasks required of individuals in modern society, the senile were ultimately an
obstruction to progress. Beard thought that the biologist Louis Agassiz, who
died shortly before Legal Responsibilities was published, was a perfect example.
“The intemperate manner of his opposition to the theory of evolution,” Beard
argued, “by which he was so rapidly winning favor among the thoughtless and
ignorant, and so rapidly losing favor among the conscientious and scholarly,
may find its partial, if not complete explanation in the exhausted condition of
his brain” (n).
In pointing to Agassiz’s unwarranted influence on the “thoughtless and ig-
norant,” Beard represented the senile as dangerous. Society could no longer af-
ford to indulge a reflexive reverence for the aged. Most people, Beard feared,
revered the aged blindly and disproportionately and were credulously per-
suaded by the opinions of the aged on the merits of past accomplishments or,
what was worse, on the merits of age alone (–). In the case of Agassiz, the
“conscientious and scholarly” would revere Agassiz for “the original work that he
did before his fortieth year” (emphasis in the original). But they would not be
influenced by his late opinions, which were clearly the product of the mental
deterioration of aging, a sign of what was “well known” to Agassiz’s friends—
that he actually “began to die” long before his death in  (n). Beard’s repre-
sentations of the senile as dangerous extended also to practical affairs of public
and private life, where the senile were perhaps even more disruptive. “Corrup-
tion in political and business life, and breaches of trust, are very common
among the old, as every morning newspaper bears witness,” Beard asserted; and
“offenses that depend on the sexual passion are not infrequent among the aged;
for it is a fact of interest that in the decline of life we sometimes return to the
vices of youth” ().
Overall, the impressive variety of moral and intellectual failures used by
physicians such as Beard to illustrate male senility can be read as a catalog of
nineteenth-century middle-class anxieties about a masculine self imperiled by
progress. The dominant gender ideology in the Victorian era figured men as
aggressively competitive and bold. The moral failings and calamities that Beard
ascribed to senile men threatened to undo a man at every stage of his life in this
highly individualistic and competitive society. Projecting these failings onto a
figure—the aged man—visibly marked as decadent and diseased helped restore
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a sense of moral stability. Whatever particular guise that figure might take, he
was always and above all the very picture of the ruined man. But if the dodder-
ing old man, afflicted with cerebral degeneration of one sort or another, might
unravel under the conflicting pressures of the modern world, the young man, in
his intellectual and moral prime, would surely flourish.
The stereotypical representation of the senile man as presented by Beard
remained dominant in medical and popular texts through the s. It can be
clearly seen, for example, in William Osler’s () infamous joke that men, hav-
ing forfeited their productivity and creativity as they aged, ought to be
euthanized at the age of sixty-five. Ignatz Leo Nascher, in Geriatrics, published in
, devoted a chapter in the textbook to “sexual perversion,” examples of
which were always figured male. These, he argued, were not indications of “de-
pravity or inverted sexuality,” as they were in the young. Rather, the condition
was simply a reflection of the “weakened mentality [and] diminished control
over the emotions” that afflicted old men (Nascher , –). Many ger-
ontologists have argued that it has persisted as a salient representation of aging
down to today (Shenk and Achenbaum ; Nelson ).
The Gerontologic Persuasion in the Postwar United States
Following World War II, the popular and professional literatures on aging were
reshaped by the creation of gerontology as a field of research and practice by
a diverse array of biomedical and social scientists, policy makers, activists,
and entrepreneurs interested in tapping the “gray market.” These various
groups, allied only loosely and at times in conflict with one another on various
matters of policy or analysis, nonetheless shared an optimistic attitude toward
aging and a commitment to improving the lives of the elderly—what I term
the gerontologic persuasion (Calhoun ; see also Achenbaum ; Katz
).
To those imbued with the gerontologic persuasion, negative attitudes to-
ward the elderly no longer seemed tenable. Consigning the fastest-growing seg-
ment of the population to “corner rocking chairs, to lifeless rooming houses,
and even to mental hospitals” was increasingly seen as a major threat to the
future prosperity of the nation (Tibbitts and Sheldon , ). The gerontologic
persuasion of the post–World War II United States set out quite literally to re-
verse the negative assumptions about old age that had dominated discourse
about old age since the late nineteenth century. Where the old, and particularly
old men, had been seen as unable to adjust to modern society because they were
decrepit and senile, gerontologists and other advocates for the elderly began to
argue that the elderly were in fact made decrepit and senile primarily because
modern society no longer made a place for them. The relentless adoption of new
technological and bureaucratic means of production, it was argued, deprived
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older men of their traditional place in society as essential repositories of valu-
able wisdom and experience. The problems of aging were thus seen as an unin-
tended—and unnecessary—effect of modernization.
This idea was formalized by Yale anthropologist Leo W. Simmons, in his
widely influential  book, The Role of the Aged in Primitive Society. Synthesizing
and statistically analyzing ethnographic literature on seventy-one preindustrial
cultures from around the world, Simmons argued that different types of cultures
produced different attitudes toward and roles for the aged. Although ostensibly
concerned in this work only with “primitive” cultures, his implicit comparison
of the exotic opportunities for fulfillment open to the elderly in these cultures
with the dead end of modern old age constituted a powerful critique of the
treatment of the aged in modern society. In a later article, Simmons made the
comparison explicit. “In anthropological perspective,” he wrote, “it is literally
true that societies achieved a very good old age for a few long before there could
be any substantial age at all for the many. But modern civilization has reversed
the process and the problems” (, ). He went on to argue that while senility
was a virtually universal phenomena, it was an ascribed status whose timing
was culturally contingent. Senility was not an objectively measurable state of
physical weakness, mental infirmity, or both, but an ascribed status of useless-
ness and burden, a status that “may be attained under various degrees of physi-
cal and mental debility in different societies.” Although all societies evidently
made some distinction between old age and senility, the senile phase of old age
“has had little significance for the simple societies which were never able to
sustain more than a few really old people anyway, and those under conditions in
which the very helpless could not long survive.” This was not true for modern
society, where this “helpless and hopeless period of life [was taking] on para-
mount importance” because economic and medical progress was successfully
removing the physical barriers to old age. “While modern civilization has greatly
progressed in the promise of longer life for larger proportions of the popula-
tion,” Simmons argued, “it has disrupted many of the time-tested adaptations of
the aged, and perhaps even regressed in its solution of the problem of successful
aging.”
Yet Simmons remained optimistic. The ultimate lesson for modern society
was that “the basic qualities of successful aging rest . . . upon the capacity of
individuals to fit well into the social framework of their own times, to win their
rights to prolonged participation and recognition, and to know when they are
through.” In short, society had only to cease dwelling on the problems of old age
and focus instead on its opportunities; society could not solve the problems of
old age for the elderly, but could allow the elderly to create meaningful roles for
themselves. “It is possible that these potentialities wait to be rediscovered, de-
veloped, and refitted into our own times,” Simmons concluded. “This may, in-
deed, be an old frontier that calls for new pioneering” (, –).
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This account of the problems of aging as the pathological by-products of
modern society was explicitly or implicitly present in most discourses on aging
through the s. For example, sociologists and educators writing about retire-
ment argued that the challenges it posed to the elderly and society were unprec-
edented; the need to cease remunerative labor at the arbitrary age of sixty-five
was a product of the vagaries of industrial society’s labor market, and society
was challenged to find new meanings for old age that had traditionally been
supplied by work (for example, see Donahue and Tibbitts ; Kaplan ;
Friedman and Havighurst ; Havighurst ). Similarly, problems associ-
ated with the family and social network of the elderly were typically attributed
to modernization; the report of the first White House Conference on Aging, held
in , suggested that issues within family life and friendships were the result of
the rural-urban population shift and of improvements in transportation and
communication that increased mobility and undermined traditional patterns
of caring for the elderly within families and neighborhoods (U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare , –). But the idea that modern society
created the problems of aging was perhaps most prominent in psychiatric dis-
course, where it was employed as an explanation for mental deterioration in old
age. For example, in David Rothschild’s account of the social origins of senile
dementia, he argued that “in our present social set-up, with its loosening of
family ties, unsettled living conditions and fast economic pace, there are many
hazards for individuals who are growing old” (, ).
Other psychiatrists took this approach further, arguing that brain pathol-
ogy itself was a symptom of social pathology. Maurice Linden and Douglas
Courtney argued that “senility as an isolable state is largely a cultural artifact
and . . . senile organic deterioration may be consequent on attitudinal alter-
ations” (, ). The authors acknowledged, however, that this hypothesis
was difficult to prove. David C. Wilson, writing in , was less circumspect,
arguing that the link between social pathology and brain deterioration was sim-
ply a matter of waiting for “laboratory proof” to support what was adequately
demonstrated by clinical experience—that the “pathology of senility is found
not only in the tissues of the body but also in the concepts of the individual and
in the attitude of society.” Wilson cited the usual hallmarks of pathological so-
cial relations in old age: the breakup of the family, mandatory retirement, and
isolation. “Factors that narrow the individual’s life also influence the occur-
rence of senility,” he asserted. “Lonesomeness, lack of responsibility, and a feel-
ing of not being wanted all increase the restricted view of life which in turn
leads to restricted blood flow” (). The pathology of modern society, it
seemed, could be discerned within the constricted blood vessels of the aging
brain.
Whatever the merits of this model of the social production of “senility” as an
account of the pathogenesis of dementia, those who embraced it were generally
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successful in winning a series of significant policy changes that helped to trans-
form the experience of aging in America after the s. The material circum-
stances of old age were markedly improved, with people over age sixty-five
moving from the poorest age group to one of the best off; significant legal pro-
tections had been won against age discrimination in the labor market, negative
stereotypes were challenged, and the elderly themselves organized for political
action on their own behalf in large and influential advocacy groups such as the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) (Calhoun ; Laslett ;
Haber and Gratton ).
The Biomedical Deconstruction of Senility
With these developments, the expansive concept of senility that had been the
basis of psychodynamic psychiatry and gerontology in the s and s was
no longer seen in the gerontologic movement as an effective way to approach
the problem of aging. To a more aggressive and politicized group of gerontolo-
gists and aging advocates in the s, ageism had become a keyword in their
efforts. The term was coined by Robert Butler in  to describe the “process of
systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against people because they are
old, just as racism and sexism accomplish this with skin color and gender” (,
). One of the worst aspects of ageism was the belief that the process of aging
entailed inevitable physical and mental decline. Virtually all the physical and
mental deterioration commonly attributed to old age was more properly under-
stood, Butler and other gerontologists argued, as the product of disease pro-
cesses that were distinct from aging. The term senility was thus particularly
obnoxious, in Butler’s view, and ought to be abolished. It was not a medical
diagnosis at all, but a “wastebasket term” applied to any person over sixty with a
problem. Worse, it rationalized the neglect of those problems by assuming that
they were inevitable and irreversible. “‘Senility’ is a popularized layman’s term
used by doctors and the public alike to categorize the behavior of the old,” But-
ler argued. “Some of what is called senile is the result of brain damage. But anxi-
ety and depression are also frequently lumped within the same category of
senility, even though they are treatable and often reversible.” Because both doc-
tors and the public found it so “convenient to dismiss all these manifestations
by lumping them together under an improper and inaccurate diagnostic label,
the elderly often did not receive the benefits of decent diagnosis and treatment”
(–). Butler did not discount the reality of irreversible brain damage, as had
an earlier generation of psychiatrists. Rather, he argued that the ageist refusal to
systematically distinguish the various physical and mental disease processes
from one another and from the process of aging itself exacerbated the tragedy of
mental illness in old age.
From his position as first director of the National Institute on Aging (NIA),
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established in , Butler focused on making funding for research into
Alzheimer’s disease a priority. In so doing, he played a key role in breaking
down the broad concept of senility that was aggressively pursued in biomedi-
cine in the late s and the s. In part, deconstructing senility involved
developing effective diagnostic procedures to systematically distinguish be-
tween irreversible dementias produced by conditions such as Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, and reversible dementias caused by treatable conditions (National
Institute on Aging Consensus Task Force ). More important, it entailed re-
casting irreversible progressive dementia in old age as a number of disease en-
tities distinct from aging—the most prominent being Alzheimer’s disease. This
was accomplished by clinical neurologists, neuropathologists, and biochemists
who entered the field in the late s and s. In the view of this new genera-
tion of researchers, Alzheimer’s disease was clearly to be regarded as a brain
disease, and research returned to the conundrums involving the correlation
between pathology and dementia, and the distinctions that could be made at a
pathological and clinical level between disease and aging and between pres-
enile and senile dementia. Far stronger correlations between pathology and de-
mentia were made by the British group of Blessed, Tomlinson, and Roth.
American researchers led by Robert Terry and Robert Katzman dropped the dis-
tinction between Alzheimer’s disease and senile dementia, arguing that at both
the clinical and the pathological level, they were identical. More important, this
new generation of researchers argued that this entity was not part of aging, but
was a disease whose mechanisms could be unraveled through basic research
leading eventually to effective treatments and ultimately prevention—hence
their insistence on the term Alzheimer’s disease rather than the more general
senile dementia or senility (Katzman and Bick ). There was nothing espe-
cially new in these arguments; they had all been made, albeit more tentatively,
decades earlier.1 Nor did research of this period end debate around these is-
sues.2 But in the context of the s, these claims did allow researchers, aging
advocates, and policy makers like Butler to make a convincing case that public
resources should be allocated for research into Alzheimer’s disease. This case
was very persuasive in the federal arena, with the result that by the end of the
s, the NIA budget for Alzheimer’s disease research had increased by more
than  percent (Fox ).
The Persistence of Stigma
But if this biomedical deconstruction of senility has been a clear success in win-
ning public support for research into Alzheimer’s disease, it has been at best
ambiguous in lessening the stigma of old age. Alzheimer’s disease advocates
often claimed that the new conceptualization of the disease, based on advances
in neuroscience, and the ambitious public awareness campaigns that had
114 JESSE F.  BALLENGER
accompanied it had lessened the stigma of late-life dementia. But there is much
evidence to suggest that stigma has in fact been heightened.
Educational material aimed at the general public and Alzheimer’s victims
and their families in particular frequently contained assurances that there was
nothing stigmatizing about Alzheimer’s. “There is no reason to be ashamed or
embarrassed because a family member has a dementing illness,” the authors of
The -Hour Day, the most popular guidebook for families of Alzheimer’s vic-
tims, assured readers. “Many brilliant and famous people have suffered from
dementing illnesses. Although dementias associated with the final stage of
syphilis were common in the past, this is very rare today.” Similarly, they
thought that if the public understood that the unsettling behavior of the de-
mented was a symptom of a disease, stigma would be lessened. “It is important
for those around him to remember that many of the person’s behaviors are be-
yond his control: for example, he may not be able to keep his anger in check or
to stop pacing the floor. The changes that occur are not the result of an unpleas-
ant personality grown old; they are the result of damage to the brain and are
usually beyond the control of the patient” (Mace and Rabins , –).
But such formulations fundamentally misconstrue the nature of stigma.
Stigma is more than the degree to which the suffering of victims can be attrib-
uted to something being “wrong with them,” or to which they “brought the suf-
fering on themselves.” Stigma is the amount of anxiety surrounding the
boundary between the normal and the pathological. Put another way, stigma is
directly related to the social stakes of a particular set of behaviors or symptoms
that are judged to deviate from some notion of normal. (These behaviors and
symptoms may or may not be brought together under the rubric of a disease
category.) The behaviors and symptoms commonly brought together in the cat-
egory of having a cold are not deeply stigmatized, even though those who cough,
sniffle, and sneeze clearly have something “wrong” with them, and are often
“blamed” for their failure to rest properly, take vitamin C, suck zinc lozenges, or
drink echinacea tea. There is simply too little at stake in whether one does or
does not have a cold for it to be highly stigmatized.
In the United States at least, the stakes involved in behaviors and symp-
toms variously called senility or Alzheimer’s disease became enormous in the
twentieth century, calling into question the very personhood of those who ex-
hibit them. Alzheimer’s attacks the cognitive skills necessary to maintain both
an inner sense of selfhood and, perhaps more important, to present a stable and
coherent self to others. “This illness strikes at the very core of our being, depriv-
ing the individual of the qualities that endeared them to all around them,”
writes one physician in the foreword to a caregiver’s account of the disease.
“There is little physical pain, disfigurement, or mutilation. . . . Instead, the dis-
ease insidiously robs the victims of their unique thought processes, their in-
sights, their judgment, their ability to learn new information. Without these
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capabilities, the adult human regresses to an earlier, dependent life” (Ellis ,
vii). As a result of these losses, dementing persons have been deeply stigma-
tized—not for having the disease per se, but for their resulting inability to carry
off their role as respectable middle-class individuals.3 Nor could attributing
these failures to changes in the brain that are beyond the control of the victim
lessen the stigma, for loss of self-control, awareness, and personal responsibility
are themselves perhaps the most horrifying things imaginable to middle-class
Americans. Consider the promotional copy on the back cover of a sensational
“supermarket” paperback on Alzheimer’s disease titled The Living Death: “They
steal. They shoplift. They’re violent. They ‘expose’ themselves in public. They’re
verbally abusive. They lie. And they don’t know any better. Meet some of the 
million Americans who have Alzheimer’s disease in the pages of The Living
Death” (Lushin ). The Alzheimer’s disease victim, it seemed, was guilty of
the most loathsome violations of propriety. In his or her total loss of self-control,
the sufferer, as portrayed in the stereotype, was the epitome of the failed indi-
vidual, just as the figure of the senile man had been in the nineteenth century.
Representations of the Alzheimer’s disease victim were a means of main-
taining the distinction between decent, middle-class citizens and the sort of
failures invoked on the back of this paperback. Thus, if the exemplary Alz-
heimer’s disease victim was, before the disease struck, a solid, respected,
middle-class citizen—as represented by Alzheimer’s advocates—he or she
became someone or something quite different as the disease progressed. The
stereotypical Alzheimer’s sufferer was in fact at the outer limit of stigmatiza-
tion—often represented as a stranger, a ghost, a shadow, a nonperson. This dis-
tinction between the stable, respectable self before the disease and the
confused, discredited self that was lost to the disease was at the core of repre-
sentations of the Alzheimer’s victim, which were frequently instantiated by the
Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Association (ADRDA). For example,
in , the association began using a graphic that consisted of a series of close-
up photos of an attractive, intelligent-looking woman in her mid-fifties. Each
photo was identical, except that, moving from left to right, they faded from
sharp black and white to gray, with the last image virtually blank—suggesting
visually the gradual effacement of the self. In its newsletter, in a brief caption
explaining the graphic, the association noted that “the image of the [Al-
zheimer’s] victim ‘getting further away’ is reflected throughout ADRDA’s post-
ers, magazines and newspaper advertisements, as well as in the theme song, ‘It’s
a Long Goodbye’” (ADRDA ).
The persistence of stigma clinging to Alzheimer’s and aging was perhaps
most perfectly articulated in Beyond the Thin Line, a little-known novel by Robert
Gard, published in . Gard had written some forty books before this novel,
most of them dealing with life, history, and culture in Wisconsin. According to
the report on the book’s dust jacket, at age eighty-two Gard was an excellent
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example of what gerontologists describe as successful aging. “Never even think-
ing of retiring,” he maintained “a heavy schedule of writing, teaching and lec-
turing.” Gard characterized the book as “a fictional synthesis of one of the great
human dramas and tragedies of our time—Alzheimer’s disease,” one based on
his experience of watching a longtime friend become demented (Gard , ix–
x). In a long passage describing the subtle early indications of dementia in his
friend, Gard vividly describes his own fears of dissolution. Observing the resi-
dents of a nursing home to which his friend has been confined, Gard senses that
they have all “passed some invisible line. They can never come back and their
families know this and perhaps have witnessed it happening over years, but
they could not prevent, nor could they identify exactly when their loved one
crossed the line of no return” (). But where was this line? How and when did
one cross over it? “The line is a mystery. Little by little it becomes knowable to
friends and family, but hardly ever to the stricken persons. Often they are un-
aware of the presence of such a line. My friend Harry didn’t know, but his
friends became slowly aware, very slowly, and in some disbelief. They didn’t
understand” (). Gard describes a number of incidents that occurred during
Harry’s descent into dementia, a recounting that culminates with his discovery
that Harry was on a locked ward of the Veteran’s Hospital, where he had been
admitted for diagnosis because he was apt to wander away and become lost. “I
could only feel shocked, and conferring with other close friends of Harry I
learned that it was all true. Little by little Harry had been slipping toward the
line” ().
For Gard, finding this line was crucial, for it defined the boundary between
the normal and the pathological, between a coherent, stable self and the inco-
herent, chaotic dependency of dementia. Yet the line was almost impossible to
detect, except when it had been irrevocably crossed. It could only be discerned
through the closest scrutiny of the behavior not only of others but of oneself as
well.
I found myself beginning to watch for the line in several older friends and
even in myself. I began taking careful heed of where I put things, of noting
what my daily habits were and if I ever varied from them unknowingly.
Sometimes I thought I could discern small lapses—at home I would head
for another room to get a certain object and entirely forget what it was I
went to fetch. I learned that these small signs were almost universal in
older people, however, and that the larger lapses, the confusion, the wan-
dering away were more serious. Of these I was not guilty, and I noted that
in my public addresses, of which I gave a fair number, my train of thought
was never broken or inextricably lost. I could talk for two hours without
notes and never lose track of where I was. I was told that this was encour-
aging, and that I was certainly not yet approaching the line. But the line
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became an antagonist. In my imagination it grew almost into a living
thing, a reality, and I fancied I saw it often drawn for this person or that.
When one considers the line it becomes easy to think in negative terms,
and to become fanciful about many aspects of life. Often I heard friends
say, “The thing I dread most is becoming senile,” and I wondered whether
they too were aware of the line. (–)
Although Gard felt reassured that he was not “guilty”—that he was not ap-
proaching the line beyond which his status as a responsible, respectable person
would be open to serious question—that reassurance could never be more than
provisional and temporary. Despite being a prolific author, despite maintaining
a fully active and productive life into his eighties, Gard continued to carefully
scrutinize his behavior and that of those around him, trying desperately to de-
tect the line of no return. Why was this so important to Gard? Even if its signs
were detected early, nothing could be done to prevent Alzheimer’s disease. In
paying such careful attention to the signs of approaching dementia in himself
and others, Gard was trying to reassure himself that his selfhood was secure and
stable.
Despite the best intentions of professionals in medicine and gerontology to
destigmatize old age by recasting senility as Alzheimer’s disease, the latter a more
clinically precise term and a disease entity that is slowly yielding its secrets to
the explorations of biomedical science, their discourse has merely reinforced
the boundary line that separates the senile from the rest of us. That line
emerged, at least in its modern form, in representations of the senile that ap-
peared toward the end of the nineteenth century. But it is a line that palpably
remains with us, structuring knowledge, policy, and the experience of every ag-
ing individual—a line that has been drawn and redrawn in the hope that some-
how it need never be crossed.
NOTES
. The distinction between Alzheimer’s disease and senile dementia had been problem-
atic from the moment it had been made. By the s, as research pointing to the
clinical and pathological similarities of the two conditions piled up, researchers were
hard pressed to maintain the distinction, though for a long time the logic of age cat-
egories remained compelling. This can be seen in a  article by William McMenemy
and Eugene Pollack, in which they argued that the distinction between senile and
Alzheimer’s presenile dementia should be made not on the basis of pathology, but on
whether “the mental illness commenced at an age when the patient still retained
normal vitality, the decline in which is usually evident somewhere between the ages
of  and ” (). A decade earlier, William Malamud and Konstantin Lowenburg
() had argued that their own findings and the preponderance of evidence in the
literature suggested that Alzheimer’s disease was not limited to the presenium, but
that nonetheless the distinction should be maintained on pragmatic grounds. Since
little was actually known about senility, saying that Alzheimer’s disease was a form of
118 JESSE F.  BALLENGER
senile dementia would not add anything to the understanding of Alzheimer’s but
would blur the meaning of senility by linking it to conditions occurring in earlier
ages. In , Rothschild and Jacob Kasanin argued that practical considerations dic-
tated the opposite: because the pathological pictures were so similar, advances in
understanding Alzheimer’s would have the practical benefit of shedding light on the
larger problem of senile dementia. “It is evident,” they concluded, “that in a broad
discussion of Alzheimer’s disease one must include also the problems of senility in its
normal and pathologic aspects” (). The distinction between Alzheimer’s disease
and senile dementia persisted in official nosology until the mid- s, but in  it
had little meaning. Most researchers of this period acknowledged that Alzheimer’s
disease and senile dementia were for all practical purposes the same entity, but found
no compelling reason to abandon the traditional distinction.
. British psychologist Tom Kitwood has claimed that the best contemporary correla-
tions leave as much as an  percent variance between pathology and the degree of
dementia. Kitwood is one of the few contemporary researchers working with a psy-
chodynamic model of senile dementia, one that is very similar to Rothschild’s. See
Kitwood (, , ).
. Of course, this is not to suggest that people who, in one way or another, are outside
the broad notion of “middle class” do not suffer from Alzheimer’s disease. Indeed, one
would expect—political representations notwithstanding—that factors such as pov-
erty would compound the suffering of Alzheimer’s disease. But this broad notion of
middle class dominated the Alzheimer’s disease movement (as it dominated most
other areas of American culture). The experiences of other people have not been rep-
resented in the Alzheimer’s disease policy discourse, and it would require another
sort of study to bring that experience to light.
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The Penetrance and Uptake
of Genetic Knowledge
MARGARET LOCK, STEPHANIE LLOYD, AND JANALYN PREST
I think it’s safe to say we will have individualized, preventive medical care
based on our own predicted risk of disease as assessed by looking at our
DNA. By then each of us will have had our genomes sequenced because it
will cost less than $100 to do that. And this information will be part of our
medical record. Because we will still get sick, we’ll still need drugs, but
these will be tailored to our individual needs. They’ll be based on a new
breed of designer drugs with very high efficacy and very low toxicity, many
of them predicted by computer models.
—Francis Collins, Director of the National Human
Genome Research Institute, Time
UUUUUUUUUUU
Comments and claims, such as the preceding by Francis Collins, as well as
reports about newly located genes, appear with increasing frequency in the me-
dia these days. The sociologist Alan Peterson argues that such stories are
deemed newsworthy “precisely because they offer people the promise of being
able to re-make themselves anew—to ‘play God’—so that they can better deal
with, if not overcome, the reality of disease, disability and death” (, ).
Because of the possibility that such stories may bring about changes in indi-
vidual behaviors, Peterson insists that it is important to investigate how “gene
stories” selectively present “facts, themes, and claims, and thereby help limit
what can be known about health, disease, and embodiment” (). Adding a
sense of urgency to such an investigation is the claim commonly made by clinical
124 M. LOCK, S.  LLOYD, AND J .  PREST
geneticists and many other medical specialists today, that all diseases must be
recognized as having a genetic basis (Lock, forthcoming).
While social scientists such as Peterson have contributed to an understand-
ing of the way in which media coverage of knowledge claims in science are bi-
ased, albeit often inadvertently, additional factors are clearly at work in
connection with knowledge uptake (Conrad , ; Peterson ). Authors
often assume that a relatively simple trickle-down process takes place as knowl-
edge is passed from one domain to another, for example, on the one hand, from
basic scientists to health-care professionals and then to patients and, on the
other hand, from basic scientists to the media and then to the public at large.
Embedded in this assumption lies another: that a uniform body of scientific
knowledge exists and experts are in effect united in their understanding about
what types of action should be taken on the basis of this knowledge. Peterson is
critical of such a position, as are we, and goes on to note that research shows
that laypeople have a more sophisticated and critical view of genetics than is
generally acknowledged by medical experts (, ; see also Kerr,
Cunningham-Burley, and Amos ). However, observing that the public holds
a critical or skeptical view of genetic research tells us little about the way in
which genetic science is understood or used by this same public.
The expansion in knowledge about molecular genetics that has occurred
during the past two decades, particularly since , when the “completed” map
of the human genome was heralded, have indeed led to Manichaean prophecies
about the implications of this new knowledge. Genetic advancements are
thought to have unlimited promise for medical developments that will benefit
all humans, but at the same time, fears have run rampant about the unleashing
of unprecedented eugenic powers and the potential engineering of social in-
equality at the molecular level. Often scapegoated, the media is but one culprit
in the authorship and perpetuation of these parallel discourses: the scientific
community, politicians, advocacy groups, ethicists, and social scientists have
contributed to both. In this chapter we set out to counter both some of the more
hyperbolic of these claims that genetics is revolutionizing medicine and the way
health and illness are understood by both professionals and the public.
Much of what has been written to date by social scientists about the new
genetics has focused on life-threatening conditions in which the involved gene
or genes follow a Mendelian pattern of transmission, and therefore inheritance
patterns and calculations of risk (but rarely severity) can be made with great
accuracy.1 However, as yet, rather little has been written by social scientists
about complex, multifactorial diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Being
alerted to susceptibility, particularly for a disease such as AD that is largely re-
stricted to the elderly, does not confer the same order of knowledge as that of
being told that one carries a mutation for a disease that is lethal much earlier in
life and that may already have been transmitted to one’s children. Before gener-
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alizations are made about what effect genetic “truths” are likely to have on indi-
viduals, the scientific “facts” and material effects of specific diseases must be
taken into account. Social scientists can be as guilty of reductionism as are cer-
tain geneticists when theorizing about abstracted futures, if such theorizing is
not grounded in the materiality of the body, or if it conflates the lived experi-
ences associated with various diverse illnesses.
To counter this type of reductionism, we focus here on a particular disease,
late-onset AD, which provides an interesting example precisely because of the
way in which genetic knowledge has recently been implicated in etiological
theories about this condition. Unlike other diseases that exhibit a Mendelian
pattern of inheritance, including early-onset AD, genetics is implicated in an as
yet poorly understood, complex fashion in late-onset AD, as it is in numerous
other common diseases.2 When making estimates about the susceptibility of
individuals to a particular disease on the basis of their genotype,3 which is
inevitably compounded by the varying “penetrance” of virtually all disease-
producing genes, resulting in a wide range of phenotypic effects in individuals,4
uncertainty is compounded enormously, and the prediction of who exactly is at
increased risk is fraught with difficulty. Under these circumstances, conveying
genetic information to people who are affected by a specific disorder or to those
who are “carriers” of a gene for the disorder, and to their family members, be-
comes problematic. In this chapter we consider the state of current genetic
knowledge surrounding late-onset AD, specifically, the way in which key parts
of it are packaged and disseminated in clinical settings, by the media, and for
the public at large. Emphasis is given to the types of information to which
people in each of these domains have access, the information they communi-
cate to others, and the information they use personally. We have found that in
the course of translation of information across groups, there is an uneven pen-
etrance of ever changing genetic knowledge into both popular and professional
discourse about AD causation.
Enlightened Geneticization?
In  Abby Lippman coined the term geneticization to capture what she per-
ceives as an ever growing tendency to distinguish people one from another on
the basis of genetics. She argues that geneticization is both “a way of thinking
and a way of doing, with genetic technologies applied to diagnose, treat, and
categorize conditions previously identified in other ways” (, ). Lippman is
concerned above all with a possible reinforcement of racism, inequalities, and
discrimination of various kinds that already exist in abundance, as a result of a
renewed conflation of social realities and biological difference grounded in ge-
netics. She suggests that we may well be witnessing an incipient neoeugenics, as
do many other contemporary writers (see, for example, Kitcher ).
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Adam Hedgecoe, a social scientist, understands the use of genetic knowl-
edge and technologies as just the latest in a long line of attempts to advance our
understanding of the body at the molecular level and is less inclined than he
believes Lippman to be to see geneticization as “an opportunistic tactic em-
ployed by doctors to gain power over patients” (, ).5 Hedgecoe argues for
recognition of a concept of “enlightened geneticization,” by which he means
that even though the contribution of environmental and other factors are today
widely accepted in scientific discourse about disease causation, genetic expla-
nations are nevertheless prioritized and subtly divert attention away from
nongenetic factors (see also Spallone ). Hedgecoe () has shown how
this discourse of enlightened geneticism is reproduced in psychiatric medical
literature. He agrees with Lippman that genetic determinism, although more
subtle than was formerly the case, is at work, but he points out that
geneticization, as does medicalization more generally (Lock and Kaufert ;
Lock, forthcoming), has some positive attributes. For example, it is abundantly
clear that once a disease is medically recognized, particularly when behavioral
changes are involved, then social stigma and allocation of individual and family
responsibility for the occurrence of such conditions are reduced (McGuffin,
Riley, and Plomin ). What is more, many families appear to take comfort in
being told that a disabling condition is the result of faulty genetics and there-
fore, by implication, has nothing to do with moral shortcomings (Turney and
Turner ). It remains to be established if this finding applies to AD, as it
does to psychiatric illness. Preliminary inquiries indicate that in many circles,
stigma is no longer associated with AD, now regarded as the result of unavoid-
able neurobiological changes and, moreover, that a good number of people be-
lieve that these conditions are part of the unavoidable process of aging.
However, stigma clearly remains attached to mental illness, even in contempo-
rary psychiatric practice (Marc Miresco, personal communication), so that the
“urge” to geneticize may be greater in psychiatric circles and among the families
of psychiatric patients.
The arguments of Lippman and Hedgecoe are insightful, but in the case of
AD, and no doubt other multifactorial conditions, even when a susceptibility
gene is incontrovertibly associated with a disease, it does not follow that
geneticization, even in an “enlightened” form, will become the dominant mode
of conceptualizing the condition at all sites where it is investigated, treated, or
managed. Although an enlightened geneticism is apparent in certain types of
professional discourse in connection with AD, dissent and disagreements, and
above all differences in emphasis, are evident among various groups of special-
ists—basic scientists, neurologists, clinical geneticists, clinical psychologists,
psychiatrists, and others (Lock, forthcoming). Nor is a focus on genetics stead-
fastly embraced by the media, which usually acknowledges that, almost without
exception, multiple risk factors are at play. Advocacy-group literature mini-
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mizes the contribution of genetics, as do the majority of patients and their fami-
lies as they face the massive burden of dealing with a disease as devastating as is
AD. Our research shows that what is common when involved patients and fami-
lies discuss the possible causes of AD is that, in addition to behavioral, social,
and environmental factors, references to hereditable tendencies are made at
times. However, other than among geneticists, highlighting the contribution of
specific genes is left at the margins of most discussions.
At a broad level of generalization, the concept of geneticization alerts us to
the persistence of a particularly insidious form of reductionism that may well be
exacerbated by the current widespread fascination with emerging knowledge in
molecular and population biology. As technologies of molecularization and
knowledge in connection with the new genetics change, so too will the social
meanings associated with specific conditions, and it will be of great interest to
track such changes. In the idiom used by researchers engaged in mapping out
the sociology of science and technology, late-onset AD is a boundary marker
that serves as an “interface” between multiple social worlds that draw upon and
emphasize different sources and types of information and interventions
(Fujimura and Clarke ).
Living with the New Genetics: Biosociality and Genetic Citizenship
Social scientists have introduced several new concepts in order to convey the
responses of the public and, more specifically, of individuals and families who
are directly affected by the new technologies of genetic testing and screening.
Rayna Rapp and colleagues have posited the concept of “genetic citizenship” as
one response to new information yielded from genomics research. Their re-
search has documented how certain families and networks of families increas-
ingly coalesce around lethal and highly disabling single-gene diseases that
afflict their children. Such groups provide mutual social support and lobby the
United States Congress for improved research funding (similar activities hap-
pen in many other countries). These activists are painfully aware that only
rarely will drug companies invest in research for the kinds of diseases that affect
their families. Because of their relative rarity, there is no profit to be had in
researching the “orphan diseases,” and lobbying for public funding is deemed
essential. This is genetic citizenship in action, and it involves not only mobiliza-
tion of affected people but also new ways of envisioning the future (Rapp ).
Two decades ago, Edward Yoxen () suggested that our newfound abili-
ties to detect “pre-symptomatically ill” individuals would ensure that virtually
all of us would shortly be subject to increased medical surveillance. More re-
cently, Carlos Novas and Nikolas Rose have raised important questions about
what it means to be designated as “genetically at risk” (). On the basis of
their perusal of Huntington’s disease Web site exchanges, Novas and Rose argue
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that genetic testing does not generate a sense of fatalism, as many have pre-
dicted, but rather brings about “genetic responsibility,” a bonding that is
grounded in a molecular optic and that transforms relationships between ex-
pert and patient and within and between affected individuals, families, and
communities.6 However, it has also been shown that among those families in
which Huntington’s disease is prevalent, the majority of individuals choose not
to undergo genetic testing.
In his  essay “Artificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology to
Biosociality,” Paul Rabinow cites the geneticist Neil Holtzman, who envisions a
time when early detection of genetic susceptibility and predispositions will be-
come routine. Rabinow chooses to underline only one of the many issues that
he believes arise from this prediction. First, he notes “the likely formation of
new group and individual identities and practices arising out of these new
truths.” He then points out that such groups already exist, formed on the basis
of the firsthand experience of diseases such as neurofibromatosis, groups
whose members meet to share their experiences, educate their children about
the condition and its genetic transmission, finance changes in the home envi-
ronment to facilitate home care, lobby for funding for further research in con-
nection with the particular disease associated with their family, and so on. “This
is what I mean by biosociality,” writes Rabinow. In rhetorical mode he adds: “I
am not discussing some hypothetical gene for aggression or altruism. Rather it
is not hard to imagine groups formed around chromosome , locus ,, site
, allele variant, with a guanine substitution.” Rabinow is quick to add
that these newer groupings will not overtake older categories and, contrary to
the claims of certain population geneticists, may even enhance the spread of
racism because of a heightened sensitivity to biological difference (, ).
Ironically, Holtzman has since gone on to forcibly argue against claims that
genetics will revolutionize the way in which disease and illness are understood.
“Statements like these clothe medicine in a genetic mantle. The result of efforts
to identify genes that have a role in common disease suggests a different pic-
ture: the genetic mantle may prove to be like the emperor’s new clothes”
(Holtzman and Marteau , ). He argues that, ultimately, with the excep-
tion of Mendelian disorders, the mapping and sequencing of the human ge-
nome will have little impact on the understanding, treatment, or prevention of
disease, in large part because of the incomplete penetrance of genotypes for
common diseases.
Of course, in contrast to the “orphan” diseases, no genetic citizenship is
required in order to place heart disease, cancer, or AD in the spotlight; gov-
ernments and the pharmaceutical industry are both deeply invested in trying
to reduce the financial and social burden associated with these conditions.7
The existence of support groups for such diseases precedes the consolidation
of molecular genetics by many years, and in the case of late-onset AD, their ac-
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tivities continue largely unchallenged and unchanged by the new genetic
knowledge.
For the remainder of this chapter, we will focus on AD, providing a brief
review of current medical understanding about the role of genetics in AD causa-
tion, followed by an overview of how this knowledge is usually interpreted
among experts. The opinions of several clinicians concerning the state of ge-
netic knowledge of AD will be presented. The position taken by AD societies and
the media with respect to current theories about the genetics of AD will be dis-
cussed. Ethnographic data based on interviews in progress with relatives of
people who have been diagnosed with AD will then be presented. These find-
ings show that even though AD is molecularized by basic scientists and many
clinicians conceptualize the disease very differently from the way they did so a
few years ago, thus far almost nothing has changed in actual clinical practice as
a result of insights gained from genetics. This is also the case for the literature
produced by advocacy groups and for families, as they confront the daily reality
of caring for someone with AD. Any thought of being genetically at risk, or of
shouldering a genetic “responsibility” is generally outweighed by numerous
other exigencies for the majority of people whom we interviewed.
Disease of the Century
It is estimated by many experts that AD—a “living death” as some describe it—
will strike between a quarter and a half of us by the time we are in our eighties.
The range of these estimates demonstrates the fallibility of epidemiological
data, but hyperbole is useful for maintaining funding. Even if the lower rate is a
better prediction, very many of us are implicated as future patients, caregivers,
or both, suggesting a remarkable challenge for social imaginaries of the future.
AD is ranked as the fourth-biggest killer in the United States, and the mas-
sive sum of $ billion a year is currently spent on the care of  million AD
patients in the United States.8 It is assumed that these costs will double as the
baby boomers grow older, and by  the number of cases will have tripled
unless a “cure” is found. It has been reported that AD costs U.S. businesses more
than $ million in “lost productivity and absenteeism” and that these costs will
soar as the baby boomers take time off to care for their elderly relatives
(“Alzheimer’s Disease” ). Clearly, no lobbying is needed to encourage a
search for a cure for this disease—very well funded research is under way to pin
down the genes implicated in AD.
Genetics and the Clinician
An Abundance of Genes
Until recently, late-onset AD had been described as sporadic, because familial
inheritance patterns did not appear to be at issue.9 However, ten years ago, an
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event radically disrupted this perception: one particular allelic variation of the
gene known as apolipoproteinE (ApoE) located on chromosome  was shown
by linkage studies carried out in the laboratory of Alan Roses to be associated
with late-onset AD (Strittmatter et al. ). This finding has since been verified
in more than one hundred laboratories and has been described as the best dem-
onstrated of all scientific findings in recent years. ApoE, already implicated in
heart disease before its association with Alzheimer’s was noted, is a polymor-
phic protein with three alleles, , , and , that appear to be universally but
unequally (clinally) distributed around the world. It is the ApoE ε variation that
places individuals at increased risk not only for contracting AD, but also for an
earlier age of onset of the disease by as much as seven to nine years. Despite
consensus on these findings, it is at the same time agreed that the allele deter-
mines nothing with respect to the incidence of AD. All that can be inferred is
that the ApoE ε genotype confers a greater degree of susceptibility but that it is
neither necessary nor sufficient to cause the disease. It is assumed that combi-
nations of gene-gene and gene-protein interactions as well as interactions with
environmental variables must also be implicated in the onset of AD, and a great
deal of time and energy is currently being invested in establishing what contri-
bution these other variables make to the disease occurrence and its age of onset
(Tilley, Morgan, and Kalsheker ).
In  a newly located susceptibility locus was reported in Science on chro-
mosome  (Myers et al. ). Other sites are currently under investigation to
locate yet more genes that may contribute in some way to AD incidence. These
sites are located on chromosomes , , , , and . In carrying out these in-
vestigations, researchers are attempting to do much more than pinpoint what is
happening at the molecular level once AD has become established; they are
attempting to demonstrate how risk of AD is increased by the presence of spe-
cific alleles, which are activated under as yet poorly understood conditions at
various points along biological pathways that are essential to normal brain
functioning. The excitement around these investigations is palpable, and the
molecularization of professional understanding of AD is undeniable.
John Hardy, the chief of the genetics laboratory of the United States Na-
tional Institute of Aging, stated during a presentation at the  biannual AD
conference held in Stockholm that “genetics underpins our understanding of
this disease AD,” adding that “findings from genetics are the baseline for re-
search into AD.”10 But Hardy’s presentation, and others like it that focused on
genetics, while they received a great deal of attention at Stockholm, caused only
a limited stir. The reason is that, including the ApoE ε discovery ten years ear-
lier, no findings that derive from knowledge about the genetics of AD have as
yet resulted in clear advances of any kind in the prevention or treatment of the
disease.11 Similarly, there is limited predictive value of knowing one’s ApoE sta-
tus because of the difficulty of converting this knowledge into useful informa-
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tion for clinicians and individuals attempting to relate individual status to fu-
ture risk of developing the disease.
Estimating Risk: Epidemiological Shuffling of “Knowledge in Flux”
Research in connection with late-onset AD is amply demonstrating that genes
are unequaled shape-shifters, the products of both evolutionary and recent hu-
man history and, at times, of toxic environments or of serendipitous mutations
as a result of faulty replication.
Population genetics must be relied upon in attempts to establish what
characteristics place certain populations at an increased risk for AD. The prob-
lem with assessing individual risk from these types of studies is no different
from the difficulties inherent in the application of large-scale epidemiological
information to any specific case; epidemiology is not “about” individual cases,
but “about” populations and probabilities. In addition to this basic problem,
there are several other sources of potential misunderstanding.
Since , a large number of population studies have been published on
the ApoE gene and its relationship to AD in which the focus has been on so-
called Caucasians (Growdon ; Korovaitseva et al. ; Roses ; Saunders
; Silverman et al. ). Inconsistencies about the effects of the ApoE gene
within this literature have the potential to cause confusion. For example, esti-
mates of the number of individuals with AD who carry the ε allele range from
 to  percent (Liddell, Lovestone, and Owen ; Ritchie and DuPuy )
and many studies do not specify whether these numbers refer to those who are
hetero- or homozygous, further confounding the matter.12 In addition, research-
ers report that between  and  percent of AD patients do not have the ApoE
ε allele, serving to highlight the complex and elusive nature of the association
between susceptibility genes and the pathology of AD (Farlow ).
In addition to retrospective studies of individuals who already have AD,
many studies attempt to estimate the number of people with ApoE ε alleles
who will eventually develop AD. There is considerable variation between the
estimates presented in these prospective studies. Depending on the study con-
sulted, the number of individuals who are heterozygous for the ApoE ε allele
and who are expected to develop AD range from . to  percent. The range for
homozygous individuals is between . to  percent (Holmes ; Farlow
). For a healthy person to be given a  percent chance of getting AD in the
future no doubt creates a significantly different anxiety level from that of a 
percent chance.
In contrast, there is better agreement that individuals with ApoE ε alleles
have an increased relative risk of developing AD. The literature suggests that a
person with one ε allele has three times the chance, and a person with two ε
alleles has between eight and thirty times the chance of developing AD com-
pared with someone with no ε alleles (Holmes ; Swartz, Black, and St.
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George-Hyslop ). However, the baseline on which this probability is esti-
mated is rarely provided, and without this information, relative-risk estimates
are highly misleading, although they still have the power to create anxiety.
Other studies report that individuals with first-degree relatives suffering
from AD have between a  and  percent chance of developing AD by the time
they are ninety (St. George-Hyslop ). In this case, the broadness of the risk
estimate seems to be so wide as to be of little value for individuals, particularly
given that the majority will have died of some other cause before age ninety.
For those individuals with two ApoE ε alleles (about  percent of the
population in Europe and North America), risk for AD is estimated as “average,”
and it is calculated that about a quarter will develop AD once over the age of
eighty. Relatively few people carry ApoE ε, although it is proportionally more
frequent among several populations other than “Caucasians.” Those who in-
herit two copies of this gene are thought to be at very low risk of contracting AD,
and this allele appears to be protective, in contrast to the ApoE ε allele.
One of the principle causes of confusion about genetic risk for AD is inher-
ent to the research design. Holmes () and Ritchie and Dupuy () suggest
that in many studies, present numbers do not represent the population at large,
because they are based on clinical samples.
The emphasis on ApoE ε in research literature obscures the fact that many
other factors have been associated with late-onset AD (including other candi-
date genes, head trauma, environment, diet, and lifestyle). Further, ApoE ε has
been shown to work in unexpected ways in certain populations. For instance,
among Pygmies, and other populations whose subsistence economy was rela-
tively recently predominantly that of hunting and gathering, ApoE ε apparently
protects against AD. This finding holds when controlled for age (Corbo and
Scacchi ). Low rates of AD have been reported for parts of Nigeria, and the
presence of an ApoE ε allele does not appear to be implicated when it does
occur. However, ApoE ε is significantly associated with AD among African
Americans, although less so than in populations of “whites” (Farrer ). It is
argued that other risk-reducing factors (in Africa) and risk-enhancing factors
(in North America) must therefore be implicated, including no doubt diet and
environment and other genes and their protein products, but researchers also
acknowledge limitations to the research methodologies used thus far. Clearly
the specific role of ApoE ε in AD is far from perfectly understood.
The bottom line is that individual risk assessments for late-onset AD that
make use of genetics are at present so vague as to be deemed by the majority of
clinicians and researchers to be of little or no use in clinical care (Farlow ;
Liddell, Lovestone, and Owen ; McConnell et al. ; St. George-Hyslop
; Tilley, Morgan, and Kalsheker ). Although it is acknowledged that
this situation may change in the future, currently, official guidelines put out by
professional and health-policy-making institutions and organizations, and by
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advocacy groups in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, state
that genetic testing for ApoE status should not be carried out routinely. This is
justified especially because there is no known prevention or treatment for AD
that is more than minimally effective.
Clinicians’ Practice and Knowledge in Flux
AD is frequently used in departments of genetics today as a model for teaching
genetic complexity and for illustrating gene-environment interaction. The gen-
eral consensus among medical professionals about the contribution that an
ApoE ε allele makes to increased risk for late-onset AD has brought about a
fundamental shift in thinking that is not as yet reflected in the media or in
advocacy literature (see below). As noted earlier, what was until very recently
understood as a sporadic disease—as happenstance—is now considered by the
majority of medical experts to be genetically transmitted, if at an uncertain rate.
The assumption is that a great deal more remains to be learned about the genet-
ics of AD and that when these advances are made, we may then be in a position
to make some major breakthroughs with respect to medications, perhaps in the
form of pharmacogenetics (Hedgecoe n.d.). However, this shift in theoretical
perspective does not as yet in any way affect patient management. The following
are excerpts selected from interviews with twenty-eight clinicians who practice
in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, carried out between
 and .
One of the interviewed clinicians described his position:
It’s very hard now to talk about sporadic—nongenetic—Alzheimer’s. Spo-
radic would be rare—and even then genes are involved—the result of a
sudden isolated mutation but not passed on in families. Until recently we
thought that no genes were involved in this disease, that it was just ag-
ing—but now we know there are: genes are involved with aging and with
the pathologies associated with aging. But genes are not causative—it’s
just that genes increase the risk, or accelerate a process that is already
under way. This process would not get expressed as pathology unless
genes like ApoE ε are present, so that the “normal” changes of aging are
transformed, resulting, for example, in an excess of plaques.
An eminent molecular geneticist who is also a clinician stated:
Genes for Alzheimer’s are not for anything at all, they simply contribute to
one’s risk for getting late-onset Alzheimer’s. We’re talking about common
polymorphisms, not mutations, and there’s going to be at least four to six
of them involved with Alzheimer’s—maybe more. They could have arisen
simply by chance, or it could be a bit like cystic fibrosis or sickle cell.13 In
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the case of Alzheimer’s, the gene protects you from something (we don’t
know what, of course) during most of your life, but you pay the price later
on because of the long-term negative effects it has on the body.
A third clinician, although he does not dispute the importance of genetics,
sounds a cautionary note:
All we can do is make a judgment of likely cause. Genetics are one influ-
ence among many leading to dementia. I’m very skeptical about the
whole genetic frenzy—there’s so much hype and no money left over for
improved nursing homes and home care. We simply don’t have a coher-
ent story for why dementia happens—we have fashions in theories about
it, that’s all. The more genes they find, the more reasonable and sensible
the story will become because of course genes, or their products, are in-
volved with just about everything that happens to the body.
A geriatric epidemiologist openly challenges the idea of AD as a disease.
As far as I’m concerned, genes are just other variables. They are markers,
inherited markers, that have to be put into the pot for analysis along with
other variables to see how they look. The great mistake with AD is to as-
sume that because there is one end point there is one cause and one
treatment. I don’t think AD is a disease. I think we should be talking
about the brain and about dementia because now we know that virtually
all dementias are mixed.
One clinician only, a psychogeriatrician, when focusing on incidence,
chose to emphasize the effects of lifestyle in clear preference to genes:
You can have Alzheimer’s without predisposing genes—the genetics are
overblown. Alzheimer’s is clearly linked to lifestyle. It all depends on
where you work professionally as to what you think about cause, preven-
tion, and best treatment. I think that lifestyle changes are crucial—there
is evidence that exercise lowers incidence, and diet is crucial because
cholesterol is involved in plaque production. People with diabetes are
vulnerable.
In none of the clinicians’ accounts is a naked language of genetic determin-
ism made use of in discussion of late-onset AD. Although all involved research-
ers and clinicians recognize the contribution of the ApoE ε allele, this
knowledge has no effect on the clinical care they offer. Given these conditions of
uncertainty, a consensus does not exist among health care professionals dealing
with late-onset AD about the utility of current genetic knowledge in connection
with this condition and not one believes that genetic testing for ApoE ε should
be used routinely in the clinic.14
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The Transfer and Translation of Knowledge in Flux
In this section we focus on how information about risk factors, assumed mecha-
nisms of the disease process, theories of causation, and therapeutic options are
portrayed in various forums in order to understand what types of information
reach AD sufferers and their families and caregivers.
A common assumption held on the part of health care professionals inter-
viewed in this study is that most, though not all, media reports create unwar-
ranted hype about the possibility of curing life-threatening diseases once the
involved genes are located. This claim has also been made by social scientists
who have argued that there has been an increase in genetic determinism and
reductionism by the general public, whose ideas have been largely shaped by
media representations (Nelkin and Lindee ). However, a number of social
scientists critical of Nelkin and Lindee’s statements have pointed out the anec-
dotal nature of many of their claims and emphasized the need for thoroughly
grounded empirical studies on this issue. In fact, contextualized studies by such
critics demonstrate that genetic determinism is perhaps not as strong as has
been suggested and that recent discourse about genetics in the media is more
nuanced than was previously assumed (see, for example, Miller ; Condit
; Condit, Ofulue, and Sheedy ; Hedgecoe n.d.). Our research tends to
support this latter perspective.
The sensationalism of the claims made at times in media headlines cannot
be denied, but in order to judge media reports, careful reading of their content
is required. For example, the manner in which genetic knowledge is presented
varies in complexity and in the weight granted to it as compared to other vari-
ables implicated in disease causation. Moreover, the popular media is not the
only source of information about genetic knowledge directed at the public. Sys-
tematic empirical examination of multiple sources of knowledge about genetics
is needed for full evaluation of the way in which scientific knowledge is trans-
lated and transmitted to the public. To this end, we begin our study by examin-
ing discourse about genetic risk and AD that has appeared over the past decade
within three bodies of literature: popular media (newspapers and magazines),
educational materials produced by pharmaceutical companies that is distrib-
uted though clinics and by general practitioners, and the literature produced
and distributed by advocacy and support groups.15
Media
It has been shown that as scientific data are translated for use in the media, a
process of simplification and homogenization frequently takes place (Conrad
) and that “user-friendly” vocabularies are made use of. Conrad () has
further analyzed the manner in which media coverage of genetic discoveries
tends to fall into a “frame” of genetic optimism, in no small part because of the
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style of journalistic writing and editorial concerns. Good news is always in short
supply, and coverage of genetic discoveries and their associated promise, no
matter how remote, are easily deemed newsworthy and make it past the edito-
rial cutting-room floor. By contrast, stories that tell of retractions or discredited
scientific studies stand little chance of making it to print, except in specialty
science magazines.
To a certain extent, Conrad’s observation that media coverage of genetic
knowledge tends to optimistically herald the promise of new discoveries and to
oversimplify, or even misrepresent, the studies on which their stories are based,
holds true for some of the media coverage of the science of AD. However, while
“AD-gene stories” may gloss the scientific knowledge surrounding AD and make
bold headlines, they do not necessarily fall into the trap of presenting simple
stories of genetic determinism or pipe-dream cures, as described by Nelkin and
Lindee (). In fact, rather than focusing on genetics, the majority of news
coverage of AD concerns itself with caregiving responsibilities, celebrity vic-
tims, and studies that explore “nongenetic” theories of causation. Genetics is
but one small part of the picture of AD that has been portrayed over the past
decade. While the media may be guilty of promoting genetic optimism in
certain headlines and in a limited number of stories, especially older ones, it
is not at all evident that this is reflective of media coverage of the disease in
general.
One reason that the genetics of AD may no longer have a central place in
newspapers and magazines is that the media tends to have peaks of interest in
studies presenting novel findings at the time of their initial “discovery.” As
Conrad () predicts, there is a saturation point at which time something is
just no longer news, and unless a new research angle is presented regarding a
disease, its coverage in the media will dwindle. Within the media coverage, the
promise of genetics has been displaced by the most recent findings from scien-
tific studies that do not relate directly to genetics. Recent media stories have
focused upon possible prevention of AD through cognitive and dietary strate-
gies, experimental vaccines, and the promise of early detection through moni-
toring of homocysteine blood levels or by means of brain scans.
When the genetics of AD are mentioned today in newspaper articles, such
reports are more often than not cautious and nonspecific: “It is unclear what
causes AD, though it is likely a combination of genetic predisposition and envi-
ronmental factors” (Picard ). Others clearly state that while researchers
have identified genetic links to a number of diseases—of which AD is listed as
but one—the inheritance of a genetic mutation does not guarantee that a dis-
ease will develop, only that there is an increased susceptibility as additional
genes and environmental factors also appear to be implicated (Andrews ).
In recent media coverage, the ApoE ε gene is usually mentioned in connec-
GENETICS AND ALZHEIMER RESEARCH 137
tion with findings from other studies. For example, the New York Times reports
that the protective effects of Vitamin E are not observed in those “with a gene
variation apolipoprotein ε, which has been linked to Alzheimer’s” (Kolata
; emphasis added). The involvement of genetics, regarding the same find-
ing about Vitamin E, is reported in another newspaper as “the ApoE ε gene,
which indicates an inherited risk of developing Alzheimer’s” (Immen ; em-
phasis added). Other articles report on studies showing that high-fat diets in-
crease sevenfold the risk for those who are genetically predisposed to develop
AD (“Les graisses” ). It appears that in newspaper coverage the linkage of
ApoE ε to AD is understood as a given, but its role is portrayed in subtly differ-
ent ways and in association with other variables.
The most problematic element observed in media coverage of AD and ge-
netics was figures and estimates of incidence and risk that were uncon-
textualized. For example: “Those who carry a certain genetic characteristic have
 times the risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease” (“La génétique” ). Or,
as claimed in Time: there is a  percent chance that someone with two copies of
an “Alzheimer’s-related gene will develop Alzheimer’s” (“Numbers” ). This
failure to contextualize figures and the misrepresentation of estimates of risk
are not confined to media coverage, as the source of figures quoted in the media
are most often taken directly from involved scientists, or from spokespersons
for or media releases supplied by advocacy groups such as the Alzheimer’s Soci-
ety and the Alzheimer’s Organization.
Therefore, while these stories tend to reflect a certain simplification of de-
tails, as predicted by Conrad (), upon careful reading, the media cannot be
accused of creating unwarranted hype about an imminent discovery of “cures”
for or ultimate causes of AD.
Pharmaceutical Educational Materials
Educational material about AD produced by pharmaceutical companies is
heavily relied upon by physicians and nurses when explaining AD to newly diag-
nosed patients and their families, but these information sources adroitly side-
step theorizing about causation: “In some cases, Alzheimer’s disease may run in
the family. In other cases, no other family members are affected . . . researchers
generally believe that the cause may be a combination of several factors. They
are working very hard to find out more about the causes of Alzheimer’s disease”
(Pfizer Canada , ). While theories of causation in general, and more par-
ticularly of genetics and heredity, are given scant attention in the pharmaceuti-
cal educational materials, when they do appear, they are usually glossed over as
“family history,” and there is a failure to clearly distinguish between early- and
late-onset Alzheimer’s disease.
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The few allusions to genetics that appear in pharmaceutical-company edu-
cational handouts are usually drawn from other sources, such as the Canadian
Alzheimer’s Society’s Alzheimer’s Disease and Heredity Fact Sheet (). Pharma-
ceutical handouts also direct patients and caregivers to “educational” Web sites
that are more detailed in their discussion of causality and risk. Here ApoE ε
makes a brief appearance: “Recent medical research suggests that people who
carry a specific gene variant—apolipoprotein (ApoE), ApoE ε—may be at in-
creased risk of AD after age . Research is being undertaken to further explore
this possibility.”
Advocacy Organizations
In addition to drawing on the material distributed by pharmaceutical compa-
nies, physicians routinely refer patients to local support and advocacy groups
such as the Canadian Alzheimer’s Society or the American Alzheimer’s Associa-
tion. These organizations offer a broader range of information than can be
found in the general media or through the pharmaceutical-industry-sponsored
Web sites, in large part because such organizations have mandates to both sup-
port and make available “state of the art” research and to convey this informa-
tion in a manner that is accessible to patients and caregivers, as well as to the
research and clinical communities.
Despite their mandates to pass along the newest information, the
Alzheimer’s Society statements with regard ApoE ε are cautious and qualified:
“[S]cientists now believe, in some cases, the pattern of inheritance of the ApoE ε
allele can be used to estimate subsequent risk, and age of onset.” The
Alzheimer’s Society specifies that while ApoE ε has been linked to various
forms of the disease, it is clear that the allele does not cause the disease but
rather is a potential risk factor. Risk estimates provided by the Alzheimer’s Soci-
ety are also vague: “[T]hose with  copies of ApoE ε will have a higher risk of
developing the disease in their early sixties, while those with  copy of the allele
will more probably develop AD after the age of seventy” (emphases added). No
concrete figures are provided. Given that relatives of AD patients are not rou-
tinely tested for their ApoE genotype, it would be interesting to know if such
vague statements aroused an interest in genetic testing among relatives of AD
patients. An unspecified “higher risk” may be cause for concern, as might be the
prospect of “more probably” developing AD, even if only in one’s eighth decade
of life. But such statements could equally have the opposite effect.
The Alzheimer’s Association’s Web site offers general estimates of average
worldwide lifetime risk for developing any type of Alzheimer’s ( percent by age
sixty-five, – percent by seventy-five, and – percent by eighty-five; hav-
ing one parent or a sibling doubles risk to  percent by sixty-five, – per-
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cent by seventy-five, and – percent by eighty-five). The authors state that
risk increases with the number of affected relatives, and having more than one
affected sibling results in the greatest increase in risk. “This is explained
through shared genes, whose influence may be large or small—deterministic
genes, in the case of FAD (familial AD). In the case of sporadic AD ‘susceptibility’
or ‘risk’ genes—they raise the likelihood of a particular outcome but do not en-
sure it” (Alzheimer’s Association ).
The association cautions, “Analyses of the exact amount that ApoE ε raises
risk are inconsistent, and the precise mechanism by which the ApoE genotype
affects risk is not yet completely understood” (Alzheimer’s Association ).
What the society fails to point out is that the general-risk figures provided by
lifetime estimated risk are not well defined in the scientific literature. For ex-
ample, included in lifetime estimated risks of succumbing to AD are not only
those diagnosed with late-onset AD, but also those with early-onset AD. Fur-
ther, as with the materials produced by pharmaceutical companies, these pam-
phlets at times conflate early- and late-onset forms of AD: “For a few families,
there is a definite connection between family history and AD. While for others,
a family history of Alzheimer’s Disease puts them at a greater risk than someone
with no family history” (idem.). Such a statement does not clearly differentiate
between the two forms of AD, which have very different meanings and out-
comes for afflicted individuals and their family members.16
MUCH OF THE information and commentary that makes its way into pharma-
ceutical educational materials and media coverage is based upon the informa-
tion provided by organizations such as the Alzheimer’s Association and the
Alzheimer’s Society. The groups are often quoted in media accounts to bolster
and confirm the importance of new scientific studies and findings concerning
AD. These sources of knowledge are also primary channels for information
about the nature and causes of AD. We suggest that the import of these sources
is probably as significant as that of the clinician in providing information about
AD to patients, family members, and the public at large.
Participation in an eight-week support group for families of patients with
AD confirmed the impression gained from the advocacy literature: the care of
patients is given top priority for discussion in these organizations, and the pre-
sumed causes of AD, including the possible contribution of genetics, is granted
only a minimal amount of attention, if more than is available through other
sources. Our interviews with family members of AD sufferers make it clear that
a very discriminating reading of what is presented in the media and as the latest
“breaking news” is common; readers critically assess the importance of “discov-
eries” and most often recall only those articles that are directly related to their
preexisting interests.
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Disparate Uptake of Knowledge in Flux among Families
of Alzheimer’s Patients
We began our study of the circulating information on AD causation and genet-
ics with the assumption that this knowledge flowed from basic science and epi-
demiology through the clinical setting then through pharmaceutical, advocacy,
and media representations, finally “trickling down” to the public at large. How-
ever, what was discovered was characterized less by “flow” than by disjuncture,
translation, and a disparate uptake of this fluctuating knowledge. Interviews
carried out in Montreal with the children of AD patients indicate that the
children’s concerns and beliefs about AD are no more a simple reflection of the
information available in the media than they are a result of current epidemio-
logical or clinical knowledge.17
While many were quick to state that they kept abreast of media coverage of
AD, it was unusual for respondents to recall in any detail the stories that they
had read or watched on television. Furthermore, their statements did not indi-
cate that they necessarily remembered or put their faith in information given to
them in clinical settings. Pharmaceutical and advocacy information pamphlets
were more likely to be sources of information on daily coping and care than on
AD causation. For the most part, respondents’ concerns were focused on the
day-to-day management of their parents. Learning to cope with a sick and dying
family member was much more pressing for them than was thinking about
one’s own risk of developing AD.
These findings contradict the writings of those social scientists who have
indicated, in relation to “genetic” disorders, that people tend to worry about
genetic risk, that this risk will be central to their life choices, and that knowl-
edge about genetic risk will play a role in increasing self-surveillance. Clearly,
the specific pathologies and prognostic effects of the disease under consider-
ation limits what generalizations can be made. In what follows, we present sev-
eral of the most common themes that have appeared in interviews in
connection with attitudes about AD and beliefs about its cause(s).
Clinical Encounters
Many respondents indicated that their parents’ clinicians did not add substan-
tially to their knowledge about the causes of AD, for the simple reason that
doctors rarely took time to discuss potential causes of the disease. Instead, most
of the discussion tended to center around diagnosis, therapy, and the imme-
diacy of caregiving. Respondents said that they spent time with the doctor in-
quiring about the stage of their parent’s disease, prognosis, and daily care.
Replies to the question “What did the doctor tell you about AD?” usually
took the following form: “That it is progressive, that it would simply continue
and there will be a point in time that my mother will need another type of
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care . . . that it is not reversible; there are some medications that might help
stabilize it to some degree, but that none of these are. . . . there is no cure. So it
is a progressive, degenerative disease” (Ari Rosen, age fifty-three, salesperson).
While sitting in on doctor-patient appointments, we observed that the
monitoring of patients’ complicated drug regimens, often including multiple
medications to slow disease progression, in addition to others prescribed for
concurrent conditions, often consumed virtually all the available time, making
it difficult to engage in in-depth discussions about disease causation or other
matters.
However, in most cases respondents reported that their parents’ clinicians
had at some point suggested several potential causes of AD, none of which was
granted much more weight than the others. Clinicians reported that they were
particularly uncomfortable discussing potential genetic causes of AD, since so
little was known about their influence on risk assessments and because this
information might result in unfounded concerns among patients. Answers such
as the following were commonly given to the question “Did your doctor tell you
anything about cause or prevention?”
I don’t inquire very far into the doctor’s knowledge base. They don’t
know, they don’t know exactly, the doctors, do they? I don’t think so. They
research and research, but they don’t know where it comes from”
(Françoise Boisvert, age fifty-eight, hairdresser).
I can’t say that we were overwhelmed by medical evidence. It’s not like we
get the feeling anybody really knows. With there being so many questions
out there, as to what is AD. It’s a catch-all term for many illnesses. What is
it? Unless you can even grasp why it happens, I guess to an extent, then
you aren’t doing really more than just giving it a name.” (Hélène Talbot,
age thirty-six, lawyer)
Diseases Run in Families
Although most respondents were not aware of any specific genetic risk factor
involved in the development of AD (ApoE was not once introduced spontane-
ously by respondents into the discussion), those who did speak of a genetic
component to AD usually thought of it in one of two ways. They either stated
that they probably had a fifty-fifty chance of developing AD (as a result of inher-
iting the gene from their affected parent) or that this parental gene makes an
unknown contribution (the increased risk is uncertain and possibly quite
small). The vast majority of respondents usually presented their understanding
of intergenerational transmission of AD in terms of familial tendencies; in other
words, anything one’s parents “had” had a chance of being passed along. For
instance, it was commonly explained that one could inherit from one’s parent
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personality, eye color, or a tendency toward a particular sickness, but when re-
spondents were asked to describe their understanding of hereditary transmis-
sion, they resorted to statements such as “Certain traits are in the family”:
I have always said to myself that it’s hereditary. Because there is so much
of it in the family, it makes me think that it’s hereditary. (Françoise Bois-
vert, age fifty-eight, hairdresser)
What I understand about this disease is that . . . I think . . . that it is inevi-
table. It transmits from parents . . . that is what I think. . . . My fears are
important. My mother often said to me, “Look at me, I am seventy-seven
and I am in good shape, you can hold on to that.” And that’s right, except
that I have a  percent chance of getting the disease because my father
suffered from the disease. So I have worries about the fact that I could
potentially have the disease. This worry doesn’t prevent me from func-
tioning or anything, I just think about it. It is just something that could
happen because my father had it and because other members of the fam-
ily had this disease . . .
I wouldn’t say that inheritance of AD was automatic, but the percent-
age is larger. But I wouldn’t say that it was automatic. It is sure that if you
look at the percentages, if there is someone close to you, like a mother or
father, you have more chances of having it, but I wouldn’t say  per-
cent. The chances are probably just higher. (Nicole Boucher, age fifty-two,
office worker)
It’s possibly not transmissible but probably I have more chances to have it
than my neighbor who doesn’t have it in his family, yes. I try not to think
about it though. This topic isn’t on my mind each day. (Jean-Pierre Côté,
age thirty-nine, lawyer)
Some respondents reasoned that if they shared other traits (especially per-
sonality) with their affected parent, then it was more likely that they would have
inherited the AD trait from that same parent:18 “My mother worries more about
my brother than about me. She thinks his personality is more likely to be similar
to hers than mine. My brother and I have talked a bit about that” (Celine Goulet,
age sixty-two, college professor). Or they suggested that they had had enough
bad luck in the form of other diseases that they presumed were inherited from
their parents to ensure that it was unlikely that they would also inherit AD: “My
father died of a sudden heart attack, and that would be my choice. And there’s
Crohn’s in my father’s family and I somehow think: OK, if I picked up that gene,
how likely is it that I have the AD gene, too. Can I have them both? I hope not”
(Celine Goulet, age sixty-two, college professor).
Several respondents had an understanding of the genetics of AD that mir-
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rors that of the geneticists who were interviewed: “Do I think that there is a
genetic component . . . yes! I think everything has something genetically re-
lated, but I think there could be a propensity towards whatever it may be, could
be asthma, heart disease, AD, cancer, and I think there’s others factors that may
make it surface or not” (Celine Goulet, age sixty-two, college professor).
Many respondents suggested that they made an effort not to research or
think about AD, its causes, or their chances of getting the disease. Their expla-
nation for this response was that because no cure existed, they were not inter-
ested in estimating their risk for AD, since they would not be able to do
anything with the information: “Dr. Jefferson once said to me, ‘There is a test.’ I
said, ‘Do you have a cure?’ He said, ‘No.’ I said, ‘Then why should I take the test?
Because if I took the test I could go straight, if the results were not to my liking,
I would go straight to the Jacques Cartier Bridge and jump!’ I know that my great-
est fear is I don’t ever want to put my husband or my children through that. But
I don’t see the point of knowing” (Esther Blumberg, age fifty-eight, homemaker).
Others stated that they had concerns about other diseases that might ei-
ther threaten their future health or with which they or a family member were
already struggling that were of more immediate import in their lives: “We have
other medical histories that I have to deal with in my family, my father as I said
had colon cancer, my mother had lymphoma, my mother’s late brother had lym-
phoma, so there is clearly some other risk profile in the family that I’m more
concerned about than I am about the AD actually” (Ari Rosen, age fifty-three,
salesperson).
A Good and Active Life
The importance of “good living” is a common theme that comes out in many of
the interviews. Virtually all respondents suggested that they tried to live a
healthy life by reducing stress, by exercising, and by eating well. Some, respond-
ing at times to medical recommendations, took vitamins, and others used or
considered use of hormone replacement therapy (though most were aware of
the recent stopping of clinical trials in connection with this treatment). The
detrimental effects of stress were acknowledged and the importance of an active
lifestyle, social and cognitive, was frequently mentioned as likely to be protec-
tive factors against AD. But people were well aware that good living was unlikely
to stave off AD forever: “Well, prevention . . . I mean, I’ve gone to lectures and
everything on Alzheimer’s and they say, you know, keep your brain working,
keep your brain active, try and do things. But you know, my mum worked her
whole life, she played bridge, she played mah-jongg, you know, she did every-
thing. Her mind was working all the time, so you know, how do you figure that
one out? There is no answer, you know? She was very active her whole life” (Ethel
Goldman, age fifty-six, homemaker).
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Aluminum . . . and Other Theories of Causation
When asked directly what they believed may have caused their parents’ AD,
respondents were likely to postulate causes that did not originate from clinical
encounters; and in most cases, these theories had not been “run by” their clini-
cians. These speculative theories apparently arose from efforts to reconcile
many pieces of information on risk factors that respondents had accumulated
from various sources. Head injuries, aluminum, stress, depression, diet, alcohol
consumption, and lack of exercise and cognitive stimulation were liberally
evoked as causative. On the whole, respondents held to complex explanations
about who gets AD, and why, which they kept separate from unfocused ideas
about the hereditary aspect of the disease. In other words, many people intu-
itively held theories of multiple causation and implicitly recognized a complexity,
over which they may have some limited control.19 Secondarily, inherited traits,
over which there can be no control, may also make a contribution. No doubt for
this reason, their significance was not given a great deal of prominence:
You know, my mother never exercised. She never dieted. She never had to
diet, thank goodness. She ate everything, and she always prided herself
on eating fatty foods and ice cream and fried things, and she never had to
lose weight. And my mother’s brother, who was also brought up in the
same household, same thing, he never did anything to watch his weight
or watch his diet, and they never exercised. So now I’m thinking, maybe
that was one of the reasons, who knows? (Ethel Goldman, age fifty-six,
homemaker)
My mum got divorced about twenty-five years ago . . . and then her world
kind of crumbled, and at that time too her job she was doing—she had
only worked in the workforce a couple years, but her job was eliminated,
the company moved and so she babysat for me full time. But she became
more and more reclusive in terms of less social activities, less outings,
and I think really, lack of stimulation, lack of outside interests, beyond
the family not a lot of friends, so possibly lack of stimulation and social
activity. (Nancy Robertson, age forty-two, nurse)
My mother had an accident. We have a country place up north, and she
was cutting wood one day—this is all before I even brought her to the
doctor—and she got hit by an ax. She hit the wood and the wood hit right
here [on the head]. She became blue, black, her eyes, everything. So I
always thought that this . . . maybe this was the cause of it. (Rosa Bellini,
age fifty-four, factory worker, retired)
I think of environmental factors, OK. I think of the pollutants in the air
and I am very neurotic about things like that in general. So I would just
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write that [AD] off as another example of living in a highly industrialized
city, where there’s a lot of pollutants. My mother didn’t live near high-
tension wires, but close to the highway for most of her life, so I . . . I mean
that’s also what my focus is, and I don’t know about her early childhood,
what may or may not have been a factor, on her own personal level. Until
she remarried it was high stress. I don’t know if that contributes or not, for
me it’s guessing, really. (Celine Goulet, age sixty-two, college professor)
Hearsay or Heresy
The sources that contributed to these “lay” theories of causation were difficult
to pin down. When pressed for detail, respondents claimed to have read some-
thing somewhere or seen something on TV, to have been just guessing, or to
have often made extrapolations from other illnesses and widespread discourse
about health and disease prevention. It was rare that respondents would be able
to specifically recall whether the source of information had been the media, an
advocacy organization such as the Alzheimer’s Society, their doctor, or commu-
nication with others with some intimate experience of AD. And yet these di-
verse, vaguely recalled pieces of information seemed to have had as much or
greater influence than the actual clinical encounter in shaping respondents’
perceptions of AD and the role that they believed genetics might play in the
development of the disease.
While only a few respondents could identify the sources of their theories of
disease causation or of particular knowledge about AD, circulating speculations
about risk factors and possible protective strategies had clearly penetrated the
minds of family members. Although none mentioned folic acid or the reported
benefits of Vitamin E, many had heard that staying “cognitively active” might
help, as might regular ingestion of anti-inflammatories, and many are familiar
with the debated benefits of hormone replacement therapy in women. There is
little doubt that hearsay was at work. Does this selective uptake and use of
knowledge about AD, with its subjugation of genetics factors, amount to heresy
against current scientific knowledge?
Knowledge in Flux
Interview responses clearly indicate that first-degree relatives of patients diag-
nosed with AD were generally not very interested in learning about the causes
of the disease. They were unlikely to push their clinicians for detailed informa-
tion about the science of AD. Nor were they searching for ultimate causes and
exhibited a more than healthy skepticism of the scientific and genetic discover-
ies they stumbled across. They were well aware that the discoveries announced
in the media did not always prove to be accurate and that promised advances
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were slow to materialize. Most respondents said that they were not interested in
learning about their risk of developing AD until there was something they could
do about it, something more than maintaining a healthy lifestyle. They trusted
that the clinician following their parent, with whom they had regular contact,
would keep them abreast of what they needed to know.
It might seem surprising that so few relatives of AD patients were inter-
ested in understanding the cause, or causes, of the disease or in estimates of
their own risk. But perhaps this is not so surprising in light of the fact that all
those people interviewed in Montreal were in the throes of caring for a sick
parent. These people suggested that the possibility of their developing AD was
far away and not nearly as immediate as were their concerns about the illnesses
with which they were currently dealing—be it their own Crohn’s disease, their
spouse’s cancer or heart disease, or their parent’s AD. While stating that they
saw their risk of developing AD as something far off in the future, most also
intimated that they did not want to think in terms of future risk. This might be
a situation in which pragmatic disregard has a place, since circumspection does
not lead to circumvention.
These interviews have helped to identify some of the factors implicated in
the uptake, or lack thereof, of genetic knowledge. There is no simple “trickle-
down effect” at work here. Instead, we observe an extreme form of incomplete
penetrance of the current genetic knowledge surrounding AD. Despite the fact
that genetic researchers have uncovered one gene that is indisputably associ-
ated with an increased risk for AD, respondents, when they spoke about hered-
ity, did so in a simplified fashion with no reference to ApoE. They recalled
having read about genes in newspapers, hearing about them in public lectures,
and being told certain things by their physician. However, the knowledge was
recalled in general terms (quite possibly as it was given to them) and was posi-
tioned alongside other speculative theories. Interestingly, respondents more
often introduced aluminum exposure as a possible risk factor than they did ge-
netics, and if they read about aluminum, they likely read about ApoE ε, since
these two items hit the general media at roughly the same time, ten years ago.
This suggests a selectivity in uptake and use of knowledge that has not been
emphasized in previous social science studies of the public understanding of
science. It is possible that the apparent immediacy of poisoning by toxic metals,
along with the fact that one can relatively easily choose to avoid this purported
source of AD risk, creates more concern than does the possibility of risk esti-
mates based on genotypes, which one can do nothing directly to modify.
Even though media headlines have announced a genetic component to AD,
the content of the articles tends to stress the complex interaction of genes, the
environment, and yet-to-be-determined cofactors. However, the majority of
current popular media coverage of AD is concerned with the shortage of home
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care for sufferers, or with the latest studies concerning anti-inflammatories
or folic acid. Genetics is but one small part of the picture portrayed in the popu-
lar media, and these articles are often less striking to afflicted families than
other articles, of which there are many, that emphasize the lived reality of the
disease.
Clinicians are located at a major point of disjuncture in the transfer of
knowledge concerning genetics and AD. Certain clinicians, such as those in spe-
cialty memory clinics, are conversant with cutting-edge genetic science and are
active researchers, but they do not transmit this information to their patients,
because in their opinion it has no effect on clinical care or recommendation
about family care of patients.20
The goals and purposes of the clinical encounters at which family members
are present need to be held in mind: the interview respondents were not pa-
tients suffering from AD and did not necessarily perceive themselves as poten-
tial patients even in the future; rather, they were caregivers. It seemed to be the
general opinion of our informants that to engage in speculation about suscepti-
bility and possible risk for themselves would be inappropriate in the clinical
setting, where their parents’ needs took precedence.21
Conclusion
As a result of developments in molecular genetics, most health-care profession-
als now think that genetics is implicated in all disease processes, including
those of complex diseases, such as AD, but they also recognize that multiple
genes, proteins, and the environment are inevitably implicated. Our data show
that there is a disjuncture in the uptake of this knowledge, at least in connec-
tion with AD, by patients, families, and the public. Advocacy groups, authors of
pharmaceutical literature, and clinicians themselves do not emphasize the im-
plications of genetic findings to patients, families, and the public; on the con-
trary, they often withhold their professional position with respect to these
findings, or else make clear their ambivalence about the clinical usefulness of
genetic information. In the popular media, the “discovery” of new genes associ-
ated with AD are reported, but these are far outnumbered by those articles
about the benefits of vitamins and lifestyle that may help to prevent the occur-
rence of this disease. Further, at least as often as prevention, caregiving is the
subject of these reports. Similarly, support groups for AD will, for the foresee-
able future, continue to focus on patient care rather than highlighting the nu-
merous genes and proteins that have been targeted as contributing to the
disease, whose predictive value is little or none.
Reasons for deemphasizing new genetic research within a clinical setting
appear to be twofold. First, to date, the complex mechanisms whereby genetics
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has an impact on AD disease causation are by no means understood. The effects
of ApoE, which is the closest thing to a genetic “smoking gun” scientists have
found, are anything but obvious. Knowledge of an individual’s ApoE status does
not affect diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment and therefore does not make a dif-
ference in a clinician’s ability to care for that individual. Second, aside from
withholding information about genetics and AD because of the limited predic-
tive value of ApoE status, a further reason for the deemphasis of genetic knowl-
edge is that caregivers in the clinical setting are most concerned and worried
about the details of caregiving and what the future has in store for their parent.
Concerns and speculation about their own future risk is actively avoided.
Professional and popular understandings of the role of genetics in illness
vary from disease to disease, and so too do the form and degree of geneti-
cization, genetic citizenship, genetic responsibility, and biosociality. In order to
predict the effects that genetic knowledge may have, it is necessary first to un-
derstand and contextualize the state of professional and popular knowledge
surrounding a particular disorder. Most important, what is relevant for Mende-
lian diseases cannot be extended to complex diseases in which susceptibility,
rather than causative genes, are implicated. Further, it is necessary to recognize
that different diseases will have very different effects on individuals, families,
and communities. Some of the reasons for this include the varying age of onset,
the form that the disease takes, and its particular pathological effects, along
with differing perceptions among individuals about the disease. For instance,
some respondents in this study indicated that their fears of developing AD were
less than their fears of developing other disorders, because they assumed that
AD would strike only very late in life. Nonetheless, others had grave fears of
putting their children through the difficulty of dealing with a parent with AD in
the future. Without detailed knowledge of these factors, it is not possible to
understand what form geneticization or genetic responsibility may take.
Not only scientists, but also social scientists, risk participating in hyperbole
about the new genetics when they focus attention on geneticization at the ex-
pense of considering the impact of the lived experience of disease on patients
and families. Our research demonstrates that the transfer and uptake of knowl-
edge and its penetrance into lay understanding of disease causation is in part
dependent on its pragmatic value for the listener and its consistency with indi-
viduals’ broader beliefs about health and illness. Rarely did respondents suggest
that their understanding of AD was significantly different from their under-
standing about other late-onset diseases; they posited that heredity and lifestyle
were probably both implicated in AD, cancer, and heart disease. Beyond the
understanding of some respondents that the disease might “run in the family,”
genetics played a small part in perceptions about AD, taking a backseat to the
pragmatics of living with, and caring for, an afflicted family member.
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NOTES
. As the mapping of genes becomes increasingly sophisticated, it has become clear that
risk estimates are very often lower than was previously believed to be the case, in
some instances, considerably lower. What was formerly assumed to be certain is no
longer the case (Almquist et al. ).
. As a result of genetic research, AD is now conventionally divided into early- and late-
onset forms. Early onset, “familial” AD, is associated thus far with approximately 
extended families worldwide accounting for perhaps  percent of all cases of AD. Ge-
netic markers for this form of the disease have been found on chromosomes , , and
, one variation of which is inevitably present in vulnerable families. These genes are
autosomal dominant mutations and are understood by most specialists as genetic
“determinants,” although twin studies have shown that age of onset for identical
twins can differ by as much as ten years, strongly suggesting that the environment
also plays a role (Tilley, Morgan, and Kalsheker ). Onset of the early forms of the
disease is almost without exception between the ages of thirty-five and sixty, with
another form starting a little later in life and occasionally not making an appearance
until age seventy. In all cases of early onset, the condition progresses rapidly to florid
dementia and death.
. Many genes are polymorphic and have a number of variations that are widespread in
the human population. Those allelic variations that have been associated with an
increased risk of developing a disorder are known as susceptibility genes. Such gene
variants are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause specific diseases, however, as,
compared with the population at large, an individual who carries one and especially
two copies of such alleles is believed to have an increased risk of protracting the rel-
evant disease. Even so, people with two copies of a susceptibility gene may not get the
disease, indicating that other, as-yet-unidentified factors are involved.
. Penetrance (a term coined by Vogt []) refers to the frequency with which a gene
manifests itself in the phenotype of carriers. Phenotypic expression is a function of
both genotype and environmental factors. Penetrance is reduced or incomplete when
carriers fail to demonstrate the associated phenotype.
. A shift toward a molecular approach in biology began in the s (Kay ). This
shift was associated with a search for what constitutes “life,” and was made possible
by the development of several new technologies. For two decades, molecular biology
focused on protein structure and function. After , when the significance of the
discovery of DNA was recognized, the emphasis switched dramatically to genes, cul-
minating in the Human Genome Project. In recent years proteomics has again be-
come a major focus in molecular biology and is the subdiscipline that currently holds
out the most hope for the development of new, individualized medications and for
elucidating numerous complex biological pathways, including those associated with
AD.
. This Internet research is open to critique in that it represents only those people who
have been motivated to turn to the Web sites. Others, even when they have “genetics”
in the family, avoid such sites. There is no evidence that they exhibit a “genetic re-
sponsibility” or that they believe that it is necessary. It is also worth noting that only
between  and  percent of people in Huntington families take up offers for testing.
. Concepts of genetic citizenship, genetic risk, and genetic responsibility are likely to be use-
ful when researching early-onset AD, which has a Mendelian inheritance pattern.
. Epidemiological figures for other countries, such as Canada, are often derived from
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estimates of the figures in the United States. With Canada having one-tenth the popu-
lation, Canadian estimates are commonly assumed to be one-tenth of those in the
United States. What is lost in mathematical gerrymandering are potential differences
in disease incidences that might result from different social and economic circum-
stances such as very different medical and social service systems.
. When a disease has a very late onset, as does AD, it is difficult to reconstruct family
genealogies effectively to document disease transmission, with the result that disease
occurrence appears sporadic.
. At this same conference, an epidemiologist clarified the way in which genes are be-
lieved to be implicated from before birth in connection with what will happen to one
in old age. Genes influence the building of “cognitive capacity,” this epidemiologist
argued, starting in the intrauterine environment and playing a large role throughout
infancy and childhood and into early adult life. During interviews, AD experts fre-
quently claimed that people with high IQs and with extensive education are at consid-
erably less risk for AD than are others. The epidemiologist’s presentation made it
clear that what is assumed in such statements is that genetic predisposition influ-
ences the laying down of the neurological networks required for brain functioning.
Certain biologically predisposed individuals will end up as adults with fewer synapses
and, as a result, are likely to have lower IQs and therefore will complete less schooling.
It is assumed that the plaques, tangles, and cell death associated with AD will do
proportionally more damage in a short space of time to such people.
. A recent New York Times article reported debate among specialists with regard to the
limited efficacy of existing drugs, stating that it may be decades before real progress is
made (Grady ).
. The term heterozygous refers to the case in which a person carries only one ApoE ε
allele (along with an ApoE ε or , for example). Someone who is homozygous for ApoE
ε has two of these alleles.
. In the examples, the involved gene has been shown to protect against a specific dis-
ease, but if individuals are homozygous for the gene then they will develop cystic
fibrosis or sickle cell disease.
. In the two clinics located in teaching hospitals with which we are most familiar, pa-
tients and their families are routinely asked to provide blood for the various research
projects that are under way. Several of these projects involve testing for genes and
proteins believed to be associated with AD in the hope of finding clues that could lead
to the development of an effective medication. If the family agrees to participate in
one or more of these studies, blood is drawn and the sample is then anonymized
before it is sent for analysis. The results of such testing are not made available to
patients, families, or clinicians, and therefore participation has no effect on clinical
encounters. Should an effective medication be developed, only then would samples
be rematched with specific patients.
. This analysis is based upon database searches (Canada Newsdisc and Factiva [Dow
Jones Index]) covering the above-mentioned time period, which cover major Cana-
dian newspapers in French and English, such as the Montreal Gazette, La Presse, Le De-
voir, Le Soleil, the Globe and Mail, the National Post, and the Toronto Star, in addition to
popular magazines such as Canadian Living, Chatelaine, and Macleans and CBC news
coverage. The Washington Post, the New York Times, Report on Business, Time, and Scien-
tific American were also examined. (It was not within the scope of this analysis to ex-
amine British and European media sources, but a comparison of the manner in which
media representation of AD and genetics might differ from the North American con-
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text might prove an interesting cross-cultural comparison). Because of the multina-
tional makeup of the Canadian population, it is to be expected that many Canadians
will be exposed to foreign media sources. However, as the intent of this analysis is to
explore the media coverage that our “typical” respondent would have most likely
been “exposed” to, we have limited ourselves to these representative sources.
. Familial Autosomal Dominant AD (FAD) is identified as rare (– percent of all
cases), and “Sporadic AD” is described in the pamphlet as the common form, ac-
counting for – percent of all cases. It is noted, “The role of heredity in Sporadic
AD is unclear and continues to be the subject of intense research” (Alzheimer’s Soci-
ety ).
. This study was based on interviews of  first-degree relatives whose parent was suf-
fering, or had suffered, from late-onset AD. The sample includes English- and French-
speaking Montrealers and represents three different clinical sites. Recent immigrants
were excluded. No detectable differences between responses of men and women or
between people of different ethnic backgrounds were observed. All names that ap-
pear are pseudonyms, to ensure anonymity.
. Richards () suggests that Mendelian genetic explanations may contradict lay un-
derstandings of inheritance grounded in kinship concepts. He finds that disorders
that “run in the family” are often linked to other associated groups of characteristics,
which one may or may not inherit from the affected parent. This anti-Mendelian phe-
nomenon, which Richards calls blended inheritance, is taken up in another paper by
the authors that looks at the manner in which adult children of Alzheimer’s disease
sufferers grapple with the complexity of risk estimates for AD based on ApoE status
(Prest, Lloyd and Lock, in progress, “When It ‘Runs in the Family’: The Interplay of
Heredity, Inheritance, and Genetics in Understanding Risk for Late Onset AD). In
spite of the fact that these respondents have undergone education and genetic-coun-
seling sessions, in addition to being followed for one year and completing numerous
qualitative scales that have reviewed the genetic information about ApoE and for AD,
we found continued references to blended inheritance and extremely simplified and
abstracted genetic explanations. These findings echo the data reported here, but are
of great interest in light of the unique nature of the sample population. This paper in
progress more fully engages the social science literature on lay understandings of ge-
netics and explores the significance of the lack of penetrance of genetic knowledge
surrounding susceptibility and risk for developing AD.
. For a rich account of how family members grapple with theories of causation, see
Annette Leibing’s research on AD in Brazil (), in which she depicts “the struggle
for meaning situated at the interface of biomedical explanations and intuitive in-
sights.”
. One future objective of this ongoing study is to characterize the exchange of knowl-
edge concerning AD that takes place between general practitioners (or nonspecialist
clinicians) and patients and their caregivers. Such interactions are likely to constitute
a majority of the clinical encounters concerning memory loss. Although the theory is
speculative, we anticipate that even less genetic knowledge is transferred in these
encounters, in light of findings from our research conducted in the specialist clinics.
. It is possible that the family members raise their concerns about their risk for getting
AD with their own general practitioners or family doctors. This part of a research
project is yet to be carried out.
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The Case of Mrs. Fine
ATHENA HELEN MCLEAN
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The narrative turn in the study of aging has brought forth a variety of
nonpositivist, nonrealist approaches to examining an elder’s life story within
the terms of the story itself, independent of its truth content. Beginning with
the early s, anthropology witnessed a flood of studies concerning the life
history approach (cf. Bertaux ; Crapananzo ; Shostak ). By ,
however, the influence of illness in the construction of one’s life history re-
ceived little attention (Kaufman , ). Since then, bolstered by interpretive
approaches to narrative in anthropology (e.g., Rabinow and Sullivan ), as
well as theory and methods from literary criticism (Bakhtin ), philosophy
(Ricoeur , ), and cognate disciplines (Polkinghorne , ; Cohler
; Bruner ; White , ), social scientists have increasingly exam-
ined the place of narrative production in the construction of meaning for per-
sons confronting illness (Kaufman ; Mattingly ), disruption (Becker
; Lovell ), or the frailties of aging (Gubrium ; Kaufman ;
Rubinstein , ; Rubinstein, Kilbride, and Nagy ; Holstein and Cole
).
Whereas many clinical applications of reminiscence and developmental
understandings of the life course have been informed by positivist notions that
view language as direct reflections of a fixed coherent self, recent autobio-
graphical works in gerontology (Gubrium , ; Gubrium et al. ;
Birren et al. ; Coleman ; Kenyon ) or at large (Climo and Cattell
) have been shaped by more critical approaches.1 Studies problematizing
the notion of a coherent fixed self (Ewing ; Gubrium and Holstein )
have been informed by a postmodern appreciation of the dialogic production
(Bakhtin ) of multiple ever changing selves produced in diverse contexts.
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The self-consciousness demanded by self-critics of ethnography (Clifford and
Marcus ; Marcus and Fischer ) has stimulated the emergence of native
voices (first-person accounts of indigenous, subaltern, or other), while soundly
delivering the postmodern message that the researcher is not revealing “truth,”
only her own particular reading of the field as text. The influence of analyses of
text-based (not natural-language-based) discourses from disciplines such as lit-
erary studies has further directed studies of narrative away from realist con-
cerns with how well they reflect “actual experience” or the narrator’s inner life,
or with how accurately the narrator’s recollections portray actual events, objec-
tively validated by external evidence. Increasingly, narratives are being exam-
ined as texts that cohere within themselves, independent of any external
validity of their truth value.
Most analyses of life stories in gerontology, however, have concerned elders
who are not cognitively impaired,2 perhaps because this group has been seen as
more capable of reflecting upon the past in constructing their own stories. For
these elders, life narratives have been appreciated for providing coherence,
resolution, or direction to the condition of their current lives independent of
the authenticity of the content of their narratives. When elders are cognitively
impaired, however, questions arise about their capacity to produce a coherent
and authentic life story, even though authenticity is not ordinarily a concern.
Perhaps the powerful influence of the biomedical model, with its realist empha-
sis on objective evidence, has inhibited efforts to collect life narratives from
cognitively impaired elders, in spite of the contention of nonpositivist narrative
studies that the need for external validation is unnecessary or irrelevant
(cf. Denzin ; Bruner ; Polkinghorne ). Even more likely, the atten-
tion that biomedicine has drawn to decaying brains and loss of reason in the
senile elderly has led researchers to discount these elders’ capacities to prod-
uce meaningful discourse and has dissuaded them from exploring their life
histories.
Thus, with few exceptions (Hamilton ; Sabat , ; Crisp ),
there has been limited attention to investigating life stories of persons with
dementia. This chapter will contribute to knowledge in this area through the
discussion of the life story of one elderly woman with dementia. After describ-
ing the study, the narrative, and the context of its production, I will examine the
extent and nature of coherence in her story, using formal textual and
nontextual criteria. Through these criteria I will consider the relevance of
facticity (or “truth”) to coherence in performance, text, and personal integra-
tion. I will also examine the meaning of the narrative in light of the existential
and material conditions of its production. The chapter will conclude with a
brief discussion about the limitations of postmodernist approaches to the study
of narratives of elders with dementia and consider both the gains and possible
risks of externally validating the stories of these elders.
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Research Considerations
The Setting
The study took place over a nine-month period from September  to July
. The site was a locked forty-bed special care unit of a five-hundred-bed
private nursing home complex in the northeastern part of the United States.
Although mainly Jewish, the residents varied in socioeconomic background and
country of birth. The affiliation and close proximity of the nursing home to a
well-regarded hospital was a major source of attraction for many families. The
special care unit was one of two identically designed units that together housed
the most severely cognitively and behaviorally impaired elders in the nursing
home.
The unit, Morgan II, was intermittently noisy because of the degree of disin-
hibition and disturbance of its residents. Disturbed behaviors included fre-
quent repetitiveness, verbal aggressiveness, physical combativeness, and
undressing in public. Despite the extreme behaviors of its occupants, this unit
had an excellent reputation in the community. However, elders rarely entered
the unit directly from the community. Rather, they were transferred there from
other units in the nursing home, because of deterioration in their condition or
escalation of disturbed behaviors.
The residents were overwhelmingly female, at a rate of  percent, about 
percent higher than the national average for nursing homes. They ranged in age
from  to  (with both extremes being males). The median age of all residents
was .. Fourteen residents were in their s, twenty-one in their s, and four
in their s; a single male was in his s.
Methodology of the Larger Study
The purpose of the project was to study qualitatively the communicative inter-
actions of residents with dementia who manifested seriously disturbed behav-
iors. The goal was to examine the specific contexts in which the disturbed
behaviors occurred, evolved, and resolved or escalated in order to determine
whether they may have represented failed efforts at communicating rather
than, or in addition to, organic deterioration.
I spent approximately nine months on the unit. My methodology was eth-
nographic and included participant observation; detailed recording of observa-
tions; and informal and semistructured interviews with the members of the
staff (everyone from housekeepers to physicians), family members, visitors, and
wherever possible, the residents themselves. I conducted observations on a
daily basis. Although the majority of these observations were conducted during
the day shift (: A.M. to : P.M.) and during several hours of the evening shift
(: P.M. to : P.M.), there were also many days when I stayed throughout the
second shift and part of the night shift (: P.M. to : A.M.). There were also
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occasions when I spent twenty-four consecutive hours on the unit in order to
observe residents whose disturbances had no predictable pattern, or who would
be disruptive after : P.M. The twenty-four-hour stays gave me a fuller flavor
of the flow of life on the unit, offering me a closer look at the way the residents
experienced it every day of their lives.
Before selecting the unit for study, I first spent time visiting it and speaking
with the head nurse and support staff to ensure that the residents would be
appropriate for my purposes. On the day that I formally began my research, the
assistant director of nursing introduced me to the unit staff, affirming the
administration’s interest in cooperating with the study. Shortly after arriving on
the unit, I described my research focus to the staff and to residents’ families
(persons designated as responsible parties and others whom I might eventually
interview). I explained to them how I would be probing into areas that they
might think were irrelevant but that this was necessary for gaining a fuller pic-
ture of the context in which disturbances occurred. I also explained that I might
appear “nosy” at times, but reminded everyone that the areas into which I in-
quired were necessary for my study. As the study progressed, the staff and family
members were generally cooperative, but a few of the nursing assistants were
not very forthcoming, because, despite my efforts to convince them otherwise,
they continued to suspect that I was a spy for the administration.
Whenever possible, I wrote my field notes immediately following a conver-
sation or observation to ensure the fullest retention of details. If much activity
had caught my attention but I was unable to document my observation at that
time, I wrote a brief outline that identified the points that I needed to develop.
After leaving the unit, I elaborated on the outline.
I kept my field notes in two separate files. A general file documented my
detailed observations about life on the unit. This included observations about
interactions between the many persons who lived, worked, or appeared there;
caregiving routines; work organization; and of course, disruptive behaviors. I
also kept a file for each of six residents I chose for more intensive, focused study.
These residents typically manifested the most disruptive behaviors, some by
fighting with the staff or other residents, others by making great demands on
staff time. In addition to the ethnographic research, I studied the current and
past medical records of Morgan II residents in order to gain some understand-
ing of how their condition, including their disturbed behaviors, had changed
over time.
Before selecting six residents for intensive study, I spent one month making
general observations and inquiries of the unit staff. I spoke with the head nurse
of the unit, a registered nurse, and the care managers, generally licensed practi-
cal nurses, from every shift. In addition, I spoke with nursing assistants, who
have the most direct contact with residents, to obtain their assessments about
the most disruptive, behaviorally disturbed residents. A resident might be quiet
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on two shifts but terribly disruptive at : A.M., so I made a point to talk with
staff, especially nursing assistants from every shift. I jotted down lists of their
candidates, asking for reasons for their selection. I then compared names on the
lists to see who most frequently appeared, with the plan to choose those who
were identified most often as being “disruptive.”
Focusing on Mrs. Fine
Selecting Mrs. Fine for Intensive Study
Among the main contenders for intensive study was Mrs. Fine, an eighty-five-
year-old woman who had been admitted to the home almost three years earlier.
Mrs. Fine was identified as being agitated and aggressive with other residents to
whom she felt superior. During mealtimes she would compare her food with
that of other residents and complain. She would frequently hit other residents
or throw food or beverages at them. Targets were residents whose behaviors
were visibly disturbed or to whom for some reason she took a dislike. Her be-
havior had been getting more aggressive in recent weeks, so she appeared on
most of the “most disturbed residents” lists I had collected. Mrs. Fine was also
known for getting very upset in her single room, where she commonly stayed
alone. She would often scream that someone had been going through her be-
longings and that something valuable was missing. She was also known to suffer
from delusions and to hallucinate at times, insisting that a man had entered her
room. She would occasionally be up at night, yelling intermittently between
naps. Most recently, she had begun to disrobe and occasionally to display exhi-
bitionist behavior.
In addition, Mrs. Fine had a severe expressive aphasia, a language distur-
bance resulting from focal lesions (Thompson , ), with word-finding dif-
ficulties that left her tearful and frustrated when they interfered with her efforts
to speak. The range and extent of her disturbances and the general agreement
from the staff about them had convinced me to include her in my study.
Mrs. Fine’s Medical History
Mrs. Fine presented with a somewhat unusual medical history, inconsistent di-
agnoses, and a history of frequent moves within the facility. About a year prior
to her admission to the nursing home, she had become confused, suffered a
stroke, and fell and broke her hip. Subsequently she experienced periods of de-
pression and delirium, both involving confusion and hallucinations. These led
to two brief psychiatric hospitalizations in the year before her admission to the
nursing home.
Mrs. Fine was admitted to the nursing home with a diagnosis of major de-
pression, multi-infarct dementia associated with her stroke, and periodic de-
lirium (paranoia, delusions, and hallucinations). She also had arthritis and a
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history of falls. While continent at the time, she performed very poorly on a
cognitive exam, unable to identify her location, age, or married name. She also
indicated that her husband had died one year ago, when he had actually died
twenty years ago.
During her stay at the home, her dementia received various diagnoses
ranging from Alzheimer’s disease to multi-infarct dementia to mixed dementia.
In fact, her clinical picture was very irregular and did not follow a pattern of
progressive decline. Despite her very poor performance upon admission on one
cognitive test (the Blessed), she performed much better on the Mini Mental
State Exam (MMSE) three years later (scoring  out of ).3 Reports of her his-
tory of continence also varied enormously, with clear improvement over the
most recent year.
Since her admission, Mrs. Fine had moved to four different units, including
two admissions to Morgan II. The moves were generally a result of her aggres-
siveness toward better-functioning residents on the other units. A fall just a
year after admission left her wheelchair bound, incontinent, and angry. Since
her last return to Morgan II, she had received physical therapy, was able to walk
again with a walker, and regained continence. Her heightened independence
had improved her mood considerably.
About a week prior to my coming to the unit, Mrs. Fine had just returned
from a brief hospital stay following left-side weakness and an inability to speak.
Tests indicated that she had not suffered another stroke, but more likely, a tran-
sient ischemic attack. Additional neurological assessments showed that she had
mild cortical atrophy, no new infarcts beyond the earlier one on her occipital
lobe (side not indicated). There was also a mild flattening of tissue (the nasola-
bial fold) on her right hemisphere. The neurological exam showed signs of
dementing disease, most likely Alzheimer’s, that was believed to have affected
her both short- and long-term memory. Since returning from the hospital, her
aphasia also seemed somewhat more marked.
This Unplanned Substudy
I had been on the unit for about three weeks when Mrs. Fine approached the
nurse’s station, where I was sitting. She was very upset, so the nurse gently asked
her to calm down and went to her room to see what was upsetting her. A few
minutes later the nurse exited her room, after assuring Mrs. Fine that her pho-
tographs were still there—a periodic worry of hers.
Mrs. Fine then turned to me and beckoned me to join her in her room. This
caught me completely off guard. I had not really conversed with Mrs. Fine be-
fore, except casually while moving about during the course of my observations
on the unit. Perhaps she had sensed my interest in her; if so, this showed an
awareness I had not come to expect from someone suffering from dementia.
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Since I had never made demands on her, she may also have perceived me simply
as nonthreatening company.
As I entered her room (the only single room on the unit), I commented on
the many pictures she had displayed on her bulletin board and on how lovely
her room appeared. “I did it myself,” she proudly proclaimed. This was the be-
ginning of a two-hour-long visit. Mrs. Fine started showing me her pictures, but
as she tried to describe each one, her aphasia interfered with her ability to ex-
press herself. In frustration at her inability to finish a sentence or locate the
right word, she would pull back her head and groan dramatically. I resisted
choosing words for her, so as not to rush her or impede her thought processes.
However, if she were struggling exceptionally, I might ask, “Do you mean X?” She
could then simply answer yes the majority of the time, or no, and try once again.
In this way we slowly proceeded through the dialogue. After Mrs. Fine proudly
pointed out pictures of her daughters and grandchildren, her eye caught one
lovely young woman, and she began to sob. “That’s my Gilda, and how I loved
her! And she died!” Gradually it came out that Gilda was her daughter, who at
eighteen had died as a result of physician negligence. While the details escaped
me, Mrs. Fine’s expression of suffering the loss of a child was clearly communi-
cated, and her words and emotions moved me to tears.4
My own tears apparently touched her and she calmed down, smiled slightly,
and continued showing me her pictures. When she came to a picture of her
husband, she started to moan and shake her head. At first, I suspected that this
was because he was deceased, but her tone of voice and gestures suggested that
there was something more to her reaction. After we sat down, I admired the
large framed picture on her nightstand of Mrs. Fine in a formal pose and fancy
dress. The photograph prompted her to share the following story.
Mrs. Fine’s Story
Many years ago, at a party she attended with her daughter, a man approached
her daughter, asking if he could snap a photograph of Mrs. Fine. Although reluc-
tant at first, after some pressure from the man, Mrs. Fine finally agreed. Later
she agreed also to have a picture taken with the man’s brother.
At that point in her story, Mrs. Fine opened the drawer of her nightstand
and pulled out a picture showing her wearing the same dress, this time with the
man in her story. Someone had jotted his name on the back of the picture, pos-
sibly as a reminder, suggesting perhaps that he was not familiar to her. They
were standing side by side formally and holding hands. Mrs. Fine looked at me
and said, “I never saw that man again.”
After the party, Mrs. Fine took the photographs to be developed at her local
pharmacy. Her husband, who had returned early from a business trip, before
going home stopped at the pharmacy to pick up some medicine for her. The
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pharmacist looked at him in a puzzled way, wanting to know if he was her hus-
band, because he had seen her (referring to the photograph) with another man.
After hearing this, Mr. Fine grew suspicious, and upon returning home and
seeing the picture, he became incensed, convinced that his wife had become
involved with that man. He then went to visit Mrs. Fine’s sister and her hus-
band, Mr. Fine’s business partner, to see if they knew anything. Her brother-in-
law confirmed that she was seeing another man.
“What a lie!” Mrs. Fine complained to me, again getting upset, holding her
hands to her temples and shaking her head.
To punish her, her husband withdrew all their money from the bank and
gave it to her sister and brother-in-law. He then signed over his business as well.
She was left penniless and with a furious spouse.
I asked Mrs. Fine if she and her husband had separated because of this
event. She said they had not, but that he refused to talk to her, believing the
others over her. Even her daughter could not convince him of her innocence.
I asked if her husband had left any estate for her children. She said he had
not, but that they were nevertheless financially secure. However, she reiterated,
“But I have nothing, just this” (referring to her room), while her sister bought a
very big house with the money. She added that this same sister took all her
jewelry after she entered the nursing home, claiming that Mrs. Fine would no
longer need it.
Within two months Mrs. Fine’s husband was dead. She believed, in retro-
spect, that he knew the end was coming, which is why he hurried to transfer
their money and business to her sister, as punishment. “But,” she insisted dra-
matically, turning to me, “it was not the money that upset me; it was his going to
his grave, still not believing me, when never once was I unfaithful to him!”
Once again, she became upset, shaking her head and then tossing it back in
despair, while sighing in agony. I expressed my empathy and stated how very
difficult this must have been for her. “Exactly!” she agreed.
A couple of months after Mrs. Fine’s husband died, her daughter went to
another party, where she expected to see the man in the picture. He never ap-
peared. A few days later, the man who took her picture showed up at Mrs. Fine’s
door to inform her that his brother had died. He then explained how his
brother, who had been terminally ill, had been admiring Mrs. Fine, which is why
he had wanted to take his picture with her.
It was these events that had left her alone and penniless.
Mrs. Fine appeared relaxed after completing her tragic tale. Then she
smiled and wished me greater happiness in my life than the horrors she had
been meted. She asked that I not share this story with anyone on the staff for
fear it might get back to her sister and cause a family upheaval; however, she did
grant me permission to talk with her daughters.
COHERENCE WITHOUT FACTICITY IN DEMENTIA 165
Methodological Issues
Although I typically audiorecord and transcribe interviews that I conduct with
family members, I did not expect to be gathering any formal life histories with
residents of Morgan II, given the severity of their impairment. So I was unpre-
pared to tape-record Mrs. Fine’s story. Even if I had had my tape recorder with
me, I suspect, Mrs. Fine would have been reluctant to let me turn it on, given her
intermittent paranoia. Also, I would not have wanted to risk having a device
interfere with her narration. In addition, as those of a cultural anthropologist,
my transcriptions would have been used for analyzing the general content of the
story, rather than for linguistic microanalysis, so I did not fear that the analysis
would suffer by relying on my reconstruction of her story.
Soon after I left Mrs. Fine’s room, I attempted to reconstruct and record our
conversation and the detailed elements of her story as fully and accurately as
possible, preserving quotes and her emotional expression as I remembered
them.
Checking the “Facts”
On three subsequent occasions, Mrs. Fine repeated parts of this story, changing
some of the details each time. The plot remained the same—her having been
photographed with this man and her husband’s disbelieving her story. What
differed were the identities of the relatives who had lied to her husband and
who had personally benefited at her expense. On these occasions, Mrs. Fine
substituted her daughter Ethel and her son-in-law for her sister and brother-in-
law. Thus, there was some arbitrariness in the elements she had selected for her
story. Because of these discrepancies and my curiosity about the veracity of her
story, I decided to investigate some of its “facts.”
I discovered that the staff were inclined to discount her statements as fan-
tasy even when they were not. One nurse said that Mrs. Fine had never lost a
daughter and warned me not to believe her stories. However, the head nurse,
who also distrusted many of her stories, and Kathy, another of Mrs. Fine’s
daughters, confirmed that a third daughter had indeed died as a young adult.
In talking with Kathy, I learned that Mrs. Fine had started telling some ver-
sion of this story several months earlier. I also confirmed that Mrs. Fine’s hus-
band had died twenty years before her admission to the nursing home. About
ten years after his death, Mrs. Fine met Mr. Haller, the man in the picture, at a
party, and they developed a serious relationship that lasted until his own death
eight years later, about two years before she entered the nursing home. The two
men had not overlapped in time. Kathy felt that Mr. Haller had offered her
mother companionship and had “doted on her.”
Kathy indicated that her father had never rejected her mother; he had
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adored her throughout their life together, giving her whatever she wanted. Like
Mr. Haller, he was a generous, loving man: “My mother had the distinction of
being loved by two men in her life.”
She related that her mother was always saving money and was quite prud-
ish. Kathy’s husband, during a later, impromptu telephone interview, stated up
front that he did not like his mother-in-law and commented that she used to
“boss around” her “spineless” husband, showing “little respect for him.” He
added that Mrs. Fine was obsessed with money and was suspicious that others—
even family members—were stealing from her. He also proffered the statement
that Mrs. Fine’s sister, who supposedly had benefited from Mrs. Fine’s losses,
was living “on welfare.” Both Kathy and her husband had independently alluded
to Kathy’s sister’s having taken some of Mrs. Fine’s wealth—an apparently bitter
issue within the family—but neither would elaborate.
Coherence and Dementia
I was struck by the apparent strength of coherence in this story as well as the
unmistakable tragic content of its plot, in spite of distortions in the timing and
identity of the characters. After describing some of the distortions, I will review
the literature about coherence in dementia and then examine the coherence in
this story.
Distortion in Mrs. Fine’s Story
There were several concrete elements in Mrs. Fine’s story that were inconsis-
tent with the facts reported by her daughter. These included Mrs. Fine’s identi-
fication of the man in the picture as a stranger, the compression of time
between her husband’s death and that of the man in the picture, and her allega-
tion that her husband had left her penniless. It would be much too easy to con-
sider the distortion as entirely the product of her dementia, which no doubt did
contribute to it. However, to disregard Mrs. Fine’s story because of her diagnosis
would be to ignore both the importance of her effort in constructing it and its
potential meaning for her.
Embracing as authoritative fact the comments of Mrs. Fine’s family is
equally problematic. Her daughter reported, for example, that Mrs. Fine’s hus-
band had adored her. Suggesting otherwise, however, Mrs. Fine’s son-in-law
claimed that Mrs. Fine had shown no respect for her husband. And Mrs. Fine
reported that her husband died believing that she had been unfaithful. Perhaps
the “truth” lies within each of these statements and somewhere in between.
Each family member spoke from a particular perspective, a unique history
of relationship with Mrs. Fine and her husband, and a selective memory of
experience.
Still, the concrete information her daughter provided, to the extent it was
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accurate, was useful for revealing how Mrs. Fine had significantly reordered se-
quential events in her life story as well as altered the identity of a principal
character and the history of her relationship with him. The family’s factual data
(dates, temporal sequence of events, and the identity of characters) can serve as
a source against which to compare elements selected by Mrs. Fine in construct-
ing her narrative. Although other comments from her family could also be used
to interpret aspects of her story, they should not be regarded as the “valid” ex-
ternal indicator of historical “truth.” Rather, they should be considered as addi-
tional narrative fragments, at various times confronting, informing,
reinforcing, or conjoining with fragments of her own memory.
Coherence and the Language of Dementia
The literature on language production in dementia suggests that considerable
loss of coherence occurs, particularly in the ability to create logical time se-
quence (temporal coherence) (Ellis , –) and sticking to the point
(thematic coherence) (Davis et al. ; Ellis , –; Thompson ,
–; Cherney and Cantor , ). Much of this literature asserts that with
dementia, and in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in particular (Hamilton , ),
speech is typically fluent, but irrelevant, circuitous, and empty of meaning
(Thompson , ). People with this diagnosis typically are reported to have
trouble selecting appropriate details, distinguishing fact from fiction, and de-
termining logical sequential order. Still, their language manifests grammatically
correct sentence structure and does not appear unusual except when consid-
ered in the context of the larger discourse (Ellis , ; Crisp , ). Thus
communication, and coherence in particular, appear to be a particular problem
for elders with AD (Ellis , ).
The literature on coherence in AD suggests that in more advanced AD,
speech difficulties extend to grammatical errors and are characterized by in-
creasing difficulty in ordering events (problems with temporal coherence), by
difficulties in determining logical sequential order (Ska and Guenard , –
), and by the inadequate usage of referents (that is, corruption of thematic
coherence) (Ellis , –).
More recently, however, researchers have been arguing that the discourag-
ing assessment of speech in those affected by dementia may be indicative of the
conditions under which that speech was produced (Davis, O’Neil-Pirozzi, and
Coon ; Crisp , ) or of cultural characteristics not taken into account
by objective assessments (Bower , ). Dismal assessment of the language
productions of demented elders may also result from the artificial experimental
conditions under which language was produced (Hamilton , ; Bower ,
; Crisp , ) as well as from the power differential this creates between
subject and researcher (Sabat , ). Like other researchers of narrative
practice (e.g., Gubrium and Holstein ), sociolinguists Hamilton (, )
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and Sabat (, ) argue for the importance of contextual and dialogic factors
in interpreting their narrative production.
Hamilton (, ) addressed the value of maintaining a personal, sensi-
tive, engaged approach to working with demented elders, and Sabat () un-
derlined the importance of giving them adequate time to find words and to
organize thoughts. His unobtrusive “indirect repair” allowed him to periodically
confirm his understanding with a simple “do you mean X?” while allowing the
elder to take charge of her dialogue. Institutionalized elders in Scotland shared
surprisingly coherent poetry with John Killick (), after he worked to gain
their trust and let them direct the communication. Killick highlighted the im-
portance of empathy, silence, and even self-effacement in promoting dialogue,
thus enabling elders to produce language that was more coherent than that
suggested by the literature.
Textual Coherence in Mrs. Fine’s Story
Unlike her diagnoses, which seemed to vary as much as her symptoms, Mrs.
Fine’s narrative seemed to have coherence far in excess of what one might ex-
pect from someone with dementia, particularly of the AD type. Perhaps her ap-
parent coherence was enabled by the minimalist position I assumed as the
lesser actor in our dialogue, quietly helping her complete her words, without
imposing my own thoughts. In fact, she led the entire narrative event, from her
invitation to me through to the completion of her story.
Despite the apparent coherence of her story, I decided to examine its for-
mal coherence by turning to coherence criteria defined by linguist Charlotte
Linde (). Like Hamilton and Sabat, Linde locates coherence not in “a disem-
bodied text,” but in the “cooperative achievement” of the discourse partici-
pants (Linde , ). Linde argues that the life story coheres if it () has a
reasonable narrative structure, () follows coherence principles, and () pro-
vides a socially shared coherence system.
A Reasonable Narrative Structure . . .
Life stories have reasonable narrative structures if they begin with an orientation
(for example, the party Mrs. Fine described), continue with a sequence of events
(such as the events following the party), offer an evaluation (her husband’s mis-
judgment and the injustice she suffered), and end with a coda (her bidding me a
better fate). Several writers have referred to this principle as manifesting
“emplotment” (Mattingly ; Bruner ). Mrs. Fine’s story clearly satisfied
this criterion.
. . . Follows Coherence Principles
To satisfy coherence principles, a life story must also present a rich account, ar-
ticulate a clear sequence of events, and show plausible causality. It was here where
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Mrs. Fine’s story was a bit shakier. Certainly she presented a rich, even moving
account, which was especially impressive given the severity of her speech diffi-
culties. Moreover, although some of the events were out of order, her recon-
structed sequence was logical. Whether the series of events she presented could
have led to her husband’s actions would have depended both on her husband
and on the history of her relationship with him. The evaluations by her daugh-
ter and son-in-law of the relationship between Mrs. Fine and her husband
clashed somewhat and only served to confuse matters. It is certainly possible
that a jealous, angry husband could be provoked to act in this way and that his
actions could have led to her poverty. Because he died soon afterward, there was
little time for him to reassess and possibly reverse his actions. Her “consequen-
tial” living in a small room of a nursing home was evidence to her of her great
material losses. Yet anyone who knew the great cost of nursing homes, and es-
pecially of private rooms, would realize that she did not ultimately arrive here
out of poverty.
. . . And Provides a Socially Shared Coherence System
Mrs. Fine’s story is readily recognizable as a tragedy (Bruner , –). As the
listener, I appreciated the implications of her unfortunate losses (her husband,
her property, his trust) and the social injustices she suffered (his misguided dis-
belief in her; the gains of her dishonest brother-in-law; her institutionalized
existence). What began as an innocent, kind gesture (agreeing to have her pic-
ture taken) turned into the source of an indisputably tragic outcome. Not only
does her story capture tragic human plights; it is also “worth telling”—two
strong features of socially coherent narrative (Bruner ). She offered a classic
canonical script—an unjustly assumed breach of marital fidelity, resulting in a
violation of another canon: marital trust.
By Linde’s () criteria, Mrs. Fine’s story had considerable coherence in
spite of the questions it raised about her husband’s responses. Her narrative
structure, the sequence of events, and the tragic plot all contributed to a coher-
ent story line that carried a persistent emotional truth.
It was not coherence, but the plausibility of some of the events, that
seemed questionable. I did not understand, for instance, why Mrs. Fine, rather
than the man who shot the photograph, was responsible for having them devel-
oped. The photographs that I saw were in fact large in size and apparently pro-
fessionally processed, not developed at a local pharmacy. In addition, it seemed
odd that the pharmacist to whom she took the pictures to be developed would
have looked at them and, even more odd, taken the liberty to ask Mr. Fine if he
was her husband, although it is hard to know how her local pharmacy actually
conducted business, from the perspective of Mrs. Fine, as a shopper there, accu-
mulating experiences that formed the basis of the memories, from which she
drew fragments. It seemed surprising too that the man who took her picture
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came to her house to tell her of his brother’s death, even though she claimed
not to have known him. Still, there may have been little details—background
knowledge (Bruner , )—that she had not shared with me that might have
provided a context to clarify her construction (cf. Gullette , ). Although
a greater understanding of these details might have improved the plausibility of
these events, it would not have affected the degree of coherence in Mrs. Fine’s
story.
Beyond Textual Coherence: “Truth,” the Self, and Meaning
Even though Mrs. Fine’s story was coherent, it departed from historical reality
(Kohli , ). Aside from some ambiguous or questionable details in her con-
tent, her reordering of events and misrepresenting as a stranger the man with
whom she had experienced an eight-year relationship call into question the ex-
ternal validity of her story. In this section, therefore, I will consider the rel-
evance of facticity—or externally verifiable “historical truth” ()—to coherence
in life stories. However, I will look beyond Linde’s textual coherence principles
to other ways in which an elder’s life narrative may achieve coherence. Last, I
will examine the relationship of life stories to issues about the self and meaning
for elders.
Coherence and the Question of Facticity/“Truth”
Subjective “Truth” versus Performative Coherence
In contrast to most analysts of life stories, Peter Coleman argues that a life story
must have “truth value” (, )—but of a subjective “truth” as understood by
the narrator, not of one determined by an objective observer (). In contrast,
Denzin locates the importance of coherence in autobiographical narration en-
tirely beyond the truth value of the narrative: “The point is not whether bio-
graphical coherence is an illusion or reality. Rather, what must be established is
how individuals give coherence to their lives when they write or talk self autobiogra-
phies” (, , cited in Gubrium and Holstein , ; emphasis added). In
other words, coherence is produced in the process of creating or performing the
life story (cf. Mattingly , ).
Narrative Truth: From Coherence within the Text to Coherence
within the Person
Similarly, Bruner argues that life narratives can only reach “verisimilitude,” not
empirical verification (, ). Linde agrees but focuses mainly on coherence
within the boundaries of the text (, ; cf. Mattingly , ). She later
adds that the value of a narrative is in its ability to help organize a speaker’s
understandings of her “past life, current situation and imagined future” (,
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). This demands a coherent, constantly revised life story that expresses “who
we are and how we got that way” (). Coherence systems provide language for
creating that new self, even if that self or the story is a fictitious one (;
Polkinghorne , –). Linde has shifted from coherence within the text to
coherence within the person.
For Bruner too, the point is not the constitution of the text, but on “how it
operates as an instrument of mind” in constructing reality (, –). “Rather
than referring to ‘reality,’ or ‘historical truth,’ the life story actually constructs
its own ‘narrative truth’” (; Polkinghorne , ; cf. Mattingly , –)
that has particular meaning for the narrator (Polkinghorne , ). Crisp too,
describes narratives as the “externalized demonstration of internal mental pro-
cesses,” (, ) without reference to their historical accuracy. For others, it
is within this narrative that identities are constructed (cf. Jamieson and Victor
, ; cf. Coupland and Coupland , ).
“Coherence Work” as Self-Constituting and Integrating:
The Forming of Emotional Truth in the Self
For Moody, also, the “coherence work” of late-life reminiscence may involve cre-
ating a fictional or metaphoric version of the self (, xxxiv). Ewing ()
explains how people create new selves (or self-representations) as they proceed
through life and engage in new experiences with different people. The need for
coherence becomes apparent only when we encounter a disruption or new life
experience that cannot fit into our existing life narrative (Linde , ); the
life story must then change to accommodate that event. The readjusted life
story helps to preserve or reproduce the sense of continuity of one’s self
(Kaufman , ).
Fragmentation occurs when a person’s available self-representations (or
selves) in a new setting or in new interactions with others no longer correspond
to the person’s prior experiences (cf. Randall , –). Whenever this
leads to the loss of a sense of wholeness or integration, or when the person is
challenged by a new situation, the person creates a more adequate self through
a new synthesis and integration in her life story (Ewing , ).
In narrative productions, self-constitution occurs because of the ability of
the narrator to separate herself from the self she is creating (Ewing , ;
Linde , , ). Although distinct selves are created in response to the
demands of new life contexts, an illusory experience of wholeness, coherence,
or “unity of feeling” is achieved because each self-representation organizes frag-
ments of experiences as if they were constant and timeless (Ewing , ;
Mattingly , ). Coherence is a symbolic process that depends more on
that unity of feeling—an affective state—than on logical rules of text or even on
actual past experience (Fernandez , ; cited in Ewing , ). It forms
its own constant emotional truth.
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For Mrs. Fine, suffering both from dementia and the dissatisfaction of her
life circumstances, two sources of fragmentation tore at her sense of wholeness.
First, her dementia challenged her sense of cognitive integration. Second, her
sense of self-integration was challenged by her depersonalizing living condi-
tions in an institutional setting that neither valued nor reinforced her personal
history and biography. Finding her current residence in the nursing home be-
yond her control and comprehension, she attempted a “symbolic reworking”
(Lovell , ), “restorying” (Randall ), or “mythological rearranging”
(Hankins , ) of her everyday experience.
Rather than unraveling, Mrs. Fine constructed a narrative that provided an
anchor from which she could affirm her identity in the midst of potential chaos
and threats to it (cf. Kohli , ). She wove her story out of “meaning traces”
(Polkinghorne , ) or fragments drawn from her dwindling memory of real
and imagined experiences and other texts available to her (cf. Crisp , ).
The powerful self-reinforcement and integrative functions of the narrative were
far more significant to Mrs. Fine than was the departure of its content from
historical reality.
The Meaning of Life Stories
Most life narratives are concerned with negative events, suggesting that
trouble—frustration, confusion, and misunderstanding—drives people to com-
municate their life stories (Ochs and Capps , –; cf. Tarman , –
). A life story helps make sense of troubling life experience (cf. Mattingly
, ) by reconciling outcomes with expectations (Ochs and Capps , ).
It also creates a sense of order out of potential meaninglessness (Tarman ,
–). For Mrs. Fine, living in a small room on the locked dementia unit was
difficult to comprehend. Her life story helped her reconcile her existential con-
dition with her expectations for something greater by explaining how she
ended up there. Although it did not enable her to resolve her situation, it did
help her to achieve psychological closure (Ochs and Capps ; Polkinghorne
, ).
Meaning in Mrs. Fine’s Story
According to Ricoeur (, cited in Mattingly , ), the meaning of a story
is organized around its ending. The narrator’s “existentially meaningful” plot
(Lovell , ) allows events to unfold toward that ending by organizing re-
constituted events and memory fragments—actual, fictional, and borrowed—in
a way that enables the narrator to make sense out of her current situation.
Mrs. Fine’s narrative ended with her unhappy living situation. In creating a
meaningful story, Mrs. Fine reworked some of the characters and their relation
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to her. She transformed Mr. Haller from a companion of many years into a
stranger. She re-created her husband from an allegedly “adoring” (Kathy’s
view), perhaps “spineless,” spouse whom she dominated (her son’s-in-law
view) to a rigid, rejecting, dominating figure, unwilling to listen to his own fam-
ily. Was she trying to create a husband whose qualities she might have pre-
ferred? Perhaps. Was she working out guilt for having supposedly “bossed
around her husband”? Possibly. More likely, she reworked her memory frag-
ments, however distorted, about her husband’s behaviors in a way that made
sense of the story’s ending: the plot required that he reject her, to help explain
her current plight. How else might she have come to live in her tiny nursing
home room?
By providing a plot directly related to her current situation (her story’s end-
ing), Mrs. Fine’s narrative protected “against the chilling possibility” that her
life and current status were “random, accidental, unmotivated” (Linde , ;
Tarman ), in short, meaningless. Her plot helped her make sense out of
events, regardless of whether they were true (Mattingly , ). Her photo-
graphs provided the trigger for creating meaningfully plotted events—“a strat-
egy of survival” (Crisp , ; Mattingly , )—which is why mislocating
them was so upsetting to her. Her compelling “need” to tell her story (cf.
Mattingly , ) was also understandable: it reaffirmed both order in the
universe and her place within it.
Mrs. Fine’s narrative also imparted a moral perspective to her life
(Mattingly , ). It served to destigmatize her plight and to exculpate her
(cf. Lovell ) from blame and responsibility for having arrived there.
Through narrative, she was able to transfer the moral responsibility for her cur-
rent situation from herself to others—the solicitous photographer, her dishon-
est brother-in-law, her disbelieving husband. Perhaps this is why she seemed so
calm, controlled, and even relieved after she finished telling me her story (cf.
Crisp , ).
Mrs. Fine’s narrative was a canonical tale (cf. Bruner , ) with a twist.
That fateful party, the inquisitive pharmacist, the lying brother-in-law all con-
tributed to her current plight. Hers was not the typical story of a cuckolded
husband, but of a wrongly accused wife; not of truth prevailing in the end, but of
dishonesty gaining victory (her brother-in-law benefiting from her losses). It is
a story of undeserved injustice (her living in a single nursing home room with
very little) and undeserved gain (her sister ending up with a huge house). There
is no resolution here, only an explanation for enduring angst—a sustained emo-
tional truth. She is both victim and heroine, admired by a stranger but rejected
by her husband, accused yet innocent; in short, she is the central character of a
powerful, yet tragic, plot.
Such a central role can be powerfully sustaining, providing the “lifebuoy of
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an identity that is drowning” (Gerbeaud , , cited in Crisp , ). The
dialogic process in which she took charge of her production, while gaining affir-
mation from me, the listener, further reinforced her sense of self-worth.
Mrs. Fine’s tale is also metaphorical. The invalidation, injustice, and par-
ticular losses she suffered in her story can be matched in real life by the invali-
dation she experiences in response to her dementia; the injustice of living in an
undesirable situation; and the loss of her freedom, autonomy, and frequent
contact with loved ones.
Discussion and Conclusion
Narrative analyses tend to emphasize the interpretive value or narrative mean-
ing of a story for its narrator rather than the correspondence of the narrated
events to an objective reality (Polkinghorne ; Mattingly , –; Randall
). When a person tells her life story, no matter how fictitious the account,
her narrative does not reflect the past, but rather “becomes the past” (Randall
, ; emphasis added). Thus an authentic life story is not one that corre-
sponds to an objective indicator of the “truth,” but rather one that is “made” the
narrator’s own” (Kenyon , –).
It is not accidental, then, that narrative analyses of persons undergoing ag-
ing, illness, or major disruptions in their lives have drawn primarily from inter-
pretive phenomenological approaches (Rabinow and Sullivan ), rather than
structural or extreme postmodernist ones. The former approaches focus, not on
coherence in the text, but on coherence for the subject. They examine the ways
in which people construct their identities and inner worlds in order to make
sense of their experiences and to preserve a sense of continuity (Mattingly ,
) or restore a sense of order in their lives. These are the most pressing con-
cerns for those threatened with its dissolution, however illusory these may be
(Ewing ).
Phenomenology embraces the very concepts—subjectivity, inner experi-
ence, unity, “truth,” and continuity—that structuralism and postmodernism
reject (cf. Mattingly , –). Postmodernism favors partializing con-
cepts—discontinuity, fracture, and contingency—that emphasize the ephemeral
quality and arbitrariness of the story. However, even though the content of a
narrative may appear arbitrary, the material and existential conditions that
gave rise to it are subjectively experienced as very real by the author. This is why
Mattingly astutely distinguishes narrative analyses that concern written and
oral texts from those that concern lived experience and inner meanings ().
A danger in focusing strictly on story (or text) is that every story is not
equally validated by other cultural scripts. For example, for those with dementia
in a medicalized setting, the disease model of dementia serves to invalidate af-
fected persons’ subjective feelings, thoughts, experiences, and emotions as dis-
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torted (empirically “untrue”) artifacts of disease and sees their stories as irratio-
nal ramblings (Crisp ). Extreme postmodernism, despite its celebration of
difference, unwittingly reinforces biomedicine’s invalidation of the demented
elder by rejecting the validity of the “truth” of her subjective experience. Thus,
biomedicine, with its insistence only on empirically validated truth, and
postmodernism, with its rejection of all “truths,” both effectively invalidate the
subjective experience of elders with dementia.
In discussing the many narratives produced by her cognitively impaired
mother, Jane Crisp () recognized a coherence and sense in them that were
not apparent to an outsider. Given her perspective about her mother’s history
of fears, preferences, and position in her marital relation, Crisp was able to see
how her mother’s stories revealed these aspects of her past or served to reverse
previous injustices. Crisp introduced external information, not to validate facts
or events from her mother’s stories, but to elucidate their possible relevance in
light of her present situation.
Because of the compromised rationality of persons with dementia, there is
considerable skepticism about taking seriously what they say. However, even
when what they say does depart from verifiable facts, elders who tell stories may
present a coherent picture, as we saw with Mrs. Fine. It is not the actual histori-
cal facts, but their construction of a new story that provides meaning to the nar-
rators and gives us clues to their lived experience.
We must ask whether anything can be gained by our turning to external
sources of information to understand the stories of persons with dementia. I
would argue that we are treading on potentially dangerous territory by risking
the elevation of some voices—and narrative truths—over others on realist
grounds. To the extent that additional information can reveal sense in a story
that would otherwise be disregarded as irrelevant, it should be embraced. Exter-
nal information that offers factual information about dates, events, and charac-
ters and clues about their reworkings may also advance our understanding of
the story’s meaning for the elder. However, when these sources are used to dis-
confirm (or even affirm) an elder’s story on the basis of its lack (or presence) of
correspondence to external indicators of “truth,” it risks disempowering and
invalidating that elder.
I frankly am unsure of how much I gained by talking with Mrs. Fine’s daugh-
ter and son-in-law. At the time of Mrs. Fine’s narration, I was too caught up in
her story and her struggle in communicating it to worry about any correspon-
dence of its elements to empirical facts. However, gaining confirmation about
the death of her daughter did make the rest of what she said more convincing to
me. But it did so not because it gave me license to believe the rest of her narra-
tive. Rather, it made me aware of the lasting effect of significant events in her
life, whether she suffered from dementia or not. Even though several elements
of her subsequent story were not historically verifiable, that was beside the
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point. Her narration made a convincing case of the significance of its narrative
truth in the context of her unhappy living situation and the power of her own
agency in reconstructing sense in her existentially and materially constrained
life.
NOTES
. See also the special collection in the Journal of Aging Studies , no.  ().
. Exceptions to this include Sabat (, ) and Hamilton (, ). These re-
searchers, however, examined narratives produced by elders, but not necessarily
their life stories. More relevant here is the work of Crisp (), who examined the
stories of her mother, who suffered from dementia.
. Although the two tests measured somewhat different cognitive elements, the Blessed,
for example, examining information, memory, and concentration; and the Mini
Mental State Exam (MMSE), memory orientation, concentration, language, and con-
structional ability (Sano and Weber , –), the difference in Mrs. Fine’s perfor-
mance went beyond differences in the tests. It reflected differences in disposition
toward being tested as well as actual differences in her in cognitive status during
times of testing.
. This recalls the way in which Sharon Kaufman found the tragic stories of her
informant’s lives “almost too much . . . to bear” (, ).
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When memory fades and one’s grasp on the factual building blocks of one’s
life loosens, what remains? Is a person still capable of growth and creative ex-
pression even when dementia strikes? To answer these questions, I relay the
story of the TimeSlips Project, a research and public-arts storytelling project
aimed at nurturing creative expression among people with Alzheimer’s disease
and related dementia (ADRD) and at sharing the stories that emerged in
TimeSlips workshops with the public at large to increase awareness of the cre-
ative potential of people with ADRD. I will () outline the storytelling method
and my study of it; () analyze the content of the stories; () discuss interviews
with staff, family caregivers, and student participants; and () describe the
TimeSlips’s outreach program’s effectiveness in changing public perception of
people with ADRD.
The Storytelling Method
The TimeSlips storytelling method evolved out of a year of experimenting with a
variety of exercises in creative dramatics. After espousing the virtues of theatri-
cal performance for older adults in my research on senior theater troupes across
the United States, I wanted to see if “playing a new role” could benefit people
with ADRD as much as I found it did for the well elderly. People with dementia
clearly have few meaningful social roles available to them. With holes where
memories of their children and spouses used to be, people with ADRD often lose
even the most basic roles available to us all—that of partner or parent. In creat-
ing the TimeSlips method, I set about to establish a social role for people with
ADRD, that of storyteller, that would in turn provide access to meaningful self-
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expression. After running a storytelling circle for three months in a long-term-
care facility, I set up a research study of the storytelling method to test its effec-
tiveness in four adult day centers, two in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and two in New
York City. The storytelling method has evolved in the years since the research
study began in . What I describe here is the structure of the storytelling
circles in those four initial adult day center test sites.
The TimeSlips storytelling method followed a clear, ritualized structure. At
least once a week, a group of people with symptoms consistent with middle-
stage Alzheimer’s disease gathered in a circle of chairs.1 With the program assis-
tant, Nichole Griffiths, I trained undergraduate students from a wide range of
disciplines (predominantly in the humanities and arts) to facilitate the
storytelling. Students and staff worked together to encourage the storytellers to
respond to a picture the students brought in each week. Throughout this chap-
ter, I refer to students and staff as facilitators and the people with ADRD as story-
tellers. The storytelling circles began with a “welcome,” in which the facilitators
introduced the activity and greeted the storytellers. Facilitators then read back
a story from the previous week to prove to the storytellers that they were indeed
capable of creative expression. Next, facilitators handed out an image to each
member of the storytelling circle and asked open-ended questions (avoiding
“yes” or “no” questions) of the group. One facilitator wrote down all the re-
sponses on a sketchpad large enough for all the storytellers to see. All re-
sponses, including any nonsensical answers, were validated and woven into the
fabric of the story. Facilitators reread the story when they noticed the storytell-
ers’ attention starting to drift. A single story often lasted up to one hour, but
most ran around thirty minutes on average. In the final step in the ritual, facili-
tators thanked all the storytellers in turn for their input as a way to acknowl-
edge the significant risk and energy demanded by a full hour of creative
storytelling.
Facilitators used a wide variety of images, but all shared one characteris-
tic—they appeared staged or fantastical in some way. We avoided images of ce-
lebrities or family photographs because we found that storytellers became too
fixated on the “real” story behind the image to freely launch into the realm of
the imagination. The images guided facilitators in their choice of questions,
which were carefully worded to give the storytellers ownership over the story.
Instead of, “What is this character’s name?” for example, a facilitator would ask,
“What would you like to call him?” Questions focused on the sensory (“What
sounds do you imagine in the background?”) and on the world outside the pic-
ture as well (“Does he have a family?”).
The free-form storytelling process demanded that facilitators leave behind
preconceived notions of what constitutes a “story.” If several storytellers re-
sponded with names for a single character, that character had several names.
Events often took place in several places at once. Multiple plot turns created a
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meandering story line that read more as a chronicle of the storytelling process
than as a traditional, linear story with a clear beginning, middle, and end and a
focus on conflict and resolution. Because facilitators reassured the storytellers
that they could say anything they wanted, since they were making up a new
story, the facilitators often received answers that did not make sense to them.
These were of two kinds. First, some were clearly meant to challenge the facilita-
tors’ promise that they would accept any answer. We referred to these as chal-
lenge answers. In one exchange, for example, a facilitator asked for a name for a
character and promised she would accept any answer. A storyteller looked up at
her slyly and said, “Oh, yeah? A-B-C-D-E-F-G.” The facilitator wrote down the
response and the name “A-B-C-D-E-F-G” became part of the story. The second
type of nonsensical answer emerged from the domain of the disease. Several
storytellers in each group had great difficulty with language. As the storytelling
workshops proceeded and they grew to trust the process, these storytellers
would often respond by adding fragmented words or sounds. Facilitators re-
peated these answers back to them and wrote them down as well as they could
capture them.
This free-form style of storytelling runs counter to theories of narrative
healing that are now gaining recognition in all corners of health professions.
From the outside, the TimeSlips method appears to be a “chaos narrative,” in
the words of Arthur Frank. Such nonlinear narratives are not thought to lead to
healing, but stall the patient in the limbo of unresolved and undirected emo-
tions. I argue that Frank’s definition is text based—and not focused on process.
The TimeSlips storytelling may look “chaotic” in terms of text, but the process
has a linear narrative underneath it. People with dementia, silenced by con-
fusion and the social pressure to say the right thing, learn to experiment
with language and form social bonds with staff and participants in the process.
As long as that narrative is clear to all participants (staff and people with
Alzheimer’s), I believe, the nonlinear form of the stories—or any other creative
activity—can be part of a healing process. And in fact, we found that facilitators’
attempts to make the narratives of the story linear shut down the process
entirely.
The Outreach Program
The second goal of the TimeSlips Project was to share with the public the stories
that emerged in the storytelling circles in order to increase awareness of the
creative capacity of people with ADRD. We did this in several ways. First, the
facilitators and TimeSlips staff created books of the stories told at each center
and presented them to the storytellers in celebrations held at each facility. Sec-
ond, in both Milwaukee and New York, a team of artists associated with the
project produced a play (with professional actors) and an art exhibit inspired by
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the stories told in each city. Each performance of the play was followed by a
postshow discussion in which audience members could share their reactions to
the stories and ask questions about the disease. Third, we created a Web site
that included stories from all four test sites as well as detailed information
about the history and aims of the project.
The Research Model
We received approval from the Institutional Research Board (IRB) at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin–Milwaukee and secured consent forms from all participating
staff, students, and family caregivers as well as assent forms from all partici-
pants with ADRD. My assistant and I interviewed staff, students, and primary
family caregivers at the outset of the project, in the middle of the storytelling
sessions, and again at the end of the project. We held the interviews in person
or over the phone, depending on the interviewee’s preference. The interviews
were “open structured,” loosely following our aim to assess interviewees’ reac-
tions to and observations of the storytelling sessions without leaning on a pre-
fabricated set of questions. The responses that I share here retain the anonymity
of the subjects. Gender or other details of the respondent may be changed to
protect their identity. In this chapter, I refer to the adult day center test sites as
A and B (both in Milwaukee), and C and D (in New York).
To test the outreach model, we received approval from the Hunter College
IRB, in New York. The main aim of this study was to test whether the art exhibit,
play production, or both, generated a change in audience members’ perception
of the creative potential of people with ADRD. To address this, TimeSlips staff
created an evaluation form and inserted it in each play program. A separate
evaluation was also available at the art exhibit. All responses were anonymous.
Although we held a play and art exhibit in Milwaukee, all responses were anec-
dotal. This research, therefore, focuses on the New York play and art exhibit.
Analysis of the Stories
All told, the storytelling workshops in all four sites yielded more than one hun-
dred stories. Some stories were only partially complete, as facilitators tried to
squeeze in one more tale before the hour was over. Of the completed stories, I
analyzed seventeen from Center A and twenty-one from Center B. From the New
York workshops, I analyzed sixteen from Center C and  from Center D. I dis-
cerned the stories’ main themes and noted their unique qualities, such as the
prevalence of humor or nonsensical answers. Although the stories reflected the
unique personality and diversity of each storytelling group, several themes
emerged in all four groups. I will focus on individual groups first, and then turn
to themes that appeared in all four. I will mainly refer to portions of stories. Full
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stories and additional information are available on the project’s Web site (http://
www.timeslips.org).
Center A
Storytelling workshops in Center A featured a fairly consistent group of up to
twelve enthusiastic participants who regularly added songs and even dances to
their stories. Of the seventeen stories I analyzed, humor appeared in all; and
eight featured main characters that were happy, confident, and likable. These
characters commonly encountered social obstacles, including the negative
opinions of people around them. The characters most typically overcame these
obstacles by remaining true to themselves.
The most common theme that appeared was the desire for freedom—to
make decisions, to be uninhibited, and to make choices. In “All the Way to Se-
attle,” a woman pilot flies “because it makes her feel free, and because her fam-
ily doesn’t pay her enough attention.” In another story, “Italians from Ireland
Getting Their Independence,” the main characters are fighting for their
“‘[Mil]Waukean independence and they are doing what’s right.” The story’s fi-
nal line, “They got it right where they want it,” asserts the characters’ power and
freedom. In the story “Look at Those Legs,” a woman rides to church on an os-
trich only to be ridiculed by her fellow congregants. She overcomes this ridicule
“because she is very sophisticated” and leads the church in the song “Amazing
Grace.”
References to religion and spirituality were also common in this group. In
“I’m Glad You’re Dead, You Dog, You,” the two main characters are wrestling
over a picture of the Virgin Mary “because she symbolizes all that they desire.”
In “She’s down There under the Puppy,” an elephant named Grandfather is not
allowed to enter a church because he might break down the walls. He takes
solace in his friendship with a little girl who is not afraid of his size, and together
they sit outside the church and listen to the choir sing “Abide with Me.”
Another common theme that emerged in the stories of group A was the
desire for human relationships, both platonic and intimate. Two main charac-
ters in one story, two nuns, were in love, but couldn’t remember with whom.
Sexual innuendo was common. In “Tiny Bubbles,” the main character lives un-
derwater and is thinking about a woman he left on the shore. “He’s thinking a
whole lot about that woman,” said a storyteller. In “It Goes Toot Toot,” John
Hibby and Bill Hobby and their wives “all fool around together.” Explicit sexual
references were not uncommon and could make some storytellers uncomfort-
able. Rather than edit the story, however, which would run counter to our
promise to the storytellers that we would include all their responses, we simply
encouraged more responses.
Several stories from group A dealt with difficult relationships. Some re-
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flected disagreements between children and their parents. In one story, for ex-
ample, the children sharply disapprove of their parent’s wrestling. Some stories
joked about traditional gender relationships; men would commonly take on
women’s duties, as in “Italians from Ireland,” where eight women were fighting
for independence while their husbands were washing dishes.
The group at Center A was warm and supportive, comfortable with re-
sponding to the facilitators’ questions with nonsensical answers. For example,
in “Everybody Is Eating Corn,” a story of a raucous dinner party at a restaurant,
one of the main characters is “allegering all over the horn.” Nearly every story at
Center A featured a fragmented or nonsensical answer. But taken in the context
of the storytelling circle, such answers had clear emotional resonance. When
repeating nonsensical answers in the retelling process of the storytelling, facili-
tators aimed to capture the emotion intent behind the sound or words.
“Allegering all over the horn” was, in context, a clear reference to a joyful cel-
ebration at the dinner party.
Center B
At Center B in Milwaukee, we worked with a group of storytellers who were
much more mixed in their abilities than those in the group at Center A. Of the
six storytellers at Center B, one storyteller had practically no verbal language at
all. Because communication was more difficult for this group of storytellers, the
pace of storytelling was slower here. Several unique characteristics emerged in
the stories created by this group, possibly because of the smaller size and slower
pace, but certainly because of the strong personalities of several storytellers. Of
the seventeen stories in Center A, none included the names of storytellers. In
Center B, however, almost half of the twenty-one stories I analyzed included the
name of a storyteller or student facilitator as characters. When asked to name a
character, some of the group’s less verbal storytellers would point to a fellow
group member instead of naming the person directly. Drawing fellow storytell-
ers into the tale was sometimes used as a gesture of intimacy and, at other
times, a gesture of friendly mocking. Either way, it always drew the group into a
deeper engagement with the process. Facilitators called out and emphasized the
storyteller’s/character’s name repeatedly with each retelling, acknowledging
the storyteller’s presence, creativity, and new role (as character).
Nearly all the stories at Center B contained “challenge” answers and an-
swers that sharply redirected what might be the assumed journey of the tale.
Their stories were less concerned with the direction of the plot and much more
focused on wordplay. “He’s a Tuba Player,” for example, begins with “He’s Tony
the trumpet player from Tampa, trying to get a tune.” Tony’s wife, whose name
is “Music,” is “rumored to be dead.” In “Thanksgiving Celebration,” their story
based on an image of a boisterous dinner party, storytellers named one couple
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“Pardon Me, I Burped” and “Charles, Who Is No Prince.” “When the check
comes” for the dinner party, “they’ll sober up!” said one storyteller.
Although the members of this group commonly used their own names as
the names of characters, they also tended to separate themselves from the story
lines and in turn from fellow storytellers. For example, in a story about a pancake-
cooking club, one storyteller said, “I wouldn’t join that club.” In “Waltzing Lad-
ders,” when one storyteller said, “Everyone is married and has children so they
don’t have parties anymore,” another countered with, “Then I’m never going to
get married!” When one storyteller added church music to a story, another
countered with, “No, that’s too holy.”
In spite of their penchant for sharp wit, participants in Center B also created
some remarkably poignant images in their stories that seem to mirror their own
feelings and fantasies. Tony the trumpet player, for example “should be forty-
two, but he’s ninety-nine. He’s happy, even though he’s alone.” In “We Want to
See Castro,” a little girl goes to Cuba with an elephant. “She’s gone far away,”
said one storyteller, “because kids do that.” In response to an image of a man
hiding his head in his coat, storytellers named the main character “Headless Joe
Wonder” and said that “he lives in a room of despair. He takes it as it comes. You
think you can’t do anything without a head, but headless Joe Wonder can.”
Centers C and D
The storytelling groups at both New York Centers C and D fluctuated dramati-
cally in size from week to week. Center C had an average of ten storytellers; they
ranged considerably in verbal skills, with the majority able to put together two
or three words. At Center C, the names of storytellers found their way into the
tales, as they had at Center B. But at Center C, storytellers sometimes competed
with one another to add their own name to the stories. In one story about a male
painter and his female model, for example, two women storytellers added their
own names to the name of the female model. We included both and hyphenated
the character’s name. Similarly, in “Mama Bear Does the Cha-Cha,” Mama Bear
is named after one of the storytellers. The story grew poignant as the storytell-
ers decided that Papa Bear was far away having affairs, but that Mama Bear
didn’t just sit at home and mope. “Mama Bear and the two cubs are at home,
doing the cha-cha.” The namesake storyteller, confined to a wheelchair, would
lead the group in a dance with her arms with each retelling.
There were few “challenge” answers at Center C, and these stories generally
featured likable characters and were peppered with humor. The raucous
dinner-party image was imagined to be “John Gotti’s birthday party,” at which
the characters were “eating diet food, because they are all fat!” In a story based
on an image of an older couple arm wrestling, storytellers said, “They are falling
in love for the first time.” Like those of group A, members of this group were
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patient with non sequiturs that emerged out of illness, and they acknowledged
the contribution of the storyteller who added them with each retelling. For ex-
ample, one storyteller could not or would not answer with more than “I don’t
know.” Facilitators asked if they could add this to the story, and the characters,
a group of women accordion players, became the I Don’t Know band. In another
example, when asked if there was music in a story about a man with a pigeon
sitting on his head, one storyteller enthusiastically made up a song whose only
word was beep. To great approval from the crowd, she energetically sang it with
each retelling of the story.
Center D’s group was very small, although it never dipped below four par-
ticipants. The group was more physically and emotionally fragile than the oth-
ers and more linguistically challenged. One member could only add sounds,
interspersed with occasional shards of words. Another storyteller had a remark-
able gift for poetic images, but struggled to stay awake and to tolerate multiple
stimuli. Her struggle was evident in her input to the stories; she often tried to
either focus or silence the group. “Every person has a story,” she said, “there’s
not a human being that doesn’t have a story. But making it mish-mosh is bad.
It’s like a bomb.” In other stories, however, her input encouraged the group to
create powerful images. In a story based on an image of a man sitting in an
enormous pile of books, they said “He is accepting responsibility to organize
this into something. He is orchestrating an orchestra in his mind.” In a tale
about a can-can dancer who works with an ostrich, they named her “Holding
On, because she’s really just holding on.” The story ended with Holding On con-
templating her career. “She never had children, and she thinks she might have
missed something. But she has a complex sense of happiness.”
As in other small storytelling groups, non sequiturs were much more com-
mon at Center D than in larger groups, in which the increased amount of input
meant storytellers could edit themselves. In a story based on the image of the
older couple wrestling, one storyteller looked perplexed and said, “All I know is
Winnie the Pooh.” Woven into the story, her response became a favorite phrase
among the storytellers. As in other groups, the storytellers used the process to
play with one another and with the staff. Their humor was vivid. In “An Exquisite
Woman,” a woman pilot flies to Russia, where she eats “chicken Kiev in a box.”
In “A Horse Is a Horse of Course,” a handsome cowboy is “any age we want him to
be . . . probably twenty-eight. And he’s attracted to beautiful women like us!”
Comparing and Contrasting Centers
Clear differences and similarities emerged in the four storytelling groups. Led
by the strong personalities of group members and by the size and nature of the
group dynamics, groups at Centers A and C yielded harmonious and playful
stories, while Center B participants challenged the process at every step, and
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Center D’s stories were powerful, dreamlike images pierced by sharp wit. As I
mentioned earlier, common themes emerged in all four groups, including the
desire for freedom, confidence, and intimate relationships. These desires were
also evident in the group dynamics, where storytellers teased one another (and
facilitators) by placing one another in the stories, by suddenly changing the
direction of the story, or by adding deliberately humorous or provocative re-
marks. In all four groups, storytellers engaged in the process as a way to express
themselves, whether they were attempting to contradict the flow of the story or
encourage its progress—whether they were challenging facilitators or sharing a
poetic image. In all four groups, storytelling provided storytellers with a valued
social role and rare access to meaning-making for people whose language has
broken down. Laughter and singing were a prominent part of all four
storytelling groups as well, so much so that staff who were not directly involved
with the storytelling tended to gather at the edge of the room to listen to the
sessions. Clearly, the storytellers retained the capacity to entertain others and
themselves with laughter, humor, and joy.
Interviews: Volunteers, Staff, Families
The storytelling process and the stories that evolve from it show that people
with ADRD do have creative potential and can play a valuable social role. The
stories themselves can tell us only so much about the effectiveness of the work-
shops; however, interviews with staff, family caregivers, and students can help
us discern whether providing people with ADRD with access to a meaningful
social role can shift the attitudes of people who care for them.
In Milwaukee, three students participated in the full eighteen weeks of
workshops, and five of them facilitated storytelling for nine weeks. In New York,
five students facilitated the nine weeks of sessions. All student facilitators were
interviewed in their first week in the program and again at the end. During the
project, they kept weekly journals of their feelings about the workshops. Inter-
views with students were open structured and focused on their perceptions of
aging, dementia, and people with dementia.
Students in Milwaukee and New York City revealed an initial fear or sub-
stantial hesitation about working with people with dementia. Several articu-
lated it as worry that they might hurt the storytellers, physically or
psychologically. One student who was studying art therapy had considerable
knowledge about dementia from gerontology courses but worried about her
lack of practical experience working with such a population. Only one student
had worked with people with dementia before and was fairly confident in her
abilities. She, however, was fearful of revealing her own disability (dyslexia) in
the group. The student volunteers had a high incidence of disability them-
selves. Of the thirteen students, three had dyslexia and another student was
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deaf. I can only speculate that they were especially drawn to a project that en-
couraged the growth of people with cognitive disabilities. But I can freely con-
clude that throughout the storytelling process, all four remarked that they
gained confidence in their own writing and creative abilities.
After revealing their initial fear of working with people with dementia, the
students were surprised at how much they enjoyed the sessions, as shown in
their journals and in final interviews. They described the laughter and emo-
tional connection that they had enjoyed with the storytellers as “giving mean-
ing to their day” and making them feel as though they were “useful” and were
“important” in the storytellers’ eyes. After several weeks of storytelling, stu-
dents commonly remarked that the storytellers did not seem to be afflicted with
what they imagined to be symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease. In their final inter-
views, three students shared their concerns that some of the storytellers were
misdiagnosed.
Three students wrote about how it made them feel hurt when the story-
tellers did not remember their names from week to week. If certain storytellers
did seem to remember the students, they felt particularly accepted. But two of
these students also wrote that despite their not being remembered, they felt a
good deal of satisfaction knowing that the storytellers trusted and accepted
them. Two students described their growing understanding that the product,
the story itself, was not the focus of the project. One student noted: “I think that
at the beginning I was looking for the product. I was looking for the good story
to come out at the end. And it was so hard! We just had to pull and push and it
was like nothing was happening. And then it kind of hit me that we were not
really there to get this good story. We were there to be with these people and,
you know, maybe appreciate them for being individuals. You know it’s to our
advantage that we are there sharing with them their ideas and wisdom and
creativity.”
The students became very attached to both the process and the storytell-
ers. By the end of the storytelling workshops, they were all able to separate their
fears of the disease from their dissipating fears of the people who suffered from
it. After the initial, cautious few weeks, the body language, vocal tone, and en-
ergy level of the students grew as they interacted easily with the storytellers.
Interviews that I conducted with staff at the four day centers revealed their
surprise at the storytellers’ creative abilities. Open-structure interviews at the
beginning and end of the process showed that staff experienced a growing ap-
preciation of the process and observed positive behavioral changes in clients.
The Center B staff were not directly involved in the storytelling process but re-
marked in interviews that they regularly read the stories and noticed improve-
ments in the center’s clients: “We have a few people who are in the project who
are very, very quiet, and I’m very happy to see them coming forward. The first
couple of sessions . . . they were very quiet and you really had to pull everything
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out of them and now I’ve noticed that as each class has been happening, they
are more and more open; they’ll talk openly and they’re more comfortable. They
are so happy after you leave, and honestly, we can really get a lot out of them for
the rest of the day.”
Staff at Center C were also not involved at the outset of the storytelling
workshops. At first they were grateful for our giving them an hour in which to
invest their attention elsewhere. After the third storytelling session, however,
staff were increasingly lured by the laughter and singing in our circle. In the
final few sessions, staff had joined the circle, asking questions and laughing and
singing with us. Interviews with the two key staff members at Center C suggest
two things: staff were surprised by the quality of the stories; and staff gained
insights into clients that they had not previously imagined were possible to ob-
tain. One staff member put it this way: “What they say, I mean, some of these
stories . . . I gave them to [the director of the day center] and she said, ‘Gee,
these guys are smart! And funny!’ And the family members, Ida’s daughter, she
read it. And she said, ‘That story is funny!’ She loved it. And I said, ‘See? That’s
what we’re doing here on Thursdays!’”
Staff at Centers A and D were fully involved in the storytelling from the
beginning. They joined us in the storytelling circles on the first day and con-
tinue the storytelling to this day—a considerable commitment considering that
the average turnover rate of staff in this field is near  percent. Center A went
beyond what we had hoped. The TimeSlips Project presented each center with
books of all the stories, inexpensively duplicated and spiral bound. The staff at
Center A took the initiative to put together (and pay for) three-ring binders and
plastic page protectors for high-quality duplications of each image and its corre-
sponding story. They invited the families of storytellers to attend a party at
which the staff presented the beautiful books to all the storytellers, each receiv-
ing a copy, and thanked them for their contributions. The event was quite mov-
ing, as storytellers reviewed their efforts with their families. One storyteller
took my arm and said, “You know what’s so great about this? It ain’t cheap!” I
knew just what he meant. The books that the staff had created were works of art,
honoring and giving value to the storytellers’ creativity. The director of Center
A, who was actively involved with the storytelling sessions, offered these re-
marks: “Being an active participant in this TimeSlips Project, I have seen the joy
that the process has brought to the participants, the comfort that it has brought
to families, the satisfaction and empowerment that it has brought to staff in-
volved. I am also impressed by the insight and awareness that it has brought to
the students, as they grow in their understanding of aging, disease, and [the]
development of humanness.”
THERE WERE RADICAL differences between the interviews with family caregivers
that occurred in Milwaukee and those that took place in New York. All but two
CREATIVE STORYTELLING AND SELF-EXPRESSION 191
storytellers in Milwaukee lived with family members. The two lived in long-
term-care programs and attended day centers for added social interaction. In
New York, the few storytellers who lived with their families commonly also had
at least part-time, paid attendants to care for them. Perhaps because of differ-
ences in the structure of care, or because of the gaps in communication with the
day centers, only two of the family caregivers we interviewed in New York were
aware of the stories. Consequently, they had little information to offer about
changes in observed behavior.
Milwaukee families had a much greater awareness of the storytelling pro-
cess and its impact on the storytellers themselves. Of the fifteen family
caregivers we interviewed in Milwaukee, the majority had read the stories
either in the single sheets we sent home each week or in the books of stories
that we presented to storytellers at the end of the project.2 Three family
caregivers said that they regularly read the book with their loved one with
ADRD. Two said they duplicated the books and sent them to other members of
the family as a way for them to understand and connect with the storyteller.
One told us that the storyteller had become possessive of the book and hid it
from her, calling it “his work.” Four family caregivers told us that they believed
that the storytelling made a clear difference in their loved one’s behavior. These
changes included initiating more conversation, exhibiting less confusion, and
expressing an increased sense of enjoyment in life. Within couples, caregivers
face tremendous challenges caring for someone with ADRD, not the least of
which is the adjustment to the change in roles the couples play. I find the fact
that family caregivers could find meaning and affirmation in the stories and the
storytelling process in the face of these challenges a testament to the power of
creative self-expression.
Educational Outreach: Changing Public Perception
In Milwaukee and New York, the TimeSlips Project sponsored art exhibits and
staged professional play productions inspired by the stories and characters that
had been created in the storytelling workshops. Our aim was to improve audi-
ence members’ perceptions about the creative potential of people with ADRD.
In Milwaukee, we collected anecdotal responses to the exhibit and play, but in
New York we created a more official analysis of the educational outreach model.
Analysis of the New York data suggests that it is indeed possible to positively
affect public perception of people with dementia.
The New York TimeSlips play was produced in an intimate (ninety-nine-
seat) downtown (off-off-Broadway) theater known for innovative performances.
We selected theater as a genre because the physical presence of the actor on
stage can create a sense of empathy with another human being in a way that
film cannot, and because people with dementia exist in a fragile world that, like
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live performance, disappears after the moment has passed. Our hope was to
capitalize on the intimacy of the space, the power of the present moment, and
the potential to engender a sense of empathy for people with dementia.
The play is set in an adult day center, where a small group of people gather
in a creative-storytelling circle. Weaving communal stories, they free them-
selves from their private struggles with Alzheimer’s to create a wondrous world
inhabited by fantastical characters that take on a life of their own. A can-can
dancer conceals the long legs of an ostrich beneath her skirts; a singing cowboy
serenades his devoted horse; a determined swimmer battles the Hudson to
break a world record; and a bookworm struggles to liberate himself from a
mountain of books. Through the storytelling process, these fragmented person-
alities band together to help one another complete their journeys even as
memory fails their authors.
In New York, we inserted an evaluation form in each printed program and
allowed time after the show and before a postshow discussion for audience
members to complete the forms. We received  responses over the course of
twenty performances throughout the three weeks of the production. We asked a
series of general questions to ascertain audience members’ ages, occupations,
and experience with dementia. We also asked a series of questions directly
about the play, including a request for a description of its theme.3 The most
common response ( percent) was “self-expression,” or “expression of an inner
life.” Next, we asked people if before viewing the play they had thought that
people with dementia could express themselves creatively, with a measure of 
being “not at all,” and  being “quite well.” The average response was ., or in
the area we described on the form as “somewhat.” In the following question, we
asked if after viewing the play they thought that people with dementia could
express themselves creatively. The average response was ..
We analyzed the before-and-after responses according to differences in age,
experience, occupation, and date of the performance. Age did have an impact
on people’s responses, but it was a relatively weak one. We found that younger
audience members were slightly more optimistic in recognizing the creative
potential of people with dementia. Each age group went up approximately two
points from before to after, but younger audience members began from a
slightly higher place than that of older members.
Those with experience with dementia (personal or professional) were more
positive in their views of the potential of people with dementia to express them-
selves creatively. Those without experience changed their attitudes more than
did those with experience. Both groups increased from their before attitude to
their after. Those who worked in health care began with a more positive attitude
in comparison with those who did not. Both groups increased two points from
before to after, but those in health care began and ended higher than those who
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were not. The differences, however, were weak, and the play had a significant
impact on every group.
The art exhibit in New York City featured six two-dimensional silhouettes
of characters from the stories that had emerged in the New York storytelling
workshops. The figures ranged from eight to twelve feet in height and included
a pair of waltzing ladders, a woman riding an ostrich, a swimmer, and an el-
ephant. The story itself was handwritten on the figure, so viewers could read it
in its entirety. The exhibit was held at the Elsa Mott Ives Gallery at Fifty-third
Street and Lexington Avenue, where the figures appeared in the enormous
second-floor windows, which overlook a busy intersection. Evaluation cards
were displayed prominently in the exhibit, but in spite of high attendance, only
seventeen viewers completed cards and dropped them in the evaluation box.
The results were similar to what we found in the play. Seven people had per-
sonal or professional experience with ADRD, eight did not, and two did not an-
swer this question. All seventeen respondents showed a positive change in their
perception of the creative ability of people with ADRD. But the small number
makes it difficult to generalize the results or to compare them with the results of
the play evaluation cards.
Conclusion
Creative storytelling supplies a social role, one with value, that allows for the
integration of past and present, and that acknowledges the strengths and poten-
tial of the present lives of people with Alzheimer’s disease and related demen-
tia. It offers storytellers an avenue for self-expression that frees them from the
demands of memory and rational language, which they can no longer master.
Creative storytelling can reorient the expectations of professional caregivers so
that they are able to recognize new and untapped strengths of their clients, in-
cluding the capacity for humor, creative imagination, and social skills. It offers
staff an enjoyable activity that can also help them develop their creative poten-
tial. It offers student volunteers an opportunity to separate their fear of
Alzheimer’s disease and aging from the people with whom they associate these
features and can be a first step toward encouraging young people to consider
working or volunteering with the elderly. Where broken communication skills
fracture relationships with family caregivers and their extended families, cre-
ative storytelling can provide a way for individuals to forge new relationships
through poetic and openly symbolic expression.
Perhaps because most people assume that people with Alzheimer’s disease
have no meaningful present, caregivers tend to encourage them to remember
the past and underestimate their remaining strengths. While I believe that
reminiscence work can be very effective and fulfilling for people wrestling with
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the early stages of ADRD, it can lead to frustration and even shame among
people in the middle stages, people whose ability to have access to and control
language and memory can be severely impaired. For us as caregivers, shifting
our focus from memory to creativity can open up channels of communication
with people with ADRD and offer both client and caregiver the potential for
growth. Sharing the creative products of people with dementia in a respectful
way can be very effective in raising public awareness about the creative capacity
of people who suffer from the condition. This two-pronged approach, both
changing the mindset and actions of caregivers and assuaging the public fear of
people who suffer from ADRD, is a step toward the cultural change for which
gerontologists so urgently call.
NOTES
This chapter is based on Ann Basting, “Exploring the Creative Potential of People with
Dementia: Dare to Imagine,” in Mental Wellness in Aging: Strengths-Based Approaches,
ed. J. L. Ronch and J. A. Goldfield (Baltimore: Health Professions Press, ).
The research phase of the TimeSlips Project received support from the Helen Bader
Foundation, Incorporated; the Fan Fox and Leslie Samuels Foundation; the Isaac H.
Tuttle Fund; the Brookdale Foundation; the Extendicare Foundation; Blue Cross and
Blue Shield; the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee; and the Brookdale Center on
Aging/Hunter College.
. Because some clients at the adult day facilities were not diagnosed with Alzheimer’s,
staff selected clients whose symptoms were consistent with that diagnoses. All par-
ticipants experienced memory loss and confusion to such an extent that they could
no longer function on their own. Some had very little language left at all. We did not
rely on the Mini Mental State Exam (MMSE), as we found that even those who could
not take the exam could participate in the storytelling process.
. Interviews with family caregivers were open-structure telephone interviews, held in
the first three weeks of the project and again at the end of the storytelling sessions.
We also produced a series of arts events inspired by the creative stories, and we inter-
viewed families again after they had attended the arts events.
. The average age of audience members was forty-two. Fifty-eight percent had experi-
ence with dementia, either personal or professional, and  percent of audience









Alzheimer’s disease is regarded as the most bewildering and frightening con-
dition facing the aging population in the twenty-first century (Schroeder et al.
) and represents a much feared stigmatizing label that carries with it the
force of a sentence of social death (Robertson ). As Herskovitz notes, senility
is characterized as “monstrosity” by the lay media with “clichéd metaphors and
representations in which Alzheimer’s is characteristically drawn in colourfully
dramatic terms that paint vividly disturbing images” (, –). Alz-
heimer’s is described as a living death, a never ending funeral, and a private hell
of devastation.
The source of the fear is found in much of the Alzheimer’s literature in
which individuals with dementia are said to experience a steady erosion of
selfhood as a consequence of the cognitive deficiencies that lie at the core of the
illness (Cohen and Eisdorfer ; Mills and Walker ). As Fontana and Smith
state, with advancing Alzheimer’s, what is actually happening is that the self is
becoming “increasingly devoid of content” (, ). It is, they say, “unbecom-
ing a self.” Others echo these sentiments by describing Alzheimer’s as a disease
that “eradicates the essence of the person” (Dalziel , ), as a process of
“drifting towards the threshold of unbeing” (Kitwood and Bredin , ).
Thus, while Alzheimer’s is usually described and analyzed in terms of the cogni-
tive dysfunction it produces, there is, as well, a presumed existential outcome:
the loss of self with the concomitant erosion of individual agency (Davis ;
Herskovitz ; Ronch ).
This presumed loss of selfhood is itself a product of the Western assump-
tion that status as a full human being is completely dependent upon cognition
and memory, both of which become impaired with advancing Alzheimer’s:
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“Alzheimer’s disease represents the loss of all those qualities by which we have
come to define our humanness” (Robertson , ). This representation of
personhood is itself the legacy of Western philosophy’s tendency to split mind
from body and to position the former as superior to the latter. In contrast to the
Cartesian mind/body dualism, in which human meaning and selfhood are at-
tributed to the mind, I propose to integrate Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ()
radical philosophical reconceptualization of perception and Pierre Bourdieu’s
(, ) sociological exploration of the logic of practice, yielding a theoreti-
cal framework that captures the existential immediacy of the body as well as its
interrelationship with culture and history (Kontos ).
The central aim of this chapter is to explore how this proposed theoretical
framework that advocates the irreducibly embodied nature of agency brings a
new and critical dimension to the challenge of the presumed loss of personhood
in Alzheimer’s and, more broadly, to the Western representation of personhood
that hinges on cognition and memory. To do so, I will analyze, from the perspec-
tive of embodiment that I advocate here, findings drawn from an ethnographic
study of an Alzheimer’s support unit of a Canadian home for the aged.
The Setting
Chai Village is an Orthodox Jewish facility that provides long-term care for 
residents; the majority suffer from Alzheimer’s dementia and a small minority
have vascular dementia.1 Approximately eighty residents reside on each floor,
the majority of whom are women ( percent), with the average age of all resi-
dents being eighty-eight years.
The present study was conducted on one of the floors that provide support
for residents suffering from Alzheimer’s dementia. Of the seventy-nine resi-
dents on the floor, thirteen participated in the study, three men and ten
women, all of whom are Jewish and of Eastern European descent and whose
cognitive impairment ranges from moderate to severe ( percent were severely
cognitively impaired).2 Because of cognitive impairment, informed consent to
participate was provided by proxy. Participant observation took place over the
course of eight months, approximately eight hours a day, three days a week,
during scheduled program activities and mealtimes and when participants en-
gaged in unscheduled activities such as walking or sitting in the hallways.
The focus of my analysis will be a series of occurrences I observed at Chai
Village that are presented here in the form of vignettes in order to fully
contextualize the events described. Also, where appropriate, I will draw upon
other instances from my ethnographic data as well as characteristics of indi-




There is among most female residents the desire to retain a sense of feminine
beauty. There is a constant concern with self-presentation such as when Anna
insists on putting on lipstick before going to social programs or when Frances
places her hand on her chest, preventing her blouse from touching her food as
she leans over her plate.3 The following scene vividly captures Molly’s attention
to social grace and neatness. It is her frailty and inability to feed herself that
makes Molly’s attention to appearance all the more significant.
String of Pearls
Molly’s wheelchair seemed enormous in contrast with her thin, wizened body.
Her legs had severely atrophied, giving the impression of two-dimensional
forms. Were she able to stand, she would be no more than five feet tall. Her face
was heavily wrinkled but the skin was soft, resembling that of a peach. Her hair
was uniformly white, accentuating her China blue eyes. The backs of her hands
were the most vivid testament to the near century she had lived. The skin was
thin, revealing a network of bones and purple veins. Her hands shook as if pow-
ered by an invisible gentle motor.
Despite her withered appearance, there was an indescribable elegance to
Molly. I noticed this in watching her as she was brought to the dining room.
Once her wheelchair was positioned at the table, a bib was fastened around her
neck. Molly then carefully unfolded her napkin and placed it on her lap. Even
though the use of the bib made the need for a napkin redundant, she nonethe-
less insisted on observing this table etiquette.
As a health care aide was feeding her, cereal dribbled from Molly’s mouth
and coursed down her chin. When the aide tried to give her another spoonful,
Molly wrinkled her forehead and gently pushed the woman’s hand away. Molly
then lifted her bib to her mouth to wipe away the cereal. It was only after her
chin was clean that she accepted another spoonful. One might expect indiffer-
ence from a woman who had lost the ability to feed herself, yet Molly’s insis-
tence on adhering to the social graces and her attention to neatness suggested a
strong and continuing presence in the world.
She closed her eyes slowly and opened them again, releasing a deep sigh.
She then looked around the table as if for the first time noticing that there were
others seated with her. She patiently waited to make eye contact with each per-
son to acknowledge his or her presence. Then reaching her wavering hand to
the back of her neck, she struggled to pull something from underneath her bib.
Extending her arm appeared to cause her pain and discomfort, yet she per-
sisted. She eventually revealed a string of pearls that she was wearing and that
had been covered by her bib. She allowed the pearls to pass through her long,
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slender, perfectly manicured fingers, placing the necklace ever so delicately
atop her bib. With this simple gesture, Molly emerged from her world of de-
crepitude, incontinence, dementia, and helplessness.
Creativity and Self-Expression
There is a rich diversity of social activities at Chai Village. Among the regular
weekly events is the creative arts program, a popular activity among the resi-
dents that offers ceramics, silk-scarf painting, drawing, knitting, crocheting,
needlepoint, and beading. The following vignette describes Ethel’s ability to sew
in the absence of any cognitive awareness of her ability to do so.
Knowing Hands
Sitting next to Edna, I admired the pink sweater she was wearing. She looked
radiant. As I complimented her on the sweater, she looked down at it, perhaps
to remind herself of what she was wearing, and announced, “I make all my
sweaters.” When she looked up at me she exuded a great sense of pride as she
smiled and lifted her chest in confidence. Ethel, who was sitting across from us,
was listening to our conversation. Eager to include her, I asked if she still did
needlepoint. Ethel had numerous colorful canvases decorating the walls of her
room, all created by her own hand. Leaning forward in her chair, she asked in a
high-pitched voice, “What? I did that before?” Her frown and downcast eyes sig-
naled her confusion. Edna looked at Ethel in utter disbelief and said, “You don’t
remember if you worked with your hands?” She wildly gestured as though she
were weaving. Sinking back into her chair, Ethel shook her head and with a hint
of melancholy said, “I don’t remember.” She then fell into an embarrassed si-
lence and lowered her head.
Several days later I accompanied Ethel to the creative arts program, as she
was on a list of residents who participated in this activity. Mrs. Anderson (the
coordinator of the program) greeted Ethel with familiarity, confirming that
Ethel had in fact participated there before. She showed Ethel to the table and
brought her a canvas that had already been stitched with several rows of yarn.
Attached to the top of the canvas was a piece of masking tape with Ethel’s name
written on it. Ethel looked at Mrs. Anderson with concern and said, “I don’t
know how.” In a kind, understanding voice, Mrs. Anderson reassured Ethel by
saying, “You don’t have to know, but we like you to try.” In great distress, hold-
ing her hands out with her palms facing upward, Ethel replied, “I cannot.” As if
it were part of their routine exchange, Mrs. Anderson began stitching a row, to
demonstrate how it was done. Ethel watched as though she were observing
something foreign. Before reaching the end of the row, Mrs. Anderson encour-
aged Ethel to take the needle and continue. Then, as if the needle placed be-
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tween her fingers had triggered a forgotten ability, Ethel began to stitch. Mrs.
Anderson seemed pleased and moved on to assist another resident.
I stood and watched Ethel with amazement. Holding the canvas in one
hand, she passed the needle through with the other and in two swift movements
the stitch was completed and she began the sequence once again. The rhythm
with which she was weaving demonstrated a proficiency that was in striking
contrast to her previous proclaimed inability. She very quickly completed the
row and, without hesitation, took a fresh piece of yarn in her hand, licked one
end, and, pinching it between her thumb and index finger, attempted to thread
the needle. The yarn splintered and she was unable to push it through. She
licked it once again, and pinching the end several times, she succeeded in pass-
ing it through the eye of the needle. She looked up at once, and as our eyes met,
she raised the threaded needle in triumph.
Ritual and Ceremony
As noted earlier, all the residents of Chai Village are Jewish, and Jewishness is a
vital, integral part of their daily life. There are two rabbis on staff at the facility,
daily synagogue services are offered on site, a centerwide kosher food policy is
in place, and there are Sabbath and other holiday observances. The following
scenes capture the enactment of different ancient, well-known ritual gestures
related to the holidays of Simchat Torah and Hanukkah. Each ritual involves
certain symbols that pertain to the Jewish home and family, as well as customs
that are physically enacted, and are thus profoundly corporeal experiences.
Prayer
Simchat Torah is one of the most widely celebrated rituals in the Jewish faith. It
is the day of celebration for the gift of Torah, the five books of Moses, whose
wisdom enables the Jewish people to know how to live close to God. The Torah
scrolls are the holiest of objects and are carefully stored in a curtained altar.
Each scroll is handwritten in Hebrew on parchment and then rolled onto two
poles that are topped with silver handles. Every Saturday, the appropriate scroll,
as determined by the Hebrew calendar, is brought out during the service and
unrolled so that a portion of it can be read aloud. The reading of the Torah is
seamless; once completely read, it is immediately reread. The rituals of Simchat
Torah revolve around a continuous cycle of Torah readings.
On Simchat Torah the synagogue at Chai Village rang out powerfully in
hymn. The service leader circled the bimah (the central platform from which the
Torah is read) while holding the Torah and reciting a short prayer responsively
with the congregation. Following Orthodox custom, women prayed in a gallery
to the side of the main body of the synagogue, where the men prayed. All had
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covered their heads in one way or another—the women with hats, scarves, and
even a small swatch of fabric; the men with yarmulkes (skullcaps) that were
made of paper, cloth, or beads. The men also covered their shoulders with a
tallis (fringed blue-and-white prayer shawls). My attention was drawn to the
center of the synagogue, where the men prayed with intensity and passion.
Among the participants stood Jacob.
Jacob would often chastise residents who, because of their dementia, would
create disruption. Ironically, his own advanced demented state had limited his
verbal expression to the use of single words. Jacob would frequently call other
residents names in Yiddish such as meshugener (crazy person), am-ha-aretz (ig-
norant individuals who are noisy and continually creating disturbances), kvetch
(a person who always complains), and fressers (people who eat like animals).
Although these words would be shouted in single utterances, all are powerful
summary interpretations of his perception of the behavior of the targeted indi-
viduals. When he was not using single words, Jacob’s speech was incoherent,
which enraged him. So intense were his outbreaks of rage under those circum-
stances that staff would have to escort him out of the room.
Jacob moved his lips with the chants of the leader of the service. I watched
as he swayed deeply, stepping forward and back, bowing and striking his chest
with clenched fists, as is commonly done in Jewish prayer. He was energetic and
forceful. Suddenly there was a disturbance in the women’s gallery that silenced
the congregation. A woman in a wheelchair had mistakenly taken the place of a
woman who had just returned from the washroom. The leader of the service
paused, and all the congregants shifted uneasily in their seats as the woman
shouted that she wanted her place back. Jacob turned to face the woman in the
wheelchair—her body twisted and crimped from the effects of a stroke—and in a
string of incoherent speech, he yelled at her, shaking his index finger. He was
visibly agitated; his body shook with anger. A porter quickly moved to resolve
the conflict in the women’s gallery and a health-care aide approached Jacob to
escort him out of the synagogue. His uncontrollable rage left little choice. How-
ever, just as the aide approached Jacob, the leader resumed the service, belting
out a prayer. Jacob’s response was immediate. His rage was instantly quashed.
He fell into a reverent silence, closed his eyes, and resumed his fervent bodily
movement of prayer.
Jacob was once again focused on the service. The leader held a Torah scroll
and circled the interior of the synagogue, followed by honored members of the
congregation, who also held the scrolls. It is customary for synagogue members
to reach out and touch the passing scrolls, raising their fingertips to their lips in
a kiss, displaying respect for the Torah. Jacob joined in the celebration with this
gesture of respect for the sacredness of the Torah. After the procession of Torah
bearers circled the synagogue, the leader broke out in joyous song and all the
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congregation joined in singing and dancing. In the center of the synagogue the
men formed a circle and danced around those who held a Torah scroll. The
women formed a circle of their own in their separate gallery and similarly lost
themselves in ecstatic fervor. Jacob hesitated for a moment, looking around the
room smiling shyly, as if embarrassed about expressing enthusiastic joy in pub-
lic. But he had little more than slight hesitation in regard to the Torah, twisting
his shoulders and hips and snapping his fingers in the air. Despite his initial
hesitation, he knew from previous experience that it was appropriate, that his
movements and gestures suited the occasion.
It is Orthodox custom for the men to be honored with an aliyah (the act of
being called up to the bimah), in order to say the blessing following the reading
of the Torah on Simchat Torah. When the dancing quieted, each male
congregant was called up to the bimah to say the broche (blessing). When Jacob
was called forward, he moved firmly and with upright posture to the platform.
Without any prompting, he leaned his body over the Torah and recited the
prayer with absolute coherence and precise pronunciation. The visiting wife of
another resident was seated next to me and, clearly familiar with Jacob’s de-
mentia, said, “You can forget everything but you never forget the broche over the
Torah.” Jacob was unable to put a sentence together, but standing before the
Torah he was in full command.
The Way Through
Hanukkah, an eight-day Jewish holiday, is celebrated in remembrance of the
rededication of the Temple of Jerusalem after its defilement by Antiochus of
Syria. This holiday is marked by the lighting of the menorah, a candelabra con-
taining nine separate candles. The lighting of the menorah commemorates the
miracle of Hanukkah, namely, that following the destruction of the Temple of
Jerusalem, the cruse of oil that was found in the ruins of the temple and thought
to contain only enough oil to burn for one day, in fact burned for eight. On each
day of Hanukkah, after sundown, the middle candle is used to light another
candle, representing the day of the holiday that has passed. This continues until
the eighth day, when all candles on the menorah are lit.
The eighth day of Hanukkah is considered to have special significance as
the culmination of the holiday, the day when the menorah burns most brightly.
It was on this day that a concert and party were arranged for the residents of
Chai Village. The planned festivities attracted more residents than the number
that the social programs normally brought in. That the day was set apart was
clear from the residents’ appearance: the women held purses that were per-
fectly preserved from earlier decades and wore their best dresses and jewelry.
Gold necklaces and bracelets studded with diamonds and pearls were worn in
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place of the usual beaded jewelry that had been made in the creative arts pro-
gram. Scarves and colorful hats brightened the women’s faces. Men wore tidy
suits over frayed but neatly pressed shirts.
The concert began with piano music and a strong alto that filled the room
with Yiddish song. As I stood listening and watching, I noticed Dora. Her eighty-
five years had been kind to her face, leaving a smooth and creamy complexion.
Her lips were full and pink, and her eyes unclouded by cataracts or glaucoma.
The backs of her hands were blotched with brown spots and her fingers crimped
by arthritis. Even Dora, within her limited financial resources, rose to the occa-
sion by wearing a faded floral polyester dress with an old green heavy-knit
cardigan-sweater set that matched. Her feet, resting on the pedals of her wheel-
chair, looked painful as her calluses and bunions protruded from her plastic
sandals.
Somehow, while sitting in her wheelchair, Dora was dancing. She created a
sense of fluidity and abandon, moving her arms above her head elegantly and
delicately wiggling her fingers while slowly lowering her hands to each side of
her wheelchair. Dramatically tossing her head back, she extended her arms
above her head as though performing an arabesque. So choreographed were her
movements that I wondered if she was reenacting a performance from another
time. When the song finished, applause erupted in appreciation of the singer
and pianist, and Dora moved her upper body forward in her chair as if to take a
bow for her own performance.
Jelly doughnuts, brought out by staff and volunteers, were served to the
residents on plastic plates with a napkin. Dora ate her doughnut as she contin-
ued to listen to the music. Licking the jelly from her fingers, she moved her head
from side to side. With her hands busy with the doughnut, she struggled to
stretch her legs out in front of her. Her swollen feet looked almost delicate as
she gently brought her toes and then her heels together, alternating these
movements to the rhythm of the music.
Following the concert, there was to be a ceremonial lighting of the
menorah. As it was the eighth day of Hanukkah, all eight candles would be lit.
Mrs. Allen, the program coordinator, invited a resident from the audience up to
the menorah, located at the front of the room on a small table that had been
carefully covered with a white cloth. Mrs. Allen lit the candles and the resident
recited the appropriate blessing while bowing her body forward over the small
flames. Although Dora watched with intense interest from across the room, it
was difficult to determine how much of the ritual she was able to see. The light-
ing of the menorah marked the end of the program, at which point the staff and
volunteers began the task of taking the residents back to their rooms.
A health-care aide approached Dora, released the brakes of Dora’s wheel-
chair, and announced, “It’s time to go.” Dora immediately clutched the woman’s
arm and shook her head vehemently, indicating that she did not want to go.
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Dora’s insistence on staying was inexplicable amid everyone’s eagerness to re-
turn to their rooms. The aide did not have time to question Dora’s resistance,
for she was distracted by another resident who had considerable difficulty in
walking and required immediate support. I watched Dora as she struggled to
make a path for herself through the crowd, manually navigating her wheelchair
around walking aides, other moving bodies, and chairs. Following a slow and
laborious process, she finally reached her destination, the table where the
menorah stood in glorious full flame.
Dora unfolded the napkin she had used when eating her jelly doughnut
and, ensuring that the jelly side was facing upward and not touching her hair,
she placed it with utmost care atop her head. She then held her palms up to the
menorah, embracing the warmth of the candles. I was close to her but she did
not see me. She then raised her hands to her face, covering her eyes, and prayed
privately. Dora had seemingly slipped into another time, subsumed by an inner
experience that was strangely sheltered from the ongoing commotion in the
room. Tears streamed through her fingers. When she removed her hands she
looked up at me and smiled with a transformed visage. I saw in her face a deep
pleasure, and I smiled at her. Dora removed the napkin that had served as her
head covering and smoothed her soft white hair. The aide who earlier had tried
to take Dora to her room returned for her. This time Dora did not resist. Dora’s
hands were gently clasped in her lap and her face was peaceful as she left the
room.
Discussion
The ethnographic data here clearly demonstrates that the residents of Chai Vil-
lage exhibited selfhood in the face of even severe cognitive impairment. It is a notion
of selfhood that speaks of a complex interrelationship between the primordial
and the social characteristics of the body, all of which reside below the threshold
of cognition, grounded in the prereflexive level of experience, existing primarily
in the corporeal. My discussion in this chapter will suggest that selfhood resists
the ravages of Alzheimer’s disease precisely because it resides in corporeality.
I turn now to Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of motility as basic intentionality in
order to begin to understand the role that the body plays, at the most funda-
mental level, in selfhood, as expressed by the residents of Chai Village.
The Primordial Sources of Selfhood
Merleau-Ponty argues that embodied consciousness, which he refers to inter-
changeably as “embodied significance” or “nonrepresentational” and as “basic
intentionality,” is a fundamental level of existence that does not involve a cog-
nitive form of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty’s basic intentionality is the body’s
concrete, spatial, and prereflective directedness toward the lived world. The
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prereflective moving body is in and of itself intentional by virtue of being natu-
rally invested with a certain perceptual significance, a bodily know-how or prac-
tical sense. He argues that the body in movement is not limited to submitting
passively to space and time, for the body actively and intentionally takes them
up in their elemental significance. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, “[A] system of pos-
sible movements radiates from us to our environment” (, ), giving us at
every moment a practical and implicit hold on our body, a hold that situates us
as subjects perceptually, linguistically, and through motor activity. I understand
selfhood as inhering in what Merleau-Ponty describes as corporeal and
nonreflexive intentionality, and as such, it is my claim that selfhood must be
understood as being enacted in the actual movements of the body.
Within this “system of possible movements,” the body possesses, according
to Merleau-Ponty, a coordinating power in relation to itself, what he refers to as
the primary perceptual level, which is prior to any explicit act of intellection on
our part. He cites the following example to illustrate the prereflective nature of
the coordination of visual, tactile, and motor aspects of our body: When bitten
by a mosquito, we do not need to look for the part of the body where we have
been bitten. We find it straight away by reaching for the itchy spot on our phe-
nomenal body. For us there is no question of locating it in relation to axes of
coordinates in objective space. In the natural system of our own body, we expe-
rience a direct relationship between our hand as an instrument of scratching
potentiality and the part of our body that has been bitten as a spot to be
scratched. The whole operation takes place, according to Merleau-Ponty, in the
domain of the phenomenal (, –).
Similarly, it can be seen in the example of Ethel’s stitching, in that when the
needle and thread were placed between her thumb and finger, she did not need
to look for her hands or her fingers when she began to sew, because they are not
objects to be discovered in objective space. The task to be performed, the stitch-
ing, immediately elicited the necessary movements from Ethel as she took hold
of the objects, assimilating their structure into her body, without any calcula-
tion on her part. Ethel’s example makes apparent the spontaneous method of
perception, what Merleau-Ponty describes as a kind of living system of mean-
ings, which makes the concrete essence of the object immediately recognizable.
As soon as Ethel took hold of the needle and thread, these objects meant some-
thing, without the meaning having to be established through cognition. In
other words, there was an immediate familiarity with, and an effortless use of,
the needle and thread.
Ethel was able to sew without any cognitive awareness of her ability to do
so. The disjunction between cognitive impairment and the coherent expression
of talent or skill draws attention to Merleau-Ponty’s example of one who knows
how to type without having to think out the location of each letter on the keyboard
(, ). Even more than this, though the typist does not know where the keys
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are in a reflective sense, he or she—to make any attempt to provide a reflective and
discursive account of the keyboard layout—would have to imagine typing in or-
der to see the direction in which his or her fingers moved to hit the appropriate
keys. Knowledge of typing, Merleau-Ponty argues, is in the hands and manifests
itself only when bodily effort is made and cannot be articulated in detachment
from that effort.
Merleau-Ponty does not intend for knowledge to be understood in an intel-
lectualist fashion in cases in which it would be associated with the supposedly
self-transparent activities of a reflexive subject. Indeed, the kind of knowledge
of the keyboard that the typist has is a practical, embodied knowledge, quite
remote and distinct from discursive knowledge. Knowledge, as Merleau-Ponty
understands it here, is the capacity for acting, the know-how belonging to a
subject whose primary relation to the environment is that of prereflective, ac-
tive, and practical involvement. He speaks of how the perception of our body
functions as a logic lived through that does not rely upon reflective-discursive
thought, and thus the meaning of that which is perceived becomes fully eluci-
dated only through bodily movement (, ). In the absence of practical
involvement, stitching did not register any significance for Ethel, as evidenced
by her protest of “I don’t know how.” Ethel’s knowledge of sewing was forthcom-
ing only when she herself took hold of the needle, thus highlighting precisely
the distinction that Merleau-Ponty draws between intellectual and practical
significance. The relevance of practical significance, which for my discussion
of selfhood has the same meaning as nonrepresentational intentionality, is
that this primordial level provides the foundational structure for selfhood.
In this sense, Ethel’s stitching renders visible how selfhood resides in, and
is manifested through, the ways of the body. Conceptualized in this way, self-
hood is supported by and emanates from the existential expressiveness of the
body.
However, there is an obvious difference between the example of Ethel’s
stitching and Merleau-Ponty’s example of the typist. The typist, though unable
to describe the layout of the keyboard, is fully aware of his or her ability to type.
Ethel, however, claims to be unable to sew, demonstrating a lack of cognitive
awareness of an ability that she in fact possesses. Despite this difference, the
relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s example of typing to my analysis of Ethel’s sewing
is that in both instances, bodily movements are not dependent upon cognition
in order for the necessary tasks to be performed, but rather rely upon what
Merleau-Ponty refers to as motor intentionality. Ethel’s ability to sew is guaran-
teed by her body itself as a “motor power,” a “motor project” (, ), in the
absence of which the instruction to sew, as given to Ethel by the coordinator of
the creative arts program, would remain unfulfilled. This is to say that Ethel’s
ability to sew is completely dependent upon her having incorporated the mean-
ing of the needle and thread and the rhythm of stitching into her bodily
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schema, just as the typist incorporates the keyboard space into his or her bodily
schema.
Embodied selfhood can be further explored through additional examples of
basic bodily movement. In Chai Village, when Molly reached behind her neck to
pull her pearls from beneath her bib, she “knew” where her hand was and how
far and at what angle she had to reach to grasp the pearls. Similarly, when Dora
performed her seemingly choreographed dance at the Hanukkah party, she, like
Molly, desired a certain outcome of her actions, and the necessary tasks were
spontaneously distributed in the appropriate parts of her body. Their move-
ments were perfectly suited to the exigencies of the circumstances without
Dora’s having to think of how to make them or to articulate reflectively the
principles upon which their actions were based. Neither Molly nor Dora
launched their bodies into blind attempts to perform an action; every move-
ment was inextricably movement and embodied selfhood. That is, selfhood can
be observed in movement where movement itself attests to the hold the resi-
dents have on the general synthesis of their bodies, a hold that emanates from
the primordial unity of the body.
The Primordial Depths of Sociability
Chai Village residents are not operating in their own private worlds. On the
contrary, they are participants in a common world and communicate with one
another. In performing social interactions, in order that we understand the
words of another person, a vocabulary and syntax must be previously known.
Merleau-Ponty argues, however, that words do not do their work by arousing
representations associated with them (, ). Language certainly has an in-
ner content, but the meaning of words is not contained in the words themselves
such that their intelligibility is finitely self-subsistent, but rather emerges in the
flow of intercourse. As Merleau-Ponty argues, it is in the context of interaction
that words assume their conceptual meaning, grasped by a kind of deduction
from gestural communication (). Thus, even with language, Merleau-Ponty
detects certain existentialist tendencies, underscoring the primacy of embodi-
ment in speech itself.
Merleau-Ponty’s intention is to restore to the act of speaking its corporeal-
ity through an analysis of the embodiment of speech in the lifeworld. Merleau-
Ponty’s argument that speech is a gestural system is perhaps most apparent
where no linguistic meaning at all is conveyed by speech itself. This is so be-
cause in such instances we are still able to communicate with one another by
virtue of the expressive dimensions of the gesticulating body, which are funda-
mental to communication in human interaction. The following exchange be-
tween Anna and Abe is noteworthy.
Abe sat down in the dining room and shouted, “Bupalupah.” Anna twisted
around in her chair so that she could see Abe (his table was behind hers). Abe’s
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face opened up. His eyes grew wider, his mouth eased into a broad smile, and he
shouted, “BRRRRRRR!” with a rising and then falling pitch. Anna imitated him,
shouting back, “BRRRRRRR!” following the same change in pitch. Abe then
shouted, “Bah!” and paused while looking at Anna. Anna shouted, “Shah!” and
then waited for Abe’s response. Abe shouted, “Bah!” and Anna, “Shah!” as they
established a repetitious pattern of exchange. Anna eventually turned back
around in her chair, with her back to Abe. Abe shouted, “Bupalupah!” as if want-
ing to initiate another exchange with Anna, but instead of responding verbally,
she raised one arm above her head and lowered it in a swift motion with a sharp
flick of her wrist. With this gesture, she terminated their interaction, and they
both began to eat their breakfast quietly.
Even when speech is incoherent and void of linguistic meaning, in face-to-
face interaction there is a smooth and appropriate alternating pattern of vocal-
izing, as well as gesticulating, back and forth. With the utterance of only “Bah,”
“Shah,” “BRRRRRR!” and “Bupalupah,” Abe and Anna were able to communicate
without any recourse to intellectual interpretation. There was a fittingness and
a meaningful relationship between the rise and fall of their pitch, their pauses,
and their postural shifts. Their gestures had a melodic flow and fluent form,
rather than appearing as a composite of bodily movements strung together in a
mechanical way. What this example illustrates is Merleau-Ponty’s argument
that communication dwells in corporeality or, more specifically, in the body’s
capacity to gesture (, ). Because of the fact of speech impairment, the force
of their speech acts derived not from semantic content but rather from the
meanings that their bodies directly indexed. Communication, Merleau-Ponty
argues, is a continuation of the corporeal schema. As such, it is my claim that
selfhood persists in and through the body’s power of natural expression, that is,
the body’s inherent ability to apprehend and convey meaning.
Limitations of Merleau-Ponty’s Perspective
We saw with Merleau-Ponty that the body naturally lends itself to movement
and gesture because of the body’s primordial essence, which functions as a form
of generality, giving embodied consciousness an impersonal quality. However,
there is a certain style or content to bodily movements and gestures, the source
of which cannot be attributed solely to a primary level of signification.
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is pertinent here because unlike the generality
of the primordial, Bourdieu addresses the sociocultural sources of bodily
practices.
Habitus consists in dispositions, schemata, forms of know-how and compe-
tence, all of which function below the threshold of consciousness, enacted at a
prereflective level. As Bourdieu states, “The schemes of the habitus, the primary
forms of classification, owe their specific efficacy to the fact that they function
below the level of consciousness and language, beyond the reach of introspective
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scrutiny or control by the will” (, ). Wacquant (), perhaps Bour-
dieu’s best commentator, has noted that Bourdieu is clearly drawing on
Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the body as the source of practical intentionality and of
intersubjective meaning grounded in the preobjective level of experience. The
body is treated as having a “generative, creative capacity to understand”
(Wacquant , )—a kind of corporeal awareness—a practical reason, with
reason existing primarily in corporeal ways. However, with the concept of habi-
tus, Bourdieu takes us beyond the elements of essentialism and the subjectivist
grasp of practical sense in order to investigate practice in the context of the
social genesis of its conditions of operation. Thus, Bourdieu’s exploration of
competence, know-how, skill, and disposition moves him into the sociocultural
horizon in which, according to Bourdieu, bodies assume their embodied signifi-
cance.
It is my argument that selfhood, in addition to having a primordial source,
consists in the dispositions and generative schemes of habitus and thus, in the
same way that dispositions are embodied and materialize in practice, selfhood
is embodied and manifested in a socioculturally specific way of being in the
world. I will continue to explore communication in the following section but
with a shift in focus to the sociocultural sources of selfhood.
Communication in Sociocultural Context
Bourdieu’s argument that cumulative exposure to certain social conditions in-
stills in individuals an ensemble of durable and transposable dispositions is
evident when we consider that Chai Village residents have a habitual state, “a
tendency, propensity, or inclination” (Bourdieu , n), to gesture in a par-
ticular manner. Voice, facial expressions, and body movements were distinctive
and predominant manifestations of selfhood in communication among my par-
ticipants. When the residents of Chai Village interacted with one another, so
identifiably Jewish were their intonation patterns and nonverbal forms of com-
munication that a person of Jewish heritage did not need to know that Chai
Village is a Jewish facility to recognize instantly that the residents were Jewish.
Following Bourdieu, we could say that their Jewishness is actually embodied in
their arms, hands, feet, and head underscoring the essence of habitus, which is
the embodiment of culture-specific conditions of primary socialization.4 I
would add that selfhood resides in the embodiment of culture-specific condi-
tions of primary socialization, and thus, Jewishness is a manifestation of my
study participants’ selfhood. Typical Yiddish gestures include flinging one or
both hands in front of the body in a swift downward motion, with elbows close
to the body and turning head away slightly; holding hands with palms facing
outward, elbows kept within a very narrow area, close to the body, while turning
the head all the way to one side, lifting the opposite shoulder slightly. Efron
() has described the various aspects of such gestures and argues that East-
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ern European Jews who have maintained their Old World traits or mannerisms
have a propensity to accompany their speech with lively bodily motions, a pro-
pensity, Bourdieu would claim, that is determined by their cultural heredity.
In addition to gestural communication, discursive expressions equally re-
veal a dispositional character that emerges from the internalization of a socio-
cultural environment through the primary experiences of the body. For
example, the Yiddish language has an expressiveness that is manifested in the
rhythm of speech. There was a great deal of emotion in the highs and lows of my
participants’ voices. As the sounds went up and down in melodious directions
one could feel the words as much as hear them. One is not born with a culturally
distinct intonation pattern but acquires it “by the childhood learning that treats
the body as a living memory pad” (Bourdieu , ). The way my participants
spoke and used their bodies to express themselves are examples of cultural as-
pects of selfhood “given body, made body” (; emphasis in original).
Ritual and Ceremony
Jacob’s prayer at the bimah and Dora’s before the menorah were ethnic ritual
gestures that captured a sacred moment by bringing the past into the present.
However, I would argue that such rituals are not a matter of bringing into the
focus of consciousness a picture of the past. Reenacting rituals that were part of
one’s early childhood is not a matter of delving into the past through a cognitive
operation. Following the logic of the concept of habitus, these rituals under-
score the active presence of the past in the body itself. We could say that the rituals
are “embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as his-
tory” (Bourdieu , ). “Embodied history” here suggests that past experi-
ences persist in the body in the form of transposable dispositions that
collectively function as a matrix of perceptions and actions. They are embodied
in the sense that the memory of them is not confined to the brain but is actually
encoded in the muscles, nerves, and sinews of the body. Following the logic of
habitus, we could say that what propels such ritual practices are dispositions
inculcated by early pedagogy that is part of a child’s primary learning and con-
stantly reinforced through socialization in a Jewish home. Thus having knowl-
edge of the broche and the meaning of the menorah is akin to having acquired
the mother tongue, in that the subject is unaware of the associated learning and
is thus ignorant of all that is tacitly granted through socialization. In this re-
spect, Jacob and Dora did not embark upon the practice of ritual as a conscious
act, for they were born into the practice.
The emotion that is commonly expressed by Eastern European Jews in ges-
ture and speech is similarly expressed in prayer through bodily movement and
melody. In the Jewish faith, gestures, movements, and melody are essential in-
gredients in the life of prayer, enabling worshippers to put the whole of them-
selves into the act of worship (Jacobs ; Rosenberg ). On Simchat Torah,
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as Jacob prayed, he swayed deeply, stepping forward and back, bowing and
striking his chest with clenched fists, his movements reflecting an intense and
vital bodily force that is common in Jewish prayer. As he rejoiced with the Torah
in dance he was highly enthusiastic, passionate, and emotional.
Following Bourdieu’s thought, Jacob’s movements are “learned” by the
body, but it is not a kind of knowledge that one has; rather, it is “something that
one is” (, ; emphasis added). This means that what the body learns is
never detached from the body; it is prereflective and thus can be activated only
by its being evoked in practice. To be even more precise, it is a “practical reacti-
vation” () whereby the knowledge that the body reproduces is not a memori-
zation of the past but rather an enactment of it. Bourdieu refers to this
knowledge as “practical sense” () that constitutes the world as meaningful by
spontaneously anticipating its immanent tendencies (Bourdieu and Wacquant
). As I have already argued, practical sense does not derive from rules, prin-
ciples, or calculations, or from a premeditated goal, which, for Jacob, would in
any case be excluded by the urgency or spontaneity of his actions. And in his
case, reflective thought and calculation would be further excluded by the fact of
his advanced dementia. Neither could Jacob’s movements be mistaken for pure
imitation, particularly if we consider that his precise and passionate recitation
of the blessing before the bimah was a solo performance.
There is an apparent contradiction between Jacob’s coherent performance
in the synagogue and the fact of his cognitive impairment, manifested in his
inability to speak coherently beyond monosyllabic utterances. This apparent
contradiction can be resolved if we approach Jacob’s ritual gesture as the appli-
cation of a practical logic, produced without any conscious intention by a struc-
tured, structuring body that functions as a generator of a symbolic act. His
prayer was not an intellectual effort of meditation and contemplation. Bourdieu
would say that it is practical sense that, for Jacob, brought an instant apprecia-
tion of the meaning of being before the bimah and enabled him to produce at
once the appropriate ritual gestures. That Jacob was in such command while
standing before the bimah attests to Bourdieu’s argument that schemes of per-
ception, appreciation, and action are not only acquired through practice, but
also implemented in a practical state in which objective structures match those of
which the schemes of habitus are a product. Bourdieu argues that habitus and
the way in which it shapes perceptions, motivation, and action dispose the sub-
ject to recognize and engage in particular practices, which in turn perpetuates
one’s system of dispositions (Bourdieu , –). We can therefore under-
stand Jacob’s actions as being the result of the reactivation of his system of dis-
positions through involvement in a practice of similarly structured practices.
The synagogue, its congregants, the presence of the rabbi, and the touch of the
Torah scrolls were aspects of an organized event that exercised the pertinent
incitement of the habitus. Jacob would not have succeeded in his performance
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at the bimah had there not been a concordance between the opportunity and
the disposition to grasp it.
As long as one ignores the notion of a “conductorless orchestration” (),
that is, habitus as a spontaneity without consciousness or will, one is left with
no other unifying principle than conscious coordination and, consequently, no
reasonable explanation for the coherent performance of ritual practices in the
face of severe cognitive impairment. On the basis of my argument that selfhood
resides in sociocultural bodily dispositions, we could say that selfhood is what
propels the reenactment of these ritual practices. To say that selfhood is the
generator of ritual practice is to stress the body’s prereflective capacity to ex-
press itself.
Selfhood: Coherence and Improvisation
We have seen in the discussion of the primordial source of selfhood that
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of bodily schema gives us a practical and inherent hold
on our body and its relation to things in the world. I have suggested that we
should think of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the perspectival unity of corporeal
schema as providing the foundational structure for selfhood, a structure that
itself consists in perception as embodied consciousness. Thus, fundamental to
the coherence of selfhood is the unique totality achieved through the synthesis
of movement and embodied perception, that is, through the body’s ability to
seize upon and transform the perceptible into something meaningful. The way
that my study participants unthinkingly carried and projected their bodies dis-
closed a coherence and unity in their directedness toward the world. It is this
unity that, at a fundamental level, allowed my participants to converse with the
world, in grasping external space, as well as in mutuality with others. Hence my
argument that bodily schema, the primordial unity of the body, is foundational
to the coherence of embodied selfhood.
However, embodied selfhood owes its coherence not only to the founda-
tional unity of the body, but also to the embodiment of culture-specific condi-
tions of primary socialization. This is apparent when we consider the ongoing
interactions of daily life at Chai Village, where there was coherence and consis-
tency in the residents’ mastery of their social world, in the ways that they em-
braced their daily routines and engaged in specific activities. The rhythm of
ongoing interactions of daily life at Chai Village owed its regularity and predict-
ability, its steadiness and persistence, to the objective structures that produced
the dispositions of the residents and that continued to inform their interaction
(Bourdieu , ). As a result of the internalization of external structures, the
residents of Chai Village were able to react to the demands of their environment
in a coherent and systematic manner.
We could say that selfhood is their practical sense operating at the pre-
objective level and endowing their world with meaning. For example, there was
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a particular logic to the meal experience, an observable coherent, consistent
intelligibility to my participants’ management of the demands of this social ac-
tivity. Such consistency, which is a precondition of the coordination of the meal
as a practice, presupposes on the part of the residents a mastery of a common
code that functions as a kind of self-regulating mechanism. Thus, there is an
immediate familiarization with, for example, the proper use of utensils, nap-
kins, salt and pepper, and butter and jam. Furthermore, when the residents sit
at the table they socialize with one another and, for the most part, respect table
etiquette while they eat their meal. In other words, there is a harmony between
practical sense and the socially objectified meaning of sitting at the dining-
room table that creates a consensus in the meaning of the practice (Bourdieu
, ). Their manner of interacting with one another at the table and the
competencies that they clearly embody are what Bourdieu refers to as “a harmo-
nization of the agents’ experiences” that results from the homogeneity of condi-
tions of existence. That is, their social history and culture are objectified in
habitus, which harmonizes practices without any deliberate pursuit of coher-
ence or conscious reference to a norm, and without any explicit coordination
(–). We know that there is no explicit coordination through cognition be-
cause, to continue with the example of a meal, there were no two lunches, din-
ners, or breakfasts that were identical in terms of the interactions that
transpired, thus militating against any notion of advanced orchestration or
mechanical repetition. This suggests that practices are regulated without being
the product of obedience to external rules because the taken-for-granted,
prereflexive nature of practices flows from embodied selfhood.
Mastery of a common code was evident not only where there was regularity
in social practice, but also when something happened that deviated from or
contradicted the common code, such as when a resident who failed to adhere to
proper etiquette was met with strong disapproval from others. For example,
Abe, one of my participants, belched loudly in the dining room and Anna held
her hands over her ears, yelling, “Tell the meshugener, stop it,” in an indication
that Abe’s behavior was offensive to her. Anna’s reaction can be interpreted as
a negative sanction because Abe’s behavior was too different from what she
expected and from that to which she had objectively adjusted. As Bourdieu ar-
gues, “[H]abitus tends to favour experiences likely to reinforce it . . . to protect
itself from crises and critical challenges by providing itself with a milieu to
which it is as pre-adapted as possible” (, ; emphasis in original). A similar
disjunction between habitus and objective conditions occurred when Molly fur-
rowed her brow and abruptly stopped eating when she saw Dody, who was sit-
ting directly in front of her, using the twisted corner of a napkin to clean her
nostrils. The behavior of Abe and Dody was deemed improper and intolerable,
attesting to the persistence of embodied selfhood. Put simply, behavior is nega-
tively sanctioned when it offends the sensibility of one’s selfhood.
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The disjunction between habitus and objective conditions that the preced-
ing examples reveal points to a central objective of Bourdieu’s work, which is to
show how cultural practices are markers underlying class distinctions. Since
habitus produces practices adjusted to the regularities of the conditions of ex-
istence, taste and etiquette, according to Bourdieu, are markers of social orien-
tation and thus provide a “sense of one’s place” (, ). For example, the
class distinctions between the residents of Chai Village, at the corporeal level, is
evident if we consider that Dora’s polyester dresses and plastic shoes would
never be confused with the elegant silk blouses, slacks, and low pumps favored
by Molly. Similarly, Anna’s oversized, tarnished Star of David is in marked con-
trast to the refined, pure white pearls that adorn Molly.
However, it is not jewelry and garments alone that distinguish residents
from one another; differences can also be gleaned through social etiquette and
physical manner. Edna is aggressive and boastful, characteristics that are in
marked contrast to Dody’s propriety and modesty and her general objections to
the indecorous, even brazen manner of Edna. There is an excessive swing of the
hips that comes from Edna’s heavy stride and even when seated there is a con-
stant movement of her hands and feet. In contrast, when Molly walks her steps
are delicate, and when she is seated, her legs are always crossed and her hands
clasped in her lap. Molly’s delicate manner is also apparent when she uses a
paper tissue, softly wiping the tip of her nose, whereas Edna, in contrast, blows
sharply and loudly, covering her entire nose and clenching it tightly with the
tissue. When eating, Goodie is prone to putting large portions of food into her
mouth at one time, using her hands as much as she does her utensils, and will
invariably drop food down her front. Molly delicately puts food between her lips
with reserve and restraint, always being careful not to get stains on herself.
All these propensities and movements of the body are socially qualified.
This is so because, according to Bourdieu, each habitus embodies both the ma-
terial conditions of existence of a class and the symbolic differentiations that
categorize and rank its relation to other classes. Individuals are then predis-
posed to make lifestyle choices characteristic of their class habitus (, ).
Molly’s refined clothing, jewelry, and table etiquette, in contrast to the aggres-
sive, brash behavior of Edna, clearly are reflective of her different social origin.
We see in the preceding examples a practical expression of class distinction,
and to this extent, there is a practical equivalence between the different divi-
sions of the social world and selfhood.
The class distinctions between the residents of Chai Village should not ob-
scure the fact that the totality of each participant’s manifestations of selfhood
discloses internal consistency and coherence such that all manifestations are
congruous with and representative of the particular social class of the indi-
vidual. This is apparent when we consider, for example, the connection be-
tween Molly’s wearing her pure white pearls; crossing her legs and clasping her
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hands in her lap when seated; delicately placing food between her lips with
reserve and restraint, always exercising care not to let food fall on herself; and
finally, politely using her tissue to wipe the tip of her nose. There is a similar
connection between Edna’s excessively swinging her hips while walking; aggres-
sively salting her food; loudly blowing her nose while covering her entire face
with a tissue; and wearing a pedestrian style of dress, demonstrated by her
loose-fitting sweaters and dated costume jewelry.
Coherence in the distinctiveness of embodied selfhood is not confined to
bodily expressions of social class. Distinctiveness is also evident when we con-
sider how spontaneity, and the ability of the residents of Chai Village to go with
the inspiration of the moment, produced diverse practices that were relatively
unpredictable, just as were their corresponding situations. The residents have
the use of their bodies not only insofar as they are involved in a concrete setting
but also to affect actions that go beyond the specificity of concrete tasks such as
sipping a cup of coffee or removing one’s shoes at the end of the day. Dora, for
example, sang on her own accord; Edna often stopped to look at the paintings
on the wall while strolling down the hallway; and Anna would glance at her
wedding band and engagement ring while quietly sitting alone. There was spon-
taneity in the residents’ openness to situations, whether this was of their own
accord or prompted by others. Abe slow danced to a song playing on the radio
with a health-care aide when prompted to take her hand; and when a Styrofoam
ball was playfully tossed to Anna, she threw it back. In all these instances, the
body puts forth beyond itself meanings that can be read as providing a frame-
work for a whole series of experiences. In this regard, selfhood does not reside in
organic processes but in human gestures and movements that issue from these
processes. This is most apparent when we consider that the preceding examples
are incomprehensible if selfhood is treated as a machine governed by natural
laws, or even as a cluster of instincts.
The examples render visible how selfhood emanates from the body as a
generative spontaneity that asserts itself in an improvised engagement with the
world. The idea emphasized here is that the engagement of the self with the
world consists primarily in the residents’ intrinsic corporeality of being-in-the-
world. This implies that self is grounded in the prereflective level of experience,
providing “practical sense” (Bourdieu ) or “practical competence”
(Merleau-Ponty ) for the residents to engage with the world. Selfhood ani-
mates their presence and endows with coherence and spontaneity their interac-
tions with the world.
Conclusion
In the literature on Alzheimer’s, the implicit reference to a presumed loss of
agency is a product of the Western assumption that only the mind relates us to
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the world and gives it meaning, rendering silent and inconsequential the lived
materiality of the body. Central to this perspective on the body is a concept of
personhood that hinges exclusively on cognition and rationality, ignoring the
significance of Merleau-Ponty’s bodily schema and Bourdieu’s notion of habi-
tus. However, as I have argued, following Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu, the exis-
tential and social aspects of the body are indispensable to the articulation of
selfhood. The coherence of selfhood and its generative spontaneity reside in our
embodiment, which is a synthesis of primordial and social being. It is an argu-
ment that challenges the current conviction that selfhood is tied exclusively to
cognition, by treating the body as a primary source of selfhood and a facilitator
of its articulation. This is not to suggest that the prereflexive body exhausts
selfhood; however—and this is the crucial point—even if the residents of Chai
Village were not as cognitively impaired as they were, or not impaired at all, still
the prereflexive body would continue to be fundamental to the whole of their
selfhood.
Although embodied selfhood is a concept I use to articulate and theorize
findings drawn from a particular ethnographic setting, it is a concept that in-
vites inference of larger scope. This is because, as I have argued, the primordial
unity of the body as well as specific sociocultural dispositions, all of which sus-
tain the self at a prereflective level, are fundamental to our existential being. In
other words, the interrelationship of the primordial body, sociocultural bodily
dispositions, and selfhood transcends cultural distinction. This is not to suggest
that selfhood would manifest itself in uniform or identical fashion irrespective
of the sociocultural context. On the contrary, the sociocultural specificity of
selfhood, as expressed in one’s habitual state and in one’s tendencies and incli-
nations to act in a particular way, would be different from culture to culture.
However, it is for further ethnographic research to explore what these differ-
ences are and what they mean in the context of the interrelationship between
selfhood, the primordial unity of the body, and specific sociocultural bodily dis-
positions. Embodied selfhood by no means concludes the matter of body-self,
body-world relations; nor is it intended to resolve the debate about the self in
Alzheimer’s disease. Thinking of selfhood as embodied provides new insight
and direction for future investigation of the localized symbiosis of prereflective
intentionality and structures of the social world. It is a symbiosis that is “en-
acted at every instant in the movement of existence” (Merleau-Ponty , ),
rendering the animated, living, experiential body as of paramount importance
for understanding the nature of human agency, selfhood, and embodiment.
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. The name of this facility is a pseudonym.
. Cognitive impairment was measured with the Mini Mental State Examination
(MMSE), a widely used method for assessing cognitive mental status (Folstein,
Folstein, and McHugh ). Within my sample of study participants, the mean MMSE
score was . and the range was – (mild, –; moderate, –; severe, –)
(Jones et al. ). MMSE scores have not been adjusted to remove the effect of age
and education, which are said to be of etiological significance in dementia (Crum et
al. ). However, by virtue of the fact that all participants resided on a secured
Alzheimer’s Support Unit because of the degree of their cognitive impairment, even if
scores were adjusted for age and education, the adjustment would not have altered in
a meaningful way their assessed degree of cognitive impairment.
. The names of residents living in Chai Village, as well as any names of Chai Village staff
referred to throughout this chapter, are pseudonyms.
. Bodily discourse has played a significant role in the history of anti-Semitism, with
claims of there being a differentiated Jewish body (for a discussion, see Gilman ).
My analysis is in no way an attempt to essentialize a primordial Jewish set of bodily
characteristics. On the contrary, I am demonstrating how the culture-specific condi-
tions of socialization become, for my study participants, an important resource for
bodily expressions of their selfhood.
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In an influential essay on dementia care, Kitwood () uses the notion of
culture to orient caregivers to the communicative aspects of care on
psychogeriatric wards. By talking about a “culture of dementia” he provides a
new perspective on the way in which dementia sufferers are usually repre-
sented, that is, in terms of a loss of voice and of the possibility of constituting a
lifeworld (Leering ; Chatterji ). He tries to think of the ward in terms of
an intersubjective space that can be shared by both caregivers and patients,
that offers possibilities for the development of a lifeworld. Kitwood’s work is
important not only in the sphere of dementia care—he is one of the few scholars
who represents dementia sufferers as intentional subjects who are responsive
to community life—but also because he shows us what is at stake in achieving
this sense of community. For him dementia becomes a way of problematizing
the very idea of communicative sharing, for it points to the singularity of indi-
vidual experience and to the fact that intersubjective relations may be built on
differences rather than on commonalities. Thus, for Kitwood dementia means
more than just a category of psychobiological pathology. It points to a special
kind of care relationship and to a model of nonverbal communication in which
there is a “heightened awareness of body language” (Kitwood , ).
In this chapter I shall use dementia as a thematic to talk about bodily dispo-
sition and the way in which it inflects the construction of ‘normal’ everyday life
on a verpleeghuis (nursing home) ward in the Netherlands.1 A term such as the
culture of dementia allows me to think of the medical institution as a local moral
world and to ask what is at stake in constituting the verpleeghuis as a discursive
entity (Kleinman ). I try to problematize dementia by using it as a lens
through which to reflect on the notion of normality as a mode of standardiza-
tion produced through ward routine (Goffman ). Problematization is itself a
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somewhat tricky exercise. As Rabinow () says, it means that something
must have already happened to introduce uncertainty in the familiar modes of
engagement with the world. In this chapter I shall describe one such event that
threatened to disrupt the routine on one particular ward and that led to the
transfer of one of the residents to a ward that specialized in the care of behavior-
ally disturbed (gedraags gestoord) persons. This allows me to destabilize demen-
tia as a taken-for-granted category and shows how it participates in other
ensembles of knowledge and practice.
To this end I juxtapose a number of different discursive sites through which
the verpleeghuis is materialized. Thus I begin with a brief account of the con-
cept that was given to the firm of architects that designed Regina Pacis by Dr.
Cornelius Leering, the first medical director of the institution. I then go on to
describe the ward routine and finally the case conferences that preceded the
transfer of the patient that I just mentioned. In the process I hope to show how
dementia offers a vantage point from which medical practitioners in the
verpleeghuis can reflect on conceptions of self and normality that structure re-
gimes of work and knowledge. The particular ward that I have chosen to focus
on is a somatic ward and does not offer dementia care. I do so deliberately, as
there is a fine line that separates somatic from psychogeriatric groups as far as the
verpleeghuis is concerned. For the organization, such divisions often function
as modes of normalization, as disciplinary regimes for the management of the
verpleeghuis population. But first, a brief account of the institution is in order.
The verpleeghuis, Regina Pacis, on which my ethnography is based is a
“combined” geriatric facility that offers intensive nursing and medical care to
elderly persons suffering from both somatic and psychogeriatric illnesses. De-
mentia as a term has very little operative significance in the organization of
verpleeghuis work. Instead it is subsumed within more functional categories
that are able to discriminate quantitatively between different kinds of corporeal
capability. Instruments that measure corporeal capability, such as the Activities
of Daily Life (ADL) rating scale, and quantify the extent of nursing care that a
patient requires help to disaggregate the verpleeghuis population on the basis
of a differentiated set of therapeutic goals.2 Dementia, too, can be used to refer to
a kind of corporeal capability but only in moral or evaluative terms. Thus,
psychogeriatric wards are sometimes thought of as enclaves of tolerance where
norms regarding bodily disposition that are crucial in sustaining the notion of a
ward community can be interrogated.
The Verpleeghuis as Community: Architectural Design
and Intersubjective Space
In the Netherlands, verpleeghuis medicine is premised on the idea that diseases
in old age are part of life and have to be managed as such. It is also recognized
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that such disabilities often make normal life in the family and community diffi-
cult to sustain. This means that the verpleeghuis defines itself in terms of two
major goals. First, it must offer specialized, long-term care for old persons suf-
fering from multiple chronic pathologies; second, it must be a “complete com-
munity” that has to cater to all dimensions of a patient’s life (Leering ).3 The
fact that these two requirements can have contradictory effects is part of the
problematic that I hope to address and is recognized as such by the practitio-
ners themselves.
Cornelius Leering, a pioneering geriatrician in the Netherlands and, as
noted earlier, the first medical director of Regina Pacis, tried to create a con-
crete structure that would fulfill both requirements. This involved restructuring
the organization at several different levels—beginning with nursing activity, the
coordination of different services such as medical and paramedical services,
recreational services, spiritual services, and so on. It also involved a specialized
architectural design—the construction of a new building whose spatial organi-
zation would reflect the primary orientation of verpleeghuis medicine, that is, a
focus on the lifeworld of the individual resident.
Through a combination of fortuitous circumstances, such as the establish-
ment of the Exceptional Sickness Costs Act in , which helped finance
treatment and paid for long-term stay in medical institutions such as the ver-
pleeghuis and which in turn led to an increase in the number of verpleeghuis
beds; the economic boom in the late s; and new theories of architecture
that tried to relate spatial design with concerns of the lifeworld; Leering was
able to restructure Regina Pacis in terms of this new vision of geriatric care.
Leering’s report elaborating these new ideas was submitted to the firm of archi-
tects in charge of constructing the new building in . It is worth discussing
here, since it not only gives a detailed account of geriatric medicine but also
offers a specific representation of bodily being in old age and of invalidity as a
crucial feature of this experience.
An account of Leering’s conception of invalidity, which relates the embod-
ied being to an environment that is made palpable by the very fact of this em-
bodiment, is necessary for an understanding of verpleeghuis culture. In the
s, when the first geriatric facilities were being established in the Nether-
lands, old-age impairments came to be seen in new ways. Active engagement
with the environment came to be viewed as a form of therapy. Interestingly, this
had ramifications for the treatment and nursing of patients with chronic dis-
ease as well. It was felt that such patients must learn to actively participate in
societal processes and were encouraged to overcome the limitations of their
disease. Bodily mobility came to be associated with well-being and became a
sign of active engagement (Blommestijn ).
Central to the relationship between bodily movement and well-being, in
Leering’s work, is a particular understanding of invalidity. Leering () de-
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scribes the state of being invalid as a form of damaged embodiment (geschonden
lichamelijkheid), that is, an inability to experience one’s body as a coherent
whole. This appears because the body is always other to one’s self; it is made
one’s own through the process of socialization. Leering says that this form of
invalidity has a particular connotation for the elderly that is not generalizable
across generations. Thus a dependency on others for one’s bodily movement,
“giving oneself to the gaze and practice of another,” as Leering puts it, is exacer-
bated in old age because it is coupled with a form of infantilization (, ). In
terms of bodily function this translates into a “disturbance” in the ADL, espe-
cially in those activities that are associated with personal grooming.4
What is the relationship between the ADL, the mode by which one experi-
ences one’s body as uniquely one’s own, and the experience of the verpleeghuis
as a “lived environment” (leef klimaat)?5 For Leering, the experience of one’s
body, the capacity to make it ones own, involves both work and learning. The
ADL scheme, which has to do with the constitution of the inner space of the self,
involves purposive activities that transform external bodily space into one’s pri-
vate intimate space. The ADL functions are also the first step in the creation of
a personalized public space. Thus, it is the responsibility of the verpleeghuis to
organize its space in such a way that the potential for experiencing bodily co-
herence is restored. Wards are supposed to be color coded so that they can be
easily recognizable by memory-impaired residents. Corridors connecting differ-
ent parts of the building are broken up by points of interest and points of rest
where residents can meet as if they were on a public street. Leering thought that
color was an intrinsic part of the architectural design and suggested that it be
used to direct movement within the building. “Light spaces,” which were sup-
posed to be accessible to residents, for example, doctors’ examining rooms, or
which were points of greater interaction, were demarcated from “dark spaces,”
which were meant for introversion but also for the performance of ADL, spaces
such as bedrooms and lavatories but also others where technical services were
carried out and that were kept out of sight. Thus, bedrooms and lavatories were
sparsely decorated, in contrast to public spaces such as the living rooms on each
ward, which were marked by distinctive colors and decorations. The shopping
area and the café were located near the entrance to the verpleeghuis to give the
residents the sense that they could go out with their visitors even while still
being inside verpleeghuis space. There were even streetlights and benches
placed in the shopping area, to reinforce the impression of a public square.
In an earlier work I described how Leering was influenced by the European
phenomenologists, among them Merleau-Ponty and Minkowsky, who thought
of space and bodily movement as crucial aspects of intersubjectivity (Chatterji
). A detailed discussion of this influence is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter. Suffice it to say that Leering was aware of the architectural debates in the
Netherlands and the influence of phenomenology on some of the postwar
222 ROMA CHATTERJI
trends in building design. However, he was following the principles of modern-
ist architecture when he divided the living environment into spheres for the
performance of different functions (Rabinow ). But for him these functions
were mapped onto the phenomenological body of the invalid resident.
This account is clearly oriented to the somatic patient. Leering was prima-
rily interested in revalidation therapy, and the ADL rating scale was not just a
tool for organizing the verpleeghuis population. Instead, he thought of it as a
fundamental aspect of a purposive engagement with the world. Purposeless ac-
tion, the repetitive gestures that are often thought to be associated with demen-
tia sufferers, found no place in this scheme. However, he did write an article on
dementia, a literary piece, in which he uses invalidity to analyze the plays of
Samuel Beckett (Leering ). He says that the experience of dementia comes
closest to describing the absurdity that Beckett sees as a part of everyday life. For
Leering, dementia is a metaphor for life lived for the moment, without temporal
depth, and dementia sufferers have the unique capacity to experience both in-
tense joy and sorrow, a capacity born of an exclusive orientation to the present.
The Ward: Normality, Dependency, and Disturbed Behavior
In the previous section I dealt with the representations of the patient in terms of
his or her phenomenological experiences and the manner in which there is an
attempt, through the architectural design of the institution, to create a space
for a potential community of residents, an alternative community in which the
impaired elderly can lead “normal” lives. In this section I deal with the interac-
tions that take place on the ward and describe the work involved in the consti-
tution of this normality. The ward has an important role in the creation of this
ideal of community. Day-to-day life on the ward is supposed to approximate
normal life in the world outside the verpleeghuis.
A brief description of the organization of ward activity will demonstrate
what I mean. Ward space is organized in terms of a temporal division between
day and night. Thus, daytime activities are thought of as being part of what
Schutz () would have called the “wide awake world,” the world of purposeful
social activity, and the night as the time of withdrawal into oneself.
Verpleeghuis residents are encouraged to get out of bed in the morning, to
dress, and to sit in the living rooms that are attached to the wards. The living
rooms are thought to be spaces for socialization, but they are also places where
nursing activity occurs during the daytime. I was told repeatedly that, unlike in
the hospital, verpleeghuis nursing was focused on the chair and not the bed.
Thus, living rooms are multifunctional spaces in which residents spend most of
their waking hours. They are furnished with easy chairs and tables at which they
eat their meals. They are encouraged to decorate the living rooms with some of
their personal possessions, a favorite painting perhaps, ornaments, or even
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greeting cards from visitors. There is an attempt to decorate the living rooms in
the style to which the residents were accustomed when they were setting up
their own homes. Considerable thought is given to the seating arrangements in
the living rooms, to encourage “contact” between residents, in keeping with
Dutch norms of sociality. Yet this sociality has to be sustained in the face of
severe impairment and dependency that at first sight seem to negate the values
of privacy and autonomy that inscribe patterns of Dutch social interaction. The
following section is a description of the nursing routine on a ward in which
there is an attempt to create a façade of normalcy that will conform to a model
of sociality, one that consciously maintains notions of autonomy, privacy, and
volition and incorporates them into the therapeutic regime of the verpleeghuis.
However, the actual “bed and body work” that makes up a significant por-
tion of the nursing routine is often at odds with the therapeutic goals of the
verpleeghuis (Gubrium ; Datta Chowdhury ; Paterniti ). Bed and
body work is formally organized around the ADL scheme. Patients are perceived
in terms of their ADL functions as “bodies in need,” to quote Paterniti’s evoca-
tive phrase (, ; see also note , below). Paterniti is justifiably critical of
this way of approaching patients—in terms of their deficiencies and the time
taken to care for them. The nurses with whom I worked in Regina Pacis were
aware of this criticism. It was an aspect of their work that was frequently dis-
cussed in ward meetings. They felt that doctors and social workers did not ad-
equately understand the nature of their work. They felt that bed and body work
was often the only way they had of achieving contact with their patients. Indeed,
communication with patients is often very hard to achieve. But there is more at
stake in bed and body work, as most nurses know but are rarely able to put into
words. Given the taboo on touch in Dutch society, especially between strangers
in public places, and the valorization of personal autonomy, intimacy is ex-
pressed through bed and body work as well. Relations of care and dependency
that threaten the ideal of autonomy are framed by a professional work routine
and thereby made acceptable.
This section is divided into two parts. In the first I describe my first day as
participant observer/nursing aid on the ward and, through this, the daily nurs-
ing schedule. In the second part, I detail the spatial organization of a living room
on the ward in which patients spend most of their waking hours. Through this
description I attempt to show the contradiction between institutional ideal and
organizational practice, for it is in the space of this contradiction that dementia
emerges—not as a disease category, but as an alternate way of doing and being.
The Ward Routine
I arrived at the Peppel (Poplar) at half past seven in the morning—my first day of
fieldwork on the ward. I had been assigned to the blue unit. (Each ward is
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divided into units of three with twelve patients each.) The nurse I had been
detailed to work with had already begun the distribution of medicine. I was
three minutes late that first morning, and work had already begun. The nurses
on the morning shift usually arrive ten to fifteen minutes earlier. They drink
what will be the first of innumerable cups of coffee together and smoke their
cigarettes. At : A.M. on the dot, coffee cups are drained and cigarettes stubbed
out, and one of the unit heads reads out the evening and night reports of the
previous day. The day’s roster is also read out, as well as any special appoint-
ments that a resident may have—to visit the hairdresser, go for physiotherapy,
and so on. Then the bustle begins—people must be got out of bed, washed, and
dressed, made ready to meet the day as it begins. The nurses working in the
units pick up the washbasins from the storeroom attached to the ward. There
are two for each patient, green for the upper part of the body and red for the
lower. Each nurse also takes a tray, on which are cotton wool swabs, disinfec-
tant, and nail clippers. If she is new or has no experience with the particular
patients she has to take care of, she takes the ADL cards with her.6 They will tell
her what functions the person can or cannot perform.
I was sent off with a student nurse to help get people out of bed. The stu-
dent nurse had a brisk and breezy air. She wasn’t experienced enough to have
developed the touches of intimacy that the more mature nurses use to soften
the work technique. She kept up a cheerful patter as we worked. She would say
to me, “Give me a hand here, catch hold of the shoulder like this . . . ” or, “This
one needs the lift . . . she’s too heavy!”7 She left me with a woman who had “a
light demential image” (licht dementieel beeld). We were introduced to each
other. She was lying flat on her back with her night dress rucked up. But she was
wide awake and said, “Pleased to meet you,” with great courtesy. The student
nurse, now called away, left hurriedly, saying that I could manage on my own.
Mw. Fokke (the patient) was easy to manage and would tell me what to do in
case of problems, she said.8 Mw. Fokke and I stared at each other rather uncer-
tainly and I began the washing routine. Mw. Fokke kept saying, “I think I can do
that myself—I do live alone, you know, so I must be able to do that on my own.”
But she spoke somewhat hesitantly and I decided to carry on. Then she said,
“Things are a little different today, aren’t they? Is there a shortage of staff?” The
nurse whom I was originally supposed to be helping came up just then, and I
asked her if Mw. Fokke could really manage on her own. She said, “Yes, that is
true, but you weren’t to know,” and she delicately covered Mw. Fokke’s chest
with a towel. I realized at that point that it had been exposed.
I saw that I had been doing everything the wrong way. Nurses take great
pains to ensure that the privacy of the body is maintained while performing
invasive activities. The private parts are covered with towels when the washing
is done—white for the upper half of the body and yellow for the lower. One starts
from the face and moves downward, in stages. After each part is washed it is
NORMALITY AND DIFFERENCE 225
quickly covered up with the towel. Most nurses carry on a conversation with the
patient while they wash and dress them. Patients are encouraged to take an
interest in their appearance—to choose their own clothes, comb their own hair,
and so on.
There is a conscious effort to maintain the status of patients as “normal,” as
I noted earlier. Nurses are taught to “frame” invasive activities so that patients’
privacy is not violated. Officially, the relationship between patients and
caregivers is supposed to be that of strangers, signaled by normal-status behav-
ior emphasizing distance and respect.
The nurse introduced me to each patient on the unit. She told them that I
was here to see things and asked them if I could watch. The patients who could
talk gave varied responses. Some were genial, others confused, and some rather
sarcastic. One woman said, “She can watch my face, but not here,” pointing to
her genitals. The ward-in-charge took the patient to tax on this later: “Mw. We
all look the same over there.” She turned to me, laughing. “She feels ashamed.”
Another patient, Mw. Roosevelt, commented on the fact that there were two
people beside her bed. The nurse told her that I had to learn and that I was here
to write a book about the residents. Mw. Roosevelt muttered that she didn’t care
if I was Sinter Klaas and was writing in my golden book.9 She had Parkinson’s
disease and her limbs were stiff and her movements awkward. At each stage of
the process of dressing she would give us instructions: “You haven’t cleaned my
eyes.” “I will do it last, with this ointment,” the nurse replied. “My back hasn’t
been dried properly. Do it again!” This was directed at me; I had been scared of
hurting her. Mw. Roosevelt wore elasticized support stockings for the edema in
her legs. She was always anxious when the stocking was fitted over the bunion
on her foot. She rapped out, “Bunion!” The nurse pressed the bunion to show
that the stocking was safely over it. She resisted slightly when she was told that
I was to do her hair, but she did so more as a matter of form. Her instructions to
us were in the same spirit, to show us that she was still in control of the situa-
tion at hand. We held out a selection of necklaces and she chose one that
matched her dress. The nurse deftly sprayed her with perfume and
complimented her on her dress. She unbent sufficiently to say that her son had
chosen it. Then the wheelchair routine began. The nurse and I put an arm un-
der each armpit while Mw. Roosevelt gave us rapid instructions—“Turn me to
the left . . . no more . . . now move the chair closer . . . ” and so on. She wanted to
visit the restroom first. We wheeled her there and left her with the calling bell in
her hand. The nurse made a cross on the defecation chart under Mw.
Roosevelt’s name. We rushed through the next job, breaking off for a quick cup
of coffee, standing in the kitchen. It was : A.M.—the time when nurses take a
five-minute break.
We got back in time to wheel some patients into the living room. Mw.
Roosevelt, whom we had left in the restroom, was already ensconced in her
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chair, at her place at the table. I wheeled in a rather mournful woman, Mw.
Timmers, who sat at the same table. Mw. Roosevelt supervised the process. I got
her breakfast from the kitchen. It was on a small plastic tray, covered with cello-
phane and with her name written on it. Mw. Roosevelt supervised the placing of
the cup of Nutramel that she was supposed to drink: “On the right side; she
can’t see from the other side.” Mw. Timmers whimpered softly. I asked her what
the matter was. “She always does that!” Mw. Roosevelt said.
We broke for a fifteen-minute coffee break at : A.M. All the nurses gath-
ered in the living rooms to drink coffee with the patients. After this we spent the
rest of the morning cleaning the washbasins, the urinals, and the bedpans, as
well as changing the bedsheets. As one of the nurses told me, “We give first
priority to the people, the rest can come later.”
Most of the nurses take their lunch break from one to one thirty. A few stay
behind to receive the lunch wagon, which comes in at about this time. Lunch-
time is another period of intense activity. Many of the patients have special
diets, while some are part of the eet tafel project; that is, they are served food in
the “normal” way—they eat from bowls, and they can serve themselves and
choose what they want to eat. The other patients eat from prepared trays. The
afternoons seem more relaxed after the hectic pace of activities in the morning.
Patients doze in their chairs. Some go for activities to Het Stekje (the central
activities room). The nurses write their daily patient reports and drink coffee
with the patients. At : P.M. the day shift ends. There are fewer nurses on the
evening shift because there is less work to be done. Patients eat a brood maaltijd
(bread meal) and then go to bed. Nurses prepare patients’ clothes for the next
day—setting out a range of outfits from which patients can make their own se-
lection if they are in the mood—match accessories, wash pantyhose, and so on.
The ward is very different at night. Most nurses hate the night shift be-
cause, unlike the day shift, which is filled with activity, it is monotonous. It is for
this reason that it is called de wacht (the wait). There is only one nurse in the
ward and she sits in the nursing station to attend to the bells that patients can
ring from their beds to summon her. Most of the summonses are for bedpans. A
student nurse called de zwerf, or “the rover,” rotates between the three somatic
wards in the verpleeghuis and helps to lift and turn patients who are given bed-
pans, incontinence mats, and related items.
The nursing schedule reflects contradictions in the identity of the organiza-
tion at large. Relations between nurses and patients are supposed to be mod-
eled on the service contract so that patients are seen as clients who are
recipients of a specialized service (care), the modalities of which they are, ide-
ally, free to negotiate. However, given the extent of impairment that marks the
average verpleeghuis patient, which makes it difficult for patients to enter into
the details of their care contract, and the bureaucratic constraints of large orga-
nizations, which turns patients into objects to be worked on, this is not usually
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possible. Doctors sometimes complained about the “medical model” that
nurses on the somatic wards seemed to have internalized. The doctor in charge
of the Peppel would tell the head of the ward that her nurses should spend qual-
ity time with difficult patients and worry less about the work regime. He told me
that nurses were trained to be task oriented and found it difficult to shift to a
people-oriented approach. However, nurses on the somatic side felt that it was
only through actual bed and body work that they achieved contact with pa-
tients. They are aware that nursing often involves activities that may violate
patients’ privacy. (After all, touch is usually restricted among strangers. Ideally,
nurses and patients are supposed to meet as polite strangers or as service ren-
derers and clients.) It is only by channeling all physical contact through the ADL
regime that they are able to maintain the facade of a service relationship.
The work schedule creates a rationally ordered structure on the ward, a
structure that is supposed to have therapeutic value for the patients because it
gives them a sense of continuity with the world outside. But it is also the only
mode that the staff has of communicating with patients. The daily ritual of
washing, dressing, and the choosing of accessories can also become the mo-
ment of contact, of renewing ties of affection between the nursing staff and the
patients. In an earlier section I said that there was a contradiction between the
specialized service that the verpleeghuis is supposed to offer—long-term care
for patients with chronic disease—and the aspiration for it to be a community
in which patients will be able to experience themselves as normal persons. Val-
ues such as autonomy and independence are central to the constitution of self
and to participation in social life in the Netherlands. Perhaps the emphasis on a
task orientation among the nursing staff was a response to this dilemma. Bed
and body work may be the only mode that nurses have of relating to patients
while still respecting the values that make the patients persons in this society.
Respect for personal privacy is also possibly the reason why the ideal of nor-
malcy is applied only to the public spaces on the wards. Patients are dressed as if
they are ready to go out, and indeed they interact with one another as polite
strangers in the ward living rooms. In fact, all interactive spaces in the
verpleeghuis are organized as public spaces.
The Living Room at the Peppel
In the preceding section we saw how Leering’s conception of corporeal inten-
tionality is translated into a ward regime. Merleau-Ponty, from whom Leering
borrows this idea, discusses corporeal intentionality in the context of the hum-
drum or routine aspects of everyday life. Institutional taxonomies, such as the
ADL scheme, tend to literalize this, turning habitual routines, necessary for cre-
ating an intersubjective world, into regimented practice. In this section I move
from the regime of bodily care and considerations of self that emerge from this
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practice, to the ward community and to the potential of a shared lifeworld that
may materialize within it. In phenomenological terms, intersubjective relations
assume a notion of shared space. It is the animate or sentient body that be-
comes the common measure for this sharing. For Schutz () there is a conti-
nuity of perspectives among actors in interactive situations based on the
assumption that their bodily experiences are similar and therefore transparent
to one another. He calls this the “reciprocity of perspectives,” subjunctively at-
tributed by the self to the other. The self experiences the other through a uni-
fied field of bodily expression that reveals the other’s conscious life.
The reciprocity of perspectives is modeled on face-to-face interaction,
which involves symmetry between the actors, as well as a certain spatial dis-
tance (cf. Berger and Luckmann ). In the verpleeghuis, a reciprocity of per-
spectives, as Schutz conceived it, is difficult to achieve. Intersubjectivity is made
possible within the care relationship but not through the assumption of a sym-
metry between self and other. The care relationship is based on dependency
and is therefore asymmetrical. Spatial distance is an important aspect of the
self’s experience of its actions as intentional and for a sense of its autonomy.
Whether or not this remains an aspect of one’s experience as a verpleeghuis
patient is a question that will be explored in this section. Is the living room an
intersubjective space? Do patients experience it as an aspect of their lifeworlds?
I describe the living room (woon kamer) of the blue unit of the Peppel—the inter-
actions between patients and the spatial arrangements that configure those in-
teractions—in an attempt to address these questions.
Let me begin with a description of the seating arrangement. There were
three small dining tables that divided the room into two segments. All three
tables were positioned in such a way that residents sitting at them had a clear
view of the park outside; the outer wall of the living room is made of transparent
glass. Mw. Roosevelt sat with her two companions, Mw. Timmers and Mw.
Fokke. As mentioned earlier, Mw. Roosevelt and Mw. Timmers sat in wheel-
chairs, which neither was able to maneuver independently. Mw. Roosevelt was a
Parkinson’s patient and was not able to perform the arm movements required
for pushing a wheelchair. She had refused the offer of an electric wheelchair.
Mw. Timmers had hemiplegia and suffered from chronic depression. During my
time on the blue unit I never heard her speak. She would communicate through
groans and whimpers and, at times, through gestures. Mw. Fokke was becoming
demented, as noted previously, but her condition was not considered advanced
enough for her to be moved to a psychogeriatric ward. Adjacent to Mw.
Timmers and Mw. Fokke were two other women, who also sat in wheelchairs,
with legs outstretched. Their limbs were so rigid and so painful for them to
move that they could not be maneuvered under tables. In the other half of the
room, three women sat at a rectangular table near the picture window. Two of
these women, Mw. Diekema and Mw. Smit, had their backs to the round table.
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Mw. Diekema was severely diabetic and had had her right leg amputated, in two
procedures; Mw. Smit had a complex set of somatic problems, but over and
above this she had also been diagnosed as manic depressive. The three remain-
ing women in the room were all stroke patients. However, Mw. Van den Berg,
who sat at a small square table adjacent to the rectangular table, also showed
signs of Alzheimer’s disease. All attempts at fixing a daily routine for her had
failed. Her food was left at her table and she picked at it intermittently. Other
than the rhythmic movement of her jaw, she showed very few signs of anima-
tion. Mw. Klasen, her table companion, had a bulbar syndrome, her throat was
partially paralyzed, and she was hemiplegic in her right side.
All the occupants of the room suffered from severely impaired mobility.
The people whom they knew and talked to were the ones with whom they had
eye contact. Mw. Smit once said to me, “I know Mw. Diekema and Mw. Guillet”
(who sat opposite her at her table). “I know Adrienna Klasen and Mw. Van den
Berg. I know when their birthdays are and where they used to live before coming
here. But I don’t know those ladies,” and she turned her head, indicating the
table behind her.
There was very little conversation in the room. Apart from the customary
“Good mornings,” silence reigned. This was broken by the cheerful voices of the
nurses asking, “Mw.—? Tea?” Mw. Fokke would try her best to keep the conversa-
tional ball rolling at her table by reading out gory anecdotes from the local
newspaper to which she subscribed. “The body of a teenage girl found in a
highly decomposed state. Tsk, tsk, I wonder what happened to her? Perhaps she
didn’t get enough to eat. These young girls—always dieting!” Her comments
were often rhetorical and did not require a response. The people in her vicinity
would murmur something now and then. They tended to adopt a somewhat
indulgent attitude toward her, because they knew that she was “confused” (in de
waar). Mw. Fokke was one of the more active residents on the unit. She would go
regularly for “activities” and to the gym, for physiotherapy. She participated in
all the festivities that took place in Regina Pacis. Mw. Guillet, who was hard of
hearing, kept herself occupied with her knitting and embroidery, but the others
just sat silently at their respective tables.
Does the ward constitute an intersubjective community? At first sight it
would seem not to be the case. It is only the seating plan that brought residents
together into some kind of a relationship. Otherwise they all seemed to live in
different worlds.
Mw. Klasen’s presence in the living room acted as some kind of catalyst for
the group. She threatened to disrupt the fragile structures of normality. She was
a relatively young woman—in her early sixties—and had come to the
verpleeghuis as a result of repeated strokes after she received radiation treat-
ment for a tumor in her brain.10 She had been a woman of considerable ability in
her past life, a musician and a poet, and an intensely emotional person, according
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to her sister. She had felt herself “disintegrating” long before she came to the
verpleeghuis.11 Her life was a tragedy, one of the many in the ward. The differ-
ence between her and the other residents was that she had not become resigned
to this loss. She could neither speak nor write. Her right side was paralyzed and
her spirit too tormented for her to be able to concentrate on learning to write
with her left hand. She did have a mechanical communicator when she first
came but could not bring herself to use it. Her anguish expressed itself in
screaming that was considered unreasonable and unbearable by residents and
nurses alike. She presented a bizarre picture—saliva dribbling down her chin
because she could not swallow and skirt rucked up over her knees so that her
catheter tube was visible. She was very restless, fidgeting with whatever lay
within her reach, wheeling herself all over the ward, even going outside. The
nurses felt helpless. They could do nothing for her, could not understand what
she wanted. I found that her bouts of screaming ended immediately if she was
held and caressed—if she was given undivided attention by one person. But it
was difficult to do this within the confines of a somatic ward. Physical gestures
are restrained. The extravagant physicality that Mw. Klasen was wont to display
was considered threatening. She had to be transferred finally, to a
psychogeriatric ward, not because she was thought to be a psychogeriatric case
but because the norms of behavior there are different.
Why was Mw. Klasen’s presence so threatening to the others on the ward?
Was it because she upset their notion of spatial order? As I have shown, interac-
tive space in the living room is largely delimited by where one sits and with
whom one has eye contact. It is as if the rim of the table becomes the boundary
demarcating intersubjective space. The notion of intersubjectivity assumes a
conception of bodily intentionality that is based on norms regarding locomo-
tion, object manipulation, and communication. It is largely through bodily in-
tentionality that subjects acquire the kind of individuation required for
participation in communicative relations. It is by positioning our bodies freely
vis-à-vis other bodies and objects that our environment is made habitable.
Thus, image schemas of the body organize the kinds of worlds in which we live
(cf. Merleau-Ponty ). In the verpleeghuis, patients rarely conform to the
bodily norms that are required for the kind of intersubjective relations that the
phenomenologists describe. Norms of spatiality and motility are imposed exter-
nally, as patient’s bodies are often not capable of free and independent move-
ment. Body images are fractured because patients are not capable of achieving
the expressive unity that would give them the freedom to command the space
that they require for making their own worlds.
The living room, as I have described, gives the impression of rigid spatial
order, externally imposed. Patients are dependent on others for locomotion;
they rarely move around the ward on their own—except Mw. Klasen. Her move-
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ments, however, were not perceived as intentional. They were threatening be-
cause they were enigmatic. She did not conform to the norms required to sus-
tain the kinds of communication that was possible on the ward. Most of the
patients whom I have described did resort to gesture to communicate their
wishes to the nurses; conversation was minimal other than as responses to the
nursing staff. Some of the patients used words very effectively, but they tended
to do so in an attempt to affirm their presence on the ward or to express their
autonomy. The patient who was capable of movement and who did use speech
to establish communicative relations with others in the living room was Mw.
Fokke, and she was considered to be confused, though quite harmless, by the
others. It was only Mw. Klasen who moved around the ward constantly—and who
screamed. It was as if she breached the norms of spatial distance that people felt
was necessary to sustain their own conceptions of personhood in the ward.
It was thought that a psychogeriatric ward would be more suitable for Mw.
Klasen, because such wards tolerate a wider range of differences. It would also
be able to provide her with a form of therapy that was difficult to find on the
somatic side—that is, close physical contact. As I have already said, the loss of
inhibitions caused by cognitive disturbances among psychogeriatric patients
allow the nurses to communicate with them through touch. This is usually not
possible on the somatic side, where the Dutch inhibitions on touch between
strangers are observed. The nurses touch patients only when washing and
dressing them, and this touch is kept impersonal to ensure respect for the
patient’s autonomy. The self of the patient is constituted differently on the two
sides of the verpleeghuis. In the case of Mw. Klasen, as we shall see, the change
of residence also resulted in a change of identity.
In this section I have tried to show how selves emerge in the complex imbri-
cation between institutional ideals and organizational imperatives. Public or-
der is internalized to produce a certain conception of the disciplined self. The
division between the somatic and the psychogeriatric wards does not only arise
from the taxonomy of disease but also assumes different orientations to care.
Theoretically, patients in somatic wards are capable of being rehabilitated. Pa-
tients in psychogeriatric wards are not. As we have seen, this division is not
strictly maintained. There were at least two patients with dementia in the blue
unit. They were tolerated because their presence was not overly disruptive. Mw.
Albers was thought to be still aware of her surroundings and to have too much
of a consciousness of self to be transferred to a psychogeriatric ward. Mw. Van
den Berg’s presence on the Peppel was more difficult to justify. Her daughter
insisted that she was not demented and therefore did not belong in a
psychogeriatric ward.
There is a sense of fear regarding the psychogeriatric side that is shared by
both nurses and patients. As will be shown in the following section, nurses
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resist sending their patients to such wards. There is a fear of infantilization, of
regression from the somatic ideal of rehabilitation and the hope of the recovery
of a social self.
The Remaking of the Self: Transfer to a Psychogeriatric Ward
In organizations, entrances and exits carry a symbolic charge. They reveal the
limits of organizational discipline and threaten the fragile order negotiated
from day to day (Goffman ; Strauss et al. ). However, the decision to
transfer Mw. Klasen to a psychogeriatric ward was not taken lightly. It took sev-
eral months and many anguished meetings between the nursing staff, the doc-
tor, and the verpleeghuis psychologist before the final decision was taken. Even
then, there was a certain amount of anxiety among the nursing staff about the
outcome of the transfer but also a helplessness, as if Mw. Klasen’s conduct rep-
resented an insurmountable barrier that their professional training did not al-
low them to cross. Here I provide an extract from the case conference.
DR. HUUB: And now Mw. Klasen—who wants to begin?—you, you, you. (He points
in turn to the two nurses from the blue unit who are present and then to me.) You,
too, have something to do with her. (He does not follow the usual style of con-
ducting a case conference. These usually begin with a brief introduction giving the
patient’s medical status.)
JENNIE, THE UNIT HEAD: Her behavior has been changeable [wisselend]. There is a
mental deterioration. Earlier, there was more contact with her. She re-
sponded to us more. It is not as if she doesn’t now. But then, it was as if she
was actually going to say something. And now she behaves in this strange
fashion—the crazy screaming, the contortions in bed—she even had her
head stuck in the bed frame last week. And the weeping. It is difficult to
know what is going on with her—yes, one can guess, I suppose.
DR. HUUB: She looks better though, physically, than when she first came here.
ELIZABETH, THE WARD HEAD: When she is physically weak, she is more tranquil.
Now that she is better she has become more restless.
DR. HUUB: She sits facing Mw. Van den Berg—couldn’t be much for her there.
JENNIE: That’s why we position her wheelchair in such a way that she can look
out the window.
JUDITH, A NURSE: She enjoyed the singing in the recreational therapy room last
Friday.
ELIZABETH, A NURSE: We have been asked not to send her again. She started to
scream and the other residents were frightened. Why she does it we don’t
know.
DR. HUUB:  (Turning to me) You told me that she liked music.12
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ANNIE, THE SOCIAL WORKER: She used to play the organ and the recorder.
DR. HUUB: This is a woman with severe cerebral injuries, but with moments of
clarity. She needs individual care. She was an intelligent woman once, she
made something of her life and then this . . . I know you all have too much
to do. Try and get a volunteer.
(At this point there is no discussion regarding her transfer to a psychogeriatric
ward. The staff is still working with a model of rehabilitation and hopes to help her
acquire a social disposition that is in conformity with the normative expectations
of the ward.)
Three months later at another case conference . . .
DR. HUUB: Last month, on January  to be precise, we had asked the psychologist
to examine Mw. Klasen to consider the question of transfer [overplatsing].
(He summarizes her medical history.) She has had a meningiom and a number
of CVAs. She has always been hysterical—according to her sister, that is.
MARTIJN, THE PSYCHOLOGIST: Her actions and thoughts seem unconnected. At
least there is a fluctuating connection. She is easily distracted.
DR. HUUB: Is she conscious of her failings?
MARTIJN: I hope not, for her sake.
DR. HUUB: . . . and the unstoppable screaming?
MARTIJN: I don’t know what’s going on in her head. Transfer to the other side has
ethical problems. It won’t help her—but it depends on the other thirty-five
people. (He is referring to the other residents of the ward.)
DR. HUUB: The change has no advantages for her. She is very sensitive to atmo-
sphere. (Turning to me) You have spent a lot of time with her. Do you want to
say something?
ROMA, THE ANTHROPOLOGIST: She can’t communicate.
DR. HUUB: Yes, yes, I understand. That’s why she screams—because she can’t.
ROMA: And she isn’t demented.
MARTIJN: Yes, but there is a fluctuating chaos in her head.
DR. HUUB: (Summing up) A woman with organic injuries whose behavior is dis-
turbing for others.
ELIZABETH: I know that she is disturbing—but we have invested so much energy
in her. We have spent hours feeding her—Roma has as well. What if she gets
worse? Can we get her back?
MARTIJN: No. There is a discrepancy between her pattern of expectations and
that of the ward.
DR. HUUB: We don’t have any other choice. We have the whole institution to
think of, not just one individual. But we have to be careful about the choice
of ward.
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The theme that strikes me as most significant in this discussion is the attri-
bution of agency to the patient. Mw. Klasen’s behavioral anomalies are attrib-
uted to her communicative incapacity and to personality quirks rather than to
her illness per se. Her behavior was thought to be opaque. She was not capable
of internalizing a discipline that would produce a socially embodied self in
alignment with institutional norms. The logical way out was to transfer her to a
ward where opaque behavior was the norm, where action was not thought to be
an outcome of will or intention.
As it so happens, she was much happier in the psychogeriatric ward and, as
is the case with many verpleeghuis residents, she expressed this through her
body. The image of her in the somatic ward had been that of a woman tottering
on the edge of chaos, restrained with great difficulty. She had limp, dank hair
falling from a point in the center of her head (the rest had fallen out as a result
of radiation treatment). This set her apart immediately in a room full of perms
and well-groomed buns. She sat in a wheelchair with a restraining belt around
her, a catheter tube visible on the side. The nursing staff, in all fairness to them,
did try their best to turn her out neatly, but her mental state was such that she
did not care about her appearance.
After she was transferred to the new ward, the nurses began a series of
normalizing experiments. They began by removing the belt. She did fall once or
twice, but on the whole this experiment proved successful. She no longer sat in
a wheelchair. She had already begun to walk, supported by a nurse, while on the
somatic side. Now she was given a stick. (This also made her more immobile, of
course.) Her hair was permed and she was encouraged to eat on her own. She
was more at peace with herself and her surroundings. She developed a special
friendship with a fellow resident; he gave her a new name, “Mien,” and she
seemed to prefer it to her own. There was a new desire to communicate and to
establish links with what she had been before. Her sister described how she had
asked for her old books and the poems that she had once written. She said that
she had noticed that Mw. Klasen was scribbling something with her left hand.
There was a scribble, then a g, another scribble, then a d, and she suddenly real-
ized that Mw. Klasen was writing gedichten (poems). When I visited her she
would show me pictures from her childhood, the books from her nursery
school, and some of the poems that she had written.
She was happy in this ward, as expressed through the new relationship she
was trying to establish with the past. But there was also a dislocation from, a
renunciation of, another part of it—the torment and suffering that had domi-
nated at least a part of her adult life. I sorted out her papers with her. She would
laugh at the old schoolbooks and the children’s poems that she had written, but
turned her face away in distress when we came across some short poems, almost
jottings, in which she had expressed her despair at the meaninglessness of pass-
ing time.
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Forgetting is not always something that overtakes one. It does not just sim-
ply occur; it can also be a deliberate choice, not just a loss, but a renunciation.
For Mw. Klasen, the past was in a way embodied in the family and the commu-
nity from which she had to be dislocated after entering the institution. In the
somatic ward, she expressed this dislocation through screaming and her dishev-
eled appearance. After being shifted to the psychogeriatric ward, she seemed to
calm herself down by bracketing away a certain part of her past and to begin
inhabiting a different region, that of her childhood. The tolerance in the
psychogeriatric ward of childlike behavior and the liberty to be different, since
norms establishing and representing the ordered body were less strictly ad-
hered to, allowed a temporary equilibrium.13
However, it is inappropriate to attribute Mw. Klasen’s transformation sim-
ply to a process of infantilization. As a result of the normalization experiments
that were being tried out on her, she developed a new consciousness of self and
an awareness of her presence on the ward vis-à-vis the other patients. Paradoxi-
cally, the psychogeriatric ward was able to achieve what the somatic ward could
not. Mw. Klasen was redefined as a socially embodied self. As I have said, Mw.
Klasen’s transfer was an acknowledgment that the goal of rehabilitation—that
is, the reconstitution of social embodiment for selves who are damaged in this
regard—could not be achieved in her case. It was acknowledged that it was a
result of the social dislocation in the ward, a dislocation in interpersonal rela-
tions, rather than of any biological disturbance caused by her illness. The
psychogeriatric ward was able to instill an inner discipline precisely by accept-
ing her on her own terms. However, the process of resocialization did involve
the sacrifice of some part of Mw. Klasen’s biography, of the passions, emotions,
and intellectual concerns that marked much of her adult life.
She died a few months later. Her anguish on the Peppel had had a positive
side. She had not given in to her illness completely; her restlessness had been a
sign of her effort at orienting herself to her new environment in the
verpleeghuis. It is as if she gave up on life after her transfer—not in despair,
because she seemed happy, but as a conscious choice.
Conclusion
In recent years, dementia studies has made a significant contribution to
strengthening the relational perspective on the self by describing the influence
of intersubjective processes on its preservation and dissolution. Cross-cultural
ethnographies have made us sensitive to the importance of culture in un-
derstanding personal and institutional responses to dementia (Sabat ).
However, cross-cultural comparisons of institutions, especially medical institu-
tions, are not so common. Such endeavors are complicated by the diversity of
institutional arrangements that are present in any given society. Particular
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institutions have cultural patterns, norms, and expectations that are specific to
them, even if they all tend to conform to the general normative structures of the
wider society. Cultural plurality can exist even within an institution. Thus, the
two wards in the medical institution that I describe seem to embody different
kinds of cultures, such that demented persons are viewed somewhat differently
in each of them.
There is a danger, however, in analyzing institutions through the prism of
culture, as I have done. Cultural relativity, when inscribed in self-referential
bureaucratic systems such as the one I describe, can be used strategically as a
justification for the perpetuation of such systems. Contradictions within the
system are perpetuated, as there is no outside source to which it is accountable.
Thus in the context of the verpleeghuis, the ideal of verpleeghuis medicine—
individualized norms, which establish a unique relationship between the sub-
ject and the verpleeghuis environment—seems to be in a contradictory
relationship to the reality of organizational functioning, which is based on “di-
viding practices” that classify and distribute patients in terms of externally im-
posed norms (cf. Rhodes ).
From this perspective, Leering’s references to the work of Merleau-Ponty
and his discussion of the embodied self can be viewed as an attempt to “natural-
ize” this contradiction by locating it within the person rather than in the tech-
niques of normalization instituted by the verpleeghuis (cf. Leering , ).
However, a careful reading of Leering’s proposal to the architects who designed
the new building reveals a more complex picture. Leering took pains to define
the two central concepts that he used in talking about the individual norm in
relation to the environment of the verpleeghuis. One was leefbaarheid, the qual-
ity of habitability; the other was menselijke funktioneren, human functioning.
Leefbaar maken—to make habitable—that is, to create an environment in the
verpleeghuis that would allow the self the possibility of true embodiment, the
ability to offer itself to the subject’s senses and intentions so that the patient
could function as a complete human being (cf. Leering , ). This allows us
to consider the dividing practices in the verpleeghuis—the division into so-
matic and psychogeriatric sides—as an attempt to realize this ideal.
Clearly, this division has more than a diagnostic or a therapeutic basis. As
we have seen, a person’s location in a particular ward may sometimes be based
on nonmedical criteria. Dividing practices also produce subjectivities. Patients
become who they are in the process of interactive reflexivity with others in the
ward, as well as through their sense of where they are, as we saw in the case of
Mw. Klasen—a nondemented person in a ward for people suffering from de-
mentia. Why did she accept the normalizing practices here, when she had re-
jected them earlier, on the somatic ward? Is it because on the psychogeriatric
side, differences are accepted as the norm? Or alternatively, one could say that
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both sides operate within the same disciplinary regime. They merely use differ-
ent strategies.
Rhodes () thinks of medical taxonomies as offering possibilities for
organizing “the many forms of otherness that mark the limits of . . . manageabil-
ity”—of the self and of discipline in total institutions. While the specific forms of
classification in the verpleeghuis may partake of this logic, I prefer to think of
the somatic and psychogeriatric sides as alternative to each other—each one
representing a different kind of normality and offering a particular form of
normativity (cf. Rabinow ). However, it is only from the vantage point of
psychogeriatrics that it is possible, within the verpleeghuis, to reflect seriously
on the idea of differences and to accept the challenge of constituting new norms
in new environmental contexts.
NOTES
. The term nursing home is not really a correct translation for verpleeghuis. Caregivers
stress the fact that inmates reside in the verpleeghuis. It is not their home. However,
until the late s the designated term for such institutions was indeed
verpleeghtehuis, which can be translated as “nursing home.” This was officially
changed to verpleeghuis, “nursing house,” in keeping with the medical goals of the
institution and an emphasis on its professional functions. However, there is also a
normative dimension to this change of designation. In the Netherlands, the home is
considered to be part of one’s private sphere and cannot be substituted by formal
institutions of any kind.
My ethnography is based on fieldwork in Regina Pacis, a verpleeghuis in Arnhem
in – and again for a short period in . I was able to pay a brief visit to
Regina Pacis again in . The fieldwork was funded by the Indo-Dutch Programme
for Alternatives in Development.
. The instrument that quantifies extent of nursing care is the Behavior Rating Scale for
Old Patients (Beoordelingschaal voor Oudere Patienten [BOP]).
. Verpleeghuis medicine is distinguished from the kind of medicine practiced in hospi-
tals. It operates with a chronic-care model in opposition to the acute/cure model that
characterizes the medical regime in Dutch hospitals.
. Leering defines function as goal-oriented action (cf. Leering ). The ADL functions
are as follows: bathing/washing, clothing oneself, ability to use the toilet, eating, and
continence. Leering thought of the ADL in terms of activities that were concerned
with the private space of one’s own body. He chose not to include walking in this
scheme because it involved more than this private space. He thought of it as an activ-
ity that involved public space (cf. Leering ).
. Interestingly, Leering never talks about the capabilities of patients when he discusses
the need to make the verpleeghuis a personalized space. The onus is on the designers
and the caregivers. This is in marked contrast to the emphasis he gives to patient
initiative while discussing revalidation and the ADL (cf. Leering , ).
. I use the feminine form deliberately. Even though there were five male nurses in
Regina Pacis at the time when I was doing my fieldwork, there were none on the Peppel.
. The lift is a crane that is manually operated to lift up people who are very heavy from
their beds on to their wheelchairs.
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. Mw. is the abbreviation for mevrouw, meaning “madam.” Verpleeghuis residents are
always addressed formally by the staff as if to stress their autonomy. Since the nurse-
patient relationship is often invasive, this is one of the ways in which formal distance
is sought to be established.
. Sinter Klaas is a figure of folklore who distributes gifts to children at Christmastime.
He records the good deeds of children in a golden book and the bad deeds in a black
book. I think Mw. Roosevelt was responding to an implicit infantilization that was
taking place. She was used to the fact that she needed help with the ADL but she
probably felt that more than one person helping her diminished her status as an adult
with an attendant claim on privacy. Before I had started work in the ward I had circu-
lated a note on what I proposed to do on the ward and in my discipline, cultural
anthropology. In India my designation is that of a sociologist, but since I am one of the
rare breed of sociologists who have studied a society other than their own, it was
easier to call myself an anthropologist while I was in the Netherlands.
. The average age of the verpleeghuis patient more than seventy years.
. Disintegrating is the term Mw. Klasen used to describe her condition in a letter she
wrote to one of her previous doctors before she was treated for the tumor in her brain.
Patient records are supposed to be as complete as possible. Considerable effort is
taken to collect documents from all medical institutions with which the patient has
had contact. Even personal correspondence between the staff of such institutions and
patients are gathered together for the patients’ dossiers.
. On my first day on the ward, someone switched on the television while I was feeding
Mw. Klasen. A recording of Vivaldi’s symphony The Four Seasons was being broadcast.
She looked up immediately with an arrested expression on her face. I remembered
reading in her case file that she had been an accomplished musician before her ill-
ness. I asked her, “Mw. You played an instrument, didn’t you?” She nodded and her
face broke into a radiant smile.
. Els van Dongen () speaks of infantilization as a way of relating to the ungovern-
able body. It invites the imposition of disciplinary techniques—the imposition of ex-
ternal rhythms of work and patterns of bodily care—but also allows trust and intimacy
between caregivers and patients. It is one way of overturning norms of autonomy and
bodily discreteness.
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Alzheimer’s Disease, the Person within,




SCENE 1: It was my first day of observation at a small psychogeriatric outpatient
clinic, part of the Institute of Psychiatry at the Federal University of Rio de
Janeiro (UFRJ).1 This was one of my field sites for my study of the psychiatry of
aging.2 In came the first patient, a small, friendly woman of sixty-four. She sat
down in front of the attending psychiatrist, Dr. Fisz, and told him in a coherent
manner that lately she had been feeling constantly depressed.3 She explained
that her family had once been large, but now the kids had left home and her
husband did not like to go out. “I withdrew from life.” The psychiatrist asked her
questions about her general health and requested that she come back for a bat-
tery of medical and neuropsychological tests, an electroencephalogram (“just in
case”), and some blood tests. He prescribed an antidepressant and recom-
mended that she attended a church group. He told me, after she had left, that he
was considering the possibility of Alzheimer’s disease, something that aston-
ished me, since the woman’s narrative had made sense to me and her self-
diagnosis of depression fit exactly into my lay diagnostic schema.
SCENE 2: Some weeks later, a Canadian visitor came to the clinic. She was a social
psychologist responsible for a World Health Organization (WHO) project in Bra-
zil. She accompanied me one morning to observe some psychogeriatric treat-
ments. A resident in psychiatry was applying the CAMDEX (Cambridge
Examination for Mental Disorders of the Elderly) neuropsychological test (Roth
et al. ) to an older woman who was sitting at a small table with her daugh-
ter. The young resident was charming and the patients liked her, but she was a
bit bored by the repetitive task of administering the test to almost everybody
DIVIDED GAZES 241
who came to the clinic. After giving us permission to observe the session, the
resident continued with her task, but interrupted the test to explain to the Ca-
nadian visitor the elderly woman’s condition. Embarrassing details of the
patient’s life and “misbehavior” were revealed as if the person about whom she
was speaking was not even present. The Canadian visitor was visibly shocked
and tried to stop the explanation, but was reassured by the resident that it was
all right.
SCENE 3: Very soon it became evident to me that many Brazilian family caregivers
located the origins of Alzheimer’s disease in the affected person’s life, a hard life
with which the person was not able to deal (Leibing , a).4 I mentioned
this at the weekly sessão clínica at the Institute of Psychiatry, where that week a
case of dementia was being discussed by doctors, other health professionals,
and students. One of the psychiatrists stood up and told me that he doubted my
account, since he saw numerous patients and no one had ever brought this up
with him.5
Divided Gazes
What do these scenes have in common, besides revealing how differently cer-
tain symptoms related to dementia can be understood by various social actors?
And with this question comes another: how do different epistemic cultures
(Knorr-Cetina ) matter to the person diagnosed with dementia, if at all? In
this chapter I argue that the scenes described above reveal two major ways of
dealing with dementia, generally perceived as opposed to each other. One is
based on an epistemic culture within biomedicine, often described as neutral,
natural, and universal (see Gordon ).The other is based on “psy sciences,”
perceived by many as subjectifying and directed toward interiority (see Rose
). Although I draw on my fieldwork in Brazil, my argument is that these vig-
nettes point to a general structure in Alzheimer’s care and research that is inde-
pendent from the Brazilian context and that is in need of being problematized.
It is easy to detect the two opposed epistemologies—the two gazes—in the
vignettes above. The first scene is about a potential forgetting, something the
psychiatrist was reading through the lens of the signs of a depressive mood. The
patient, as the observing anthropologist, perceived the symptoms as embedded
in the life of the elderly woman; the psychiatrist interpreted her sadness as the
first sign of an underlying brain disease.6 This scene is from a time () when
public awareness about Alzheimer’s, “the disease of the century,” was spreading
in urban Brazil—as had occurred ten years earlier in North America (Leibing
, ).7
In this psychogeriatric unit, Alzheimer’s was suspected, or at least
investigated, in nearly every patient, although it was a unit for mental health in
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general. This felt persecutorial to me at the beginning of my fieldwork, but I also
respected Dr. Fisz’s knowledge, as he was one of the country’s leading geriatric
psychiatrists. Reasons for this rather exclusive focus on Alzheimer’s include a
general recognition of the rapidly growing number of elderly persons in Brazil
(Veras ) and the discovery of this population as consumers and voters; the
growing number of articles in scientific journals pointing to a promising new
field; an extensive discussion of matters related to aging within the general
media (Leibing ); and the desire of some to gather a sample for future pub-
lications or pharmaceutical trials in this emerging field of expertise. My initial
feeling was that many elderly people were transformed through this sometimes
hypothetical diagnosis into something “less alive,” a new kind of being. In the
mid-s, in the both popular and professional literature, Alzheimer’s was re-
garded almost exclusively as a “loss of self” (Cohen and Eisdorfer ).
In the second scenario above, the resident considered the old woman to be
too far removed from reality to be part of “us.” The Canadian visitor, who at that
time was herself dealing with a close friend’s suffering from Alzheimer’s disease
at home, saw in front of her a disabled person who somehow, despite having
difficulties, still shared a common reality with the people around her.
IT WOULD BE EASY to see these vignettes as proof of reductionist (mostly) bio-
medical perceptions and interventions, as opposed to humanistic
biopsychosocial approaches in the social sciences and many health professions.
This dichotomy, though, is too simplistic when aligned with the moral catego-
ries of good and bad rather than being viewed as belonging to the history of
thought. The dichotomy has roots in the old division between Naturwissen-
schaften and Geisteswissenschaften (see, for example, Taylor ; Rouse ;
Latour ). I do not want to focus on the roots and origins of these two
strands of science, in addition to their common history, as others have done
this already (see note ). Rather, I argue that this opposition is, in reality, much
more complex and intertwined. I do so by taking a closer look at the
“personhood movement” and its recent history of rescuing “the person
within”—and how the tenets of this movement have been incorporated into
biomedical care.
The personhood movement needs to be seen in a wider context. It is often
defined as holistic care that acknowledges the fading self of the Alzheimer’s
patient. It is explicitly opposed to biomedical epistemologies. Indeed, following
Foucault (), I argue that the personhood movement problematizes the pre-
vailing biomedical discourse on Alzheimer’s disease. The movement apparently
introduced uncertainty and a loss of familiarity to this prevailing biomedical
discourse on Alzheimer’s, something that Foucault considered essential for a
problematization, because it requires a certain detachment from that phenom-
DIVIDED GAZES 243
enon as something taken for granted (see Foucault ). Consequently, the
task should not be to repair the conflict between two epistemologies, as in bio-
medicine and the personhood movement, but “to understand and to put forth a
diagnosis of ‘what makes these responses simultaneously possible’” (Rabinow
, ff.).
Personhood Wars
Personhood, in general, refers to the person within—the reflexive, immaterial,
communicable essence of a person that is located deep within the body, but
that is sometimes veiled by symptoms.8 Symptoms to be treated by medical doc-
tors, such as depression or forgetfulness, are localized in the brain. Making
these pathologies visible has been important throughout the history of
Alzheimer’s disease. Nonetheless, both the staining of nerve cells by Alois
Alzheimer at the beginning of the twentieth century and positron-emission to-
mography (PET) scans and other forms of brain-imaging technologies nowadays
show overlapping results for “normal aging” and pathologized brains.9 It was com-
mon in the mid-twentieth century to evoke personhood (meaning personality) as
the factor that made the difference. For example, Harvard psychiatrist David
Rothschild wrote in  that “the person’s capacity to compensate for the dam-
age [of senile lesions] seems to be the factor which determines whether or not a
psychosis [that is, senile dementia] will occur. Here one must reckon with unfa-
vorable traits of personality, innate or acquired, which may be associated with a
weak capacity . . . , but psychological stress and strain may also play a role by low-
ering the patient’s resistance” (Rothschild and Sharp , ; see also Leibing
, ; Ballenger ). Since the beginning of the s, compensation has
been derived from the “brain reserve capacity”—the notion that a higher degree
of education or IQ (sometimes also the size of the brain) results in a later appear-
ance of symptoms. Although “this relationship may be an indirect one” (Coffey
), brain reserve capacity is now invoked to explain apparent mismatches
between observed degrees of neuropathology (for example, the so-called plaques
and tangles of Alzheimer’s disease) and measurements of cognitive performance.
Most biomedical reasoning regarding Alzheimer’s is related to cognition.
From the point of view of the psy sciences, which encompass the previously
mentioned personhood movement, the difference in question is not only the
assumed materiality of the brain or of genes in biomedicine versus the immate-
riality of the person or self, comparable to what once was the soul, but also that
the latter approach is linked to a personal narrative, to communication, and to
the ethics of good caring. The biomedical care of persons suffering from senility
is therefore often seen as iatrogenic, in its denial of personhood and is thus
causing premature social death.
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SCENE 4: In  the Institute of Psychiatry in Rio de Janeiro received an unusu-
ally high level of funding from the Ministry of Education to build a center for the
elderly (CDA) within the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Although the cen-
ter was intended to treat all mental health problems in those over fifty-nine
years old, the then director of the Institute of Psychiatry determined that the
name of the center should contain the word Alzheimer’s, to call attention to the
disease and possibly result in more funding.10 Alzheimer’s, in , was the dis-
ease of the moment.
The center’s multidisciplinary team, however, faced a great challenge:
while the medical doctors had direct access to research and publications from
abroad, the other health professionals (psychologists, occupational therapists,
physiotherapist, and so on) did not. Except for one psychologist who was start-
ing an academic career (her master’s thesis was on personhood), the others
were mostly trained in clinical work based on “the spoken word.” This kind of
approach was not always useful in sustaining the desired therapeutic relation-
ships with people suffering from senility, a condition that in an advanced state
makes coherent communication extremely difficult. On some days, the indi-
viduals who were in treatment wanted to go home; asked repetitively for their
partners; did not react to suggestions; cried; offended other people; or did not
care for painting, carpet weaving, or other activities, while others behaved just
the opposite. Initially, a trial-and-error approach predominated at the day cen-
ter, while the professionals faced a “mysterious disease,” as Alzheimer’s is often
characterized.
After a while, though, a kind of routine was established. Many patients en-
joyed coming to the center, family members joined the institution and offered
assistance, dance parties were organized once a month. The music therapist
discovered that even in an advanced stage, some elderly persons suffering from
a dementia could remember whole texts from songs from their youth; one psy-
chologist helped the patients to plant flowers in pots and observed some who
did not forget to water the plants in the following days. Even psychotherapy was
initiated for some patients—the CDA had discovered the person within.
This kind of practice, addressed to the person within, contributed to a deep
division within the center; a battle between “hard science” and “soft science”
became the cause of passionate fights and power struggles. Doctors were ac-
cused of treating patients badly, of not caring. There were, of course, the “other
doctors” (os médicos diferentes), those who spent more time with each patient,
subjectified the suffering, and often had problems with time management be-
cause they spent too long with each family (fifteen minutes was scheduled for
each medical encounter, compared with forty-five to sixty for a meeting with a
psychologist). However, also on the “psy side,” some professionals did not work
the expected way; they were uninterested, without the necessary empathy, or
ended up quitting because working with Alzheimer’s patients was excessively
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frustrating. The center soon had its “personhood war”—the staff were divided
almost completely in half, with the exception of certain professionals who
bridged both sides.
WHILE DOCTORS WERE treating symptoms that were peripheral to the phenom-
enon of “Alzheimer’s”—its central sign, cognition, has no effective treatment
(Blech )—they were nevertheless legitimated in that they were treating a
medical condition. The other helping professions were facing “the mysterious
disease Alzheimer’s” without institutionally anchored texts to legitimate their
practices. This changed when the first texts on personhood were discussed in
staff meetings. (Among them was Diana McGowin’s book [] on her own ex-
perience with Alzheimer’s.) These kinds of texts declare that nonmedical inter-
ventions are central to the care of Alzheimer’s because of their “holistic
approach,” something that biomedical interventions were unable to provide.
Tanya Luhrmann () describes psychiatric training in the United States
as a “somehow brutal experience.” She concludes, however, “It is, of course,
more complicated than that. But much about hospital experience invites a
young psychiatrist to feel detached and distant from her patients, while outpa-
tient psychotherapy invites a more tangled, intimate involvement” ().
Luhrmann convincingly describes how medical training enables detachment
for some, but not all, doctors, by separating “the person from the body.” The
Brazilian scenes described above seem to show the consequences of these two
orientations within medicine: the way one understands a disease influences the
way one asks questions, influencing—but not determining—how one is able to
perceive a person and his or her disease and how one is able to provide treat-
ment (see Hacking ). An important element of the conflict between “the
two gazes” is what Pierre Bourdieu calls “doxa” (Bourdieu and Eagleton )—
taken-for-granted dominant knowledge and the tensions created by reacting to
it. What follows is a discussion of the contestation of biomedical knowledge, as
seen by the personhood movement, in dementia care that is based on an attach-
ment to the patient and on the attempt to communicate with the person within.
This is generally formulated by creating dichotomous absolute categories.
For instance, the personhood movement explicitly contrasts itself with bio-
medicine, the latter perceived as inhuman and objectifying. In this sense, Bond
et al. () point to the “medicalization” and “labeling” of insight in
Alzheimer’s patients as found in forty-nine psychiatry or psychology texts, a
practice that results in a “more [acute] depersonalization [and] loss of indepen-
dence” (), while an Irish initiative for dementia care describes this new vi-
sion as the following:
Throughout the continuum of care, it is critical to keep the individual
person at the forefront. A worldwide movement is growing to maintain the
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“personhood” of dementia patients, so easily lost in the language of neurological
diagnosis, management of symptoms, financial costs and care arrangements. As
the late Tom Kitwood, who had been leader of the Bradford (U.K.) De-
mentia Group, explained: “A radically different approach has been gath-
ering momentum, bringing with it a quiet transformation of attitude and
care practice . . . in many countries throughout the world. . . . One of the
most striking facts about this convergence is that almost identical con-
clusions have been reached by virtually independent routes. . . . The be-
ginnings of a paradigm can now be discerned: while its principles and
practices aim to be thoroughly compatible with the well-attested findings
of biomedical science, the central difference is that its principal focus is the
person, not the brain” (European Institute of Women’s Health, n.d.; empha-
ses added).
The person within has been discovered relatively recently in dementia care,
but there already exists a long discussion on personhood in the social sciences.
The classical text by Marcel Mauss () on the social history of the person
shows that within many Western societies, a person, a psychological being, be-
came his or her consciousness. More specifically, anthropologists have chal-
lenged the notion of a unified self and revealed the ethnocentrism within many
of its notions (for an overview, see Sökefeld ).11 Professionals who work with
psychodynamic theories create, as did Sigmund Freud, an archeology of the in-
ner self, and ethicists discuss when personhood begins and ends. The bioethi-
cist Theodore Fleischer, in a recent article on what he calls “the personhood
wars,” distinguishes between personalism, in which a “human being achieves a
claim to life and medical resources only if he possesses certain capacities, pri-
marily cognitive abilities and self-consciousness” (, ; emphases added), and
physicalism or vitalism—comparable to Charles Taylor’s human potential—
whereby “every human being, even one who lacks capacities, is entitled to have
a life” (, ). Fleischer’s sympathies clearly lie with the latter approach,
arguing that a human being is more than cognition and self-consciousness, an
argument that many recent Alzheimer’s activists would agree with.
Charles Taylor () juxtaposes two types of scientists: “the correlators,”
who are linked to the natural sciences, and “the interpreters,” who follow a
hermeneutic approach. This is another example of opposing bad (objectifying
and erklärend [explaining]) with good (verstehend [understanding]) science. The
roots of much modern biomedical theory were formed in the seventeenth cen-
tury and are generally opposed to the Romantic origins of the “interpretative”
approach, especially linked to Herder and Humboldt.12 Clifford Geertz ()
criticizes Taylor’s analysis as too simple-minded. Geertz points to the constant
changes in the framing of these sciences and to the several forms of “crossing
over” from one type to the other, using the example of current science studies.
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He claims that Taylor’s description of the natural sciences is too schematic and
suggests, instead, reframing natural and human science by taking into account
the existence of “a loose assemblage of differently focused, rather self-involved,
and variously overlapping research communities in both the human and the
natural sciences . . . and the abandonment therewith of the Taylor-Dilthey con-
ception of two continental enterprises” (; emphasis in the original).
Nonetheless, Taylor also states that within this “dialogue of the deaf” there
is a place for both (an argument I very much agree with), although Taylor notes
that the “limitless imperialism of the correlators” (, ) is the source of
many tensions between the two. Taylor’s point is confirmed by the recent ap-
pearance of criticism in the media about unethical practices within the phar-
maceutical industry (for example, Angell ). This kind of criticism has to be
separated from a general notion of biomedicine as ontologically bad, because
the latter type of thinking limits an informed, critical view. By looking at the
historical roots of the “two gazes,” it is possible to describe the personhood
movement as a “natural companion” of the biomedical approach—or at least, to
describe the two as epistemologies with a long history of coexistence. What I
want to argue is that the divided gaze and its almost automatic division into
good and bad science, psychology and cognition, or soft and hard science has a
long history and is deeply rooted in “Western” thinking (see, for example,
Ginzburg ). I now turn to the personhood side of dementia research in or-
der to illustrate that at least part of the discussion of personhood is, first, essen-
tially a dynamic formation of a morally loaded category and, second, part of an
ongoing historical process of defining life and death in many societies, of what
one could call a “biosocial death.”
Personhood, Life, and Death
What could it mean in general to say that possible ways to be a person
can from time to time come into being or disappear?
—Ian Hacking, “Making Up People”
Personhood is everywhere. The first three submissions we received for potential
inclusion in this volume described the person within. Gerontology congresses
discuss personhood extensively. Even within more biomedically oriented meet-
ings, personhood is a topic, in addition to all the “hard” facts. There are differ-
ent approaches: for instance, phenomenological perspectives; accounts given
by individuals suffering from senility; and measurable “insight”—the difference
between what the affected person says, as opposed to the words of the caregiver
or of neuropsychological tests, as providing the baseline of truth (for an over-
view, see Clare ).13
Personhood is generally invoked in reference to forms of human life and to
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certain human beings (and sometimes to animals)—for example, fetuses, coma-
tose people, and some disabled people—who cannot speak for themselves. In
most cases, discussing personhood (although sometimes understood as person-
ality; that is, what makes a human being specific and distinguishable from oth-
ers) gives life to people who might otherwise easily become transformed into a
mere “capacity to be killed” or “bare life” (Agamben , ). In this sense, the
unveiling of personhood is an attempt to extend life in life, but it also reframes
life itself in novel ways: “[B]iological ethics ascribes each human life equal
worth. But our practices and techniques show us that, on the contrary, the bio-
logical lives of individual human beings are recurrently subject to judgements
of worth. . . . [S]uch a judgement [is] about the relative and comparative ‘quality
of life’ of differently composed human beings and of different ways of being
human” (Rose , –).
The extension of the human life span generally refers to practices directed
against a death that might be called biological, although death’s very biology
has been redefined recently and is still an issue of debate. The change in the
definition of death, from failure of the heart and lungs to failure of the brain
(“brain death”), that occurred in some countries at the end of the s (Lock
) hides another historical shift that no doubt is less radical, but still has
important consequences for affected people and their families. I am talking
here about the changing notions of personhood in Alzheimer’s disease and
other forms of dementia in relation to a death in life, or what social scientists,
for some time, have been calling a “social death.” My argument here is that
when talking about personhood, one can understand it as a kind of life exten-
sion, or one could frame it as the cultural negotiations around a biosocial death.
A person can simply be excluded from society by others ignoring him or her
(for example, through incarceration or stigma). There is also a second, more
specific form—a biosocial death—in some medical conditions or with some
medical technologies, in which a person’s capability of participating in society
diminishes to the point that the person is considered a nonperson or as not
having full personhood. I here use the term biosocial because the two are insepa-
rable; a social death occurs because of a person’s biology, and biology cannot be
described apart from the social body. Additionally, related to what Paul
Rabinow () calls “biosociality,” it is very likely that new groups and new
identities are formed around certain forms of a biosocial death (see, for ex-
ample, Jaber Gubrium’s [] description of the formation of Alzheimer’s lay
groups in the United States).
People who are able to stay alive only with the help of machines provide
examples of biosocial death, but reduced cognitive functioning (as in, for ex-
ample, dementia) in an individual can lead to the perception that that indi-
vidual is a nonperson.14 Contrast the criterion for dementia as given in the
International Classification of Diseases, tenth edition (ICD–)—the “deterior-
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ization in both memory and thinking which is sufficient to impair personal ac-
tivities of daily living” (Cummings and Khachaturian )—with the tradi-
tional definition of person as a “self-conscious or rational being” (Webster’s
Encyclopedia, d ed.), emphasizing the importance of reflexivity and rationality.
It is fashionable to quote Giorgio Agamben, whose work on “bare life” has
influenced a number of scholars, but I want to focus here on only one aspect of his
work. Agambem () calls attention to a space without rights located between
life and death. It is a frightening no man’s land, representing “black holes in
world society” (Assheuer ). These “black holes” are both geographical spaces
(such as death camps and some long-term-care facilities for the elderly [Augé
; Scheper-Hughes ]) and existential spaces where only the body counts,
not the person. One who inhabits such a space is a “living dead” person, leading
a “life devoid of value,” as Agamben puts it, in terms that might also describe a
person with dementia under certain, changing circumstances, as we will see.
Charles Taylor () has made a similar point. There is a “universal human
potential,” and this potential, “rather than anything a person may have made of
it, is what ensures that each person deserves respect” ()—even those who are
disabled or comatose and incapable of realizing this potential by themselves.
This “potential” bears a certain relation to Agamben’s idea of the body stripped
of its personhood: bare life. The difference is that although bare life can be
killed “without [it] being murder,” Taylor’s idea of universal human potential is
exactly what protects life from being killed. Applying these insights to the terms
of the personhood movement, some biomedical practices involving Alzheimer’s
patients assume bare life, while “holistic approaches” assume universal human
potential.
But there is more to the new ethics of dementia care. These ethics have led
to new sensibilities that are of inestimable value for formerly “mad” people or
the “living dead” and that at the same time have created new values that often
are taken for granted. I now turn to the imagined and flexible boundaries be-
tween life and biosocial death, within a discussion of personhood. A focus on
these boundaries gives rise to an analytical image, of a space between life and
death that results in norms and values for both the living and the dead. Four
short discussions of interrelated moral landscapes of personhood help to make
my point about these shifting boundaries of life in life.
Dead Windows/The Great Astonishment
We never really knew when to say good-bye.
—the son of a deceased Alzheimer’s victim, in Bob Artley,
Ginny: A Love Remembered
The first nonmedical texts written about those suffering from Alzheimer’s dis-
ease often stemmed from caregivers mourning the loss of a loved one in life.
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Their descriptions are embedded in accounts that deal with the frustrating ex-
perience of caring for a partner, parent, or friend who resembles only physically
that loved one, a person whose essence has been destroyed by the “gray plague.”
Most of the early literature on Alzheimer’s is centered on the suffering of family
caregivers; there are very few works on the despair experienced by the affected
person when dealing with the dramatic changes in him—or herself. According
to the earliest handbooks on the disease, caregivers need to supervise the per-
son suffering from dementia day and night because of the danger this person
may pose to him—or herself and others (sources of such danger being gas, fire,
the risk of getting lost, and so on). The diagnosis engulfed the whole person.
The hopelessness and emptiness expressed in the language that was used
to situate a demented person outside a shared world are illustrated by book
titles such as Alzheimer’s Disease: Coping with a Living Death (Woods ). In an-
other book on early public Alzheimer’s culture, Jaber Gubrium reproduces, for
example, a poem called “No Longer You,” written by a caregiver about her hus-
band. This poem had been published several times in the newsletter of the
Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Association (ADRDA) in the early
s. The author writes that “the body is yours, a shell,” and compares the eyes
of her sick husband with the “windows of a vacant house.” The poem finishes
with the statement that “that person” was no longer her husband and that she
was only his caregiver (Lois Ellert, quoted in Gubrium , –).
In writings such as these from the s, the notion of the nonperson
comes through clearly for three main reasons. First, the image of a nonperson
(“a shell”) dominated the early popular and scientific literature on Alzheimer’s
disease because at that time little could be done for the sufferer. A second rea-
son for this extremism is that new diseases are often described in apocalyptic
terms. It might be difficult to imagine that Alzheimer’s, the disease of the cen-
tury, as it has often been called, was an unknown phenomenon only twenty
years ago. As Barry Reisberg noted in one of the first books of the “new era” of
Alzheimer’s, “It is difficult to discuss a condition for which no name exists. Indeed,
it is very easy for people to completely ignore or deny a condition which they do
not even have a word for” (, ; emphases added). Jaber Gubrium () de-
scribed the dawning public awareness of Alzheimer’s and specifically how inter-
est developed at the grassroots and political levels. Patrick Fox () traced the
political, economic, and professional influences that shaped the new category
Alzheimer’s disease, as a new battle was joined against an ailment that threatened
all who were aging.
A third reason for the prevalence of the nonperson in the early Alzheimer’s
literature is that, in general, people visited a doctor much later in the disease
than they do today, simply because public awareness was not as widespread as it
is now. These advanced cases became the model for nearly all people with de-
mentia. Reisberg, in , described one case: “The tragedy was that this brilliant
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and wonderful man was being gradually and inexorably destroyed” ().
Reisberg delivered an empathetic and sensitive account of his case, but it was
“the man”—not a part of the man’s faculties—that was being destroyed. This
totalitization was typical of the s, and it continues today in many medical
and nonmedical texts (for example, Spohr , ).
In a related development, after the publication in  of the third edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), psychiatry
changed dramatically. It was rebiologized: the unconscious was replaced by the
brain as the primary site of mental health—a shift from “symbol to sign” (Gaines
)—and later, in the early s, the new genetics appeared (Young ;
Leibing b).
As I have shown elsewhere (Leibing , , ), interest in studying
Alzheimer’s disease reemerged in the mid-s with the Newcastle study (Roth
et al. ). The authors tried to find a significant correlation between the num-
ber of plaques in the brain and the degree of cognitive impairment.15 Symptoms
were linked to the degenerating brain both through the brain’s new visibility,
made possible by new technologies, and through the potential for quantifica-
tion that came with these new technologies. A similar, more recent study also
perpetuated the image of elderly people as children. Shakespeare’s notion of a
“second childhood” was clearly evident:
A new MR imaging technique used to study white matter in the brain has
found something intriguing—the brains of Alzheimer’s patients show
some of the same signs as the immature brains of children.
Diffusion tensor MR imaging examinations were performed on 
normal persons, ranging in age from infancy to late adulthood, says Jef-
frey Lassig, MD, of the University of Michigan, and lead author of the
study. . . .
“When we compared  Alzheimer’s patients’ brains to  others of the
same age with no signs of dementia, the Alzheimer’s patients’ brains
showed significantly higher water molecule diffusion. In other words, the
Alzheimer’s patients’ white matter behaved more like the white matter of
a child’s brain than that of a normal adult,” says Dr. Lassig. However, the
increased diffusion in Alzheimer’s patients is most likely related to dam-
age or dysfunction of axons (white matter tracts), while the higher water
diffusion in the white matter of children is a normal phenomenon in im-
mature brains, he says.16
These brain images were (and still are) exceedingly powerful; with their
growing influence, the general notion of the nonperson dominated discussions
of dementia, even in cases in which the disease was only in the beginning
stages. And even when there was clearly self-awareness in patients diagnosed
with Alzheimer’s, they were often automatically considered irresponsible and
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irrational, which likely influenced the way in which they experienced them-
selves and the world around them. The effects of this view of Alzheimer’s is
described in McGowin’s () book, one of the first accounts of living with the
disease; her doctor mentions that her insight “is uncharacteristic for
[Alzheimer’s]” (), and some doubt her diagnosis completely.17 In an especially
touching and often-quoted section of the book, her outcry is specifically against
this attribution of nonpersonhood: “If I am no longer a woman, why do I still feel
I’m one? If no longer worth holding, why do I crave it? If no longer sensual, why
do I still enjoy the soft texture of satin and silk against my skin? My every mol-
ecule seems to scream out that I do, indeed, exist, and that existence must be
valued by someone!” ()
Accounts such as McGowin’s illustrate Charles Taylor’s claim that nonrec-
ognition or misrecognition “can inflict harm or can be a form of oppression,
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” (,
). Although the early biomedical and caregiver images of Alzheimer’s disease
mostly overlapped, first-person accounts were published and read in the s,
a sign that an awareness of personhood was developing. These accounts were
followed in that decade by quickly growing groups of Alzheimer’s caregivers and
interpretive health professionals dedicated to the new challenge of
“Alzheimer’s” (see Gubrium ).
The New Voices of Alzheimer’s
Dorothy [Wordsworth] seems to have recognized the onset of her own
mental confusion some time in the year 1835. . . . Three lines of verse in
her last journal suggest her self-awareness: My tremulous prayers feeble
hands/Refuse to labour with the mind/And that too oft is misty dark &
blind.
—Robert Gittings, and Jo Manton, Dorothy Wordsworth
In contrast with Dorothy Wordsworth, who worried in her diary about the
changes in her “misty” mind, a growing number of affected persons today make
their experiences and worries more public, at least in North America and Eu-
rope.18 The impact on the general public is probably minimal, but affected fami-
lies have increasing access to these kinds of accounts that shed light on “lived”
aspects of the disease. These writings enable others to connect to the reality
of the person with Alzheimer’s, in other words, to recognize a shared reality
with, or ‘personhood’ in, the family member after the diagnosis of the disease.
Thus, the diagnosis does not immediately signify a biosocial death (see Snyder
).
Recently, Thomas DeBaggio (), who had previously been a journalist,
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published an account of his journey into Alzheimer’s disease. His book reveals a
markedly different perspective from that of McGowin’s account, which was
written by her in the s (her book was published in , but the story she
tells takes place when her symptoms started, more than ten years earlier). In the
image shown on the cover of DeBaggio’s book, only half his face is depicted,
implying that he is only in part a full human being.19 He writes: “For me now, any
question of identity becomes profound and difficult. Without memory you lose
the idea of who you are . . . I am flooded with early memories preserved in pro-
tected places of my brain where Alzheimer’s does not reign supreme. These
memories become the last remnants of my search for who I am. Am I anything
without them?” ().
DeBaggio describes himself as sometimes confused, sometimes angry, and
sometimes full of fear of the moment when the “eager beast in my brain gob-
bling time in both directions” will take over completely. However, there is never
a notion of being treated as a nonperson; on the contrary, he describes his fam-
ily and friends as supportive and understanding. He exposes the great suffering
of family members witnessing the sick person fade away and brings to light the
fear that can arise: his son worries about carrying the genes that increase his
possibility of getting the disease himself. For DeBaggio, the real moment of be-
coming a nonperson—although coinciding with the loss of cognitive function-
ing, the feared black hole—is primarily linked to his becoming a burden. As a
result of earlier diagnosis as well as patients’ enjoying the attribution of
personhood, today’s Alzheimer’s patients are more independent, which in
many Western societies is highly valued. Nevertheless, the preoccupation with
becoming a burden is present: “At some point, I will no longer experience the
pain of watching my mind deteriorate to a point of incomprehension. Then the
loved ones around me will have the unwelcome task to look after me and shelter
me from harm. My burden is slight compared to that of the truly living
(DeBaggio , ).
The beauty of these texts lies in the strength and courage of their authors in
dealing with a reality that signals great trepidation for many. They describe a
new world, and their effort can help many in similar situations. Anne Basting
() correctly states that these accounts nevertheless write about, and not
from within, dementia, since a coherent text is thought to be the only way to
address the readers. Coherent memory, independence, and identity are so
strongly interwoven that the authors themselves limit personhood to the peri-
ods of “normalcy,” when they are part of the “truly living,” as DeBaggio puts it.
Basting, like some advocates of the personhood movement (cf. Kitwood ),
suggests a reformulation of the concept of memory as a more inclusive notion,
conceived of as social and interactive (see also Halbwachs ; Kirmayer ;
Leibing ).
254 ANNETTE LEIBING
Experts for the Person Within
When personhood emerged as a topic within dementia care in the s and
(more intensively) the s, it challenged the previous, pessimistic assump-
tions held about the personhood of the person diagnosed with Alzheimer’s.
Texts were published by professionals and caregivers who had more intense
contact with Alzheimer’s patients than did many doctors and, therefore, were
better able to perceive the interactive person within. Further, they were, like
most psychologists, trained to recognize interiority. Michael Ignatieff, writing
about his mother, who had suffered from Alzheimer’s, describes exactly this
kind of discovery:
It [my mother’s disease] changed my view of what a person is, to realize
that she remained a person when no attribute of personhood remained. Go
figure, as they say. . . . It seems to me slightly scandalous that . . . it has not
been made a properly philosophical subject, because these people are
taking us to places we would rather not think about and what they have
to say—to that degree that they can say anything at all—should teach us
something about what a person is, what human identity is. It taught me,
for example, to be less sentimental about memory as a carrier of human
continuity. My mother had no memory whatever, but she was the same
person. There were continuities. (, –; emphasis added)
And a Brazilian psychologist, working with patients suffering from demen-
tia in a public psychogeriatric institution, declared, “My interest in this topic,
the impact of [Alzheimer’s] on the family and the patient, started when I was
treating patients with [the disease]. They told me clearly how bad they were
feeling when they perceived that now they were different persons than they
were before and how much that had changed their daily life” (personal commu-
nication).
Assuming that “the correlators” and “the interpreters” form a historically
intertwined, almost interdependent unit, it is not surprising that it was in the
s that the personhood movement emerged as a reaction against the
“atheoretical and explanatory” approach in psychiatry after DSM-III. The
rebiologization of psychiatry, certainly responsible for a greater detachment of
psychiatrists from their patients (Luhrmann ), provoked a reaction that
represents probably one of the most important driving forces behind the
emerging moral economy of the personhood movement.
The personhood movement is also intimately linked to new sensibilities in
end-of-life issues. In the s, the phrase terminal care was replaced by palliative
care. Palliative care, referring to the relief of pain and other symptoms, further
accentuated what had started in the s, a general individualization and con-
trol over death and its rituals (Walter ). Dying people, through the help of
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counselors, were encouraged to talk about their feelings and to actively shape
the final period of their lives. Cicely Saunders, the foremost figure in the adop-
tion of palliative care, reveals in her biography (Du Boulay , quoted in
Walter ) that for her, as a Christian, a good death did not mean that one had
to come to terms with God; rather, a good death was one in which the patient
“was himself.” Religion was now often replaced by spirituality, entailing a claim
on self-realization and the search for “your God within” (ibid.). All these ele-
ments have directed a gaze into people’s interior world and contributed to the
emergence of personhood as a value designating good care. This does not mean
that interiority did not exist before—indeed, Peter Gay () has written an
extensive moral history of introspection. What I want to argue is that in the
s a long-existing trend was reformulated in a more inclusive way, one that
encompasses the whole of life’s course; not only the fetus but also the comatose
and those near death have become persons to be rescued from a biosocial
death.
As a result, the boundary between life and biosocial death has been further
remodeled by scholars and health professionals who specialize in rescuing the
cognitively impaired. Taylor (, ) observed that we need “a rather differ-
ent theory of meaning, more in line with those developed in the Romantic pe-
riod,” and two important authors within the personhood movement initiated a
discussion on this point within the health professions (for an overview, see
Brack ; Hulko ). Naomi Feil (, ) developed validation therapy,
which interprets some of the signs or symptoms of dementia as feelings that
express conflicts stemming from earlier periods in life.20 And Kitwood, contest-
ing the common notion that dementia is a “death that leaves the body behind,”
in his book Dementia Reconsidered: The Person Comes First (), summarizes his
approach toward what he calls “person-centered care”: “Contact with dementia
or other forms of severe cognitive disability can—and indeed should—take us
out of our customary patterns of over-busyness, hypercognitivism and extreme
talkativity, into a being in which emotion and feeling are given a much larger
place” ().
Quoting Martin Buber’s comment “All real living is meeting,” Kitwood and
his followers insist on two prerequisites for proper care: () an emphasis on the
capacities of the feeling person and not only on his or her losses, and () a re-
definition of memory as interactive and not individualized. It is probable that
these ideal prescriptions have never been attained within an institutional set-
ting. Nonetheless, they have inspired a number of admirable projects that have
made a difference (see Brack , Basting, this volume).21 To follow Kitwood’s
instructions through completely would bring about a major revolution, not only
because it would mean a large investment in time and staff during a period of
ever tightening health budgets, but also because redefining “memory as inter-
active” would only be possible after a major shift from what is deeply rooted in
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our thinking and practice: that memory is the carrier of individual identity and
personhood. I argue in the conclusion of this chapter that a certain shift is al-
ready happening, at times when the boundaries between self and other is
blurred.
Medicating the Person Within
Another recent impulse for defining the boundaries between person and non-
person stems from the pharmaceutical industry, which is discovering the per-
son within. A relatively new focus on “behavioral and psychological signs and
symptoms in dementia” (BPSSD or BPSD) (Finkel ; Kurz ) is, in reality,
nothing new. Alois Alzheimer’s first patient, Auguste D., suffered initially from
an obsessive jealousy regarding her husband and developed a number of other
symptoms in the following years, which Alzheimer meticulously described
(Maurer and Maurer ; Jürgs ). But throughout the history of
Alzheimer’s disease, cognitive symptoms have always been in the foreground.
Ian Hacking () believes that this is because memory is more easily mea-
sured than emotions, such as irritability or jealousy.
Since , there has been a renewed interest in behavioral and psychologi-
cal problems. In , the International Psychogeriatric Association (IPA)—with
an “unrestricted grant from Jansen Pharmaceutica”—organized an international
consensus conference on the topic:
The development of the Consensus Statement on Behavioral and Psycho-
logical Symptoms of Dementia (BPSD) represents a first step toward rec-
ognizing that these are core symptoms of dementia and that it is as essential
to study and treat them as it is to study and treat any other aspects of
dementing disorders. It is to be hoped that by better defining BPSD, we
will develop better standardized measures and scales which we can use to
further study the symptom clusters and assess the outcome of our treat-
ment interventions. (Finkel ; emphases added)
If there are behavioral symptoms that can be treated or even cured, a per-
son displaying those symptoms must be defined beyond his or her cognitive
functioning. And if daily activities are at the center of medical interventions, it
is an acting person who is being treated, someone who will eventually, at least
for some time, be functional again (for functionality as a “new paradigm” for
successful living, see Katz and Marshall ).
The psychiatrist Alexander Kurz () writes that a major reason for this
new interest is the limited usefulness of cholinergic agents and nootropics
(memory-enhancing medications) to date, while behavioral and psychological
problems can be easily medicated with traditional psychiatric medications,
opening up a new and promising market. While the first drug to treat
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Alzheimer’s, Tacrine, was described as improving only memory, newer medica-
tions also improve functioning in daily life activities and decrease behavioral
problems.22 On the home page of Pfizer’s Web site (http://www.aricept.com, ac-
cessed August ) we find the following description of the drug Aricept, in
which improvements in everyday activities are highlighted more than are those
in memory. “Such medications [as Aricept] are now available: acetylcholinest-
erase inhibitors have been shown to stabilize Alzheimer’s disease and help slow
the progression of the symptoms of the disease. Several studies have revealed
that these medications have a positive impact on daily activities, behaviour, and
overall functioning, including memory and orientation of time and place. Other stud-
ies have demonstrated that some of these drugs may be safe and effective over
the long-term, significantly delaying the worsening of symptoms” (emphasis
added).
Janssen-Cilag defines dementia by emphasizing daily activities of patients
and caregivers. “Dementia, a progressive brain dysfunction, leads to a gradually
increasing restriction of daily activities. The most well-known type of dementia is
Alzheimer’s disease. Dementia not only affects patients, but also those surround-
ing them, as most patients require care in the long-term (Janssen-Cilag Web site
[http://dementia.com], accessed August ; emphases added).
The concept of BPSD is strongly linked to the IPA, which as noted earlier,
received funding from the pharmaceutical company Jansen Pharmaceutica. The
Alzheimer’s Association, which defines Alzheimer’s as “a complex disease that
affects the brain” (http://alz.org, accessed August ), separates these symp-
toms on their Web site. There, “symptom management” is a subitem, not linked
to a concept such as BPSD and, it seems, also relatively separated from medical
interventions. The choice of quoted articles suggest that it is more of a topic for
nonphysicians. This can be contrasted with an IPA publication in which one
author recently defined Alzheimer’s as “characterized by deterioration in the
ability to perform activities of daily living (ADL) in addition to loss of cognitive
function and behavioral changes” (Potkin ). IPA has also published supple-
ments of its journal International Psychogeriatrics (Finkel ; Finkel and Burns
), and an educational pack on the topic has been distributed to the health
professionals of the association.
BPSD brings together at one table “correlators” and “interpreters,” who
then publish together, such as in the IPA supplements. For instance, in the IPA
publication following the  consensus conference, the well-known Alz-
heimer’s researcher Zaven Khachaturian () writes, “We also should strive to
maintain a patient’s ability to function independently for as long as possible. Al-
though drug treatment has a role, we must not overlook psychosocial and envi-
ronmental therapies, which may be particularly effective in decreasing caregiver
burden” (; emphasis added).
The multidisciplinarity is nevertheless limited. In these publications, most
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topics are covered by doctors, and the few non-MDs who are included use the
same language as that of the doctors—one of scales, measures, and burden. Fur-
thermore, what became very clear in the interviews I conducted with doctors in
Brazil and Canada before this BPSD shift occurred was that these doctors were
not treating dementia, but “improving a bit the patient’s quality of life.” Doctors
until now have been limited to treating symptoms such as sleeping problems or
depression (which are now BPSD symptoms) as well as administering neuropsy-
chological testing and some medication with limited efficacy in Alzheimer’s.
The difference is that at the time of the interviews these BPSD symptoms were at
the periphery of Alzheimer’s; now, the symptoms are becoming more central to
the category, and doctors thus treat dementia itself.
One of the possible consequences of this new way of clustering symptoms is
that the involvement of the pharmaceutical industry could mean a total
medicalization of dementia. General knowledge would be that medication is the
quickest and most cost effective approach, and only if it fails, should there be
more time-consuming activities led by other health professionals. This kind of
economic ratio is evident in the following quotation: “Of those patients with
dementia who had documented BPSD, % were moved to a higher MM [man-
agement minutes] category solely because of BPSD. . . . Although the possibility
of eradicating all behavioral problems in an institutionalized dementia popula-
tion is unlikely, the advent of new medications designed to treat these problems
makes it more likely that at least some level of control . . . might be possible
(O’Brien, Shomphe, and Caro , ).
A stronger narrative of a link between certain symptoms and neuropathol-
ogy might also veil environmental influences. Reading the descriptions by phar-
maceutical companies of certain Alzheimer’s drugs, one gets the impression
that the available medications treat a general and indistinguishable bundle of
symptoms. The IPA BPSD expert team does not use this kind of unifying ap-
proach but divides up the symptoms, as does the Alzheimer’s Association. But
as Finkel (, , quoting Reisberg et al.) writes, “[T]here is thus evidence that
BPSD is a distinct syndrome that should be studied independently of functioning
and cognition in clinical trials” (emphasis added). In statements such as these,
the heterogeneity of symptomatology and course that is found in a syndrome
such as Alzheimer’s is reduced to the notion of “general functioning.”
This story could be told as one of greed, of profit as the main motive for
concentrating on these symptoms and the reshaping of the dementia category.
But it could be also told in a different way. The so-called medicalization of cer-
tain symptoms might be an important means of providing for the continuation
or extension of personhood, via the redirection of the medical gaze from man-
aging memory to the highly disturbing symptoms that are responsible for the
institutionalization of many people with dementia (Kurz ). Much of the suf-
fering that Bernard Heywood () writes about, when in the s he was
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caring for his neighbor Maria, could have been diminished by treating with
drugs—sensitively—her sleeping problems or some of her more frightening hal-
lucinations. Such treatment might have preserved and extended the
personhood of this “poor child.” The impact of this quite recent reshaping of
dementia is still to be seen.
Conclusion
We prefer all sorts of abstract nonsense nouns—the self, the subject—to
what does make sense, the soul.
—Ian Hacking, “Memory Sciences, Memory Politics”
One of the goals of this volume is “to understand what senility is becoming,” as
Lawrence Cohen has formulated it in the introduction. In this section I will
point out one possibility of what senility might become through a rethinking of
personhood in a way that might overcome some of the limitations of the con-
cept. It has been suggested that when talking about personhood in the context
of Alzheimer’s, one frequently means extending life in life. This relatively recent
trend in Alzheimer’s care has been discussed through consideration of two
structuring forces: the dichotomic and interrelated traditions of hermeneutic
versus objectifying science, and the work on “personhood” as a work on
(life)time and inclusion, or a negotiation of biosocial death.
Biosocial Death
Although outlined only briefly, the four chosen “ethical scenarios” provide in-
sight into some of the authoritative spaces in which a person with dementia can
live, what Nikolas Rose calls the “diverse apparatuses and contexts in which a
particular relation to the self is administered, enjoined, and assembled” (,
). The argument here is that although the boundaries between life and bio-
social death are constantly changing, much of what constitutes the new sensi-
bilities of personhood are derived from the same premises—personhood is
conceived as an interior essence, and in the case of dementia, personhood is the
reduced remainder of the once complete (DeBaggio’s half face). Many attempts
to endow personhood appear to be related to a politics of pity, partly because of
this “remainder,” which is difficult to interact with as a “new whole.” Although
this idea of personhood undoubtedly makes possible caring for a person who
otherwise would have been considered a “shell,” one challenge could be to over-
come the notion that cognition is the decisive carrier of personhood. A short-
coming of this chapter is that the multiple and heterogeneous attempts to
preserve personhood (to consider someone as one of us) within the personhood




Personhood, self, and memory are not unproblematic natural categories. A vast
literature on memory exists, but little has been said about how to disentangle
memory, identity, and the self. Adherents to the personhood movement (which
is not as homogeneous as the name suggests) have repeatedly made the sugges-
tion that memory is not merely a neural activity but should be redefined as
“interactive and not individualized” (Kitwood ; Basting ). Whether the
level of health/therapeutic care is enough to reach this goal and whether health
professionals can even inculcate this approach at a time when this way of think-
ing has not spread in a more general way throughout society, remains an open
question (see Lambek ).
Some social scientists, though, have pointed to some new understandings
of life itself. In all four ethical scenarios, extending life in life was limited by the
administration of an interiorized self, primarily defined as cognition, even
when cognition was said to be secondary in some psychological approaches. If
memories were exteriorized, the boundaries of the self would be blurred and
the therapist/caregiver transformed into part of a social brain (if we perceive it
as the site of memory). Everybody who has worked with people suffering from
senility knows some couples in which the healthy member functions as a men-
tal walking stick for the forgetful partner. A typical sign for this is a constant
quest for reaffirmation of what has been said (for example, in the question “Isn’t
it?” directed to the healthy partner). But the limitations of this are obvious, es-
pecially when the relationship is not a good one or because of the limited time
of a therapy session if it is the therapist who acts as the support.
What about objects extending memory? As Canguilhem () put it more
than fifty years ago, “Machines can be considered as organs of the human spe-
cies” (). Robert Davis, who writes about his own senility, describes some of
the tools that help him to become a partial “cyborg,” explaining that books are
easier to understand on tape recordings than when read to oneself, and the use
of a computer is preferable to handwriting: “Strangely, when I attempt to com-
municate in my own handwriting I leave words out . . . and write in a scrawl,
legible only to my wife. . . . Much to my surprise, the thoughts appeared much
more completely in the typewritten material. . . . Now I am able to write letters
and feel that I am not totally isolated from the world of intelligent people”
(, ).
This kind of extension (of life in life and of self), by blurring the boundaries
of self and other, is one way to continue thinking personhood. This extension
can be other persons: for example, Deborah Hoffman in the film Complaints of a
Dutiful Daughter () describes the forgotten past to her mother and becomes
momentarily part of an extended or interpersonal memory. The extensions can
also be objects, which become humanized in their integration into personhood.
As Emily Martin, relying on Donna Haraway’s work on cyborgs, comments: “Per-
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haps it is the weight of human-centered accounts that has prevented us from
seeing that human consciousness has very frequently stretched beyond the bor-
der of the skin. Perhaps it was the dominance of the ideology of individualism in
the West that shut our ears to ways our identities never were single” (,
)—our ears and our (divided) gaze.
NOTES
I am grateful for the comments of Lawrence Cohen and Jennifer Cuffe, as well as those
made by two anonymous readers. This chapter is dedicated to the patients and staff of
the CDA at the Institute of Psychiatry/Federal University of Rio de Janeiro—a little bit
more to the interpreters than to the correlators.
. In this chapter, I am mixing Brazilian and “international” sources, since I am focusing
on elements of Alzheimer’s culture that are shared across several national bound-
aries. Elsewhere (e.g., Leibing a), I have focused on local aspects.
. At that time, in , the psychogeriatric clinic consisted of one room within the gen-
eral outpatient clinic, which was operated by one psychiatrist, one resident, and two
psychologists. Later, this unit expanded and was given its own building, and it be-
came a center for clinical practice, teaching, and research.
. All names “from the field” are pseudonyms.
. Some people are opposed to the label caregiver because it somewhat professionalizes
the act of helping others. This category is, nevertheless, an important element of the
culture of chronic diseases: it provides a vocabulary and behavioral codes in addition
to a notion of shared suffering. It gives positive value to (mostly female) practices that
had previously been taken for granted and were largely invisible.
. This propensity to characterize Alzheimer’s disease as stemming from one’s life cir-
cumstances is not a pattern exclusive to Brazil but is also found in Latin communities
in the United States (Levkoff and Hinton ), for example, in Cleveland (Rob
Friedland, personal communication); I noted it in Montreal when I was interviewing
health professionals there. I will deal with this “international” feature in a forthcom-
ing article.
. A depressive symptomatology accounted for the visits of more than half the elderly
who came to the unit. Depression plays different roles in dementia: it can be the first
sign of the condition—something that Alois Alzheimer had suggested in ; it can
be part of dementia (understood as neuropathological in origin, as reactive to the
symptoms of the disease, or both); or it can be the cause of a so-called
pseudodementia, in which depression or anxiety produces similar symptoms. De-
pression earlier in life can also be a risk factor for dementia in old age, although there
is no consensus on this (see, for example, McGuire and Rabins , –).
. This is true for the middle and upper classes. During research in a shantytown in Rio
de Janeiro, a colleague and I found that dementia was not an important preoccupa-
tion for discussing aging (Leibing and Groisman ), partly because of its associa-
tion with madness.
. Personhood, or the person within, refers to a number of concepts that are being used
interchangeably at times, at other times with different, but overlapping meanings.
Although not always used in the same ways, the following terms connote certain at-
tributes: insight: quantifiable; personhood: communicable; awareness: compliance;
self: essence; subjectivity: reflexivity (for different models of the self used in the social
sciences regarding Alzheimer’s research, see also Herskovits , ).
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. Nils Gellerstedt undertook one of the largest early studies of the brains of people who
were healthy before their deaths. From the fifty brains Gellerstedt examined,  per-
cent had senile plaques and  percent showed tangles typical of dementia.
Gellerstedt concluded that “these formations, whether or not they are found in high
quantity, do not permit a secure affirmation about the prior mental state of the pa-
tient” (/, ). Gaetano Perusini had already come to the same conclusion in
, exactly contrary to the findings of the Newcastle study thirty years later (see be-
low).
. Since it was not a unit exclusively for Alzheimer’s patients, the center was finally
called the “Center for Persons with Alzheimer’s Disease and other Mental Disorders of
Old Age.” It became better known under its abbreviation, as the CDA.
. The self is “endowed with reflexivity and agency,” as Sökefeld () writes.
. To analyze these roots goes beyond the scope of this chapter. See, for example, Duarte
; Gay ; Klemm and Zöller ; Russo ; Taylor ; and Luhrmann .
See also Geertz  and Latour . Stephen Katz () provides a lucid history of
gerontological knowledge. He argues that gerontology often divides the definition
of the aging body into two: one that is associated with biology and the other with
psychology.
. In this chapter, I am using dementia and Alzheimer’s disease almost interchangeably.
The more general notion senility would mean that the starting point is not a priori a
clinical or pathophysiological state but a “set of practices located in time and space,
practices in and through which bodies come to matter in particular ways” (Cohen ;
emphasis in the original). However, since I am talking here explicitly about medical
categories, I stay with the terminology created within this specific context.
. Some people, generally arguing against euthanasia, defend the notion that some co-
matose people actually are aware of the world around them but are incapable of ex-
pressing themselves, imprisoned in a damaged body. The medical doctor Mihai D.
Dimancescu () wrote for the Coma Recovery Association about another form of
biosociality: “Many a recovered patient has related events that occurred when every-
body believed they were still in a coma. I was impressed by twenty three year old Judy,
who remained unresponsive in an intensive care unit bed for three months. . . . One
day Judy did wake up and gradually regained her speech. . . . She told me that she
‘always remembered that darn professor refusing to stop by her bed,’ saying that she
would not wake up.”
. This correlation could only be obtained because a high number of people without
cognitive impairment and without neuritic plaques were included in the study. This
is why in , one of the authors, Sir Martin Roth, disassociated himself from this
result (Bauer ).
. “Imaging Technique Shows Brains of Alzheimer’s Patients Similar to Children,”
alzheimersupport.com, December , .
. Jerson Laks, MD, thinks that it is the vascular form of dementia that often allows for
the preservation of insight for a longer period of time than Alzheimer’s disease (per-
sonal communication). Peter Whitehouse, MD, doubts that the book could have been
written at all by a person suffering from a dementia (personal communication).
. We do not know much about how memory loss is experienced in contexts in which a
different approach to cognition, memory, and the aging body exists. Although
memory loss is not perceived everywhere to be equally negative, aberrant behavior
seems to be a problem in many societies (see Cohen , on India; Barker , on
Polynesia; Traphagan , on Japan).
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. Different from the picture of DeBaggio’s partial face—the diminished self—the image
on the cover of McGowin’s book is that of her (entire) face in gradually fading shades.
. An interesting finding from Feil is that her techniques do not work for early-onset
dementia. The underlying assumption that this form is fatalistically genetic in origin
is opposed to the “mysterious” late-onset dementia, which is sometimes linked to the
person’s life (see note ).
. A further step in “life extension” is the attempt to understand the nonverbal signs of
elderly demented persons (Hubbard et al. ; Hamilton ).
. According to Medline Plus (), “Tacrine (TAK-reen) is used to treat the symptoms of
mild to moderate Alzheimer’s disease. Tacrine will not cure Alzheimer’s disease, and
it will not stop the disease from getting worse. However, Tacrine can improve thinking
ability in some patients with Alzheimer’s disease” (emphasis added).
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Being a Good Ro ˇjin
Senility, Power, and Self-Actualization in Japan
JOHN W. TRAPHAGAN
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During the summer of , six women and three men gathered at about ten
o’clock in the morning at the Furiai Puraza (Contact Plaza), a senior center lo-
cated in the town of Yonegawa in northern Japan. The group assembled for the
first day of a cooking class that would meet six times over the following three
months. As the participants, all of whom were in their late sixties and early
seventies, waited for the class to commence, the director of the center spoke
briefly about his hopes that all the students would learn not only to cook, but
also about proper nutrition. The class, he said, fit within the “goal of having zero
people using the kaigo hoken system”—the long-term-care-insurance scheme
initiated in  as a comprehensive social program aimed at helping people
cope with frailty and disability in old age (Campbell and Ikegami ;
Traphagan, forthcoming). He then went on to inform everyone, “There are vari-
ous kinds of uneasiness [fuan] that the elderly encounter: economic uneasiness,
social uneasiness, and so on. This sort of class should help prevent this uneasi-
ness, at least at the social level.”
After the introduction, the women in the group headed for the kitchen and
began managing the process of cooking, using as a guide the recipe they had
been handed by the instructor and largely ignoring the few directions she gave.
All the women, having used the facility for a previous class, knew where all the
pots and pans were located and were adept at food preparation. The men, in
contrast, were for the most part uninvolved with the preparation of the food.
Two of them helped with peeling some of the vegetables and then went to the
adjacent room to smoke. The one man who participated in the entire process of
preparation was seventy-five years old and lived alone, having lost his wife
about a year earlier. As the women boned the fish and made a mayonnaise
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dressing for the salad, I asked him if he enjoyed cooking and he quickly replied,
“No, but it’s better than eating at restaurants all the time.”
For this man, there were practical consequences of taking the course in
terms of learning something about cooking so that he could take care of him-
self, but for most who were involved, instruction in cooking was virtually irrel-
evant. Throughout the morning, there was no specific instruction in the
preparation of the food; instead, the “class” seemed to be an opportunity for the
participants to get together and cook. The one time that the instructor did offer
advice was during a brief summation of the day in which she went over the
nutritional value of the meal that the class had prepared. She indicated that fish
is very high in calcium, a point that she had made casually several times during
the preparation, and that it was very important for the elderly to have calcium
to strengthen their bones. She also commented on the high nutritional value of
using mayonnaise in the salad dressing because of its plentiful calcium, ignor-
ing the various drawbacks to mayonnaise, such as its high fat content.
In many respects, the cooking class had little to do with nutrition or learn-
ing to cook. As noted above, there was virtually no instruction in how to prepare
the meal, and the men, all of whom lacked knowledge of cooking, either stayed
out of the process or simply observed the activities of the women, who already
knew what to do. Rather than being centered around learning to cook, the class
had as its focus two key issues that are closely tied to conceptualizations of
growing old in Japan: () being involved in group activities is essential for a good
old age, and () maintenance of health in old age, in part accomplished through
such group participation, is a social and moral responsibility that is fundamen-
tal to being a good ro ˇjin (old person). The placement of the class within the
context of the senior center and the center director’s characterizing the class as
a means for the participants to avoid the kaigo hoken system are intertwined
with the moral discourse on old age and senility in Japan. Local governments
use a narrative that emphasizes the moral concepts of effort and self-cultivation
in the project of being a good rǒjin.1 Engagement in these practices is presented
not only as positive behavior for personal reasons, but also as a moral responsi-
bility, to be carried out by being involved socially in contexts such as the cook-
ing class. Social interaction forms a valued “object” (Bell , ) that is
implied through the manner in which government officials strategically deploy
rhetoric and manipulate the discourse on growing old. The context of the Furiai
Puraza, and numerous other, similar contexts in which elders come into direct
contact with government officials, form a matrix of power relations, structured
not only in terms of dominance, but also as a strategic field through which the
concept of a “good rǒjin” is both conceptually and practically defined by both
government officials and those who are potential users of the social services
and government facilities (Foucault , ). At the center of this strategic field
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of power is senility, which in certain forms represents a basis for differentiation,
distinguishing the good rǒjin from the bad.
Foucault’s conceptualization of power having been invoked, it is important
to point out that while I think that Foucault is largely correct in his notion that
power and resistance are typically found together (, ), in the example
discussed here, it will become clear that the object toward which the use of
power is directed—maintenance of physical and mental well-being through so-
cial interaction—is valued both by those who make use of such facilities
as the Furiai Puraza and by the government officials who invest their time
and sometimes political careers in the development and use of those facilities,
even if this object is valued for different reasons. Thus, there is little call for
resistance.
Power, as it relates to the discourse on old age in Japan, is conceptually
structured in terms of the notion of ikigai, which translates loosely as “one’s
raison d’être” but which is better understood as signifying a moral ideal that
emphasizes self-actualization and self-discipline. Ikigai is employed by govern-
ment officials as a means of encouraging older people to focus their primary
attention on maintaining physical and mental health. While this is certainly
beneficial to the elderly themselves, its use can also be understood as a subtle
form of coercion in which old bodies are directed to become (self-) disciplined
bodies through the exploitation of the moral force contained in the concept of
ikigai.
Northern Japan
The Furiai Puraza, described briefly above, is located in the center of a town of
about eight thousand people and to which I have given the pseudonym
Yonegawa. Like most such facilities in Japan, the Furiai Puraza is little more than
a kitchen and a few rooms that can be used for many different types of activities.
On the day of the cooking class, another group of women was using an adjacent
room for a sewing group that met on a regular basis. This particular facility was
built specifically as a location for older people to gather in, and one of the town
officials explained that its construction was made possible by funding con-
nected to the kaigo hoken program and that the center was specifically intended
to be part of that program as a means of helping people be active and, thus,
hopefully maintain physical and mental health further into old age. This, in
turn, would mean less drain on other resources for elder care, such as nursing
visits, home helpers, or more expensive needs such as nursing home residence.
Yonegawa is an agricultural community devoted to rice farming, situated a
few kilometers outside of Akita City, the capital of Akita Prefecture, on the
northwestern side of Japan’s main island of Honshǔ. Yonegawa is one of three
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locations where I have conducted fieldwork since , the other two being in
the neighboring prefecture of Iwate. In each of these locations, I have held nu-
merous discussions with people about their ideas, perceptions, and attitudes
concerning senility. The region’s heavy orientation toward agricultural produc-
tion defines it as one of the most rural areas of Japan; and, indeed, many of the
older people who live in the region have spent at least part of their lives engaged
in agricultural production. The toll of the hard labor involved in rice farming is
evident in the bodies of the elderly, particularly the women, who often have
bowed legs and severe osteoporosis that leaves many permanently bent at the
waist at a ninety-degree angle. Moving around to do simple household chores or
errands about town is difficult for these women, as they struggle to hold their
heads upward as they walk. Locals often attribute these back problems in
women to years spent in the rice fields bent over for planting, weeding, and
harvesting, but it seems equally likely that a lack of calcium in the traditional
rice diet also played a significant role.2
Throughout the region, broad expanses of checkerboard rice paddies
stretch out to meet a dark green mountain range, whose peaks are snow topped
from September until June. While rice is the central agricultural product, apple
orchards and dairy farms are also common throughout the region, particularly
in Kanegasaki, where dairy farming plays a major role in the town’s economy.
Although agriculture is important economically and the region is viewed as ru-
ral, the presence of industrial society is unavoidable. Along with the rice pad-
dies, mountains, and winding rivers, there are automobile factories,
semiconductor-production facilities, high-speed rail lines, and shopping cen-
ters. The region is closely linked to Japan’s high-tech economy and is tightly
integrated into modern society. Satellite dishes are a common sight on houses
throughout the area, and sport utility vehicles are a ubiquitous mode of trans-
portation to the area’s supermarkets, shopping malls, discount stores, and
video arcades.
Senility, the Japanese Version
Elsewhere, I have presented detailed discussion of the cultural construction of
senility in Japan (Traphagan , , a, b); here I will offer only a
summary of the main issues, emphasizing the manner in which senile bodies
are differentiated from healthy bodies and the linkages between concepts of
individual and communal well-being (cf. Cohen ). Although the concept of
senility in Japan overlaps with the North American version, important differ-
ences shape the way in which Japanese think about functional decline in old age
and the ways in which people react to the potential onset of senility. Three cat-
egories of senility obtain in the Japanese context: Alzheimer’s disease
(arutsuhaimǎ); other forms of dementia associated with old age (ro ˇjinsei chihǒ),
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such as vascular dementia; and boke, a polysemous term that is difficult to trans-
late directly into English but in the broadest sense connotes “being out of it” or
a combination of physical and mental disorientation (Traphagan , ).
The first two categories are primarily thought of as biomedical or clinical cat-
egories of disease, understood in terms of a pathological cause that is largely
outside the control of the individual. When people refer to these conditions,
they often use the phrase shikata ga nai, a kind of shrug of the shoulders mean-
ing “there’s nothing one can do.” Long (, ) argues that this phrase indi-
cates a sense that circumstances are beyond one’s control, but also may index
attempts to maintain personal control over the process of dying and the sense
of self in the face of terminal illness, which is in many ways not differentiated
from death itself. Similar to terminal illnesses such as many forms of cancer,
there is a belief with these types of senility that when control is lost, “existence
is no longer thought of as a truly human life” (Long , ). For the victim of
Alzheimer’s or other biomedical categories of senility, the victim and those
around him or her are beyond the point of being able to exert effort to change
the circumstances of life caused by the onset of the disease.
The third concept, boke, is typically viewed as a social category of illness
over which people have some degree of control. Although the idea of boke is
nothing new in Japan, the concept emerged as a central feature of public dis-
courses on aging in the s, after the publication of Ariyoshi’s () novel
Kǒkotsu no hito (Person in Ecstasy), which describes the tribulations of a woman
attempting to care for her senile, and increasingly difficult, father-in-law.
Ariyoshi’s work pointed out not only challenges faced by those who must care
for elders experiencing dementia but also the horrors of losing one’s capacity to
function normally and interact with others—the capacity to be socially involved
representing a key element of a good self and a normal life in Japan. In relation
to its onset and progression, boke is conceived in terms of a narrative that
elaborates a theory of selfhood in which selves, as Dorinne Kondo notes, are not
separable from the contexts in which they are constructed and maintained
through active involvement in “culturally specific forms of pedagogy” related to
self-building and enacted through social participation (, ). This pedagogy
of self-enactment, as I will discuss below, is consciously developed and encour-
aged by government officials and is particularly important when it comes to the
elderly, who are at risk of losing the ability to engage in self-building because, as
a result of their age, they have greater potential to experience or allow a reduc-
tion in activity. Boke symbolically represents the disintegration of an
intersubjective self and loss of the ability to engage in the pedagogies of self-
actualization that are critical to creating ideal selves (Traphagan ).
It is important to point out that it is impossible to draw a line that would
clearly mark the distinction between biomedically defined forms of senility and
boke. Meanings associated with the term boke are both ambiguous and
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polysemous. The symptoms of boke are largely indistinguishable from those of
Alzheimer’s disease as it is understood in the North American biomedical con-
text, although the categorization of the symptoms reflect Japanese notions of
the person (Traphagan ). In one book on the subject, the author divides
the symptoms into three areas: bodily disorientation, social disorientation, and
inner (kokoro) disorientation (Kikkawa ). Bodily disorientation includes
symptoms such as difficulty with walking, short steps, balance problems, diffi-
culties speaking, stiffening of the hands, incontinence, weakness, and appetite
loss. Social disorientation includes doubting others, lacking energy (ki), aggres-
sive behavior, jealousy, overdependence, irresponsibility, and inability to take
one’s roles in family, society, and so on. Inner disorientation is associated with
forgetfulness, inability to organize ideas, being quick to anger or cry, lacking
patience, lack of perseverance, vagueness, and unwillingness to meet others.3 In
some cases, the word is presented as simply a lay term for biomedically defined
diseases such as Alzheimer’s. For example, in one book about how to prevent
boke, Alzheimer’s and vascular dementia are equated with boke, this last being
divided into these two forms of dementia, with vascular dementia, in contrast
to Alzheimer’s, presented as being preventable through exercise and diet
(Gonda n.d.). This approach to the concept of boke clearly taps into broader
cultural concepts of the category as representing a controllable form of dementia.
But the term also has connotations that diverge from Alzheimer’s and other
biomedically defined forms of senility. For example, at times the condition is
used as a source of humor by comedians and, in representations of people in a
boke state, on television shows. Boke elders who are experiencing relatively
minor symptoms are sometimes depicted in the public media as cute in a way
similar to that of a dependent child. In one television drama I observed, the
boke Grandpa of the household consistently had a pleasant smile on his face,
did silly things, and was forgetful, but was presented as generally enjoyable to
live with. Even when he wandered off, it was an opportunity for joviality when
he was ultimately found.4
Older people themselves sometimes joke about forgetfulness by stating
that they are already starting to become boke. This joking indexes deep fears
about the onset of the condition, fears that are rooted in culturally circum-
scribed ideas about the importance of self-building and effort as fundamental
to being a good person. Indeed, the implication of having some degree of con-
trol over the onset of boke is that one should make efforts to prevent the onset
of the condition. While this is perhaps not surprising—in American society, for
example, there is value placed on keeping oneself fit—it is particularly poignant
in Japanese society, where being active and giving one’s all are highly valued
moral concepts; idleness is represented as the antithesis of activity and, thus, is
endowed with moral import. As Margaret Lock points out, for Japanese the idle
person is anathema because he or she fails to participate as an active, socially
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viable, member of society and, thus, as a contributing member to the public
good (, –; Traphagan ). In short, the boke person is viewed as
having failed to have made sufficient efforts, through being active in hobbies,
sports, study, and other pursuits, to have staved off the condition.
Engagement in activities intended to delay or prevent boke is not simply a
matter of individual activity; it also carries moral weight as a social responsibil-
ity. The moral component of boke is related to Japanese notions of reciprocity
and interdependence, which are themselves closely connected to the Japanese
conceptualization of selfhood as intersubjective. As a person enters into more
severe states of boke, he or she becomes removed from the interdependencies
and social relations that define one as a human being in the Japanese context
(Plath , ). Being removed from the context of these interdependencies is
particularly frightening to Japanese because the individual is unable to recipro-
cate those favors he or she receives. With boke, interdependence degenerates
into a state of unidirectional dependence in which the individual receiving
care, because of his or her cognitive and physical condition, is unable to recip-
rocate. While any form of disability takes on this character to some extent, the
boke condition is particularly problematic because it is viewed as something
over which people have at least some degree of control (Traphagan ).
In short, the basic consequences of becoming boke include not only the
specific difficulties associated with cognitive decline, but also the fear that one
may be perceived as not having made sufficient efforts to prevent that decline
from occurring. When combined with strong concerns about avoiding overbur-
dening others with care provision, this forms a strong motivation to engage in
activities aimed at avoiding the onset of boke, and these activities are typically
conceptualized in terms of the notion of ikigai, as will become clear below.5
Contexts for Self-Actualization
On the cover of the brochure for a facility known as the Center for Lifelong
Learning (shǒgai kyǒiku sentǎ) in the town of Kanegasaki, the following descrip-
tion is printed prominently at the top in a section that refers to the Agricultural
Village Environment Improvement Center (nǒson kankyǒ kaizen sentǎ), part of
the Center for Lifelong Learning: “For the purpose of residents to carry on an
abundant and bright life, an institution where one can be healthy through
study, learning, sports, and recreation.”6
This slogan sums up the basic idea behind the government rhetoric that
presents these kinds of facilities as contexts for self-actualization—activity di-
rected toward self-actualization is viewed as synonymous with being healthy.
Health is generated and maintained through a combination of activities that
involve both the mental and the physical aspects of the person and that are
carried out primarily in concert with others. Facilities such as this center, and
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the senior center discussed at the beginning of the chapter, broadly fall under
the rubric of ko ˇminkan, government-run community centers that are found in
most municipalities in Japan and that manage a wide range of cultural activities
(see Tamanoi , ). These centers typically consist of an office and several
large rooms in which local residents come to engage in group activities, such as
lessons on the tea ceremony, music, exercise, calligraphy, or even magic. In re-
cent years there has been a fair amount of improvisation on the ko ˇminkan
theme, with facilities directly aimed at older people cropping up on a regular
basis.7
The kǒminkan in Kanegasaki is more than simply a public facility in which
people pursue hobbies and cultural activities. It is also a focal point where gov-
ernment officials and local citizens interact and a context in which government
officials disseminate official ideas about what constitutes a good community
and good people within the community. Some of the ways in which one main-
tains a good self, and by extension a good community, are expressed in the
charter of Kanegasaki. The charter is read aloud, sometimes solemnly and
sometimes with a lack of attention, at most public gatherings, including meet-
ings of government officials and gatherings at the start of some classes in the
facility. Many in the town can recite the charter from memory, or at least know
the primary bulleted points. Below is a translation of the charter:
Let us increase the level of education and culture, and make a cheerful
town
n Increase education and raise the hopes and dreams for all generations
n Throughout one’s lifetime, enrich (nourish) an abundance of education and
hobbies
n With broad vision, act with good judgment
n Make our cultural assets important and volunteer to devise a new culture
n Defend morality, erect good customs, and make the natural features of the
town beautiful
Let us make this a town of spiritual and material richness and work in
health
n Lead a healthy, safe life with cheerful mind and body
n Make a hygienic, beautiful, rich environment
n Hold on to happiness and pride in work and increase production
n Learn advanced technology and modernize industry
n With originality and invention, have a life of material and spiritual richness
Let us tie our warm hearts together in love, and make a wonderful town in
which to live
n Make cheerful, happy, sound families
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n Support courtesy and live harmoniously with kindness and generosity
n Live with consistency by respecting our responsibilities and keeping prom-
ises, and living a decisive life
n Take good care of children, the elderly, and unhappy people and defend the
happiness of all people
n Make public morality and public property important and volunteer for the
betterment of society
Several relevant themes emerge from an examination of the charter. First,
health is defined and contextualized not only in terms of the individual, but also
as an aspect of a community that is progressing and productive. The second
section, which deals explicitly with health, indicates not only the importance of
physical and mental health, but also a healthy (hygienic) environment, pride in
work, increased production, and advancement in industry. Of course, the entire
charter emphasizes the idea of community and community building, which is
not surprising, since it is intended as a means of focusing the attention of
townspeople on improving the town. However, that community is achieved
through focus on an active approach to making individuals and, through that,
making a community—more specifically, a moral community—in which indi-
viduals are dedicated to the communal good. The emphasis is not on what the
community is or should be, but on what people should do to make it become. The
charter emphasizes self-actualization as a central means to building a good
community, and these ideas form the basis for a pedagogy of creating disci-
plined selves. The contexts in which these ideas are promulgated are the venues
through which individuals and groups engage in that activity (Traphagan
a).
Indeed, there is a broad label under which these ideas are generally ex-
pressed. This concept, known as machizukuri, is part of a community-develop-
ment drive encouraged and, in part, financially supported by the national
government (Robertson ; Knight ). In Kanegasaki, the concept of
machizukuri (town making) forms the central narrative for self-actualization
that bureaucrats employ to encourage the creation of a sense of community and
citizenship, reflecting the values of modernity and democracy (Bestor ,
). This is articulated at the individual level through a second concept,
known as hitozukuri (person making). Government officials argue that through
hitozukuri individuals will cultivate their own interests, hobbies, businesses,
and so on, and through that the community as a whole will be improved—as one
government official put it, as “individuals continue to better themselves, this
will be reflected in the children of the community. If parents better themselves,
children will also become better people. If everyone studies it will bring in expe-
riences and ideas to the town, improving the community as a whole”
(Traphagan , ). This rhetoric reflects the core concept of a pedagogy
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that is aimed at constructing disciplined selves through building and maintain-
ing relationships with other members of one’s community (Kondo , ).
Essentially, the individual selves who become involved with activities asso-
ciated with facilities such as the center are objects of power aimed at transform-
ing and improving not only themselves, but also the community as a whole. As
Foucault notes, discipline is “a technique for the transformation of arrange-
ments” (, ). Discipline organizes individual bodies into a network of
(power) relations in which people engage, or are compelled to engage, in ac-
tions associated with an idealized form such as a good student or model pris-
oner. To be (self-) disciplined is to align one’s own behavior as closely as
possible with that of the idealized form of behavior, and the degree to which
one is able to do this becomes a basis upon which one accumulates symbolic
capital. The disciplined self is the symbolic representation of culturally circum-
scribed expectations about good behavior. Within the context of the center,
disciplined individual selves are individual symbols of a disciplined commu-
nity, just as a prosperous community (a disciplined community) is a symbolic
reflection of the disciplined selves that constitute it.
In other words, the activities supported by local governments are designed as
conduits through which people can engage in the discipline of self-actualization.
And many of these activities are directly aimed at the elderly. Perhaps the most
prominent of these are two games known as gateball and ground golf, which are
popular among the elderly.8 Other examples include exercise classes, group cal-
ligraphy lessons, and group instruction in traditional Japanese musical instru-
ments such as shamisen. At some facilities women get together weekly to
participate in group sewing or choral singing.
Certain activities, particularly exercise and sports, are strongly promoted
by town governments. Under the auspices of the Center for Lifelong Learning in
Kanegasaki, for example, the town sponsors a marathon and various athletic
meets for people of different age groups, such as baseball tournaments, volley-
ball tournaments, and gateball tournaments for the elderly. During the initial
introductions by town leaders (aisatsu), such events are usually placed into the
framework of machizukuri. Many public, town-sponsored events that have at
least a minimal physical element begin with group stretching exercises, and the
town encourages residents of all ages and physical condition to participate in
town-sponsored exercise classes, to attend health checks (for blood pressure,
pulse rate, and so on) and to visit the town’s sports center for physical exams
that compare actual and physical age (Traphagan ).9
For older people in particular, use of these facilities and the activities re-
lated to self-actualization are organized around the concept of ikigai, an idea
that “functions as a core notion for the expression of private and public iden-
tity” among Japanese (Johnson , ).10 The term varies considerably in rela-
tion to the specific practice to which it refers, but it generally connotes one’s
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purpose in life or something that one does deeply and wholeheartedly. As I have
pointed out elsewhere (Traphagan, forthcoming), a college student might de-
scribe playing mah-jongg as his or her ikigai, while a woman in her thirties
might describe her children as her ikigai; a man in his forties might describe his
work as his ikigai, or a woman in her fifties might describe flower arranging as
her ikigai. Rather than emphasizing specific activities or specific kinds of activ-
ity, ikigai indexes activity itself. Furthermore, it indicates a sense of fulfillment
or pleasure derived from pursuit of the activity in which one engages
(Yamamoto-Mitani and Wallhagen , ).
Gordon Mathews (, ; see also Traphagan, forthcoming) explains the
concept as consisting of two forms. On the one hand, pursuing an ikigai usually
indexes commitment to a group of people engaged in the same activity. Such a
group might be one’s flower-arranging class or the company where one is em-
ployed. In this sense, ikigai can be understood as implying connection to a so-
cial context in that it involves group membership and interaction with others.
On the other hand, the term conveys a more inner and somewhat reflexive (or
introspective) quality in that it implies activity that is directed toward self-real-
ization or self-actualization and that is focused on the development of the indi-
vidual. As noted above in the discussion of the charter of Kanegasaki, these two
elements of ikigai are viewed as complementary. A fully realized self is one that
is thoroughly capable of and involved in social interaction while also being
self-reflexive and concerned with continual processes of self-improvement or
self-actualization. The concept presented by town government officials in Kane-
gasaki and other locales is that if individual selves are engaged in self-articulation
through the pursuit of ikigai, the entire community will benefit.
Although finding an ikigai can be important at any age, for the elderly it is
often viewed as a matter of fundamental importance for avoiding a lonely, sad,
and illness-ridden old age and, as such, is strongly advocated both by govern-
ment bureaucrats and by younger family members (Traphagan, forthcoming).
Having an ikigai is viewed as being the central method through which one may
be able to avoid the onset of boke, although it is by no means seen as a guaran-
tee. Mathews () notes that the pressure on the elderly to have an ikigai is so
intense that one may actually be brought to consider or commit suicide, and,
indeed, older informants have told me that the lack of an ikigai is one of the
primary reasons elders do commit suicide. Reasons for committing suicide
among the elderly are, of course, more complex than lack of an ikigai. Fear of
burdening family members with long-term care is also often cited as a reason
older people commit suicide (Traphagan , ). However, the interpretation
of elder suicide as being tied to a lack of ikigai is important, because it indexes
the emphasis placed on social interaction as a basis for living a good old age.
Insularity is viewed as a prescription for various forms of decline, both physical
and mental, which may, in turn, lead to despair.
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The rhetoric of ikigai is represented by the government through pamphlets
and fliers that are available in most public offices and form a source of informa-
tion intended to help people organize self-articulation, or self-discipline,
around the idealized self dedicated to the pursuit of ikigai. These publications
emphasize the importance of having an ikigai and often contain images of el-
ders engaged in hobby activities along with such slogans as “Ikigai is the source
of vigor,” a proclamation that appears on the front of a pamphlet that encour-
ages older people to become “health millionaires” through having an ikigai.11
This particular pamphlet provides numerous examples of potential activities
that can form one’s ikigai. In figure ., some examples of activities within the
home that can form an ikigai are shown. In the top drawing, an older couple is
shown doing pottery, and the caption encourages people to spend time pursu-
ing an ikigai as a couple. This is interesting because, although mixed-gender
activities, such as gateball and ground golf, are sometimes pursued by married
couples, in general older people focus their attention on participation in groups
that are either entirely male or female.
At the bottom of the page, a drawing shows an older man happily cooking
and encourages one to take on the challenge of learning to cook. This is particu-
larly interesting since, although not unheard of, it is atypical for men to involve
themselves in cooking (or any other domestic work). Men, because throughout
most of their lives work has formed their ikigai, are perceived to be at high risk
of becoming boke following mandatory retirement at the age of sixty or sixty-
five (depending upon one’s employer), unless they are able to find an ikigai to
replace work. They are often perceived as a nuisance to their wives, because
they have never been involved in domestic chores such as cooking and clean-
ing. Indeed, the pamphlet discussed here describes housecleaning as a poten-
tial ikigai. Cooking in this pamphlet is presented as one example of a way in
which men can both find a suitable activity to bring fulfillment and contribute
to domestic harmony in the process.
Power, Senility, and Ikigai
How, then, are ikigai and senility (in the form of boke) linked? Both concepts
index a third concept, that of effort (gambaru), or giving one’s all, which is a key
element in the moral pedagogy associated with defining a good person in Japa-
nese culture (see Singleton ). For older Japanese, concern focuses not sim-
ply on having an ikigai as a means of avoiding the onset of boke—in fact, there is
a fair amount of angst about whether being involved in social activities actually
will prevent or delay the onset of the condition. The salient aspect of the rela-
tionship between ikigai and boke is to be found in the idea that one should be
constantly engaged in efforts to be active, particularly in contexts that involve
other people. This emphasis on effort is widely evident in Japanese
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conceptualizations of self-building and self-discipline. As Kondo notes in her
discussion of an ethics retreat at the company where she worked, the focus of
the retreat rested far less on attaining specific goals than it did on strengthening
one’s ability to persevere and give one’s full effort in the demanding tasks set
forth in the curriculum of the retreat. She describes daily running in which the
goal was to prepare for a . kilometer marathon set for the end of the program.
The point was not to win the race. Instead, “the key was to finish and not to give
up” (, ). While Kondo points out that pressure to persevere in formal
contexts such as the ethics retreat are not met without resistance, the basic
lesson of much of the Japanese attitude toward self-discipline and, ultimately,
toward being a good person rests on the notion of giving it one’s all. Effort and
perseverance are core concepts in Japanese notions of the good self, and effort
FIGURE 12.1 A page from a bro-
chure encouraging people
that they can find an ikigai
even within the home.
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and perseverance are the focal points for the exercise of power in relation to
ikigai and boke.
The exercise of power in relation to this complex of ideas is found in at least
two ways. First, the doing that is associated with the pursuit of an ikigai is, itself,
a source of power for older people. By engaging in the pursuit of developing an
ikigai, older people are able to accumulate, or embody, symbolic capital associ-
ated with being a good rǒjin. As noted earlier in the chapter, “the good rǒjin” is
a category of old person that is characterized by active engagement—that is,
making sufficient efforts—in activities, largely social in nature, that help to
maintain physical and mental health and, in particular, can be interpreted as
being beneficial in preventing or delaying the onset of senility. The pursuit of
an ikigai is a practice aimed in large part at avoiding the onset of boke, but the
consequences of that onset are more than simply a matter of potentially staving
off cognitive decline. To become a boke rǒjin is to risk the implication that one
did not make sufficient efforts to avoid that state. In other words, the pursuit of
an ikigai is an explicit tactic in which power—which I am defining in this con-
text as doing itself—is used to generate the perception that one is being a good
rǒjin. In other words, the simple fact of giving one’s full effort to avoid the onset
of boke is a tactic used to manipulate potential positive and negative sanctions
(Bell , ) in the form of social acceptance as a good rǒjin or the stigmatiza-
tion of being a boke rǒjin.
I want to stress here that the accumulation of symbolic capital associated
with being a good ro ˇjin is by no means the only reason people engage in the
pursuit of finding and maintaining an ikigai. Being active is viewed as inher-
ently good in Japanese society—anyone, regardless of age, who is actively in-
volved in self-improvement and engages in social interactions is looked upon in
a positive way, and being interested in self-improvement is viewed as a very
natural type of behavior (Lock ; Traphagan ). But for the elderly, there
is particular significance found in the pursuit of an ikigai, because the free time
associated with postretirement life, particularly for men, is viewed as putting
the elderly at greater risk of sliding into inactivity and thus contributing to the
social and individual circumstances that bring about the boke condition. In
other words, pursuit of an ikigai is a use of power focused inward; it is power
aimed at what Long describes as “directive control” intended to manipulate
changes in self (physical and mental) that are associated with the aging process
by manipulating the “most basic sense of who one is” (, ).
The second sense in which power is used in relation to ikigai is seen in
government officials’ concern with the potential costs of an illness-ridden eld-
erly population. The Japanese government is acutely aware of the potential
problems the country faces—both fiscally and in terms of service provision—as
the population continues to age and as an increasing number of individuals
face cognitive and physical decline. As of the  census, the proportion of
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people in the population who were over sixty-five had reached  percent, and
in some areas, such as To ˇhoku, it has already surpassed  percent (Ministry of
Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Japan ).
Although there are no formal sanctions in the event that an elder chooses
not to pursue activities aimed at maintaining personal health, the strategic use
of the concept of ikigai by government officials is a means of exercising power to
guide or direct older people to build selves that accord with ideals associated
with the good rǒjin. Having a healthy mind and body is more than a matter of
personal concern—it is a social responsibility, one that is particularly important
for the elderly to recognize given that they are at increased risk of functional
decline in comparison with other age groups.12 Government officials strategi-
cally deploy the concept of ikigai, and the centrality of self-actualization
through having an ikigai, as a moral frame through which the elderly can ex-
press—through doing—their own willingness to contribute to the social whole
by being good rǒjin. Old bodies in Japan are not simply subject to forces of
dominance over which they lack control, but the doing of ikigai “generates so-
cial and symbolic capital associated with being a good, active person”
(Traphagan , ). Symbolic capital associated with being a good ro ˇjin is
collectively constructed around the notion that healthy individuals form a
healthy community.
Political leaders use the concept of ikigai not only as a means to encourage
and help people to avoid individual functional decline in old age, but also as a
way to avoid overburdening the social service system, particularly the fiscal bur-
den of kaigo hoken. Facilities such as the sho ˇgai kyo ˇiku senta ˇ and such classes as
that in cooking, discussed above, function as an institutional structure for
channeling self-actualization (ikigai). In other words, these contexts are locales
where various forms of power are being simultaneously enacted—subtle forms
of dominant power in employing the concept of ikigai to direct older people in
their behaviors, and productive power in the form of individual and collective
generation of symbolic capital associated with being a good rǒjin.
In the Japanese context, boke, or perhaps more precisely the fear of the
onset of boke, is tightly linked with moral, political, and economic discourse on
aging. Facilities such as the senior center in Akita or the Lifelong Learning Cen-
ter in Kanegasaki are presented as contexts through which individuals can en-
gage in activities aimed at preventing or delaying the onset of boke. But they are
also contexts in which power is strategically used by both government officials
and the elderly who make use of the facilities. Although there is a subtle ele-
ment of coercion in the manner in which the government uses the conceptual
elements of ikigai as functions of individual and social responsibility to influ-
ence people’s behavior in ways that may limit use of social and health services
designed for the elderly, this use of power is not unidirectional. Indeed, both
those in political power and those using the facilities are confluent agents in the
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field of power associated with senility. Power in this framework is not organized
around a binary opposition of political structure and individual agency; rather,
the political structure through which people wield power and the individual
agents who engage that structure converge. In other words, structure and
agency are isomorphic. The goals of individual agents and the political structure
are two different expressions of the same fundamental set of social constructs,
which emphasize activity and social interaction as fundamental to being a good
person, and which underlie the basic assumptions that run throughout the field
of power (cf. Margenau , ).
Furthermore, in the context of coping with senility in Japan, the exercise of
power lacks an inherent element of resistance. While the elderly are subtly co-
erced into structuring self around the ideals associated with activity and effort,
they participate in these activities willingly and are themselves enacting power,
both in terms of their confluence with government rhetoric and in terms of
their efforts aimed at preventing boke. Given that the elderly are faced with the
seeming inevitability of functional decline in old age, it is in their self-interest
to comply with these government-promulgated ideals. And, indeed, the ideals
themselves are simply reflections of long-standing conceptualizations of what
makes a good person in Japan—lifelong dedication to effort both as an indi-
vidual and as a member of a larger social whole. Being a good rǒjin means en-
gaging oneself in the matrix of power relations that is used to organize the
articulation of self around doing and effort.
NOTES
Research for this chapter was supported by a variety of funding agencies. I am appre-
ciative of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, the Northeast
Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies, and the Michigan Exploratory Cen-
ter for the Demography of Aging, which supported research during . Fieldwork in
the summer of  was supported by grant AG from the National Institute on
Aging to study religion, well-being, and aging in Japan. Research in – was sup-
ported by a Fulbright Doctoral Research fellowship.
. I use the term narrative to indicate the context in which the processes of discourse and
rhetoric generation are embedded. Narrative provides the basis of possible meanings
that can be used to stimulate discursive and rhetorical activity (see Schrag , ).
. Although fish was available, it was expensive in earlier times and thus not eaten fre-
quently. In addition, following World War II, there was a considerable period of food
shortages that also contributed to nutritional problems.
. For a discussion of how Japanese conceptualize somatic and mental elements of the
person in term of ideas about inner-ness (uchi) and outer-ness (soto), see Traphagan
.
. This should not be interpreted as meaning that Japanese generally conceive of living
with an individual suffering from dementia in these terms. Ariyoshi’s () novel
portrays a very different picture, depicting sacrifice, emotional pain, and physical ex-
haustion as characteristic of the experience of caregivers for boke individuals.
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. Other consequences may also be related to the onset of the boke condition. For ex-
ample, it is possible that families may be regarded as having been at least partially to
blame for the onset of the condition, in a way similar to what Cohen () finds in
India, although in my fieldwork I have not encountered specific cases of this type of
social stigmatization. One area that does appear to represent a negative consequence
for elders who experience is in terms of access to some social services. At least in rural
areas, it can be difficult for families with a boke member to actually find a nursing
home willing to accept the individual; this is particularly problematic because of the
shortage of nursing home beds in rural areas. Nursing homes will in some cases claim
that they are unable to deal with the difficulties specifically associated with a person
who has any form of dementia, boke or otherwise. This is an area related to the expe-
rience of boke that is in need of further research.
. Jyǔmin ga kenkǒ de akaruku yutaka na seikatsu o itonamu tame no kenshǔ, gakushǔ,
supo ˇtsu, rekurieeshon ga dekiru ba to shite sukoterareta shisetsu.
. Ko ˇminkan are not specifically intended for older residents, although it is typically
older people who make the most extensive use of these facilities.
. Gateball is a game similar to croquet that has been played by the elderly in Japan for
many years, and ground golf is a recently developed game similar to golf. Both of these
games are played primarily by the elderly (see Traphagan ).
. Although these ideas have been promulgated and encouraged by the national govern-
ment, not all towns buy into them with the vigor that has characterized Kanegasaki’s
use of these ideas. However, these ideas reflect a general concept that individuals
hold responsibility for self-maintenance and cultivation and that self-cultivation is
not that of an isolated self, but one of a self in community. The responsibility thus is
not simply a responsibility to care for oneself, but a responsibility to care for the com-
munity as a whole by caring for oneself.
. An earlier version of this discussion of the concept of ikigai appears in Traphagan,
forthcoming.
. I have discussed this particular pamphlet elsewhere in relation to the conceptual-
ization of disability in Japan; see Traphagan, forthcoming.
. As Akiko Hashimoto () points out, unlike in most Western societies, in Japan the
identification of the elderly as a class of persons in greater need and at greater risk of
becoming a burden is a legitimate form of social differentiation.
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